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ABSTRACT 
 
The international relations literature on internationalism in foreign policy has not 
taken account of the internationalist methods and motives of countries of the 
developing world. This thesis aims to correct this absence through an analysis of 
Southern internationalism, as evidenced by the foreign policy approaches of South 
Africa and Brazil in the first decade of the 21st century. By utilising a neoclassical 
realist approach to the study of the emergence of new powers, the use of 
internationalism as a foreign policy tool is interrogated as a response both to 
domestic imperatives, such as perception and identity, and systemic constraints and 
opportunities. Central to the analysis is an examination of the role of governing 
parties in foreign policymaking, both as key actors in determining policy, and as the 
sources of ideational constructs, in this case ‘internationalism’, that have a bearing 
on foreign policy. 
 
Foreign policymakers are limited in their perceptions and responses to external 
threats and opportunities by the domestic institutional structure, as well as by 
external threats and opportunities. In South Africa, responses are often limited to 
rhetoric, owing to limited resource extraction capacity, in spite of the highly 
centralised foreign policymaking structure under Mbeki. In Brazil, constitutional 
checks and balances also limited the state’s responses to external stimuli under Lula; 
yet, these responses, when they are implemented, can be more forceful owing to 
greater resource capacity. The ‘new Southern internationalism’, propounded by both 
South Africa and Brazil, is a function of domestic politics and external pressures, as 
evidenced by the Haiti case. These findings make a contribution to advancing the 
analysis of emerging powers, their trajectory and intentions in international 
relations, as well as the extent to which governing parties can influence foreign 
policy outcomes, and under which conditions. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
1.1. Context 
The challenge to growing American unilateralism following the terror attacks of 
September 11, 2001, opened a new chapter in international politics. As much as it 
provided an avenue for the full expression of American military supremacy through 
the wars subsequently initiated by that country, the period following the attacks 
raised profound questions about the future of the multilateral security system, 
international trade, and assistance for development, among others. At a more 
fundamental level, the climate posed new questions about the types of power that 
would continue to hold currency in the international system of the twenty-first 
century, and hence, what balances of power would look like going forward. It was in 
this first decade of the twenty-first century that certain states of the developing 
world became more assertive in countering the tendencies toward unilateralism, 
great power negligence, and their own marginalisation, while at the same time 
enjoying spurts in economic growth and development, and the consolidation of 
democracy.  
 
Since the intensification of globalisation after the Cold War – economic 
globalisation, the globalisation of the ideas of democracy and human rights, and 
technological globalisation – the opportunity has been created for a number of large 
developing states to join the mainstream of the mainly Northern-dominated global 
economy, and also to speak with a stronger moral voice on many of the world’s 
most pressing issues. The relaxation of economic barriers and the liberalisation of 
economies the world over during the 1990s ushered in a period of phenomenal 
growth for countries such as India, China, South Africa, Mexico and Brazil. This is 
largely the context in which this century’s emerging powers have been analysed: as 
an economic phenomenon. Little attention has been paid, with the exception of 
India and China, who occupy ‘rough’, or highly militarised, neighbourhoods, to the 
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broader strategic foreign policy approaches of these powers, and how, more 
narrowly, they conduct themselves outside the domain of economics.1  
 
What is it to be an ‘emerging power’?2 What determines ‘emergence’ in the new 
international setting that has prevailed since the end of the Cold War? In the flurry 
of acronyms which have attended the rise of new regional and, potentially, global 
powers, analysts have lost sight of the foreign policy trajectories and systemic 
environment that makes possible the emergence of new powers. Have the states 
identified as new powers consciously sought to become great powers, or regional 
powers? What are the domestic decision-making environments that condition their 
rise? What are the external opportunities and constraints?  
 
These themes – of a new world order, of rising economic strength and 
responsibility, of global justice, and of old-fashioned power politics – have been 
scantly addressed in relation to the new emerging powers.3 South Africa and Brazil, 
in particular, have sought to frame their foreign policies in mostly conciliatory 
terms, premised on moral concepts, such as international justice, solidarity, 
multilateralism and equitable representation of the developing world in global 
decision-making forums. The rise of new powers has historically been accompanied 
by great dislocation, instability, and often violence in international politics. Yet, the 
projection of these two new regional powers in Africa and Latin America, 
respectively, has been attended by a new type of international politics, characterised 
                                                
1 Examples of recent works considering the economic dimension include Parag Khanna, 
The second world: how emerging powers are redefining global competition in the 
twenty-first century (London: Random House, 2009); Alice H. Amsden, The Rise of “The 
Rest”: Challenges to the West from Late-Industrializing Economies (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003); Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World (New York & 
London: WW Norton and Company, 2008). 
2 The terms ‘emerging power’ and ‘intermediate power’ will be used interchangeably in 
this thesis. While the term ‘middle power’ will also be used along with the two terms 
aforementioned, it is noted that there is a considerable literature that has been spawned 
by this category of power in international affairs, but that this does not affect the use of 
the term here. This will be discussed briefly in Chapter 2.  
3 Important exceptions include, Andrew Hurrell, “Hegemony, Liberalism and Global 
Order”, International Affairs, 82, No.1 (2006): 1-19; Chris Alden and Marco Antonio 
Vieira, “The new diplomacy of the South: South Africa, Brazil, India and trilateralism”, 
Third World Quarterly, 26, No. 7 (2005): 1077-1095; Leslie Elliott Armijo, “The BRICs 
countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) as Analytical Category: Mirage or Insight?”, 
Asian Perspective, Vol. 31, No. 4 (2007): 7-42.  
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overwhelmingly, yet not completely, by the “diplomacy of generosity”4 and 
internationalism. The extent to which this new politics – largely devoid of sabre-
rattling and arms races - is a figleaf for ‘business as usual’ hegemonic designs is an 
important question for International Relations.5  
 
Much of the behaviour of these states is consonant with predominant norms of 
international society (characterised by respect for human rights, democracy and the 
free market), leading to a positive view of their potential impact on the challenges of 
global governance. They are also perceived as ‘forces for good’ in their immediate 
regions, by external powers hoping to exercise influence, though not always by their 
neighbours.6 This thesis forms part of the response to a call in the literature to 
“focus less on the BRICs [Brazil, Russia, India, China] as a group, and more on the 
complex processes of change and “bricolage” that have been taking place within 
each of the emerging states in the global order”.7 This is because each state is 
subject to “a complex process of breaking down and reassembling old and new 
ideas, [while] values and policies are melded together to produce something 
qualitatively different, …work[ing] against the notion that today’s emerging powers 
will simply be absorbed within an expanded version of a liberal Greater West”.8 
 
                                                
4 This term was used by former Brazilian president, Lula da Silva, to describe his 
government’s policies in South America. See Paulo Roberto Almeida, “Never Before 
Seen in Brazil: Luís Inácio Lula da Silva’s grand diplomacy”, Revista Brasileira de 
Política Internacional, 53, No. 2 (2010): 160-177: 161.  
5 In this thesis, the academic discipline International Relations will be denoted by the use 
of upper case, while international relations as foreign affairs will be denoted by lower 
case.  
6 Brazil was listed along with Mexico, Canada, Chile and Colombia as “sharing [US] 
priorities”, and partners in promoting a “truly democratic hemisphere…advanc[ing] 
security, prosperity, opportunity and hope” in the 2002 US National Security Strategy. 
Similarly, South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya and Ethiopia were listed as “countries with major 
impact on their neighborhood”, and “anchors for regional engagement”, requiring 
“focused attention”. See The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America, September 2002, Washington, DC. It should be noted that the 
neighbours of these states do not necessarily share this view. This ‘hub and spoke’ 
relationship between intermediate states and great powers is discussed in Laura Neack, 
“Middle Powers Once Removed: The Diminished Global Role of Middle Powers and 
American Grand Strategy”. Paper presented at the 41st International Studies 
Convention, Los Angeles, California, March 14-18, 2000. Accessed online at: 
http://www.ciaonet.org.gate2.library.lse.ac.uk/isa/nal01/, on 18 April, 2011.  
7 Andrew Hurrell, “Brazil and the New Global Order”, Current History,109 No. 724 
(2010): 60-66. 
8 Ibid.: 64.  
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This introductory chapter frames the research puzzle, outlines the research 
objectives of the thesis, as well as its argument, and methodology. Reasons are 
provided for the case selection of South Africa and Brazil, as well as Haiti; and, the 
broader significance of the research is explained. The chapter closes with an outline 
of the structure of the thesis. 
 
1.2. Research Objectives 
 
The research question to be addressed by this thesis is:  
 
To what extent does internationalism condition, i.e. limit, the foreign policies of South Africa and 
Brazil? 
 
What will count as examples of ‘internationalism’? They will be instantiated by cases 
in which governments commit resources, both material and political, to 
international action that has no immediate material benefit for the state in question. 
This includes committing troops to multilateral peacekeeping operations; disbursing 
aid; and, adopting strong positions on conflicts and crises that have no immediate 
and direct impact on their material position, i.e. affecting their security or economic 
growth prospects. A more detailed discussion of internationalism is provided in 
Chapter 2. 
 
The thesis examines the extent to which two leading leftist movements as political 
parties have influenced the foreign policies of the states they govern, otherwise 
similarly placed in international affairs, affecting their determination to act with 
restraint on issues of international importance, privileging the peaceful resolution of 
disputes, the primacy of multilateralism, the principle of non-interference,9 and 
solidarity with the developing world. The research objective is to account for 
divergence in the levels of influence of Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT)10 and the 
African National Congress (ANC), and how this affects foreign policy outcomes. 
                                                
9 The terms ‘non-interference’ and ‘non-intervention’ are used interchangeably in this 
thesis. They refer to a belief in diplomacy as the key method by which a state may 
attempt to influence the behaviour of other states, on the basis of mutually-recognised 
sovereignty and self-determination. The moral rectitude and legal permissibility of 
intervention, as well as the extent of actions that qualify as intervention, are a matter of 
scholarly and international political debate. 
10 PT will at times also be referred to by its English name, the Workers’ Party.  
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Hence, shifts in the international balance of power and the domestic political 
structures of each state (independent and intervening variables, respectively) are key 
to understanding the resulting form of internationalism (dependent variable). That 
the two parties concerned originated on the left of the political spectrum is 
significant for the expectations that these beginnings have generated. In economics, 
they were expected to have implemented policies involving deep state engagement 
in the domestic economy, along with far-reaching welfare and wealth redistribution 
policies. In foreign relations, as will be discussed in later chapters, their respective 
arrivals in power were met with trepidation and uncertainty in some quarters, while 
they were hailed by progressive observers. This is due to an expectation of the 
rejection of foreign economic control by governments of the left, as well as 
solidarity broadly with the developing world.  
 
The categories that will be utilised to examine levels of governing party influence on 
foreign policy are new categories introduced here, namely: institutional freedom and 
legitimating power. Institutional freedom refers to the nature of the links between the 
governing party and key state foreign policy institutions, giving an indication of the 
degree to which power is centralised in the governing party, or in its leadership. 
Legitimating power, meanwhile, refers to the degree to which key individuals of the 
governing political parties are able to justify and win support for particular 
international actions or foreign policy preferences.   
 
While both ANC and PT forged extensive links abroad during their respective 
struggles for democracy, and while each at one time enjoyed the undiluted support 
of a broad array of civil society forces and ‘new social movements’, at home and 
further afield, the extent to which each party as government is able to command 
both institutional freedom and legitimating power in domestic society is contingent 
upon the array of domestic and international forces. The concepts of institutional 
freedom and legitimating power directly pertain to the latitude, or freedom of 
action, enjoyed by the government of the day, or indeed, the state, in extracting and 
mobilising national resources for foreign policy purposes. This notion of latitude is 
a key contribution of the neoclassical realist framework, which utilises relative state 
power as a determinant of foreign policy outcomes (see Chapter 3). 
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Foreign policy is “a goal-oriented or problem-oriented program by authoritative 
policymakers (or their representatives) directed toward entities outside the 
policymakers’ political jurisdiction”.11 In a more comprehensive sense, it is also 
comprised of  
those actions which, expressed in the form of explicitly stated goals, commitments and/or 
directives, and pursued by governmental representatives acting on behalf of their sovereign 
communities, are directed toward objectives, conditions and actors – both governmental 
and non-governmental – which they want to affect and which lie beyond their territorial 
legitimacy.12 
 
Hence, foreign policy comprises purposive action that is expressed or conducted by 
way of policy – in words and action – and takes place across international 
boundaries.13 ‘Major foreign policy actions’ are classed here as those that entailed 
the deployment of military forces, or the allocation of monetary and other (i.e. 
personnel) resources, by the state. 
 
The research question is prompted by a number of empirical and theoretical 
observations and ‘puzzles’. They will now be addressed in turn.  
 
• The first puzzle concerns the meaning of ‘internationalism’ outside the West. 
Internationalism as a concept in the International Relations (IR) literature 
has been marginalised, associated as it is with the ‘idealism’ or ‘liberalism’ 
that has traditionally been given short shrift by realist scholars who have 
dominated IR. The concept has been labelled ‘fuzzy’ and ‘empty’, but 
enjoyed a new resurgence in the popular imagination of the West in the 
early to mid-1990s, when it became the self-conscious foundation of foreign 
policy in a number of Western states, from New Labour’s Britain, to the 
Nordic states.14 The concept has hardly ever been applied to states of the 
developing world in mainstream IR, however, even as much of the foreign 
policy activity of prominent developing countries since the onset of 
independence in the middle of the last century clearly fit the internationalist 
bill. Related to this theme, and potentially enveloping it, is the general 
                                                
11 Charles F. Hermann, “Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect 
Foreign Policy”, International Studies Quarterly, 34, No.1 (1990): 3-21: 5.  
12 Walter Carlsnaes, “Chapter 17: Foreign Policy”, in Handbook of International 
Relations, ed. W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B.A. Simmons (London: Sage Publications, 
2006), 335.  
13 Ibid., 335.  
14 This will be explored in detail in Chapter 2.  
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antipathy of the IR literature to any concept of ethical action on the part of 
developing countries in foreign policy. Developing countries have been 
deemed too busy crafting a precarious survival to be concerned with ‘post-
modern’ issues of state identity and true solidarity (i.e. not based on mutual 
defence of bad governments). The activities of Cuba during the Angolan 
civil war, for example, are often cast in the shadow of Moscow, in spite of 
the recent emergence of documentation proving that Castro acted largely 
independently in engaging Cuban troops in Angola.15 Implicit in this 
absence is an assumption that developing states adopt expansive16 foreign 
policies only to serve aggressive or selfish ends. Only recently has light been 
shed upon ideas of international order and global justice emanating from the 
non-Western world.17  
 
• The second puzzle is that foreign policy analysis (FPA), generally focused on the 
developed world, has lagged behind developments in the emerging centres of regional and 
global power. A primary assumption driving the FPA literature on the 
developing world, including today’s emerging powers of India, Brazil, 
Malaysia and South Africa, has been that of state weakness. This view is 
undermined by the growing agency of large developing countries in 
international politics today, to the point where global governance initiatives 
increasingly depend on their participation. In 1983, Bahgat Korany18 
remarked with disappointment on the paucity of works dealing explicitly 
with foreign policymaking in the developing world, in spite of the growing 
                                                
15 See Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington and Africa, 1959-
1976. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002).  
16 ‘Expansive’ is defined by the OED as “able, [or] tending to expand; …having a wide 
range and comprehensive”. It is used here in distinction to ‘expansionism’ in foreign 
policy, which is defined as “advocacy of, or furtherance of, a policy of expansion, esp. of 
territorial expansion”. The latter is usually undertaken by means of military aggression. 
Why this is not applicable to the recent foreign policy strategies of two emerging powers 
is the broader subject of the thesis. Hence, ‘expansive foreign policy’ as used in this 
thesis is a synonym for ‘activist foreign policy’, and is used to denote foreign policy 
strategies that are far-reaching and wide-ranging, both in terms of geographical spread 
and issue areas.  
17 See the rise of a ‘Chinese school’ of International Relations, and various works 
elucidating theoretical development in the developing world, highlighting alternative 
approaches to IR from the non-West that are inhibited from becoming ‘mainstream’ for 
example, Arlene Tickner, “Seeing IR Differently: Notes from the Third World”, 
Millennium, 32, No.2 (2003): 295-324; Navnita Chadha Behera, “Re-imagining IR in 
India”, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific,7 (2007): 341-368. 
18 Bahgat Korany, “Review: The Take-Off of Third World Studies?: The Case of Foreign 
Policy”, World Politics, 35, No. 3 (1983): 465-487.  
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importance of this group of states, whether as a ‘social movement’ within 
the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), or as a narrower grouping, the 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) cartel, which had 
held the global economy to ransom in the 1970s. Nonetheless, a number of 
studies have since emerged, considering the gamut of peripheral polities in 
international relations and their foreign policymaking. By no means an 
extensive literature, besides selected volumes examining ‘Third World’ 
foreign policy19, it does include categories such as ‘revolutionary foreign 
policy’20, the foreign policy of ‘modernizing states’, as well as the foreign 
policy of ‘new states’.21 
 
• A third puzzle to be addressed is the role of domestic actors other than the state in 
the formation of foreign policy, even in the most centralised of foreign 
policymaking environments. Why do states similarly placed in international 
politics choose different paths to power? This question calls for an opening 
of the ‘black box’ of foreign policymaking: the domestic environment. The 
last two decades of the twentieth century saw two notable movements of 
the Left come to power in Brazil and South Africa, after many years of 
domestic and international political activism. Were they able to exert the 
same type of menacing presence to Northern (especially American) interests 
so feared of Castro and other leftist leaders for most of the twentieth 
century? If not, why not? Does the domestic political landscape, and the 
daily struggles that animate it, bear any resonance for the international 
relations of states?  
 
• The fourth puzzle is that of intermediate states and ‘emergence’ as a great power in 
the current international order. An underlying assumption of the thesis is the 
changed ‘social’ environment in which contemporary states operate, in 
which the rules of great power have changed since the end of the Cold War. 
While the development of nuclear capabilities was almost universally 
                                                
19 Stephanie G.Neumann, ed., International relations theory and the Third World 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998); Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner, ed., The 
foreign policies of the Global South: rethinking conceptual frameworks (Boulder, 
Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003). 
20 Stephen Chan and Andrew J. Williams, eds., Renegade States: The evolution of 
revolutionary foreign policy (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994). 
21 Peter Calvert, The Foreign Policies of New States (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1988). 
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frowned upon by developed and developing countries during, and in the 
immediate aftermath of, the Cold War, there appears to be a selective and 
grudging acceptance of the development of these capabilities by the allies of 
the Western powers, such as India and Israel, for example. In this context, 
alternative means of power projection have been sought by aspiring powers, 
and this has conditioned the rise of new powers, eager to present their 
emergence as peaceful and responsible. 
 
• The fifth and last puzzle to be engaged by the thesis is the theoretical 
development of studies of developing countries in international politics. While there is 
not yet consensus on the existence of a multipolar world, there is certainly a 
realisation that new powers are emerging to challenge the United States and 
its allies as architects of international order. Thus, while the United States 
still presents a salient systemic variable as the world’s sole superpower, there 
is more room currently than there was within the Cold War’s bipolar system 
for the expression of national interests by smaller, yet ‘system-affecting’22 
states. Neoclassical realism can fill a gap in this area, helping to shed light on 
the foreign policy preferences and choices of states in the developing world, 
centred on the role of the state in this process, a vacuum which has been 
identified by neoclassical realist scholars.23 
 
1.3. FPA in the Developing World: State of the Art 
 
Theoretical development on and in the developing world has always lagged behind 
its developed world counterparts. The non-Western developing world has typically 
been marginalised in international relations. Subsequently, studies of developing 
countries as actors on the international stage have been limited to particularistic 
considerations of strategic significance, their economic underdevelopment, and their 
                                                
22 Robert Keohane devised a hierarchical categorisation of states in which ‘system-
affecting states are those that “cannot hope to affect the system acting alone [but] can 
nevertheless exert significant impact on the system by working through small groups or 
alliances or through universal or regional international organizations”. Robert Keohane, 
“Review: Lilliputians’ Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics”, International 
Organizations, 23, No.2 (1969): 291-310: 295. 
23 Jeffery W. Taliaferro, “State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the 
Resource-Extractive State”, Security Studies, 15, Issue 3 (2006): 464-495: 495.  
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prime positioning as case studies on violent conflict. Foreign Policy Analysis in the 
developing world has followed a similar pattern.  
 
Four major sets of problems – analytical, conceptual, theoretical and practical - 
appeared to hamper attempts to conduct systematic studies of foreign policymaking 
in the so-called Third World.  
 
Analytical Problems  
A feature of FPA for the developing world was the resort to political economy 
approaches to account for the foreign policy of ‘fragile’ and ‘dependent’ societies. 
This simply substituted one single-factor approach, psychological reductionism, for 
another, political economy. While it explained some foreign policy decisions by 
developing countries24, its utility waned with the rising economic power of certain 
developing states, which consequently experienced an increase in policy autonomy. 
A further analytical problem was the attempt to apply theories generated within the 
European and North American contexts to the developing world, taking for granted 
the existence of seemingly unproblematic categories, such as ‘the state’, ‘balance of 
power’, ‘alliance’, and others.25 
 
Conceptual problems 
A key conceptual issue was how outputs were defined, i.e., what exactly was meant 
by ‘outputs’ – whether behaviour/discrete acts or objectives, or both. Korany argued that 
an exclusive focus on discrete acts - a behavioural approach - would preclude the 
identification of “a meaningful body of foreign policy26 rather than merely an 
agglomeration of state actions”.27 Such an approach would also make it difficult to 
                                                
24 For example, Cyril Kofie Daddieh, and Timothy M. Shaw, “The Political Economy of 
Decision-Making in African Foreign Policy: Recognition of Biafra and the Popular 
Movement for the Liberation of Angola”, in Korany (ed), 1984: 61-85.  
25 KJ Holsti, “International Relations Theory and Domestic War in the Third World: The 
Limits of Relevance”, pp103-132, in International Relations Theory and the Third World, 
ed. Stephanie G. Neumann (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998). 
26 For Korany, foreign policy is “a continuous, wider phenomenon [than decisions], 
embracing general objectives, stated strategy, and a series of routine actions”. See 
Bahgat Korany, “Foreign Policy Decision-Making Theory and the Third World: Payoffs 
and Pitfalls”, in How Foreign Policy Decisions are Made in the Third World: A 
Comparative Analysis, Bahgat Korany (with contributors), (Boulder and London: 
Westview Press, 1984): 39-60:39. 
27 Bahgat Korany, “Analyzing Third-World Foreign Policies: A Critique and a Reordered 
Research Agenda”, in The Political Economy of Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia, eds. 
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identify cases – and these were numerous – where foreign policy goals and outputs 
did not coincide (i.e. foreign policy failure). To mitigate these problems, foreign 
policy output could usefully be divided into three components (which will be 
utilised here): 
 
1. general objectives and verbal strategy that provide the rationale for the 
country’s global postures and orientation; 
2. routine actions: e.g. economic transactions, cultural agreements, pattern of 
diplomatic representation 
3. turning-point decisions (in areas of international conflict and cooperation), 
e.g to impose an economic boycott; launch a war, recognise a new govt., 
etc.28 
 
The examination of each of these components poses its own problems. General 
objectives and verbal strategies are often devoid of detail and measurable outcomes. 
However, they do provide an idea of which priorities guide foreign policy makers, 
and the ideational universe that delimits possibilities in a given foreign policy. This 
thesis will examine general objectives and verbal strategy (contained in election 
manifestoes and government strategic plans, for example) to gain an understanding 
of broad foreign policy goals and orientation for South Africa and Brazil.  
 
Routine actions will be downplayed for the purposes of this thesis, apart from 
giving an approximate guide to the volume of relations between states. Routine 
actions do not require modifications of foreign policy, and therefore do not signify 
key issues for foreign policy decision-makers.  
 
A turning-point decision, such as the decisions by South Africa and Brazil to 
become involved in Haiti, albeit in different capacities, will be examined in Chapter 
7 of the thesis. This analysis will take place at a societal, rather than an individual, 
level. This is in keeping with the theoretical components of the thesis that examine 
the impact of the governing party and Foreign Ministries on foreign policy 
decisions. Thus, the significance of the Haiti case for this thesis lies in its 
                                                                                                                               
David Wurfel and Bruce Burton (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1990): 
27.  
28 Ibid., 33.  
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representation of a ‘turning point’ decision in the practice of South Africa’s and 
Brazil’s foreign policies in the period under consideration.  
 
Theoretical problems 
In its approach to causality, the classical, realist perspective sought to ascribe single 
factors, either the search for power or the defence of the national interest, as 
determinants of foreign policy. This approach was superseded by the comparative 
foreign policy approach that incorporated a wider array of factors, multiplying the 
levels of analysis (by incorporating structural factors and domestic political factors, 
in addition to unit-level factors such as the search for power and the defence of the 
national interest). In addition, the inclusion of the additional two levels complicated 
the single-factor explanation advocated by the realist approach. The search for 
‘power’ for example, was problematized in light of the state’s search for security (a 
distinction highlighted by the divergent ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ realist 
approaches: The search for power characterised the former, while the search for 
security characterised the latter). The second factor, the defence of the national 
interest, was questioned in terms of which sub-national grouping was ultimately 
represented by the ‘national’ interest; as well as the extent to which the ‘national’ 
interest is subject to “the ‘legitimate’ demands of [the state’s] international 
environment.29  
 
A further concern centred on the ‘how’ question, or the decision-making process. In 
this area, Korany noted a significant lack in Third-World studies of the actual 
foreign policy decision-making process.30  This lack was not only filled by a 
disproportionate emphasis on the psychology of a single key decision-maker, as 
alluded to earlier, which easily became a substitute for “the analysis of social 
complexity, political fragmentation, … and external networks”31, a “great man” 
theory of foreign policy in the developing world.32 It was confirmed by a belief in 
the ‘inapplicability’ of Allison’s bureaucratic politics model of decision-making in 
the Third World setting.33 Unlike polities in the developed world, the developing 
world was only rarely considered a site of sophisticated levels of bureaucratic 
                                                
29 Ibid., 29, 24.  
30 Ibid., 30.  
31 Ibid., 30.  
32 Korany, “Foreign Policy Decision-Making Theory”, 41.  
33 Ibid., 56.  
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politics and political lobbying. This literature has been updated, however, to include 
a number of studies on developing countries of great depth and complexity.34 It 
remains limited, however, in terms of its interaction with IR literature, a gap this 
thesis seeks to fill by utilising the neoclassical realist approach in the study of the 
foreign policies of two major developing countries.  
 
Practical problems 
A number of empirical changes have joined the challenges facing researchers of the 
foreign policies of the developing world. Along with substantial, if uneven, 
economic growth across the Global South, has come the prospect of increased 
complexity in foreign policy choices, and in the institutions deciding upon and 
implementing foreign policy. Economic growth, has not only ushered in greater 
diplomatic complexity (not least, economic diplomacy), it has offered some states 
considerable policy autonomy and a relaxation of dependence on external factors in 
the making of foreign policy. This has made it possible for foreign policy to serve 
higher-order needs than the basic needs of ‘survival’, whether political or economic, 
and arguably to begin to defend, with material support, more philosophical and 
humanitarian interests.  
 
The impact of globalization on state powers and agencies in developing countries 
has not been uniform, with some agencies, especially finance or trade bureaucracies, 
gaining at the expense of others.35 In addition, the emergence of new forms of 
diplomacy – such as ‘niche’ diplomacy or middle power diplomacy - are attributed 
to the increasing need of peripheral states to adapt to their international context.36 
Another significant development in the last twenty years has been the 
democratisation of a number of former Third World states. This has led to an 
expectation of increased accountability and transparency in foreign policymaking. It 
has also had the effect of complicating the already vague notion of ‘the national 
                                                
34 A selection includes: Yufan Hao, China’s Foreign Policy Making: Societal Force and 
Chinese American Policy (Surrey: Ashgate, 2006); David Lampton, ed., The Making of 
Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform. (Palo Alto :Stanford 
University Press, 2002). An early contribution was made by Yaacov. Y.I. Vertzberger, 
Misperceptions in Foreign Policymaking: The Sino-Indian Conflict 1959-1962. (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 1984). 
35 Maurice East and Justin Robertson, eds., Diplomacy and Developing Nations: post-
Cold War foreign policy-making structures and processes. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005).  
36 Justin Robertson, “Introduction: The research direction and a typology of approaches”, 
in ibid.,1-36: 4.  
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interest’, as greater numbers of sub-national groupings become increasingly vocal 
about their foreign interests, or the domestic implications of the state’s foreign 
relations.  
 
Hence, the ‘Third World’ is no more uniform37 than it was at the height of this 
label’s use. However, the persistent trait of a subjective sense of marginalisation 
from power equations in international politics, along with unrelenting challenges of 
economic development, retain the relevance of the ‘Third World’ or ‘Global South’, 
if not as an objective, quantifiable reality, then at least as a collective mentality, or 
identity.38 More than an identity, the category still serves as a ‘political platform’39 
embracing development, fairer trade and transparent, accountable global financial 
practices, along with the democratisation of multilateral institutions.   
 
The shortcomings highlighted in the approaches described above may potentially be 
overcome, or at least limited, by the neoclassical realist approach to foreign policy 
analysis. This is not a unified approach, but the emerging tradition bears some 
hallmarks that are beginning to render it a distinct theoretical perspective in the 
analysis of foreign policy. It embraces a multi-level, multi-variate analysis of foreign 
policy, including the global-, state- and individual-levels of foreign policymaking.  
 
1.4. Outline of Argument 
Given the preference for military restraint and greater levels of international 
diplomatic engagement by the new emerging powers, the question arises whether 
internationalism as a foreign policy perspective conditions the foreign policies of 
emerging powers, and if so, to which extent this is the case.  The thesis proceeds by 
presenting the progress of internationalism as a foreign policy outlook since the 
turn of the twentieth century, especially from the perspective of the Global South. 
                                                
37 Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner, “Chapter 11: Conclusion”, in The Foreign Policies 
of the Global South: rethinking conceptual frameworks, ed. Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-
Wagner (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003): 183-188: 184. 
38 Louise Fawcett, “Conclusion: Whither the Third World?” in The Third World Beyond 
the Cold War: Continuity and Change, eds., Louise Fawcett and Yezid Sayigh (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999): 242.  
39 Hans-Henrik Holm, “The End of the Third World?”, Journal of Peace Research, 27, 
No.1, (February 1990): 1-7: 6. See also Donald Puchala, “Third World Thinking and 
Contemporary International Relations”, in International Relations Theory and the Third 
World, ed. Stephanie G. Neuman (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1998): 133-158. Also 
see Chris Alden, Sally Morphet and Marco Antonio Vieira, The South in World Politics 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).  
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This is followed by the presentation of the case for neoclassical realism as an 
approach with which to make sense of internationalism in foreign policy, by 
answering the secondary question, Why do states with especially limited resources (i.e. 
developing states) adopt expansive foreign policies?  
 
There are a few potential answers to this question. These include answers drawn 
from the realist, liberal and constructivist theoretical perspectives. First is the 
potential of threat. The likelihood of attack by a neighbour could propel an 
expansive foreign policy. This is the theoretical position of defensive realism, a 
branch of structural (or neo-) realism. In this approach, states seek to gain greater 
control over their environments as a way of reducing the likelihood of attack, in 
response to a threat. Therefore, states expand only when faced with insecurity.40 In 
the words of Kenneth Waltz, a famously defensive realist, states should seek only 
‘an appropriate amount of power’.41 Defensive realists recognise restraint in states’ 
actions stemming from three factors:  
 
• A fear that balancing will occur on the part of neighbours and enemies of 
over-expansive states. 
• The offence-defence balance favours the defence, i.e. the non-aggressor.  
• Even where conquest is feasible, costs outweigh benefits.42  
 
For each of these factors, restraint stems from systemic dynamics, and is related to 
material measures, i.e. the fear that other states will out-arm the state in question; 
the fear that the aggressor will be short-changed; and the fear that the costs of 
conquest will be greater than its profits. This approach does not leave open the 
possibility that restraint could stem from within the state, given that it is still a 
structural approach to international relations.  
 
As enunciated by offensive realists like John Mearsheimer, states should do all they 
can to accumulate as much power as possible anyway and pursue hegemony, to 
                                                
40 Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1998): 9.  
41 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Michigan: McGraw-Hill, 1979): 40, 
cited in Ibid., 75.  
42 Ibid., 75-76.  
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ensure their own survival,43 regardless of how imminent a threat appears. This is an 
unlikely answer to the question posed of the two case studies, as they each occupy 
relatively peaceful environments. Brazil has not seen inter-state war within its 
immediate region since the 1867 wars with Paraguay and Argentina, and South 
Africa has occupied a less volatile region since the change of government in 1994. 
Power accumulation for its own sake is not how South Africa and Brazil have 
elected to project their influence, and each state has been remarkably reticent in its 
projection of power regionally.  
 
Realism also bequeaths the concept of polarity – or how the number of great 
powers in the system affects relations between states - to the analysis of rising 
powers. Comparative capabilities and how powers rise are determined by their 
material resources, and, according to classical realists, by the social bases of national 
power. States have access only to expendable state power.44 Balancing is dependent 
both on the external agglomeration of power through alliances, and the internal 
build-up of capabilities through economic growth and national development, not to 
mention the development of indigenous arms industries, and the less tangible social 
base of national power. 
 
Related to this interpretation is that power is an end in itself, the view of Classical 
Realism. States seek power in order simply to become more powerful, more 
influential and less susceptible to the predations of greater powers. Small powers 
seek power to become intermediate powers; and, intermediate powers pursue power 
to become great powers. The concepts of prestige, honour and recognition, are 
implicated in this answer to the question posed above. This is highly plausible in an 
analysis of South Africa and Brazil because it accounts for the reliance on repetitive 
tropes of ‘belonging’ and ‘rightful place’ evident in the speeches and public 
utterances of the national leaders of South Africa and Brazil. Yet, it does not 
account for their arguably muted paths to power. Furthermore, the realist opposites 
of balancing and bandwagoning also do not go far enough in accounting for the 
behaviour of emerging powers: they are too narrow. In formations such as BRIC, 
                                                
43 John Mearsheimer, “Chapter 4: Structural Realism”, in International Relations 
Theories: Discipline and Diversity, eds., Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007): 71-88: 72.  
44 Zakaria, From Wealth to Power. This concept is elucidated further in Chapter 3.  
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emerging powers Brazil, Russia, India and China, have banded together to pursue 
their collective interests, ostensibly in opposition to US and other Western influence 
on international markets and politics, and as a counterbalance to Western trade. Yet, 
this does not encapsulate all of their behaviour in relation to the US. There exist 
simultaneously areas of co-operation and accommodation. Proponents of the ‘soft-
balancing’ thesis bring much to bear on the analysis of intermediate powers. ‘Soft 
balancing’ is described as the use of “non-military tools to delay, frustrate, and 
undermine aggressive unilateral…policies [of the superpower]”.45 Yet, not all actions 
that appear to constitute soft balancing, e.g. the formation of the India-Brazil-South 
Africa Forum (IBSA) and expansion of the BRICs grouping - may actually be a 
response to US unilateral action. They may stem from the domestic or regional – 
rather than systemic – level. It is also necessary not to lose sight of the coordination 
challenges for these states, as well as abiding suspicions between them, such as 
those between India and China, for example.46 
 
A second theoretical possibility for answering the question is drawn from the liberal 
approach to international affairs. Here, domestic – or unit-level – reasons may be 
adduced for the adoption of expansive foreign policies in the presence of resource 
restraints. States’ primary motivations for action are profit and the well-being of all 
citizens, thus these actions are attenuated by domestic imperatives. These may 
include, the domestic system of government and how threats are processed and 
perceived, as well as how government authorises the possible responses to threat; 
and, importantly, domestic conceptions of a state’s role in international relations. 
The cases of South Africa and Brazil are highly amenable to this interpretation, 
given that each state is a democracy, and has expressed solidarity with poorer 
developing countries on the basis of its own domestic experience with poverty, and 
marginalisation in international politics.  These perceptions are especially associated 
with the Left of centre governments that have held power in South Africa and 
Brazil since the end of the twentieth century, the African National Congress (1994-
present) and the Partido dos Trabalhadores (2003-present), respectively47. However, 
                                                
45 Robert A. Pape, “Soft Balancing against the United States”, International Security, 30, 
No.1 (2005): 10.  
46 Hurrell, “Hegemony, liberalism and global order”, 15-16.  
47 From a gloomier perspective, democratisation has also been thought to bring out the 
worst in ruling elites, predisposing transitional states to war and aggression. This, too, is 
not an accurate depiction of the foreign policy behaviour of democratic intermediate 
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liberalism alone cannot account for muted emergence strategies, as both states have 
been criticised for decidedly illiberal postures toward human rights-violating states, 
such as Cuba and Myanmar. In addition, at the domestic level, there has not been a 
noticeable opening of participation in the policymaking process by either Brazil or 
South Africa, giving short shrift to ideas of the democratisation of foreign policy.  
 
A third set of reasons why under-resourced states would adopt wide-ranging foreign 
policies, and commit resources to them, lies within the constructivist approach to 
international relations. Here, the primary motives for states’ international actions are 
identity-related. Constructivists emphasise a social ontology that gives rise to 
motives for action that diverge from rationalism. States may conduct actions that 
stem from sensitivity to the logic of appropriateness, rather than rationalism’s logic of 
consequences.48 Hence, states may commit to costly international action as the result of 
a perception by leaders that it is the correct, or appropriate, thing to do for a given 
identity, whether it is the identity of ‘great power’, ‘responsible power’, or ‘emerging 
power’. These actions may include, but are not limited to, participation in 
peacekeeping activities, granting aid, and seeking permanent representation in the 
United Nations Security Council.  Such actions may also be motivated by a 
conviction that the community to which the state owes moral or ethical duties 
extends beyond the nation state, and includes the wider community of those who 
share certain characteristics, such as poverty or race or marginalisation from 
international affairs.  
 
Yet, while identity accounts for much in the foreign policy postures of South Africa 
and Brazil, it cannot account for how, whether, and over what duration of time, 
structural features of the international system bring about change in the foreign 
policies of these states. 
 
For these reasons, neoclassical realism represents a sharp analytical tool with which 
to examine the foreign policies of emerging powers. Neoclassical realism is a 
tradition of scholarship in IR theory that has been gathering pace over the last two 
                                                                                                                               
powers such as South Africa and Brazil. For a discussion of the relation between 
democratisation and conflict, see Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, 
“Democratization and the Danger of War”,  International Security, 20, No.1 (1995). 
48 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of International 
Political Orders”, International Organization, 52, No.4 (1998). 
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decades. More a collection of works than an established theoretical tradition, it 
combines the neorealist approach to international politics, as popularised by the 
structural realism of Kenneth Waltz, with a rich account of the state more common 
to classical realism. In this way, systemic constraints on state behaviour are 
mediated through the domestic agential power of the state, resulting in varying state 
power resources for states that are similarly placed in international politics. The 
approach thus helps to account for the impact of shifts in relative power capabilities 
between states, and how these shifts are interpreted and processed by domestic 
actors. It thus provides an interactive account of foreign policy outcomes, comprising 
both systemic and unit-level factors (see Chapter 3).  
 
‘Mobilisation’ and ‘extraction’49 are two domestic strategies pursued by all states, 
identified by Mastanduno, et al. in their discussion of a ‘Realist Theory of State 
Action’. ‘Mobilisation’ refers to economic measures to enhance national wealth, 
while ‘extraction’ refers to the conversion “of wealth into power by taxing, 
requisitioning, or expropriating social resources”. These resources are allocated to 
military expenditure, aid donations, dues payable to international organisations and 
other international activities. Part of the argument advanced here is that the 
mobilisation and extraction of national resources or state power has not been a 
straightforward task for intermediate states. While traditional realist conceptions of 
intermediate states privilege their relative capacity to conduct international actions, 
neoclassical realism adds a domestic/societal dimension, along with the key variable 
of perception, including self-perception, such that hard power is not necessarily 
consonant with state power. State power is hard power (or national power) 
mediated by domestic social forces.  
 
Internationalism has traditionally entailed strong, principled stances on international 
issues such as conflict, poverty, and multilateral institutions (see Chapter 2). Yet 
even these positions are mediated by a government’s domestic context, and a 
government may prefer muted actions to more decisive action, in a bid to avoid 
risk, both in the domestic political context, and in the external context. Domestic 
politics constrains government initiatives that are “strong in intensity and 
                                                
49 See Michael Mastanduno, David A. Lake and G. John Ikenberry, “Toward a Realist 
Theory of State Action”, International Studies Quarterly, 33, No.4 (1989): 462-463. 
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commitment”: “in other words, the government engages in low-risk behaviour and often 
avoids changes in policy”, in order to accommodate political opposition to its policies.50 
This is just one of three possible alternatives that a government has in dealing with 
political opposition to its chosen foreign policy. The other two are ‘mobilisation’51 
through legitimation of the regime and its policies; and, ‘insulation’, through the 
marginalisation of opposition. All three alternatives can have clear consequences in 
foreign policy outcomes. Accommodation may see a government being able to win 
over its critics, either by adopting a more muted line (avoiding risk), or by ‘paying 
off’ opposition with side-payments. Legitimation of the regime sees leaders 
discrediting their adversaries, potentially resulting in more forceful foreign policy 
actions.  Accommodation is the focus here because it is more prominent in 
parliamentary democracies or factionalised ruling parties. Legitimation reflects a 
strategy of greater coercion, where opponents cannot be co-opted, and also tends to 
occur in periods of great political instability. Insulation, meanwhile, is a common 
strategy for political leaders hoping to “deflect or reduce domestic constraints on 
their foreign policy choices”, by closing the issue off from public scrutiny and 
debate.52 
 
Neoclassical realism will thus be utilised as a theoretical framework for analysing the 
strategies of emergence of South Africa and Brazil, respectively. This framework is 
developed in Chapter 3. With a shift in power at the system level as a central 
assumption, the hypotheses guiding the enquiry are as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 1: The greater the institutional freedom and legitimating capacity of the 
governing party, the more autonomy inheres in key decision-making structures, the 
closer the model approximates neorealism’s unitary actor. Decisions to allocate 
resources to international issues will be based on hard power considerations and 
                                                
50 Joe Hagan, Political Opposition and Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective 
(Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993): 128. Emphasis added.  
51 The term ‘mobilisation’ is used here in a different sense to that employed in the 
remainder of the thesis. Here it is used by Hagan to denote a potential instrument used 
by governments for managing opposition to foreign policy, while the usage in the rest of 
the thesis refers to the proactive promotion of national wealth and military strength for a 
given purpose, in this case foreign policy. Where the first meaning is intended, this will 
be indicated.  
52 Joe Hagan, “Chapter 8: Domestic Political Explanations in the Analysis of Foreign 
Policy”, pp117-143, in Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in its Second 
Generation, eds., Laura Neack, Jeanne A.K Hey, Patrick J. Haney (Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice-Hall, 1995): 117-143.  
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exercised more frequently, where the state possesses the resources to do so. The state will act in 
line with neorealism’s predictions, behaving competitively and aggressively. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The lesser the institutional freedom and legitimating capacity of the 
governing party, the less autonomous and more porous is the decision-making 
process, the more the model approaches a pluralistic decision-making system. 
Decisions to allocate resources to international issues will be delayed, and subject to 
numerous bargains and negotiations. They will occur less frequently, and will have 
to balance the interests of various factions, even if the state possesses the resources to act. 
Internationalism as a risk-avoiding set of actions will take priority.   
 
This set of hypotheses would be called into question if a state exhibited low degrees 
of international activism, preferring to focus on domestic issues, even while under 
the rule of governing parties with extensive freedom to act, and with high public 
legitimacy, with a middle-range position in international affairs.  
 
It would also be called into question where a governing party is weak in relation to 
domestic political institutions, and with low public legitimacy, but is still able to 
conduct an activist foreign policy, using state resources for disparate goals.  
 
This study seeks to analyse the role of the internationalism subscribed to by 
governing parties in the state foreign policies they manage. The independent 
variable is the shift in international relative power positions. The intervening 
variable is the structure of the state, especially the capacity of the governing party to 
influence outcomes according to its preferences. The dependent variable is the 
resultant foreign policy direction on specific international issues.  
 
Independent variable (X): Middle-range power and material capability in international 
politics (relative position). 
 
Dependent variable (Y): How the state ultimately chooses to project its power or 
expand its interests. 
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Intervening variable (X1): The ruling party and its legitimating ideologies, along with the 
extent of its freedom of action in formulating foreign policy.  This includes an 
account of the interaction between the ruling party, the legislature, the executive and 
the foreign policy bureaucracy in forging broad lines of foreign policy strategy. 
These interactions are analysed through the lenses of two categories: institutional 
freedom and legitimating capacity.  
 
The causal factor of special theoretical interest is the role of the ruling party, given 
that it provides the head of state, and numerous other foreign policy functionaries, 
as well as the overall legitimating national discourses. If the governing party is found 
to be theoretically significant then this means that greater care should be taken, in 
plotting the trajectory of future rising states, of the ideologies and values espoused 
by the ruling party of a state, rather than its leader exclusively. Neoclassical realism 
predicts that states would seek to address an imbalance of power, but that they 
would possess differing abilities to do so, and various constraints on their action. 
The claim is posited here that the governing party is key to mobilising and 
extracting these abilities.  
 
South Africa and Brazil each represent a ‘tough’ test of the neoclassical realist 
approach, because each state occupies a relatively peaceful environment, and the 
United States, a historical ‘offshore balancer’ in both the Southern African and 
South American regions, has been largely absent from both during the period under 
consideration. Each state may thus have been expected to expand their reach and 
seek to fill power vacuums in their regions. That neither state has selected 
aggressive expansion – as might be predicted by neorealism – is explained by 
domestic factors, such as prevailing ideologies and party politics, in addition to 
systemic factors and power balances. 
 
Thus, where governing parties domestically face opposition or the threat of 
opposition, they are less likely to engage in international activism. State power 
requires a stable social base for its projection abroad.  
 
 40 
The role of left-leaning political parties in government and their influence on foreign policy in 
combination with state institutions may only account for a small variation in eventual foreign policy 
outcomes. It is not possible to account for the whole spectrum of action.  
 
The argument developed by this thesis is thus three-fold: 1. That internationalism is 
a feature of the foreign policies of certain developing countries; 2. That 
internationalism fulfils both domestic and international purposes, by serving the 
interests of the governing party; and, 3. That internationalism is an approach to 
international affairs that limits the capacity and propensity of intermediate states to 
respond to threats and opportunities. In summary:  
The argument developed here is that Leftist governing parties, in the presence of systemic and 
domestic constraints, under-determine the responses of states to external threats and opportunities. 
 
 
1.5. Methodology 
The primary methods employed in the writing of this thesis are qualitative. These 
include the consultation of government and party documents, interviews with 
individuals close to the foreign policymaking process of both the South African and 
Brazilian governments, and the political parties - in some cases, the same individuals 
- and consulting secondary literature. There was no problem translating written 
Portuguese, while Brazilian diplomats, academics and party officials dealing with 
International Relations are fluent in English, therefore translation was not necessary 
in these cases. Field research was conducted over the course of two trips to Brasília 
and Rio de Janeiro in May, 2008 and July, 2010, respectively. The first trip to Brazil 
lasted one month, while the second lasted one week. Interviews were also 
conducted in Johannesburg in June 2007, while some interviews with academics and 
a former South African cabinet member, Dr Essop Pahad, were conducted 
telephonically.  
 
Attempts to reach Mr Jean-Bertrand Aristide were unsuccessful, as were attempts to 
reach Mr Lula da Silva, Prof Marco Aurélio Garcia, Mr Samuel Guimarães Neto and 
Mr Mbeki and his deputy Foreign Minister, Mr Aziz Pahad. It was generally 
challenging to obtain clarity on government motives for given actions, especially 
from those close to the decision-making processes. Those at a distance, but still 
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involved in policy implementation, such as diplomats, were slightly more 
forthcoming. It was nonetheless possible to gauge from published speeches, 
biographies and newspaper articles the types of calculations that entered into the 
making of certain decisions. In the Brazilian case, the Western analyses of Brazilian 
foreign policy were slightly more critical and objective than those by Brazilian 
scholars and diplomats. In the South African case, diplomats were, unsurprisingly, 
defensive of South African positions, but scholars were more critical and objective. 
A full list of interviewees may be found in the reference list at the end of the thesis. 
 
The methodology of analysing the extent of internationalism as a conditioning 
factor in foreign policy is to assess the divergence between the foreign policy 
traditions of the governing parties, ANC and PT, respectively, and the position of 
the state on certain issues, and as evidenced in policy planning documents and 
annual reports over time. This divergence, whether large or small, is mediated by the 
extent of the governing party’s dominance in society, and measured by the extent of 
its control over domestic political institutions related to foreign policymaking, along 
with the success with which it can justify its policy proposals. With Almeida, it is 
recognised that while “programmes and proposals for action are often too generic 
and vague to permit evaluation of their content”, the best way to examine policy 
positions is by looking at broad international relations themes contained in the 
campaign platforms of presidential elections contested by PT [and ANC], and the 
principle statements of its candidates contesting or holding electoral office (as 
president)”.53  
 
The thesis is a comparative foreign policy study to the extent that what is being 
compared are the behaviours and foreign policy rhetoric of two states similarly placed in 
international politics during the period under consideration. Both states opted for 
heightened diplomacy and rhetoric focused on equitable representation in 
multilateral institutions, the peaceful settlement of international disputes, non-
interference in the domestic affairs of other states, and South-South solidarity. How 
did their respective domestic political and economic contexts contribute to these 
                                                
53 Paulo Roberto de Almeida, ‘A política internacional do partido dos trabalhadores: da 
fundação à diplomacia do governo Lula’, Revista de Sociologia e Política, No. 20 (June 
2003): 89.  
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outcomes? Which instruments have they used to gain influence in international 
politics, and with what impact on their foreign relations? 
 
The methodology employed makes extensive use of the analysis of discursive 
elements of foreign policy, recognising that intermediate power activism does not 
depend solely on material capabilities, but also on the domestic and international 
legitimation of these actions.  
 
The use of the comparative case study method is justified by the need to understand 
the international behaviour of two states that share many similarities, and to 
understand their actions as a class of action, i.e. internationalist action, in 
international affairs. The method for this form of comparison is to ask the same set 
of questions of each case, namely:  
 
• What is the role of internationalism in foreign policy? 
• How do domestic institutional arrangements promote or inhibit the self-
interested actions of governing parties or leaders in foreign policy? 
• What is the history of internationalism in each state’s foreign policy, and 
with respect to its governing party? 
• How do perceptions of state strength affect the decisions to engage in 
activist foreign policies? 
• Which forms of international action are most likely to match the domestic 
policymaking context, i.e. the ease or difficulty of resource mobilisation and 
extraction?  
 
 
1.6. Why South Africa and Brazil? 
 
Internationalism as an underlying foreign policy assumption, as acts instantiated in 
international activism in the foreign policies of South Africa and Brazil between 
1999 and 2010, comprises the unit of analysis. This is because South Africa and 
Brazil are two states among the group of newly-emerging powers who have, by and 
large, eschewed the development of hard power for the furtherance of their 
international goals, leading to the puzzle as to why this should be the case, and 
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whether the internationalism long-espoused by their ruling parties, ANC and PT, 
respectively, plays any role in this. While they have been at peace with their 
neighbours for the period under consideration, they have participated in 
international conflicts, either as mediators, or as troop-contributors to multilateral 
peacekeeping missions. Faced with roughly the same international position – 
regional hegemon, continental powerhouse, upper middle income developing 
country – South Africa and Brazil have responded  - by and large - similarly to their 
international threats and opportunities.  This temporal period is, furthermore, the 
period that has seen the heightening of South African and Brazilian activism on 
international questions, and coincides with the premiership of the noteworthy 
leaders of two large and influential leftist movements in each country. Where they 
differ, on the intervening variable, is that while Brazil plays host to a Presidential 
electoral system where alliances need to be painstakingly constructed for electoral 
primacy, South Africa is a parliamentary democracy, in which a single party, the 
ANC, is dominant.  
 
For the most part, other domestic factors are, for the purposes of this study, held 
constant. South Africa and Brazil are both marginal recipients of Official 
Development Assistance (ODA), in spite of each country playing host to a fifth of 
its population living in poverty.54 This affords some measure of independence in 
foreign policymaking. Military spending as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) is comparable at 1.7 percent for South Africa and 1.8 percent for Brazil. 
This is lower than other states considered intermediate states, such as Malaysia 
(2%), Turkey (2.8%), India (3%), China (2%) and Russia (4.3%).55 Brazilian and 
South African societies both faced chronic inequality during the period under 
consideration, with two of the highest Gini coefficients in the world. Domestic 
politics in both polities have thus been driven by the issues of development and 
economic growth, employment and redistribution, and foreign penetration of the 
domestic economy. A key point of similarity is the effect of race-based 
considerations on society, which has played a significant – yet different - role in 
national identity for both states. The percentage of Brazil’s population considered to 
be ethnically white is 53.7 percent, while mixed and black constitute some 45 
                                                
54 As noted in Table 1, this figure only fell dramatically for Brazil near the end of the 
period under investigation.  
55 World Bank, World Development Indicators.  
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percent.56 In South Africa, Blacks constitute 79 percent, with the rest comprised of 
whites, coloureds and other groups.57 Africa and African heritage have played a role 
in the foreign policy outlooks of both the Mbeki and Lula administrations. 
 
Key points of difference relate to the size of the economy and domestic political 
structure. Brazil is the eighth-largest economy in the world, while South Africa is 
the 31st-largest.58 Brazil has a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of USD8 
070, while South Africa’s is USD5 760 (see Table 1).59 This affects the study by 
influencing the types of diplomatic instruments each state has access to. Its effects 
are limited, however, by the comparable position in the global system of states 
occupied by the two countries. Domestically, Brazil plays host to a presidential 
political system, while South Africa operates a parliamentary proportional 
representation system. This difference in domestic state structure affects the 
cohesion of central government, and the ease with which wide-ranging legislative 
reform can be undertaken.  
 
 
 
 Brazil (upper middle income) South Africa (upper middle income) 
 1999 2009 1999 2009 
GDP 
(current, in 
USD) 
586,863,191,445 1,573,408, 702,182 133,183,580,945 
285,365,879,67
6 
Population 
(Growth 
rate, %) 
168,000,00060 
(1,5) 193,733, 795 (0,9)  39,900,000
61 (2,4) 
49,320,150 
(1,1) 
                                                
56 CIA World Factbook. 2011. “Brazil”. Accessed online at: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/br.html on 16 May, 
2011.  
57 CIA World Factbook. 2011. “South Africa”. Accessed online at: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sf.html on 16 May, 
2011.  
58 World Bank. 2009. Gross Domestic Product Data. Accessed online at: 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/GDP-ranking-table on 16 May, 2011.  
59 Ibid.  
60 United Nations Population Fund, 1999. 6 Billion: A Time for Choices: The State of 
World Population 1999. p72. 
61 Ibid., 70. 
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 Brazil (upper middle income) South Africa (upper middle income) 
 1999 2009 1999 2009 
Net ODA 
received (% 
of GNI) 
0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4 [2008] 
Exports of 
goods and 
services (% 
of GDP) 
9 11 25 27 
Imports of 
goods and 
services (% 
of GDP) 
11 11 22.7 28 
Poverty 
headcount 
ratio (% of 
population) 
21.5 [2003] 7 22.0 [2003] 22.0 [2008] 
Inequality 
(GINI 
coefficient) 
59 55.0,  75th 58 [2000] 57.8, 129th 
Military 
expenditure
s (% of 
GDP), world 
ranking 
1.7 1.8, 88th 1.4 1.7 [2006], 
92nd 
Table 1: Brazil and South Africa compared62 
 
 
 
In answering the question, ‘Why South Africa and Brazil?’, it is also important to 
outline the reasoning underlying the choice of Haiti as a case study, in which the 
foreign policies of both South Africa and Brazil may be compared. The Haiti crisis 
of 2004 represents a ‘turning point’ foreign policy decision for South Africa and 
                                                
62 Data obtained from the website of the World Bank, accessed at 
http://data.worldbank.org/country on 3 February, 2011. Military expenditure figures 
obtained from CIA World Factbook 2011, accessed online at: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sf.html on 7 March, 
2011.  
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Brazil, because in engaging in this crisis, extending beyond rhetoric and routine 
actions, both states accepted sizeable responsibilities far beyond their regions.  The 
crisis offers an opportunity to analyse how and to what effect resources in the South 
African and Brazilian states, respectively, were mobilised, extracted and allocated for 
a foreign policy goal that did not have an immediately perceptible impact on their 
objective national interests. Unlike the question of Palestinian statehood, for 
instance, on which both states have been outspoken supporters, Haiti was not a 
historical concern of either. The island also lies beyond the traditional spheres of 
influence of both states, although admittedly, it is geographically closer to Brazil, 
and hence instability would pose more of a security threat, despite not being an 
immediate threat. The involvement of both in the Haiti crisis ignited the ire of 
critics at home, and represented unpopular, and confusing, foreign policy choices.   
 
1.7. Proposed Contribution of Current Work 
 
The thesis produces two conclusions: State structure, especially the nature of the 
relationships between governing parties, the executive and the legislature, plays a 
significant role in how states respond to international threats and opportunities. 
Also, the trajectory of intermediate states is contingent upon both systemic and 
domestic factors.  
 
With a range of systemic constraints – normative, security/military, economic, and 
environmental – the traditional paths to power for emerging or great powers are 
hindered in numerous ways. In the normative realm, nuclear weapons development 
is frowned upon by Western and non-Western states alike. Security/military 
expansion competes with the pressing needs of national development as a national 
priority. Economically, the dominance of the market has rendered states 
increasingly docile, if complicit, in the face of the increased domestic presence of 
foreign investors and multinational corporations. Lastly, the climate change 
negotiations between North and South have sought to impose limits on the extent 
to which developing states can cause harm to the environment in the process of 
industrialisation.  
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The findings of this research will shed light on the role played by governing parties 
of the left in informing and directing states’ foreign policies. These findings will be 
generalisable to the extent that a state has the capacity for activist, independent 
foreign policy; and are availed of international opportunities, presented by openings 
in the management of global affairs by the great powers. It is of utility in 
understanding why certain states pursue certain strands of foreign policy, and also 
provides guidance as to the conditions under which political parties may be 
influential in the making of foreign policy, especially foreign policy that is 
independent and autonomous of the influence of any external power. The findings 
will not apply to states that cannot formulate foreign policy independently. It is 
more likely to be applicable to those states that possess the resources and inclination 
to be able to choose how they respond to external stimuli, or more broadly, middle 
or intermediate powers in international affairs.  
 
By way of addressing the five puzzles outlined earlier, this research bears resonance 
for five broad areas:  
• IR theory: IR theory has paid scant attention to emerging powers, a lack that 
neoclassical realism may potentially fill. While numerous studies have been 
conducted on the rise of Western states in history, there are not many book-
length treatments with an explicit theoretical focus on less ‘traditional’ 
emerging powers,63 or indeed those that have risen in recent years, post-
9/11, and indeed, post-Cold War. In addition, there are no major studies to 
date that apply a neoclassical realist approach to emerging powers outside 
the West.64  
• FPA: The role of governing parties in determining national foreign policy 
priorities and perspectives is under-represented in the foreign policy analysis 
literature. Especially in the light of Latin America’s ‘Pink Revolution’ of the 
early 21st century, in which a number of states came under the leadership of 
governments of the left, it is vitally important to understand the extent to 
                                                
63 While it is recognised that there are numerous country studies of foreign policy, there 
are few that analyse the emergence of new powers from outside the western world. A 
few recent exceptions are: Sumit Ganguly, ed., India as an Emerging Power (London: 
Frank Cass, 2003); Alistair I. Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds., Engaging China: the 
management of an emerging power. (New York: Routledge, 1999); James I. Matray, 
Japan’s emergence as a global power (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2001). 
64 A minor exception is Braz Baracuhy, “A Crise da Liga das Nações de 1926: Realismo 
Neoclássico, Multilateralismo e a Natureza da Política Externa Brasileira”, Contexto 
Internacional, 28, No.2 (2006).  
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which domestic institutional arrangements allow or constrain the capacity of 
governing parties to significantly change foreign policy. Neoclassical realism 
will provide a sound analytical tool for analysing both the domestic and 
systemic factors conditioning the rise of intermediate states. 
• Brazilian foreign policy: there are few critical treatments of Brazilian foreign 
policy under the Lula administration.65 Most studies, conducted by Brazilian 
scholars, in Portuguese, tend to accept as given Brazil’s ‘exceptional’ status 
in international politics, without questioning how this came to be, whether it 
is sustainable, and why this has been the chosen foreign policy outlook of 
Brazilian governments, especially the civilian governments since 1985.  
• South African foreign policy: while there is a surfeit of critical study of 
South Africa’s foreign policy since the end of Apartheid, owing largely to 
widespread disillusionment in the academic community with both the 
formulation and implementation of this area of public policy, South Africa’s 
foreign policy has only on occasion been subjected to theoretical and 
historical scrutiny.66 
• The international response to the Haiti crisis, which experienced its apex in 
2004 with the removal of Jean-Bertrand Aristide from power has not been 
treated by scholars of international relations, in spite of its relevance for the 
United Nations and new models of peacekeeping, and its contentiousness 
for highlighting divergent positions between the UN and the major powers 
on one hand, and the region’s major interstate organisation, the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM), on the other.  
 
1.8. Chapters Outline 
 
The thesis is arranged as follows: 
 
Part I presents the analytical framework, and comprises four chapters. Following 
the introduction, Chapter 2 presents Southern internationalism as a mode of 
                                                
65 An important exception, by a Canadian scholar, is Sean Burges, “Consensual 
Hegemony: Theorizing Brazilian Foreign Policy After the Cold War”, International 
Relations, 22, Issue 1 (2008), among other works by the same author.  
66 See for an example of a theoretical treatment Paul Williams, “South African Foreign 
Policy: Getting Critical?”, Politikon, 27, No.1 (2000); and Roger Pfister, “Gateway to 
international victory: the diplomacy of the African National Congress in Africa, 1960-
1994”, Journal of Modern African Studies, 41, No.1 (2003), for a historical treatment.  
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expansive, activist foreign policy that has characterised the actions of large states of 
the developing world since at least the middle of the last century. It also seeks to 
contextualise this approach to foreign policy in the light of the internationalism 
practiced by Northern states, and within a larger approach to state action based on 
ethics and framed by cosmopolitanism. 
 
Chapter 3 analyses whether an internationalist stance is the result of state strength 
or state weakness, building on concepts found within the neoclassical realist 
approach to state capacity as a determinant of state behaviour. Chapter 4 presents 
an analysis of the foreign policy decision-making process in each case study country, 
reflecting on the institutional freedom of the governing parties, domestic intra-
governmental relations, and authority chains, for their potential influence on foreign 
policy outcomes.  
 
Part II presents the two case study chapters, Chapters 5 and 6, on South Africa and 
Brazil, respectively, along with a third chapter, Chapter 7, that examines how each 
state mobilised and extracted resources in response to a ‘typical’ Third World crisis, 
and how domestic policymaking arrangements and perceptions helped or hindered 
responses to the Haiti crisis of 2004. Chapters 5 and 6 provide expositions of the 
dynamic of growth in state power and growing national interests on the parts of 
South Africa and Brazil, respectively. Chapter 7, meanwhile, examines one example 
of a culmination of these respective processes: engagement in the Haiti crisis that 
reached boiling-point in 2004.  
 
Part III comprises Chapter 8, the concluding chapter that draws together the 
findings and key theoretical and empirical implications for Southern 
internationalism, and foreign policymaking in South Africa and Brazil, respectively.  
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Chapter 2: Internationalism in the Global South: The 
evolution of  a concept 
 
 
Our own freedom as a people is diminished when another people are not free. Thus we have a continuing responsibility to make 
whatever contribution we can to the struggle for the birth of the new world order that is so spoken of, so that the peoples of the world, 
including ourselves, live in conditions of democracy, peace, prosperity and equality among nations. In pursuing these objectives, we 
must be careful to avoid great power arrogance and conferring [sic] ourselves a misplaced messianic role. 
Nelson Mandela, President of South Africa, 8 January 1996, marking the 84th anniversary of the founding of 
the African National Congress (ANC)67 
 
There will only be security in a world where all have the right to economic and social development. The true path to peace is shared 
development. If we do not want war to go global, justice must go global. 
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, President of the Republic of Brazil, 19 September 2006, at the opening of the General 
Debate of the 61st Session of the UN General Assembly68 
 
 
Introduction 
 
‘Internationalism’ is a concept that is only cautiously applied to the foreign policies 
of countries of the developing world. Nonetheless, as will be shown in this chapter, 
aspects of what has been in the past referred to as ‘internationalism’ in foreign 
policy, are discernible in the foreign policies of a few large developing democracies 
today. What is meant by internationalism is not static, and even the observations 
made in the current work about developing countries should be factored into 
understandings of what internationalism broadly comprises at the start of the 
twenty-first century.  
 
The so-called ‘rise of the rest’ has brought to the fore once again the questions of 
global inequality, global responsibility, and other issues associated with the North-
South divide that reached its apex in the 1970s.69 Appearing to meet this challenge 
in new and inventive ways, are a few large developing countries who have accepted 
the mantle of representing the interests of the developing world in their foreign 
policies and in their multilateral negotiating positions. These states include Brazil, 
                                                
67 Cited in Janis van der Westhuizen, ‘South Africa’s emergence as a middle power’, 
Third World Quarterly,19, No.3 (1998). 
68 Ministério das Relações Exteriores, website of the Brazil Ministry of External 
Relations, 
http://www.mre.gov.br/ingles/politica_externa/discursos/discurso_detalhe.asp?ID_DISC
URSO=2923, accessed online, 7 May, 2007.  
69 Alden and Vieira, “The new diplomacy of the South”, 1077. 
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India, China and South Africa. Their approaches to issues as diverse as climate 
change, humanitarian intervention and technology transfer, have been tinged by 
historical ‘anti-imperialism’, acting in tandem with expanded global economic reach 
and reliance on multilateral institutions to broaden their diplomatic scope. At the 
same time, the internationalism of the Western democracies has come under 
increasing pressure in recent years, employed as it has been, in the service of military 
interventions in among others, Kosovo, and recently, Libya. 
 
Clarifying the concept of internationalism in foreign policy has important 
implications for a number of areas: theoretically, there is no in-depth exploration of 
internationalism in the foreign policies of developing countries, with most of the 
research having been conducted on the internationalist foreign policies of the 
‘classical’ like-minded middle power states, namely, the Nordic countries, along with 
Canada and Holland.70 While the link between domestic social-democracy and 
internationalism has been more or less firmly established in these cases71, these 
studies do not shed light on the motivations of less wealthy polities for 
internationalist foreign policies. In addition, there is little research being conducted 
on the intellectual influences on, and contributions made by, foreign policymaking 
in the developing world. Foreign policymaking in the former third world is largely 
seen either as a knee-jerk reaction to the environment occupied by the state in 
question, or as a concession to ideology. That is to say, it is brushed aside either as 
the performance of survival and realpolitik, or as empty ideology. For policy 
purposes, studying the foreign policies of these countries – now referred to as 
‘emerging powers’ - provides a better understanding of their motivations, as well as 
                                                
70 Cranford Pratt, ed., Middle Power Internationalism: The North-South Dimension 
(Quebec: McGill-Queens University Press, 1990); Cranford Pratt, ed., Internationalism 
Under Strain: The North-South policies of Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, and 
Sweden (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1989); Olav Stokke, ed., Western Middle 
Powers and Global Poverty: The determinants of the aid policies of Canada, Denmark, 
the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African 
Studies, 1989). These volumes were all outcomes of the same research project, The 
Western Middle Powers and the Global Poverty Project, established in the early 1980s.  
71 See David Black, 1992. “Australian, Canadian and Swedish Policies Toward Southern 
Africa: A comparative study of ‘Middle Power Internationalism’”. Unpublished PhD 
Thesis: Dalhousie University; Mikko Kuisma, “Social Democratic Internationalism and 
the Welfare State After the “Golden Age””, Cooperation and Conflict, 42, No.1 (2007); 
Annika Bergman, “Co-Constitution of Domestic and International Welfare Obligations: 
The Case of Sweden’s Social Democratically Inspired Internationalism”, Cooperation 
and Conflict, 42, No.1 (2007). 
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potentially providing indications of their future plans and how to manage relations 
with them.  
 
It should still be noted that to study any form of idea or ‘ideology’ in foreign policy 
is to engage in a cautious task of ascribing motives to actions, where direct causal 
arrows cannot always clearly and accurately be drawn. Furthermore, as Robert Cox 
noted in 1979, “(i)deological analysis is… a critic’s weapon and one most effectively 
used against the prevailing orthodoxies which, when stripped of their putative 
universality, become seen as special pleading for historically transient but presently 
entrenched interests”72. To what extent ‘internationalism’ in the developing world73 
serves as ‘special pleading for…transient interests’ is a question that has been 
analysed before, with reference to the establishment of the OPEC oil cartel, the 
calls for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), and more recently, the 
leadership assumed in multilateral trade negotiations and certain peacekeeping 
operations by large developing countries such as India, Brazil and South Africa. 
Internationalism is an ‘ideal type’ category of foreign policy orientation, and as such 
there are many real-world variants and limitations on its practice. Nonetheless, it is 
still possible, and indeed necessary, to analyse the impact of professed 
internationalism on the foreign policies of states of all types, as it is in the name of 
internationalism that many far-reaching foreign policy decisions are made. 
 
                                                
72 Robert Cox, “Ideologies and the New International Economic Order: Reflections on 
Some Recent Literature”, International Organization, 33, No.2 (1979): 257.  
73 The terms ‘Third World’ and ‘developing world’ are used interchangeably in this thesis. 
I have chosen not to enter the worthy debate on the labelling of this group of countries, 
but to allow my arguments to rest on the assumptions of 1) a common perspective with 
regard to international economic relations, and 2) colonial histories, to serve as my 
guide in using these terms. My analysis will proceed to two countries that have 
unequivocally identified with the developing world. For further discussion of the 
terminology, see Mark T. Berger, “The end of the ‘Third World’?”, Third World Quarterly, 
15, No.2 (1994), and Leslie Wolf-Phillips, “Why ‘Third World’? Origin, Definition and 
Usage”, Third World Quarterly, 9, No4 (1987). The World Bank defines ‘Developing 
countries’ as “countries with low or middle levels of GNP per capita [USD755-USD9, 265 
in 1999] as well as five high-income developing countries – Hong Kong (China), Israel, 
Kuwait, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates” (World Bank website, Glossary). The 
Bank justified the inclusion of the latter five in spite of their high per capita income 
because of the structure of their economies, or because of official positions taken by 
their governments A further reason for my reluctance to define the Third World and list 
the countries that inhabit it, is because the thesis questions precisely the use of the idea 
of the ‘Third World’, and its attendant ideologies, in the furtherance of specific foreign 
policy aims.   
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The chapter proceeds with a general examination of the concept of 
‘internationalism’ in international thought. A periodised history of internationalism 
from just before World War I to the post-Cold War period is provided. This is 
followed by an interrogation of the question of what ‘internationalism’ may mean 
when in it is not employed in the service of ‘Western’ values and goals – given that 
the term has come to be synonymous with quintessentially ‘Western’ foreign 
policies. Doubt over precisely this question has led some to question which side 
‘emerging powers’ are on in the international normative landscape. However, it has 
also opened the way for a ‘new’ internationalism as embraced by large developing 
countries. Owing to the prominence of the state in developing country foreign 
policy discourses, the role of the state in the internationalism of the South will be 
analysed. The discussion of the state ties this foreign policy trend to domestic 
developments within developing countries and highlights the utility of 
internationalism as a foreign policy tool for emerging states. Just before concluding, 
some critiques of Southern internationalism are discussed.  
 
 
2.1 Which internationalism? 
 
The key dividing line in scholarly and political conceptions of internationalism is 
that between its substantive and procedural aspects. There are additional concerns 
stemming from an internationalist commitment in international politics, such as the 
rate and type of change envisaged for the international system, and the tension 
between maintaining the peace and defending the law. A discussion of these 
questions forms the focus of this section.  
 
‘Internationalism’ has been described as applicable to “any outlook, or practice, that 
tends to transcend the nation towards a wider community, of which nations 
continue to form the principal units”74. For Fred Halliday, it is  
 
a set of ideas founded on a belief that the world is becoming more and more 
integrated and united, a belief that this objective process is accompanied by a 
growing sense of international belonging, identity, responsibility, even citizenship – 
                                                
74 Perry Anderson, “Internationalism: A Breviary”, New Left Review, Issue 14 (Mar/Apr 
2002): 6. 
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and most important, that these two processes, and their interaction, are broadly to 
be desired, ‘a good thing’.75  
 
More substantively, internationalism refers to “the idea that we both are and should 
be part of a broader community than that of the nation or the state”.76  
 
An earlier, and very influential interpretation came from the student of imperialism, 
J.A Hobson, for whom it was characterised by “its assumptions of rationality, the 
harmony of interests and the possibility (or inevitability) of progress in human 
affairs”77. For Lawler, internationalism is “a philosophy of foreign policy 
constructed around an ethical obligation on the part of states actively to pursue 
authentically other-regarding values and interests”78. There is thus broad agreement 
on internationalism compelling action extending beyond the nation, or the state, 
and having ethical foundations.  
 
In a narrower, procedural, sense, ‘internationalism’ is also the name given to an 
international political programme. This programme, it may be argued, has 
universally been seen as an antidote to the pitfalls of an anarchical international 
system, through its commitment to finding means of peaceful coexistence between 
sovereign states. Through the ages, the programme has assumed different forms, 
depending on how threats to international peace and security are conceived. 
Internationalism has traditionally been suggested as a ‘middle way’ between ‘realism’ 
and ‘universalism’79. While for realists conflict is inherent in a system composed of 
independent states, without a central overarching authority, ‘universalists’ place 
greater store in ‘the essential unity of mankind’, regardless of the divisions imposed 
by ‘international relations’ and state sovereignty.80 Yet, internationalism appears to 
accept the inevitability of conflict between states, while still seeking peaceful means 
of conflict mediation.  
                                                
75 Fred Halliday, “International Relations in a post-hegemonic age”, International Affairs, 
85, No.1 (2009): 47. 
76 Fred Halliday, “Three concepts of internationalism”, International Affairs, 64, No. 2 
(1988): 187.  
77 J.A. Hobson, cited in David Long, Towards a new liberal internationalism: the 
international theory of J.A. Hobson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 3.  
78 Ibid., 441.  
79 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 24-7, cited in Kjell Goldmann, The logic of 
internationalism: coercion and accommodation (London: Routledge, 1994): 19.  
80 Goldmann, The Logic of Internationalism, 19-20.  
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‘Internationalism’ has thus been associated both with the prospect of ethics in 
international affairs, and with the mechanisms for ameliorating the practice of 
international affairs by power politics, for example, through greater economic 
interdependence and greater reliance on international law and institutions.81 These 
views may be arranged on a continuum, from conservative (solidarist to pluralist) 
conceptions of internationalism, which emphasise security and state sovereignty; 
and more radical conceptions, predicated on far-reaching ideological convictions 
(which can also be solidarist or pluralist). The first type, solidarist-conservative, is 
exemplified by the solidarity of western Europe after World War II in opposing 
Communism, embodied in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), along 
with the federalist plans for the European Community.82 Pluralist conservative 
internationalism was evident in Allied cooperation with Stalin in the drawing up of 
the plans for the post-war order, especially the constitution of the permanent 
membership of the UN Security Council (UNSC). Examples of solidarist radical 
internationalism include the African group in the UN General Assembly (UNGA) 
during the 1970s, when similar identities converged on specific international 
interests, such as the ending of apartheid in South Africa and the introduction of 
fairer trading practices with the North. Pluralist radical internationalism was typified 
by NAM, which accommodated both Western-aligned and Soviet-aligned member 
states, in spite of its ‘non-aligned’ appellation.83  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Continuum of Internationalist views 
                                                
81 Goldmann, The Logic of internationalism.  
82 Carsten Holbraad, Internationalism and nationalism in European political thought 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003): 22.  
83 As shown by Alden et al., through its first 25 years of existence, the NAM membership 
trod a careful path between moderation and radicalism in order to maintain their unity of 
purpose and the continued existence of the organization as an alternative to the East-
West rivalry. See Alden, et al., The South in World Politics, especially Chapter 2.  
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According to Goldmann, internationalist outlooks may be seen as either inward-
looking or outward-looking.84 Outward-looking programmes may be further 
divided into particularist and universalist programmes. If a programme is outward-
looking and particularist, it seeks the holder’s own good and the propagation of his 
own values; while universalist programmes tend to seek the realisation of values 
deemed to be universally applicable. This is proposed in the current chapter as the 
distinction between the internationalism of the developed and developing worlds. 
While the internationalism of the advanced countries has sought to propagate values 
such as democracy and market capitalism, the internationalism of the developing 
world has long sought to protect the rights of individual states to govern themselves 
in the manner that each saw fit. While this position often fell prey to despotic self-
interest, its perspective is nonetheless worth closer analysis (see Section 2.3).  
 
The universalist outlook itself may be divided into a conflict-oriented outlook, and a 
coexistence-oriented outlook. For Jens Bartelson, this is a question about the 
ultimate objective of systemic transformation:  
 
Whereas some have regarded and perhaps still would regard internationalism as a 
way to bring about the victory of one set of universal values over rivaling ones, 
others would regard internationalism as a way of reconciling competing value 
systems in a pluralist world.85  
 
Thus, what separates these two is the premium placed upon peace and security: 
while peace is the highest end of the coexistence-oriented outlook, for the conflict-
oriented outlook, other values may take precedence, such as justice or equality, or 
human rights and democracy.86  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
84 Goldmann, The Logic of Internationalism: 2. 
85 Jens Bartelson, “The Trial of Judgment: A Note on Kant and the Paradoxes of 
Internationalism”, International Studies Quarterly, 39, No.2 (1995): 256.  
86 Goldmann, The Logic of Internationalism: 3. 
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INTERNATIONALISM AS A PERSPECTIVE ON INTERNATIONAL 
POLITICS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The Concept of Internationalism 
 
 
 
Finally, the coexistence-oriented form of internationalism may be radical, aimed at 
substantial transformation of the international system, potentially leading to the 
establishment of a world government. More moderate aims seek gradual change in 
international life. 
 
Internationalism may assume coercive or accommodative forms. In its 
accommodative form it involves a commitment to the reduction of the likelihood of 
international conflict through the operation of international rules, including both 
legal and non-legal norms. It is therefore involved in the creation of rules, the 
institutionalisation of non-legal rules; and, the enhancement of compliance with 
international rules.87 The accommodative aspect of internationalism takes for 
                                                
87 Ibid., 28-38.  
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granted that states will always have incompatible interests, by virtue of their 
structural environment and composition. In its coercive form, however, 
internationalism aims to reduce these incompatibilities. Internationalism in its 
coercive form involves an attempt to replicate the techniques of small group social 
control in the international system of sovereign states.88 
 
It may be difficult both to maintain peace and uphold the sanctity of international 
law, however, as keeping the law may involve punitive measures. This is known as 
the “Internationalists’ Dilemma”.89 States from the former developing world have 
particularly come under fire in recent years for their apparent disregard of the 
requirements of the maintenance of international peace and security through their 
insistence on alternative means of conflict resolution. The traditional institutional 
means of conflict resolution have in some instances been seen as corrupted by the 
influence of past and present imperial powers. Thus, certain initiatives, such as 
South Africa’s diversion of the Myanmar question from the UNSC during its 2007-8 
tenure as a non-permanent member, have invited heated criticism. An alternative 
view may see this action as part of an internationalist project to strengthen the 
machinery of multilateralism, so as not to place overwhelming power in the hands 
of a UNSC widely perceived to be unrepresentative, and undemocratic.90 
 
Thus, in answer to the question posed as the title of this section, ‘Which internationalism?’, large 
developing countries, it is suggested, have sought to embody an internationalism in their foreign 
policies that is outward-looking, universalist, co-existence oriented, and moderate. This means that 
a duty for international action is recognised; action is predicated on the universal values of statehood 
(as opposed to humanity); peace and security represent higher values than the triumph of any 
particular value; and, change sought is moderate and gradual.  
 
In order to gauge the significance of internationalism as practised by the developing 
world, it is instructive to trace the trajectory of internationalism in the twentieth 
century. This is the subject matter of the following section.  
 
                                                
88 Ibid., 45.  
89 Ibid., 50.  
90 It is recognised that enlarging the UNSC could also weaken it. See Thomas G. Weiss, 
“The Illusion of UN Security Council Reform”,The Washington Quarterly, 26, No.4 
(2003): 147-161.   
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2.2 A Periodised History of Internationalism 
2.2.1 Early conceptions 
Liberal internationalism was characterised, from the eighteenth century 
onward, by optimistic ideas based on the belief that “independent societies and 
autonomous individuals can through greater interaction and cooperation evolve 
towards common purposes, chief among these being peace and prosperity”.91 This 
was a persistent strain of internationalism, evident in the ideas of Adam Smith and 
his peers during the Scottish Enlightenment; again in the nineteenth century and its 
belief in free trade; and, once more in the twentieth century in the plans for the 
League of Nations, and its successor, the United Nations.  
This was an internationalism that as often as not eschewed world government and 
encouraged the emergence of sovereign nation-states, but which saw the 
satisfaction of national demands as a precondition for the emergence of a more 
cooperative international order.92  
 
Hence, this was neither (yet) a cosmopolitan internationalism, nor one that looked 
forward to a world government, but one that retained the value of independent 
nation-states and an apparent grip on the ‘realities’ of international power politics.  
 
The socialist internationalism of Marx was decidedly outside the bounds of the 
repressive and brutal state of the time (the autocratic monarchies of the mid-19th 
century). It was an international solidarity with an interest in socialist revolutions 
and independence movements. The internationalism Marx envisaged would have 
been required to repel any attempts by reactionary states to quell democratic and 
socialist movements.93 Hence this was an internationalism of the international 
working class qua class, both universalist and radical in its intent. It was not yet a 
state project, and was, in fact, competing with the state.  
 
During and after World War I, internationalism was seen as the basis for thinking 
about the prospects for international government, in terms of a moral emphasis on 
‘the need for a new international consciousness’.94 Embodied in this international 
consciousness was the idea of progress and the conviction that a positive 
                                                
91 Halliday, “Three concepts of internationalism”, 192.  
92 Ibid., 
93 Alan Gilbert, “Marx on Internationalism and War”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 7, 
No.4, (Summer, 1978): 355.  
94 Casper Sylvest, “Continuity and change in British liberal internationalism, c. 1900-
1930”, Review of International Studies,31, No.2 (2005): 266.  
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transformation in the anarchical international system was possible, so that it would 
better resemble domestic order, which was more conducive to the pursuit of 
collective goals. World War I represents a neat dividing line between the moral drift 
toward internationalism and an internationalism established more firmly (it was 
hoped) in real-life institutions. When moral force, predicated on rationalism, failed 
to prevent the catastrophic Great War, attention turned increasingly to institutional 
means, such as the League of Nations, of preventing international warfare. Today’s 
developing countries participated in these projects: South Africa and India as 
members of the British Empire delegation, and as participants in their own right, 
and Brazil as an independent state, along with Haiti, China, Liberia and a number of 
South American countries, even if only as ‘powers with special [as opposed to 
general] interests’, or participants who could only be present on issues where their 
interests were directly at stake.95 
 
It may be said that it was the onset of two world wars that, paradoxically, rendered 
the objectives of liberal internationalism more ambitious. The reliance on moral 
progress and rationality had not prevented the outbreak of major war, and efforts 
were set in train to establish institutions that could preclude the resort to war for the 
future resolution of disputes. Since commerce, now found to be quite compatible 
with warfare, was not enough to stem the tide of violent conflict, more stringent 
standards would have to be set and institutionalised.96 This did not bode well for a 
pluralist international society, which had just become more diverse with the rise of 
Japan.  
 
2.2.2 Cold War 
The primary referent of internationalism during the Cold War was the group 
of middle powers, namely the Nordic states – Denmark, Norway and Sweden, along 
with Australia, Holland and Canada. Lawler characterises the Nordic 
internationalism as one practiced by states who “established a reputation for having 
foreign policies that were ‘more responsive to cosmopolitan values and 
                                                
95 Ruth Beatrice Henig, Versailles and after, 1919-1933. (Abingdon: Routledge, 1995): 
74.  
96 Halliday, “Three concepts of internationalism”, 192.  
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internationalist considerations than…those of many other states”.97 This was 
particularly unusual during the Cold War period, characterised as it was by the 
height of power politics. What was noteworthy about these states was their activism 
in the name of multilateralism, a law-governed international society, and the primacy 
of the UN in maintaining international order98 in the face of a polarised 
international system. Scandinavian internationalism was reasoned away by Realists 
as a response to their smaller stature and comparative military weakness.  
 
The key historical features of this internationalism were: Law, Organisation, 
Exchange and Communication.99 Each of these aspects has been given varying 
emphasis by different approaches to internationalism. What appears to have 
changed in the middle of the twentieth century are the ends to which 
internationalism was adopted as a foreign policy stance. While traditional analyses 
focus on peace and security as the end sought by internationalism, the adoption of 
particular foreign policies by certain developed states in the middle of the last 
century gave a new objective to internationalism. In addition to being set up as a 
response to the problematique of “solving the problem of anarchy without replacing 
anarchy with hierarchy”,100 internationalism became the response to the new 
challenge of how to bring about global economic justice in the absence of a global 
authority, without harming the individual economic interests of states: in short, a 
reformist internationalism. This problem arose in tandem with the independence 
and underdevelopment of formerly colonised Asian and African states. It stemmed 
from the traditional internationalist concern of ameliorating conflict, but was here 
based on the assumptions that “international exchange reduces the likelihood of 
war: (1) by making states increasingly dependent on one another; and (2) by making 
international relations increasingly complex”.101 This form of internationalism was 
ultimately successful in staving off heated North-South conflict. 
 
 
 
                                                
97 Peter Lawler, “Janus-Faced Solidarity: Danish Internationalism Reconsidered”, 
Cooperation and Conflict, 42, Issue 1 (2007): 104, citing Pratt (1989:7).  
98 Ibid., 104.  
99 Goldmann, The Logic of Internationalism, 4.  
100 Ibid., 4. 
101 Ibid., 41.  
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2.2.3 Post-Cold War 
 
The immediate aftermath of the Cold War, accompanied by the apparent ‘end of 
history’ – the triumph of democracy and market economics – saw the emergence of 
a more muscular internationalism. This was supported by the strengthening of the 
United Nations Security Council’s role in international peace operations (although 
eventually the UNSC would prove an obstacle, for example, to US unilateralism), as 
East-West rivalries subsided. Western states, especially the United States and 
Britain, became more willing to use force to intervene in conflicts, and more 
aggressive in the pursuit of spreading democracy. 
 
Anthony Lake, National Security Adviser in the Clinton administration (1993-2001) 
described US foreign policy at the time as ‘pragmatic Wilsonianism’, and 
characterised it as aiming at “expanding democracy and free trade, at defending 
democracy from its foes, at quarantining repressive and pariah states, and at 
protecting and promoting human rights”.102 This may be compared with the writing 
of a US philosopher during the closing stages of WW1 about internationalism: “It is 
therefore the duty of the great nations to assume responsibility for the educational 
and economic development of backward portions of the earth, in order that the 
world can become prepared for an internationalism based upon the principle of 
equal political, social, and economic opportunities for all men”.103 Among the 
weaknesses of this perspective of internationalism are: selective implementation 
owing to limited resources; blind implementation of processes and policies in 
diverse cultures; and the potential for abuse by bellicose leadership.   
 
This form of internationalism underpinned international interventions in response 
to humanitarian crises, such as that undertaken by Western nations of NATO in 
1999 in Kosovo, for example. The very idea of an agreed-upon concept of human 
rights in whose name states could go to war represented a landmark for liberal 
assumptions of progress in the international system. Progress, that is, both with 
reference to individual claims as against state claims, and with regard to what is 
                                                
102 Cited in Stanley Hoffman, “The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism”, Foreign Policy, No. 
98 (Spring 1995): 159.  
103 William Kelley Wright, “Ethical Aspects of Internationalism”, International Journal of 
Ethics, 28, No.3, (April 1918): 354. 
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perceived as a gradual dilution of the ‘moral significance’ of national boundaries, or 
the claims that individuals of one state can make against all states.  
 
These post-Cold War shifts in internationalism, marked less by laissez-faire, than by a 
muscular interventionism, have signalled the onset of a crisis in classical liberal 
internationalism. The distinctive Nordic internationalism of the Cold War period 
has begun to diminish and diverge in the company of more numerous, more 
aggressive, Western internationalisms.104 Academic discussion and the policy of 
internationalism after the Cold War has been animated by debates on interventionist 
foreign policies conducted by the US and Britain.105 These policies have, in turn, 
formed part of political cosmopolitan debates about the proper boundaries of 
ethical action, and the boundaries of the state’s responsibility. Internationalism has 
also been associated with terms such as ‘progressive foreign policy’ and ‘ethical 
foreign policy’. The present work maintains the link of this literature with the state’s 
prominent role in internationalism, and its preoccupation with if and how the state 
can realise, nationally and internationally, concepts of the global good (for the 
moment taken as given). This trend is noted in recent work on the internationalist 
foreign policies of the Nordic countries, analysing the domestic demands for this 
foreign policy stance, and to what uses it has been put.106 This research is 
necessarily comparative and brings into focus the close relationship between 
domestic politics and foreign policy. Bergman has developed an apparently strong 
contention linking domestic levels of welfare provision with international 
commitments to welfare in the Nordic countries.107 This approach focuses on 
advanced industrialised economies and cannot account for the ways in which 
developing countries fashion their accounts of internationalism. Little has been 
written on the internationalism of the developing world, the ideas that gave rise to 
solidarity, and how they are implemented;108 yet, third world internationalism 
                                                
104 Peter Lawler, “Janus-Faced Solidarity: Danish Internationalism Reconsidered”, 
Cooperation and Conflict, 42, Issue 1 (2007). 
105 Lawler, “Janus-Faced Solidarity”,102. See also Tony Blair’s speech in Chicago, 1999 
on ‘The Doctrine of the International Community’, accessed online at 
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106 See Peter Lawler, “The Good State: in praise of ‘classical’ internationalism”, Review 
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107 Bergman, “The Concept of Solidarity”. 
108 For an exception and race-based account, see Darryl C. Thomas, The Theory and 
Practice of Third World Solidarity (Westport: Praeger, 2001). 
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remains a rallying cry in contemporary international relations, especially as a 
potential foil for latter-day Western interventionism.  
 
 
2.3 Internationalism and solidarity outside the West 
 
Internationalism has long been a feature of the foreign policies of significant states 
in the developing world. This form of internationalism came to be characterised by 
four key features, namely: solidarity among developing states (or South-South 
solidarity); commitment to the non-use of force in the resolution of international 
conflicts; a commitment to non-inteference in the internal affairs of other states; 
and, the commitment to multilateralism.  
 
Solidarity has been a defining feature of the foreign policies of developing states 
since the early years of independence. ‘Solidarity’ is defined as “Holding together, 
mutual dependence, community of interests, feelings, and action”.109 This 
perspective informed the aforementioned internationalist foreign policies of the 
Nordic states during the latter decades of the Cold War110. Yet, from the case of 
Cuba’s involvement in Angola’s civil war between 1975 and 1976,111 to widespread 
support for Palestinian statehood, what are here termed ‘third world 
internationalisms’ have been narrowly defined and infrequently analysed in the 
International Relations literature.112  
 
The primary elements of a distinctly ‘Third World’ internationalism began to 
crystallise at Bandung in 1955, at the Asian-African Conference. The realisation of 
their common concerns in international affairs led African and Asian leaders to start 
meeting in the late 1950s, and to begin to constitute a common identity distinct 
                                                
109 Oxford English Dictionary.  
110 See Lawler, “The Good State”, 443.  
111 The declassification of Cuban government documents relating to the mid-1970s 
mission in Angola lent credence to the contention that this mission was not conducted 
upon the instigation of the USSR, and hence was not a clear example of socialist 
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Documents on History of African Involvement’. Accessed at: 
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112 Exceptions from cognate fields include: Richard L. Harris, “Cuban Internationalism, 
Che Guevara, and the Survival of Cuba’s Socialist Regime”, Latin American 
Perspectives, 36, No.27 (2009); John M. Kirk, “Cuba’s Medical Internationalism: 
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from the world of the imperial powers. This position gave rise to the formation of 
the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961. The movement was based on the principles 
of: peace and disarmament; independence and self-determination; economic 
equality; cultural equality; and, universalism and multilateralism.113  
 
Transnationalism – an early solidarity between not yet independent nations - 
retained the primacy of the ‘nation’ in whose name, in many cases, independence 
had been won, yet signalled the strong solidarity across national boundaries of all 
formerly subject peoples. Once independence had been achieved, however, the 
principles of solidarity shifted to embrace a commitment more in favour of the 
international sovereignty of the newly-independent states, encompassing their rights to 
national development and the recognition of their status as equals in international 
politics. This was encapsulated in the principles broadly contained in the Panchsheel, 
agreed to between China and India over the Tibet issue, but later extended to 
relations more broadly in the developing world. While the pre-eminence of the state 
is one key point of divergence, another potential reason for the divergence in 
internationalisms between the developed and developing worlds is the scepticism 
with which the developing world held the ‘normative’ proclamations of the West.114  
 
The development of multilateralism as a key tenet of third world internationalism 
occurred through the early institutional support offered to African and Asian states’ 
by their membership of the institutions of the United Nations, especially the 
General Assembly.115 There, they were singled out as a distinctive group, based on 
the following:  
 
Their aversion to condemnation or denunciation of the communist world; their 
determination to prevent the transformation of the United Nations into a Cold War arena; 
                                                
113 A.W. Singham and Shirley Hune, Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments (London: 
Zed Books, 1986): 14-15. 
114 This is noted in the case of India by Rhada Kumar, “India as a Foreign Policy Actor – 
Normative Redux”, CEPS Working Document No.285, February 2008. Centre for 
European Policy Studies, 1.  
115 For analyses of the African case see John Karefa-Smart, “Africa and the United 
Nations”, International Organization, 19, No.3 (1965) The United Nations: 
Accomplishments and Prospects (Summer, 1965); and David. A. Kay, “The Impact of 
African States on the United Nations” International Organization, 23, No.1 (1969). For an 
analysis of Afro-Asian voting patterns in the UNGA on the Hungarian Question, see 
Samir N. Anabtawi, “The Afro-Asian States and the Hungarian Question”, International 
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their stress on peaceful settlement, negotiations, and conciliation between the two 
superpowers; their hostility to alliances; their professed reliance on moral suasion and the 
force of world public opinion instead of physical coercion ... They play the role of 
modifying some of the decisions of the great powers by affecting their expectations in the 
competition which involves the small countries. It is in this manner that these minor states 
may be said to be influential.116  
 
These states were able to mobilise on major issues of significance to them, including 
decolonisation and the South Africa issue. NAM was joined by the Group of 77 
(G77), formed at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) in 1964.  
 
Bandung entrenched the principles of non-interference and respect for sovereignty, at least 
in theory, in the relations of the developing world. The southern internationalism it 
engendered was further underscored by ‘(a)n almost physical feeling of solidarity 
and shared humiliation’.117 It had domestic resonance, too. Amrith has shown how, 
in the case of Singapore, internationalism created a space where the highly racialised 
public sphere could be transcended – thereby potentially, at least rhetorically, 
undercutting its negative effects. More recently, it may be argued that 
internationalist discourses in the Global South serve a domestic inclusionary 
function once more. While liberal economics has been accepted as a national 
development course in the face of decades of unsuccessful populist economics on 
the part of ruling parties in selected states of the Third World, Marxist outlooks on 
the international economic, social and political environments are parlayed into a 
transcontinental ‘Southern’ internationalism, potentially uniting government elites 
and grassroots activists in opposition to northern neoliberal economics,118 to the 
benefit of governing parties (this will be discussed further in the case study chapters, 
Chapters 5 and 6). 
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The concepts of ‘neutrality’, ‘non-alignment’, ‘Southern solidarity’ and ‘South-South 
co-operation’ have all been used with reference to the international actions of the 
third world as a collectivity. It is worthwhile to separate these concepts from the 
concept of ‘internationalism’ as used in the thesis. To begin with, ‘neutrality’ was 
never a feature of the positions adopted by developing countries in collective 
forums such as the Asian-African Conference of 1955, or the Non-Aligned 
Movement. Non-alignment referred primarily to the right reserved by the newly-
independent states not to declare their support in advance for either the East or West 
blocs on international matters.119 Non-aligned states remained vigorously charged 
with international questions, however, and did not simply seek to avoid affiliation 
with the East or West. Neutrality, meanwhile, is the “legal status that arises from the 
abstention of a state from any participation in a war between other states”.120 
  
‘Southern’ or ‘Third World’ solidarity is an amorphous concept related to the 
support (mainly political and economic) offered to countries lacking in industrial 
development, with a shared colonial experience and a perspective of marginalisation 
in international affairs, by countries sharing these qualities. Finally, ‘South-South 
cooperation’ took form from the end of the 1960s onward, and was inspired by 
dependencia perspectives advanced by South American scholars. It was evident in the 
desire of developing countries, recognising a subservient role in relation to the 
advanced industrialised economies, to de-link from these economies and forge 
stronger economic ties among themselves, which they assumed would be less 
exploitative and more relevant to their development. South-South co-operation has 
taken the form of capital flows and trade contacts, though these have never come 
close to matching the established contacts with traditional Northern economic 
partners.  
 
Third World internationalism, not unlike the internationalism identified with large 
developing states earlier, is a distinct foreign policy posture that assumes the 
developing world as its focal point, and emphasises the issues of international 
economic justice and development; questions of equitable international political 
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120 P.A. Murthy and B.K. Shrivastava, Neutrality and non-alignment in the 1990s, 
(London: Sangam Books: 1991): xv.  
. 
 69 
representation; and peaceful mechanisms of international conflict resolution. It is 
characterised chiefly, but not exclusively, by: a commitment to solidarity with the 
developing world; a commitment to the peaceful resolution of international 
disputes; a commitment to multilateralism; and, a commitment to non-interference 
in the domestic affairs of other states.  
 
It is in this context that contemporary influential developing states are seen as ‘heirs 
to Bandung’. It was within the post-Cold War, ‘Global War on Terror’ framework 
that, paradoxically, an opportunity arose for certain larger developing countries to 
exercise a measure of leadership on particular international questions. This 
stemmed, in part, from a perceived lack of legitimacy on the part of the most 
powerful states, namely the US and Britain. It may also be attributed to both the 
growing visibility of emerging economic powers, and from the exhibition of 
sensitivity from the developed world that followed terror attacks on their territories, 
and, the subsequent search for partners in the renewed objectives to reduce global 
inequality, perceived to be linked to terrorism, and other global problems, such as 
the management of the global economy and climate.121 
 
Therefore, while in the developed world internationalism has largely been linked to 
solving traditional security problems in the international system, for the developing 
world, there are the additional focuses of increasing their international 
representation, particularly concerning multilateral institutions, and increasing their 
autonomy through greater numerical strength, and by the provision of alternatives 
(whether for financial or other material support) to potentially exploitative relations 
with established powers.122  These qualities imbue the contemporary emerging 
powers with the same features as erstwhile ‘middle powers’. In the literature 
spanning the turn of the 21st century, middle powers were seen to be playing more 
diffuse roles on a multiplicity of issues. Cox identified four key attributes: 
                                                
121 See Statement by G8 leaders, and the leaders of Brazil, China, India, Mexico and 
South Africa following the terrorist attacks on London, 07/07/05.  
122 This is not to assert that South-South relations may not be exploitative. For example, 
the methods used in South Africa’s pursuit of its commercial interests in Africa have 
been met with considerable controversy from within the Continent. See John Daniel, 
Varusha Naidoo and Sanusha Naidu, “The South Africans have arrived: Post-apartheid 
corporate expansion into Africa”, in State of the Nation 2003-4, eds., John Daniel, Adam 
Habib and Roger Southall, (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2004). 
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An ability to take a certain distance from direct involvement in major conflicts, a 
sufficient degree of autonomy in relation to major powers, a commitment to 
orderliness and security in inter-state relations and to facilitating of orderly change 
in the world system….123 
 
Indeed, while there is no clear definition of middle power in the literature, there is 
broad agreement on its behavioural and functional characteristics, and the ascription 
of this label to certain large developing states, such as India, Brazil and South 
Africa.124 Internationalism is a key feature of middle power foreign policy.125  
 
Contrary to the pursuit of ethical foreign policies in developed parts of the world, 
where they reflect the ‘exhaustion of modern politics’,126 rapidly industrialising 
developing countries, even the most internationally competitive members of this 
group, are still caught up in the challenges of these modern politics: the politics of 
development and progress, leaving little political room for deliberation on ethical 
foreign policies. Yet, what may be termed ‘ethical’ foreign policies, in the sense that 
these policies appear to be based on some normative foundation, but do not appear 
to accrue immediately perceptible benefits to the country, have increasingly been 
practiced by emerging developing countries, in face of sometimes stern opposition 
from domestic quarters. 
 
According to Lawler,  
the principal challenge now for any resuscitated internationalist alternative to the 
dominant narrative of Western foreign policy is an investigation of what kinds of 
national context can generate an internationalist discourse sufficiently sensitive to 
the cultural complexities of the contemporary world or contemporary multi-ethnic 
states and to the dangers of a presumptive moral universalism.127  
 
This is indeed the claim of the ‘new’ Southern internationalism: that the national 
contexts that can provide a measure of this sensitivity are those that have 
                                                
123 Robert Cox, “Middlepowermanship, Japan, and future world order”, in Approaches to 
World Order, Cox, Robert W with Timothy J. Sinclair (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996, 1989): 244. 
124 See Alexandre Nina, “Action against hunger and poverty: Brazilian foreign policy in 
Lula’s first term (2003-2006)”, Working Paper Number CBS-83-07, Centre for Brazilian 
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experienced international marginalisation, and those that are facing challenges of 
development and political articulation themselves; those who have fallen prey to 
moral universalism, and those who seek to resist it.  
 
2.4 Internationalism and the State 
 
What role is there for the state in Southern internationalism? In recent years, it has 
appeared that ‘global civil society’ has assumed much of the responsibility for 
representing the interests of the Global South. This was evident in protests such as 
the Battle for Seattle in 1999, and in more recent campaigns to cancel Third World 
debt, and to raise the profile of international development issues in developed 
countries. In addition to this, rightful scepticism may be attached to any attempt at 
ideological posturing and solidarity on the part of certain states in the developing 
world, whose records of democratic governance are not unblemished. As noted 
earlier, however, it was in the name of the state and independence for peoples 
subject to colonialism that earlier forms of internationalism in the developing world 
took shape. As Brennan notes, “Good dialectical sense would suggest that a political 
form born in the epoch of colonial conquest [the state] might play some role in 
resisting the next stage of imperial hegemony”.128 The state in the South is a 
valuable vehicle for the practice of internationalism, as will be shown in this section, 
although some important challenges still remain.  
 
Each era of internationalism since its apotheosis after World War I has had cause to 
re-fashion itself in response to its assumptions about the state. As Sylvest notes, 
prior to the outbreak of World War I, a conception of internationalism prevailed 
which had little to do with the state.129 The term ‘internationalism’ was first used in 
English in the 19th century, to denote a range of relations, from transnational 
relations of any kind, to specific liberal concepts of imperialism (the moral 
conception)130 and has most frequently been linked, with reference to the early 
twentieth century, to the calls for the establishment of international institutions in 
                                                
128 Timothy Brennan, “Cosmopolitanism and Internationalism” New Left Review, 7 
(January-February, 2001): 76.  
129 Casper Sylvest, “Beyond the State? Pluralism and Internationalism in Early 
Twentieth-Century Britain”, International Relations, 21, No.1 (2007): 73.  
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the face of anarchy in the international system (the institutional conception).131 
Although the term was initially more frequently used to denote cooperation 
between individuals, groups and nations, and emphasized the development of 
international law, it was not necessarily concerned with cosmopolitan ideas of 
transcending the state.132 The foremost example of internationalism in the closing 
decades of the nineteenth century was the international labour movement, the 
International Workingmen’s Association (the First International), which Halliday 
directly implicates in the coining of the term ‘internationalism’. After World War I, 
the nation-state returned to favour as the “most important building block”133 in the 
internationalist view of politics. This was accompanied by a centralisation of 
domestic politics following the war.134  
 
This commitment to the state as the primary vehicle of internationalism found 
resonance in the independence and nationalist struggles of many states of the 
former Third World. This commitment to the state, combined with the notion of 
‘solidarity’, are, however, two features that have resulted in the de-emphasis of 
human rights – a prominent feature of liberal internationalism - in ‘Southern’ 
internationalism. Starting at Bandung, a dual, potentially conflicting, discourse was 
peddled, of transnational solidarity on questions pertaining to the independence of 
colonised nations on the one hand, and the near-silence on colonised minorities on the 
other. Highly salient is the fact that third world internationalism was conceived in 
the context of struggles for decolonisation; hence, there were significant 
impediments to it being thought of in any terms but statist ones.  
 
Afro-Asian solidarity coalesced around their respective struggles for independence: 
“The fundamental consensus of Bandung was an emphasis on the absolute 
sovereignty of the post-colonial state”.135 Thus, at a time when European states 
were commencing the process that would lead to the eventual negotiation of a 
measure of their respective national sovereignties, through the launch in 1951 of the 
European Coal and Steel Community, in Africa and Asia, expressions of political 
modernity were taking place in the non-negotiable form of the independent, post-
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colonial state.136 The commitment to the sovereignty of the state was even 
embraced in the call for a New International Economic Order in the 1970s, a 
demand that limited the issues of contention to states.137  
 
Just as it did among industrialised countries, the dialectic relationship between 
nationalism and internationalism played out in newly-independent states, with its 
effects both in the international arena and domestically. Importantly, while it would 
be anachronistic to speak of ‘internationalism’ existing between Africans and Asians 
before the end of colonialism in the middle of the last century, the roots of later 
internationalism, embodied in what would become state foreign policies, can be 
traced to the ideologies and convictions of sub- and pre-nation state formations, 
such as political parties (like the African National Congress in South Africa, and the 
Indian National Congress in India): here, the roots of internationalism were nationalist. 
Hence, this form of internationalism prized the hard-won sovereignty of developing 
countries, even at the expense of individual human rights. This strand of 
internationalism was exemplified by the principles of the Panchsheel, which included, 
as aforementioned: mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and 
sovereignty; non-aggression; non-interference in each others’ internal affairs; 
equality and mutual benefit; and, peaceful coexistence.  
 
The question has been raised whether international solidarity still requires the 
nation-state.138 This question is highlighted by the entry into government of the left 
in a number of pivotal states worldwide, a trend that has arguably changed the 
nature of the state, and potentially, the nature of solidarity. However, “(The State 
offers) a manageable (albeit top-heavy) site within which the working poor can 
make limited claims on power, and have at least some opportunity to affect the way 
they are ruled”.139 The North-South divide still animates a variety of major 
international issue areas, such as the global climate talks, the stalled Doha Round of 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and a number of conflicts on which 
developed countries differ with the developing world. The state is still being 
vociferously contested in many so-called Third World locales: it is still a treasured 
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goal for Palestinians, for example. In terms of international law, furthermore, the 
state is the only unit recognised to act in the name of a nation, and therefore has 
noted powers of representation, whatever its shortcomings. Hence, it may be argued 
that the state retains its significance as a vehicle of international solidarity. 
 
Realism in foreign policy, placing a premium on the jealousy with which states 
guard their sovereignty in the anarchical international system, remains the 
counterside of traditional internationalism for developing countries. This has been 
evident in recent years in the opposition to humanitarian interventions voiced by 
certain developing countries, such as South Africa, India and China, who all 
disapproved vocally of NATO’s attacks on Serbia in 1999; and, most recently, 
BRICS opposition to military action by NATO in Libya.  
 
Thus, internationalism may be considered a set of instruments of diplomacy at the 
disposal of states, while it also plays a role in defining the goals of foreign policy. It 
has ideational components, such as South-South solidarity, and multilateralism,  
along with instrumental components, such as commitment to the non-use of force, 
and to non-interventionism. While these two elements may be difficult to separate 
in practice, there are times when the instrumental use of internationalism is evident 
at the expense of its strong moral content.  This has been the basis of the strongest 
critiques of Southern internationalism. 
 
 
2.5 Critiques of Southern Internationalism 
The classical challenges to these defences of Third World, or Southern, 
internationalism retain some of their force, however. The realist challenge is 
presented in the form of state interests, such that states can never seen to be acting 
altruistically, but always governed by some commitment to the national interest. 
Southern governments have repeatedly vindicated these challenges in recent years, 
whether by the African Union’s sheltering of Sudanese president, Omar al-Bashir, 
after his indictment on war crimes by the International Criminal Court (ICC), or by 
lack of censure of illiberal governments by Southern-dominated institutions of the 
UN. EH Carr’s ‘realist critique of internationalism’, while he did not have large 
developing states in mind, made the case that calls for solidarity “come from those 
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dominant nations which may hope to exercise control over a unified world”.140 The 
claim that ‘we are not just for ourselves, we are ‘international’’ could easily be used 
as justification for expansion, or some other forms of material benefit. 
“’International order’ and ‘international solidarity’”, noted Carr, “will always be 
slogans of those who feel strong enough to impose them on others.”141 
  
Of equal significance here are the post-structuralist critiques questioning liberal 
cosmopolitanism’s ‘homogenising universalism’ and ‘linear progressivism’.142 
Through its commitment theoretically, or in practice, or both, to the sovereign 
independence of other states, and the principle of non-interference in the domestic 
affairs of others, internationalism as it emerged in the developing world, while it 
may be a victim of numerous others, does not fall prey to these weaknesses. As 
Lawler has suggested, ‘classical internationalism’, undertaken by states, could be the 
sought-after middle ground between idealistic cosmopolitanism and flagrant 
interventionism as seen in Iraq in 2003. 
 
The form of solidarity that is hailed to defend the supra-national interests of large 
developing countries is most often limited to the shared humanity of the immediate 
region, or continent – or at a stretch, impoverished people worldwide. The 
commitment to equality of all people and to democratising multilateral institutions, 
as well as bringing about equitable international economic arrangements is born of 
this conviction. In recent years, these convictions have come up squarely against the 
settled norms of the Western international order, as this order has come under 
increasing threat from diverse cultural approaches and interpretations of 
international order; and, indeed, from the manner in which it has been defended by 
powerful Western states, too (mainly in the form of military interventions). Not 
unlike a number of other developing and formerly ‘non-aligned’ governments, for 
example,  
many in Brazil and in particular many who later were associated with the Lula 
government suspected that the liberal norms of the 1990s concerning human 
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rights, democracy, and free markets had been used in selective ways to reflect 
narrow national interests.143  
 
In addition,  
(s)ince the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, many have suspected 
Washington of exploiting new security threats to mobilize support at home and 
abroad for the projection and expansion of US power.144  
 
Therefore, while the times have changed, solidarity among governments of 
the developing world still appears to be working at cross-purposes to the 
international goals of the advanced industrialised democracies of the West. What is 
a point of concern for the latter is that many of these developing countries now also 
embrace democracy and have made giant leaps in terms of development, with the 
potential to increase their influence on their regional neighbours and other 
developing countries, and in the world financial system. This extends also to their 
claims to represent the developing world in important international negotiating 
forums. The question becomes one of whether these states have changed to 
accommodate the international normative order as propagated by the West, or 
whether they have sought to adapt that order to their own conceptions of order.  
 
 
Conclusion 
Internationalism is a strident political force in contemporary global politics. In spite 
of its somewhat vague conceptual clarity, it forms a key component – especially 
since the end of the Cold War - of the foreign policies of a number of great powers 
and intermediate states. The developed and developing worlds have typically been 
divided over whether to pursue the substantive, proselytising aspects of 
internationalism (also labelled ‘liberal internationalism’), or the procedural, 
institutional aspects of internationalism.  
 
This chapter has sought to show how internationalism has come to the forefront of 
the foreign policies of certain influential developing states. While it shares much 
with traditional forms of internationalism witnessed in the foreign policies of a 
number of social democracies during the Cold War, there is also much that is 
different with reference to this variant of internationalism. The relationship between 
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domestic welfare arrangements and foreign policy is not as stark, for one. A second 
is the divergent views on state sovereignty and non-intervention. The concept of 
internationalism in the foreign policies of countries of the Global South has 
coalesced around four key tenets, namely: solidarity, multilateralism, non-interference and 
respect for sovereignty, and non-violent means of conflict resolution. 
 
Southern internationalism, cultivated since the early decades of the last century, has 
been shown to be more than mere ideology, serving instead as an enduring 
cornerstone of foreign policy for many developing states of all sizes. Southern 
internationalism may be a potential successor to Western internationalism, which 
has endured a crisis since the end of the Cold War: a crisis of legitimacy and 
implementation. The Southern response is an internationalism of accommodation 
rather than coercion, and internationalism as a mechanism for the coexistence of 
divergent values and national cultures, rather than a vehicle for the propagation of 
specific values.  
 
However, this stance is far from unproblematic. One of the main tensions involved 
in the analysis of internationalism in the foreign policies of developing countries is 
that the attendant cosmopolitan assumptions that such policies rest on are 
considered to be the products of modern outlooks on international life. Countries 
of the developing world are typically considered to be grappling with the 
establishment of the first modernist principle of international life, sovereignty or 
statehood, and the strengthening of their jurisdiction over clearly delimited 
geographical territories. There is also still much scepticism attached to the 
attribution of internationalism to the foreign policies of the developing world.  
 
With growing domestic resources, large developing countries that project 
cosmopolitan foreign policy goals, such as the democratisation of multilateral 
institutions, the equity of the international financial architecture, and the respect for 
diversity in international relations, increasingly square up to pressures of self-interest 
and power, pillars of the realist domain of international relations. How to make 
theoretical sense of these tensions – and a proposed solution – are the subject of 
the following chapter.  
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Chapter 3: The State, Internationalism, and Governing 
Parties: A Neoclassical Realist Approach to FPA for 
Emerging Powers 
 
Introduction 
 
Why do states with limited disposable resources commit to foreign policies that 
require the mobilisation and extraction of national resources in areas that do not 
represent obvious threats or opportunities? Internationalism in the foreign policies 
of intermediate states poses a puzzle for analysts of foreign policy. Given the 
uncertainty regarding the internationalist credentials of large and powerful 
developing states, it appears necessary to devise, or apply, a theoretical approach 
that could account for the role of internationalism, and other-regarding behaviour 
by states of the developing world that marries their emergent role (in terms of 
capabilities) with their particular outlook on foreign policy.  
 
This chapter makes the case for internationalism as practiced by large states in the 
developing world, as a foreign policy instrument aimed at enlarging the scope of 
interests of a state, and hence its scope of activity; raising its international 
diplomatic profile (allowing it to ‘punch above its weight’ in international affairs); 
and, increasing the extent to which it can influence smaller states and powers. While 
it may appear counter-intuitive, internationalism as a tool of foreign policy in this 
way achieves a comfortable fit with the realist, especially the classical realist, outlook 
on international life, which privileges competition for scarce positional resources – 
such as “prestige, status, political influence, leadership, political leverage, a positive 
trade balance or market shares”.145 These are all hallmarks of the foreign policies of 
contemporary emerging powers. While classical realism would disavow any 
commitment of the state to those living beyond its borders,146 neoclassical realism, 
through the introduction of unit-level variables, highlights the role played by 
political leadership and unit-level characteristics in determining the trajectory of 
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foreign policy. The latter include ideational components, which may involve the 
state in responsibilities to those beyond its confines.  
 
Yet, emerging powers do not operate within a vacuum. They are constantly 
cognisant of their relative position in international politics. Brazilian presidents and 
diplomats, for example, have made repeated reference to Brazil’s ‘rightful place’ in 
the global order; while other emerging powers are acutely aware of their regional 
status and how they are perceived by their neighbours.  
 
The emergence of new actors on the international political scene, adopting classical 
pro-developing world postures, while growing rapidly in economic terms and 
playing pivotal regional security and diplomatic roles, has muddied the way 
intermediate, or ‘middle’ powers, are discussed and analysed. These are no longer 
small, advanced capitalist democracies, with homogeneous populations and strong 
corporatist relations between state and society. They are multiethnic, developing 
countries with mixed records on democracy, and with specific ideas about their 
desired roles in international relations. Some of the prevailing discourses about the 
international relations of second-tier states (both developed and less developed) 
have invoked their propensity to be different sorts of power than the great powers 
that outrank them in material capability, and often in diplomatic influence.147 This 
difference stems from their place within the international hierarchy of states, as well 
as their own domestic responsibilities and historical trajectories. As noted in 
Chapter 2, emerging developing states seek, among other things, to distance 
themselves from ‘imperialist’ behaviour. They seek solidarity with the developing 
world, and also to underline the centrality of multilateral institutions to international 
order. Much of their claim to representivity in global institutions rests on their past 
and present experiences with underdevelopment, and their ability to translate these 
into a bridging capability between the developed and developing worlds. They also 
claim to seek the resolution of global issues that affect the majority of the world’s 
people. The extent to which this is possible, however, is determined by systemic 
                                                
147 For a small selection, see Hans Maull, Hans, “Germany and the use of force: still a 
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constraints and national interests. Thus, both the system- and state-levels are crucial 
to understanding the foreign policies of intermediate states.  
 
The extent to which ‘moral’ discourses of ‘solidarity’ and pluralism in international 
relations serve very narrow, national interests is a matter for further investigation. A 
number of intermediate states sought permanent seats on the UN Security Council 
when permanent membership of this body came under review in 2005, the 50th 
anniversary of the UN. In addition, some intermediate states, including South 
Africa, Brazil and China, have clearly positioned themselves as representatives of 
the developing world. While the anti-imperialism and anti-colonialist stance of the 
early independence period have vanished in all but rhetoric, the question still 
remains why emerging powers have sought, in the main, to tread a careful path 
around established powers, such as the United States. Some have even resisted the 
temptation to develop ‘hard power’ capabilities and the means to project them.  
 
It seems necessary, therefore, to find a way to account for the upward trajectories of 
certain intermediate powers, that takes into account both structural factors, such as 
balance of power (changes in relative capabilities), that limit action,148 as well as the 
dominant ideas in domestic society that affect how each state views its threats and 
opportunities in formulating foreign policy.149 This chapter will outline a theoretical 
and methodological framework for examining the impact of a pacific, yet resource-
intensive (not limited to material resources), internationalist outlook on emerging 
states’ foreign policies.  
 
As noted by Taliaferro, there at least three key factors influencing state power – or 
the “variation in extractive and mobilization capability affect[ing] states’ ability to 
                                                
148 Structural factors are not only limiting factors; they may also be constitutive factors, in 
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adjust to shifts in their international environment”150, namely: state institutions, 
nationalism and ideology.151 It is upon this basis that an analytical space is found for 
the role played by governing parties in the formulation of foreign policy, both as 
holders of the levers of political power, and as repositories of ideology guiding 
foreign policy. 
 
As important as governing parties is the role of political leadership. Leaders do not 
operate in isolation, and they cannot focus on one context, to the exclusion of 
others.152 
Leaders define states’ international and domestic constraints. Based on their 
perceptions and interpretations, they build expectations, plan strategies, and urge 
actions on their governments that conform to their judgements about what is 
possible and likely to maintain them in their positions. Such perceptions help frame 
governments’ orientations to international affairs. Leaders’ interpretations arise out 
of their experiences, goals, beliefs about the world, and sensitivity to the political 
context.153 
 
Furthermore, “Whether and how …leaders judge themselves constrained depends 
on the nature of the domestic challenges to their leadership, how the leaders are 
organised, and what they are like as people”.154 
 
The immediate political vehicle within which leaders, such as Thabo Mbeki of South 
Africa, and Lula da Silva of Brazil, constructed their foreign policy strategies was the 
political party structure that brought them to power, and sought to perpetuate its 
own tenure in power. This thesis operationalises their position by way of two 
variables, institutional freedom155 (or the degree to which power is centralised in an 
individual or the governing party), and legitimating power (or the degree to which 
individuals or political parties are able to justify particular international actions). 
This party political structure is in turn located within a state structure that either 
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underlines a party’s dominance, such as a parliamentary system, or one that limits it, 
such as a presidential system.                                                                                                                                                                                  
         
Intermediate states have made a scant impact on mainstream International Relations 
theorising. The key developments in theorising about these states have centred 
upon their middle power status, and more recently, their possibilities of acting as 
different types of power. Neorealism overlooks lesser powers altogether. Liberalism 
has, however, been able to account for both the domestic factors influencing the 
international outlooks of intermediate states, as well as the centrality of 
multilateralism to their foreign policies. The theoretical outlook that is able to 
account for both systemic and domestic determinants of states’ foreign policies is 
found in the neoclassical realist approach to foreign policy analysis. As noted by 
Taliaferro, “Neoclassical realism suggests that state power – the relative ability of 
the state to extract or mobilize resources from domestic society as determined by 
the institutions of the state, as well as by nationalism and ideology – shapes the 
types of internal balancing strategies a state is likely to pursue”.156 Zakaria adds that 
state power is “that portion of national power the government can extract for its 
purposes and reflects the ease with which central decision makers can achieve their 
ends”.157  
 
This chapter proceeds in four sections. First, in response to the possible puzzlement 
that might greet a theoretical association between internationalism in foreign policy 
and neoclassical realism, a discussion of ethics and realism in foreign policy analysis 
is conducted. This is followed by an exposition of three key contributions of the 
neoclassical realist approach and their place in the thesis. Finally, the role of 
governing parties and leading individuals in resource mobilisation and extraction is 
interrogated. The chapter concludes that by combining the strengths of system-level 
and unit-level analysis, it is possible to gain deeper insight into what motivates 
internationalist foreign policy approaches by intermediate states. In addition, and 
more importantly, combining material-structural and ideational factors in an analysis 
avoids the untenable and false dichotomy that is frequently established with regard 
                                                
156 Taliaferro, “State Building for Future Wars”, 467.  
157 Cited in John Glenn, John, “Realism versus Strategic Culture: Competition and 
Collaboration?”, International Studies Review,11 (2009): 525.  
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to seemingly altruistic or ‘ethical’ foreign policy, viewed by some as a contradiction 
in terms.  
 
3.1. What has morality to do with it? 
Chapter 2 made the case for a divergent internationalism in the developing world 
since the middle of the twentieth century. As noted by some analysts, however, this 
form of solidarity and internationalism often served to protect deviant regimes from 
international censure, as well as to increase the global prestige of otherwise 
insignificant states. To what extent, then, is internationalism really about ethics?  
 
For large developing countries – or so-called ‘emerging powers’ – the case may be 
made that adopting internationalism as a foreign policy approach has more to do 
with domestic restraints and limited capabilities than actually diffusing a given 
ideology, liberal or otherwise. This is especially true since the demise of the 
empirical category of ‘Third World’ since the 1970s. Thus, the key tenets of 
internationalism highlighted in Chapter 2, namely: 
 
- Commitment to the peaceful settlement of international disputes 
- South-south solidarity  
- Commitment to multilateralism, and 
- Respect for the principle of non-interference 
 
combine to increase the relative power capabilities of intermediate states, while 
potentially reducing the challenges to resource extraction and mobilisation. By 
committing to the peaceful settlement of international disputes, states are able, 
especially in their immediate geographical regions, to forestall the use of force, for 
which they may not be militarily and strategically prepared. Maintaining a 
predictable and stable international environment also contributes toward economic 
stability and growth for emerging economies.  Seeking increasing engagement with 
countries of the developing world diversifies trade opportunities for emerging 
markets and also strengthens their bargaining capacity in multilateral settings, where 
the strength of numbers may win important concessions or resolutions. The 
commitment to multilateralism is an important ‘force multiplier’ in the diplomatic 
strategies of intermediate states, as they are able to some extent to mitigate the 
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power of great powers, such as the Permanent Five members of the UN Security 
Council. Finally, respect for the principle of non-interference assists in limiting the 
scope of great power action within weaker states, and also protects the 
constituencies of rising regional powers from interference in their domestic affairs.  
 
Recent realist scholarship recognises the centrality of ethics to the realist political 
tradition. Indeed, Classical Realism has been singled out for possible synergies with 
more normative approaches to international relations,158 given its recognition of the 
social bases of national power, and its more differentiated view of the state, 
compared to neorealism.159 Hence, classical realism is not entirely dismissive of 
international morality, while it may have been sceptical of it.160 Neorealism, on the 
other hand, would not take international morality into account at all, as this would 
be characteristic more of an international society of states – whose existence it 
denies - than an international system, and also because neorealism does not 
entertain the possibility that states have any other option but to obey the dictates of 
a self-help anarchical system in which any but selfish actions, in the national 
interest, would be punished by conquest or similar losses. This thesis, in positing a 
place for internationalism in a neoclassical realist approach to the rise of emerging 
powers, finds a place for a specific international outlook in the foreign policy 
calculations of states. Internationalism, an ethical stance, is a domestic-level factor 
that mediates the state’s responses to external challenges and opportunities.  
 
This thesis, in examining the foreign policy postures of two emerging powers, faces 
a choice between internationalism as a form of morality in international politics, and 
internationalism as a cloak for the national interest, or, realpolitik. Brown has argued, 
however, that this is a false dichotomy, as states may rarely, if ever, be expected to 
act without any regard for self-interest, and it is quite plausible to expect that states, 
like human beings, face complexity in their motivations for action: interest and 
                                                
158 Richard Beardsworth, “Cosmopolitanism and Realism: Towards a Theoretical 
Convergence?”, Millennium, 37, No.1 (2008). 
159 See John Hobson, “Chapter 2: Realism”, in The State and International Relations. 
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, for a comparison between the classical realist 
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160 Andrew Hurrell, “Who speaks for the Global South? Emerging Powers and Global 
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ethics may underpin the same foreign policy outcome.161 As a practical measure, 
furthermore, he argues that “(a)ny judgement about the ethical status of a particular 
foreign policy programme has to be made in the round, and not simply in one 
area”.162 
 
A neoclassical realist framework does not exclude internationalism, to the extent 
that internationalism may be regarded as both a feature of domestic ideology, used 
for placating political allies domestically, and as a tool for building followership 
internationally. It may simply be regarded as another instrument of international 
policy, and a vehicle for the pursuit of self-interested goals. 
 
Scholars in the neoclassical realist tradition, carrying the mantle of classical realism, 
have made great strides in furthering understanding about how ideas and power are 
often inseparable components of foreign policy, by focusing on unit-level and 
system-level influences on foreign policy outcomes. These themes are examined in 
the following section.  
 
 
3.2. Neoclassical realism: Conceptual and Theoretical Issues 
 
Neoclassical realism represents an attempt to synthesise the strengths of classical 
realism and neorealism in a parsimonious theory of foreign policy that may be 
applied to states of any size or ranking in the international hierachy. Although 
neoclassical realism utilises realism’s focus on the anarchical state system as the key 
determinant of foreign policy, it includes a more open approach to the roles of 
perception and domestic politics than does the traditional neorealist position. Its 
adherents emphasise that neoclassical realism is not a theory of international 
politics. Instead, it is a theory of foreign policy analysis. Neoclassical realism seeks 
precisely to re-insert the state between systemic dynamics – such as the relative 
distribution of power - and foreign policy outcomes. Its assumptions about the 
state, in turn, derive primarily from classical realism. This is so because neoclassical 
                                                
161 Chris Brown, “Ethics, interests and foreign policy”, in Ethics and Foreign Policy, eds., 
Smith, Karen E. and Margot Light (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001): 21-
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162 Ibid., 29.  
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realists theorise a state that is more responsive to domestic imperatives and thus 
more constrained by them.163  
 
The aspects of the neoclassical realism research agenda that are directly relevant to 
this thesis are: 
 
- The international structure as a decisive factor in the foreign policy 
calculations of states; 
- The differential between national power and state power; and, 
- The nature of unit-level intervening variables, in this case governing parties,  
individual leaders, and perception.  
 
Each of these aspects is now discussed in turn.  
 
3.2.1 The systemic dimension 
 
The primary system characteristics affecting the choice of foreign policy goals and 
means include: system polarity, the distribution of power in the system; and, the 
rules of the game.164 The systemic dimension of international life is highly relevant 
to intermediate states. Intermediate states gain their identity from their position 
relative to other states. They are either stronger than the weaker states, or weaker 
than their more powerful counterparts. At the same time, the relative distribution of 
power in the system affects foreign policy decisions because a change in relative 
distribution might necessitate a responsive action by an intermediate state, either 
within its own region, or extra-regionally. The balance of power dynamic frames the 
perceptions and decisions of decision-makers at the unit level. This dynamic 
employs two central assumptions: 1) Anarchy – or the lack of any central deciding 
power - as a constraint on states’ behaviour; and, 2) The relative distribution of 
power among states. 
 
                                                
163 See as an indicative account Jonathan D. Caverley, “Power and Democratic 
Weakness: Neoconservatism and Neoclassical Realism”, Millennium, 38, No.3 (2010). 
164 Valerie Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory 
(Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2007): 27.  
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As noted by Taliaferro, however, neorealism, by avoiding analysis of the internal 
characteristics of states, completely overlooks their differential capacity to respond 
to shifts in the balance of power:  
“Waltz’s theory assumes that units have an unlimited capacity to extract and 
mobilize resources from domestic society. For balance-of-power theory, what matters is a 
state’s aggregate power, the sum of its economic, potential, and military capabilities”.165  
 
Nonetheless, this relative distribution of power among states is what 
decision-makers perceive when they consider the state’s position in the international 
system. The distribution of power in the system affects the extent to which states 
can attain their goals. Their goals, in turn, are determined by their own national 
capacity and the extent to which this can be mobilized and extracted by central decision-
makers.166   
 
Mobilisation, recall, refers to economic measures to enhance national wealth, while 
‘extraction’ refers to the conversion “of wealth into power by taxing, requisitioning, 
or expropriating social resources”. These resources are directed toward military 
expenditure, aid donations, dues payable to international organisations and other 
international activities.167 
 
State goals range from the bare essential ‘survival’ to aggrandizement of national 
power. Emerging powers seek recognition from established powers; improved 
access to overseas markets; and, the increased ability to participate in system-
affecting decision-making. Therefore, threats can also be framed in terms of these 
goals. However, in providing dynamism to the framework, it is posited, with 
Zakaria, that where states experience significant growth in their material resources, 
they tend to redefine their political interests abroad, “measured by their increases in 
military spending, initiation of wars, acquisition of territory, posting of soldiers and 
diplomats, and participation in great-power decision-making”.168 Thus, growth in 
material resources links the classical measure of state strength – physical resources – 
with a conception of changing national interests in response to this growth, through 
the mechanism of perception. 
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In neoclassical realism the system acts as a ‘container’ of state action. Systemic 
pressures are nonetheless open to interpretation, meaning that “systemic incentives 
and threats, at least in the short run, are rarely unambiguous”.169 In addition, there is 
rarely ‘a’ single, correct response to systemic incentives, and actions taken by states 
may often have the opposite effect to that intended.170 As Hagan contends, while 
foreign policy is “an inherently political process”,171 the international environment 
is the ultimate container for how the state leadership forms its foreign policy. This is 
ultimately still a highly deterministic view, but one that as will be seen later, is highly 
pertinent to the position of middle- or intermediate powers. 
 
However, the story becomes more complicated in the developing world, where 
most emerging states are located today. Growth in material resources, under Leftist 
administrations, such as those of the ANC in South Africa and PT in Brazil, would 
imply large-scale state-directed programmes aimed at wealth redistribution. 
However, as will be shown in the individual case study chapters, this has taken place 
on a limited scale. Close relations between these governing parties and the labour 
movements in their respective countries have only had a limited impact on foreign 
policy, but larger structural issues, such as state capacity or national power, affect 
the projection of strength by these two rising powers (See Figure 3).  
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Systemic Constraints : 
Anarchy 
Relative Distribution of Power 
 
Unit Level: 
 
Degree of autonomy of central decision-makers in a context of growing material power resources 
(change in relative distribution of power) 
• Mobilisation capability 
• Extraction capability 
• Role of governing party (Left-oriented) 
• Rising economic capacity 
" INSTITUTIONAL FREEDOM of governing party 
" LEGITIMATING CAPACITY of governing party 
 
Figure 3: Schematic Representation of Neoclassical Realist Approach to 
Emerging Powers 
 
Neoclassical realism downgrades realism’s assumption of states’ search for security 
as a driving force of international politics. According to Rose, an early exponent of 
the approach as theory, “Instead of assuming that states seek security, neoclassical 
realists assume that states respond to the uncertainties of international anarchy by 
seeking to control and shape their external environment”.172 In other words, states 
attempt to decrease levels of uncertainty, but not necessarily through the acquisition 
of arms and by building the capability to make war. States still seek the means for 
survival, but territorial gains and existential threats do not form the core of their 
security concerns. With special reference to the two countries under consideration 
here, Brazil has not seen major war since the middle of the nineteenth century, 
while post-Apartheid South Africa has not faced any major military threats from 
outside its borders.  
 
Economic and security issues feature as major factors for emerging states in seeking 
to ‘control and shape their external environment’. One of these factors is their 
ability to participate in multilateral decision-making. While this aspect of 
internationalism is dismissed by realism, or more generously viewed as dependent 
upon powerful states’ interests, it is a vital component of the foreign policies of 
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intermediate states. Regionalism and maintaining leadership within their immediate 
regions is another important means of limiting uncertainty. A third way to limit 
uncertainty for emerging powers is to diversify commercial linkages so that financial 
crisis in one part of the international market poses limited threat to the domestic 
economy.  
 
In recent accounts of the new post-Cold War multipolar order, scholars are divided 
over the extent to which potential powers are balancing against or bandwagoning  
with the United States, the sole superpower in the system.173 Problems in 
conducting such an analysis include doubt over how balancing is measured, 
although Waltz allowed for both internal (domestic growth) and external balancing 
(alliance-formation). There too, it is doubtful whether the formation of negotiations 
coalitions in the World Trade Organisation, for example, constitute the formation 
of an ‘alliance’ against US interests, as they are not military in nature. There are no 
doubt shifts in the relative distribution of power globally, as the rapid economic 
growth of China, India and Brazil attest to. The extent to which they affect their 
regions, let alone the system, is yet to be fully grasped. 
 
While the system is broadly conceived as anarchical, the consequences of anarchy 
are not predetermined, and individual states “may differ in their ability to control 
the policy agenda, select policy options, or mobilize resources to respond to 
systemic incentives”.174  
 
3.2.2 The differential between national power and state power 
 
The most important modification that neoclassical realism makes to neorealism is 
the acknowledgement that “(u)nit-level variables constrain or facilitate the ability of all types 
of states – great powers as well as lesser states – to respond to systemic imperatives”.175 
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Neorealism’s emphasis on the system as a determinant of foreign policy remains; 
but events and perceptions at the unit-level condition the responses of states to 
external stimuli:  
 
Specifically, [neoclassical realism] seeks to explain why, how, and under what 
conditions the internal characteristics of states – the extractive and mobilization 
capacity of politico-military institutions, the influence of domestic societal actors 
and interest groups, the degree of state autonomy from society, and the level of 
elite or societal cohesion – intervene between the leaders’ assessment of 
international threats and opportunities and the actual diplomatic, military, and 
foreign economic policies those leaders pursue.176 
 
State power is thus hard power, or brute national power – the sum of a state’s military, 
economic and social capabilities as traditionally considered by neorealists – 
mediated by domestic forces. Taliaferro defines state power as “the relative ability 
of the state to extract or mobilize resources from domestic society as determined by 
the institutions of the state, as well as by nationalism and ideology”.177 With Zakaria, 
it is noted that,  
Although classical realism correctly focuses on the nation-state as the principal 
actor in world politics, it inadvertently obscures an important distinction. 
Statesmen, not nations, confront the international system, and they have access to 
only that fraction of national power that the state apparatus can extract for its purposes. 
Therefore, according to the hypothesis of … state-centred realism, statesmen will 
expand the nation’s political interests abroad when they perceive a relative increase 
in state power, not national power.178 
 
Implicit in the neoclassical realist approach is the idea that state power is contingent. 
This prompts the questions: what produces and conditions state power? Is it based 
on material capabilities, such as a large economy or military? Which social forces 
and relationships affect the projection of state power? As noted by Mastanduno, et 
al,  
 
The sources of national power are many – political, economic, military. The ability 
to project this power abroad hinges in important respects on the deftness of the state 
officials in cultivating public opinion, educating the citizenry, and bolstering the authority of 
government institutions.179 
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Classical realists argued for an approach to national power that included its social 
base. According to Carr, “Power over opinion is … not less essential for political 
purposes than military and economic power, and has always been closely associated 
with them. The art of persuasion has always been a necessary part of the equipment 
of a political leader”.180 Astute leadership is an important component of the 
translation of ‘static’ national resources into potential state power. The ideas held by 
these individuals thus play an important role in the policy process:181 It is to this 
question – of leadership, political parties and key domestic actors - that we now 
turn.  
 
3.2.3 Unit-level intervening variables: The role of governing parties and 
leaders 
 
Foreign policy decisions are taken by an individual or a group of individuals, who 
are connected to society through their elected office, along with other incentives to 
select and implement certain policies over others. This elected office derives from 
the domestic political structure that establishes legitimate authority over the state, 
and may be parliamentary or presidential. The individual or group of individuals 
tasked with taking foreign policy decisions is referred to as a Foreign Policy 
Executive (FPE) in some of the neoclassical realism literature.182 It is also known as 
the ‘decision unit’ in FPA. A ‘decision unit’ is “a set of authorities with the ability to 
commit the resources of the society and, with respect to a particular problem, the 
authority to make a decision that cannot be readily reversed”.183 Differences from 
state to state in national extractive capacity will result from different decision-
making and –implementing rules within the state, such as the extent to which 
government is centralized, the nature of the party system with respect to democratic 
accountability and cohesion, and the relationship between the governing party and 
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the executive (i.e. Lead ministries) – in other words, the state structure (to be 
discussed in Chapter 4).  
 
The role of leadership should not be overshadowed by a general account of how the 
executive manages power in systems where governmental power is divided between 
various branches. Leadership is a distinct aspect of foreign policymaking in 
intermediate states. This is because individuals become more important to the 
policymaking process in the presence of three enabling factors:  
 
- when they enjoy a concentration of power; 
- when systemic, domestic and bureaucratic forces are in conflict or are 
ambiguous; and, 
- in conditions of change or fluidity, because of their ability to act more 
decisively than large bureaucracies.184 
 
“Where there is “uncertainty” about threats and how to deal with them, 
governments’ responses will depend upon how leaders perceive and interpret the 
threats based on their own belief systems”.185 Leaders, no matter the extent to 
which policymaking is concentrated in one individual, should be placed within their 
domestic political context, in order to gauge their latitude of action and the extent 
of the support they enjoy for international engagements.  
 
A number of studies have assessed the role of political parties in foreign 
policymaking.186 While the roles of opposition political parties generally have been 
assessed in terms of their nuisance potential in the implementation of foreign 
policy, the specific contributions – whether ideological or otherwise – made by 
governing parties have not been the subject of much FPA research. Nor has there 
been, generally speaking, the recognition of the possibility of governing parties 
                                                
184 Byman and Pollack, “Bringing the Statesman Back In”, 141-142.  
185 Hagan, “Does Decision-Making Matter?”, 11.  
186 A selection includes: W.E. Paterson, “Political parties and the making of foreign 
policy: the case of the Federal Republic”, Review of International Studies, 7, No.4 
(1981); Brian C. Rathbun, “Plus Jamais La Guerre? Les partis et la normalisation de la 
politique étrangère de l’Allemagne”, Critique internationale, 25, No.2 (2004); Juliet 
Kaarbo, “Power and influence in foreign policy decision making: The role of junior 
coalition partners in German and Israeli foreign policy”, International Studies Quarterly, 
40, No.4 (1996). 
 95 
facilitating ‘alternative’ diplomatic relations that run parallel to, if not always in 
tandem with, state diplomatic arrangements.187  
 
However, it is not only the ruling party that matters, as Ripsman notes, executive 
autonomy derives “not merely from the form of democracy (i.e. its institutional 
structure), but also from the decision-making procedures and procedural norms that 
govern the conduct of foreign security policy”.188 The less autonomous the 
executive, the further away from neorealism’s unitary state one gets. Paradoxically, 
other research has found that in parliamentary systems, executives tend to trump 
legislatures, while in presidential systems, presidents are not as autonomous as 
might be expected.189 This compels a narrowing of one of the objects of analysis, 
the decision unit, and privileges the ruling party as an object of analysis.  
 
Governing parties form part of the second image of foreign policymaking, at the 
level of the state. While they are not synonymous with the state, they comprise an 
important component of the state, and governing parties may ‘pay’ for injudicious 
foreign policy decisions by being voted out of power.190 Furthermore, analysts 
frequently look to the nature of the governing party for indicators of the potential 
trajectory of a state’s future foreign policy. Governing parties also represent an 
important interface between the public and foreign policy. While their influence 
may be limited when they rule by coalition, or where foreign policy decisions may 
be vetoed in a parliamentary system, their impact on determining the course of 
foreign policy is significant. This impact is mediated through the executive and its 
role in determining foreign policy. The governing party thus forms a central 
component of the Foreign Policy Executive – both through its ideology and key 
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individuals - located at the “intersection of domestic and international political 
systems, and can act internationally for domestic reasons or domestically for 
international ends”.191 
 
As argued by Jennifer Sterling-Folker, conflict groups (that are generally the basis of 
realism’s ontology of international relations) cohere around shared conceptions of 
identity, and not mere profit.192 Therefore, there is more to a coalition’s foreign 
policy perspective than opportunities for economic loss and profit. It is also 
possible to include notions of solidarity and identity.193 These two coalitions could 
very well be engaged in deeper struggles in the process of national group identity 
formation. This process, as Sterling-Folker argues, is “intimately linked into internal 
subgroup competitions for state control, …”.194 What is more, these subgroup 
competitions for control of the state and its outward posture involve decisions 
about resource allocations. These questions become all the more pertinent in growing 
developing countries with problems of wealth distribution and overall socio-
economic development.  
 
Party influence is, of course, also determined by the nature of the given party itself, 
and the relations of accountability and cohesion within its ranks. Governing parties 
have frequently to forge coalitions with outside partners, with whom they have to 
make concessions, although they also depend on the support of allies who share 
their ideological convictions. As governing parties, they face both domestic and 
external challenges to their rule. The degree of salience they ascribe to each arena 
will likely determine their foreign policy outlook.  
 
The analysis of governing parties, their ideologies and leadership, as well as the 
extent of the influence they are able to exert on foreign policy, are valuable in an 
                                                
191 Lobell, “Threat Assessment”, 56. 
192 Sterling-Folker, Jennifer, “Chapter 4: Neoclassical realism and identity: peril despite 
profit across the Taiwan Strait”, in Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy. 
Eds., Lobell, Steven E., Norrin M. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009).  
193 The notions of ‘identity’ and ‘solidarity’ appear alien to a realist framework. Numerous 
theorists have called for greater dialogue between theorists of identity (mainly in the 
Constructivist approach to IR) and realism. See J. Samuel Barkin, “Realist 
Constructivism”, International Studies Review, 5, Issue 3 (2003), and a forum in 
response to this article, “Bridging the Gap: Toward A Realist-Constructivist Dialogue”, in 
ISR, 6, Issue 2. 
194 Sterling-Folker, “Peril despite profit”, 115.  
 97 
analysis of the foreign policy formulation process. They also provide important 
clues about the levers of power in society, and what the priorities of the national 
community are. Even debates challenging governing party interpretations of threats 
and justifiable means of achieving international goals shed light on contending 
views of domestic priorities. This is a key variable in the capacity of states to 
respond to international threats and opportunities. While governing parties may not 
be able to shift course entirely on foreign policy, for various structural, historical 
and cultural reasons, they still play an important role in defining national threats, 
and in determining the best of use of the means to resist them.  
 
The main concern here is not with electoral politics and the variations in public 
opinion on foreign policy in developing countries. Rather, the main concern of the 
thesis is the personal and institutional impact of key individuals in governing parties 
in the states considered, upon foreign policy. A second key concern is with the 
process of how certain party principles, or foreign policy platforms, are converted 
into national foreign policy, resulting in foreign policy choices that may be predicted 
neither by a strict realist approach, nor a strict liberal approach.  
 
Operationalising the variables 
The key variables regarding the role of governing parties in this framework are as 
follows:  
• Institutional freedom to convert national power into state power, i.e. latitude to 
mobilize national resources and extract them for foreign policy purposes. This 
freedom is gauged by the following factors, among others: the relationship 
between the executive and legislative branches of government; the size of the 
numerical majority of the governing party in the legislature (where the legislature 
possesses some power over the foreign policymaking process); the relative 
strength of various components of the executive, such as the presidency and the 
relevant ministries. This is a variant of state structure arguments in foreign 
policy analysis.  
• Legitimating power to convert national power into state power, i.e. reasons for 
international action or a given foreign policy activity resonate with the governing 
party’s own stated views and principles, or with those of the broader society. 
Legitimating power depends on factors such as shared identity, reasoned 
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argument, and rational cost-benefit analyses. Clearly, this could be a double-
edged factor, as party values (regime survival) could be in competition with 
societal values (national survival): which hold the day? How does this affect the 
implementation of a foreign policy action? As noted by Taliaferro, “The ability 
of states to extract resources from society is not simply a function of the 
strength of institutions: it also depends on leaders’ ability to raise and maintain 
support for national security strategies”.195 Legitimating power tends to vary 
with the perception of external threat by the public, as well as the extent of 
social cohesion generally, and the level of ideological inclination in society.196 
 
These two variables more than any others determine the conversion of national 
power into state power, and indeed the mobilisation and extraction of national 
resources for foreign policy purposes. For this reason, the focus on the cognitive 
universes, or ‘operational codes’197 of individual leaders is not primary in this study. 
A leader’s beliefs about the limits of politics, the weight of history, and the nature of 
politics and political conflict, while important, are ultimately only a minor factor 
relative to his ability to win the mobilisation and extraction of state resources for 
foreign policy. The latter two abilities depend upon the leader’s place in a legislative 
system, and his legitimacy in the eyes of his constituents and those who control the 
levers of state power. 
 
How can we hypothesise foreign policy outcomes from the relative strength of 
governing parties in mobilising and extracting national power? With a basic 
assumption of a shift in relative power: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The greater the institutional freedom and legitimating capacity of the 
governing party, the more autonomy inheres in key decision-making structures, the 
closer the model approximates neorealism’s unitary actor. Decisions to allocate 
resources to international issues will be based on hard power considerations and 
exercised more frequently, where the state possesses the resources to do so. The state will act in 
line with neorealism’s predictions, behaving competitively and aggressively. 
 
                                                
195 Taliaferro, “State Building for future wars”, 489.  
196 Taliaferro, “State Building for future wars”, 491. 
197 George, Alexander, cited in Neack, The New Foreign Policy, 60. 
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Hypothesis 2: The lesser the institutional freedom and legitimating capacity of the 
governing party, the less autonomous and more porous is the decision-making 
process, the more the model approaches a pluralistic decision-making system. 
Decisions to allocate resources to international issues will be delayed, and subject to 
numerous bargains and negotiations. They will occur less frequently, and will have 
to balance the interests of various factions, even if the state possesses the resources to act. 
Internationalism as a risk-avoiding set of actions will take priority.   
 
 
3.3 Why neoclassical realism? 
 
The advantages of applying the FPA theory of neoclassical realism to the study of 
middle power foreign policies are manifold. To begin with, by giving a privileged 
position to the state, without excluding the determining role of system variables, 
neoclassical realism is useful for the study of young democracies in which the state 
still plays a dominant role as a site of competition for political power, influence and 
material rewards. This means that narrow interests face less opposition when 
presented as state interests, because of the lack of a tradition of participation and 
questioning of foreign policy choices.  
 
A second advantage of using neoclassical realism for the analysis of foreign 
policymaking in intermediate states is its propensity to illuminate seemingly 
‘irrational’ policy choices and outcomes, by bringing into focus the second-tier 
(Putnam’s two-level game)198 on which policymakers act. In new democracies, 
particularly under leftist regimes, there may be high expectations of accountability 
by governments, high-stakes for re-election, and close scrutiny of the economic 
repercussions of foreign policy decisions, for example, which all impact upon 
eventual foreign policy outcomes. 
 
Third, new democracies or rising powers are equally cognisant of and sensitive to 
the perceptions of the ‘international community’, generally, though not exclusively 
comprised of advanced, industrialised democracies. As Gorjão has shown, the 
                                                
198 Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level 
Games”, International Organization, 42, No. 3, (Summer 1988).  
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nature of interim or transitional governments cannot explain their foreign policy 
decisions independently. Perceptions of the international community, especially 
related to the legitimacy of outgoing previous regimes, may provide incentives to 
incoming administrations for foreign policy change, for example.199  
 
A fourth advantage is the theory’s cognisance of the agency of individual leaders in 
the middle power activism of large developing countries. Unlike the middle power 
activism of the ‘traditional’ middle powers of the global North, which largely 
derived from state-society pressures on foreign policy,200 mediated though political 
parties and religious organisations, individual leaders, as seen in Chapter 2, have 
been prominent in forging internationalist foreign policies in the developing world. 
Yet, the neoclassical realist approach does not fall prey to the ‘charismatic leader’ 
approach to foreign policymaking in developing countries, criticised by Third World 
scholars for psychological reductionism, and bearing a disproportionate amount of 
the explanatory burden in older theories of FPA in the developing world.201 In this 
way, too, middle powers are not submerged as they are by neorealism’s ‘great 
power’ bias. The additional variables of perception, and relative power highlight the 
potential significance, on any given international question, of even the smallest state.  
 
It might be argued that there is some potential for tension in using a realist theory 
to account for ‘internationalist’ or liberal postures in international politics. In fact, 
there is none. The basis of such criticism would be that it would be highly unlikely 
for ideas to trump interests in determining courses of action in foreign policy. Thus, 
any ideas  - or ideals – proffered as the basis for international action would merely 
be masking rational state behaviour typical of the realist paradigm. The reality is that 
international action based upon, or cloaked in the language of, ideals may be in a 
state’s best interests as it seeks to build diverse coalitions in international 
negotiations, and render its external environment more predictable. For example, 
                                                
199 Paulo Gorjão, Paulo, “Regime Change and Foreign Policy: Portugal, Indonesia, and 
the Self-determination of East Timor”, Democratization, 9, No.4 (Winter 2002).  
200 Notable leaders acted as guides for Northern internationalism, too. These include 
Lester Pearson of Canada and Olaf Palme of Sweden. Yet, domestic society in both 
Canada and Sweden was overwhelmingly in favour of the internationalist foreign policies 
promoted by these leaders. (See Black, 1992). This is the case to a far lesser extent in 
the global South, as will be shown in Chapters 5 and 6.  
201 Korany, “Review”, 469. For a more detailed discussion of psychological issues in the 
FPA of developing societies, see Bahgat Korany, Social Change, Charisma and 
International Behaviour (Leiden: Sijthoff,1976): 86-90, cited in the 1983 article.  
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legalistic approaches to international conflicts, such as the use of the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism, and the obstruction of the expansion of the UNSC’s remit, 
may be the recourse of the weak, but they still constitute means of surviving the 
vicissitudes of the international system.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Ever since the rise to prominence of second-tier states in international multilateral 
negotiations in trade, the environment, nuclear weapons and regarding humanitarian 
intervention in the 1990s, observers have been interested by the interplay of power 
and principle in their stances. This dynamic has been affirmed by the allocation of 
greater levels of resources to international aid projects and multilateral peacekeeping 
initiatives. While emerging powers such as Brazil and South Africa have enjoyed 
growth in the last two decades, they have only marginally improved on poverty 
levels at home, and meeting a myriad of social and economic needs. Much of this 
tension has taken place under the rule of governments of the Left, whose priorities 
may have been expected to lie with domestic constituencies. Instead, many of these 
notions of justice, equality and poverty alleviation have been exported abroad in 
foreign policies that appear to expand the traditional ambit of developing states. 
Why has this been the case, and have ethics anything to do with Southern 
internationalism? 
 
Born out of an enduring concern for the variation of states’ responses to similar 
international conditions, neoclassical realism provides an ideal theoretical 
perspective from which to approach the trajectories of emerging powers. 
Neoclassical realism as a theoretical approach to foreign policy analysis is solidifying 
its presence in the sub-field, but would benefit from being tested by application to 
second- and third-tier states. The three central contributions of neoclassical realism 
utilised in this thesis are: 1. The systemic dimension of foreign policymaking as a 
key factor; 2. The difference between national power resources and state power; 
and, 3. Unit-level intervening variables.  
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The neoclassical realist framework sets aside a place for the analysis of perception 
and the competition among ideas in the domestic politics of foreign policymaking. 
This renders the latter highly amenable to subjectivity and the agential power of 
individuals and groups, such as ruling parties, in the governing apparatus of a given 
state. In this way, the constraints and opportunities presented by the international 
system – the distribution of capabilities, the offense-defense balance, and the 
balance of regional and global power – are mediated by the nature of state-society 
relations domestically. This means that emerging powers’ capacity for emergence is 
mediated simultaneously by domestic imperatives and international considerations, 
and that their internationalism, or greater activism, paradoxically, should not be seen 
as an unequivocal indicator of state strength.  
 
Ruling parties depend upon institutional freedom and legitimating power to give 
meaning and allocate resources to their interpretations of external threat, or shifts in 
the balance of power, globally or regionally. Their choices of pacific foreign policies 
may have as much to do with the constraints they face domestically, as with their 
own proclivities toward internationalism, and concerns with justice in foreign 
policy.  
 
Thus, where ruling parties enjoy great degrees of institutional freedom and 
legitimating power, the state will approximate neoclassical realism’s unitary actor 
model, and decisions to engage in expansive foreign policy will be frequent. Levels 
of internationalism will be low. Conversely, where ruling parties enjoy lesser 
institutional freedom and face challenges in justifying their foreign policy goals, 
engagement on international issues will not be as frequent, nor as intense in terms 
of resource allocation. The latter scenario would prevail as governing parties seek to 
avert the costs of domestic opposition to a foreign policy decision or posture.  
 
Neoclassical realism holds many advantages for a study of this nature, among them, 
elevating the state once more as the locus of foreign policy analysis, as opposed to 
the faceless forces of globalisation that gained currency in recent decades; bringing 
into focus the dual contexts in which statesmen act, along with the roles of 
perception and individual leadership, all of which are central to the foreign policy 
 103 
conduct of intermediate states. In the following chapter how these variables interact 
in the two case study countries, South Africa and Brazil, is discussed. 
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Chapter 4: State Structure, Governing Parties and Foreign 
Policymaking for Emerging Powers: The cases of  South 
Africa and Brazil 
 
 
Introduction 
By the middle of the last decade, governments of varying hue of leftist ideology 
were in charge of a growing collection of states worldwide. This trend was no more 
evident than in Latin America, where, by the time Fernando Lugo became president 
of Paraguay in August 2008, nearly every state on the continent was under Leftist 
leadership. The Cold War provided a framework in which the potential ascent to 
power of movements and political parties of the Left was constructed as a threat to 
the values of the free world, represented by the US and its allies. The threat was 
based on the assumption that governments of the Left were sponsored by the 
USSR, and subject to Communist infiltration. This threat was frequently met by 
intervention, and other attempts to undermine Leftist movements and 
governments. For other states not as firmly ensconced in the North Atlantic 
alliance, however, government of the Left represented progressivism, international 
solidarity, and the prospect of state-supported development.  Quite apart from the 
Cold War connotations of Leftist government, ideologically leftist administrations in 
the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and even the United States, have created 
scholarly and popular expectations of foreign policy guided by ‘progressivism’ and 
internationalism. These expectations are based on assumptions that Leftist 
governing parties can automatically translate their progressivism into a ‘force for 
good’ internationally, and that conservative governments are more subject to the 
dictates of Realpolitik than doctrine,202 but these assumptions are open to question.  
 
The key contribution of the neoclassical realist approach to foreign policy, as 
illustrated in Chapter 3, is that it accepts the causal primacy of systemic factors in 
affecting foreign policy, while making conceptual room for the influence of 
domestic dynamics, such as state-society relations, perceptions, ideas and 
personality, on the capacity of states to respond to challenges and opportunities 
stemming from their external environment. How can this assertion be made more 
                                                
202 Paterson, “Political parties and foreign policy”, 230.  
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practicable and analytically relevant for the foreign policy analysis of large 
developing countries?  
 
Governing parties are pivotal actors in determining policies that state officials will 
implement for the duration of the former’s tenure in government. However, foreign 
policy appears to be an area of still marginal significance to the electoral fortunes of 
political parties in developing countries. This may mean that stances on 
international issues are comparatively under-developed in party manifestoes, and 
that they generally feature low on the priority lists of political parties contending for 
power. Or it could indicate that state bureaucracies, such as External Affairs 
ministries, have a high degree of autonomy in deciding the broad contours of 
foreign policy, and that continuity would prevail over radical change. It could point 
to newer democracies allowing greater freedom for governing parties to define 
threats and mobilise national resources to avoid them or challenge them.  
 
The extent to which governing parties, progressive or otherwise, are able to 
influence foreign policy perceptions and outcomes depends to a considerable extent 
on the pre-existing institutional make-up they encounter upon entering power, and 
how they are able to manipulate these institutional structures to their own ends. 
Governing parties are, of course, not monolithic. They are, as with any other 
collectivity of human beings, populated by a variety of interests, norms, values and 
responsibilities. Nonetheless, they enter government on a series of platforms, 
elaborated during elections, sometimes explicitly related to foreign policy. The 
extent to which these are implemented, or to which they change existing policy, is 
an important measure of their influence on foreign policy outcomes. Intra-party 
dynamics, such as the extent of democracy within the party, and the role of political 
leadership, are also central to the eventual influence of political parties on foreign 
policy formulation. Part II (Chapters 4, 5 and 6) will analyse the extent to which 
ruling party preferences (conceptualised as ‘internationalist’ postures) in South 
Africa under Mbeki and in Brazil under Lula, have been translated into national 
foreign policy goals and outcomes.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to elucidate the means whereby the two governing parties 
ruling the countries under examination in this thesis, the ANC of South Africa, and 
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PT of Brazil, respectively, exert influence on foreign policy. Neoclassical realism 
highlights the role of unit-level factors, including state structure, which is here 
translated into the relationship between governing parties, the legislature and the 
executive in the formulation of foreign policy. In keeping with the path highlighted 
by the previous chapter, this chapter seeks to provide some empirical weight to 
neoclassical realism’s focus on the state structure as a variable between systemic 
processes and foreign policy outcomes.  
 
Governing parties form a link between the executive and its foreign policymaking 
duties on one hand, and domestic constituencies on the other. Domestically, Leftist 
parties undergoing structural change often involving shifts to the right on economic 
questions, along with increasing marginalisation of ‘radical’ voices during political 
horse-trading, require the means to placate their populist and progressive 
constituencies. These means include material and ideational resources. Material 
resources are supplied by the cultivation of followership in potential economic 
markets with new trading partners; while ideational resources are supplied by the 
cultivation of solidarity with the former ‘Third World’, and activism on specific 
issues currently framed in a ‘North-South’ language, such as the Palestine question, 
and international trade negotiations. This claim supposes that governing political 
parties alone are responsible for foreign policymaking. The reality, as will be made 
clear in the sections to follow, is that governing parties make foreign policy 
decisions that must be implemented by foreign policy bureaucracies often of long 
standing and substantial traditional autonomy, though this may vary from case to 
case. The bargains entered into have important implications for foreign policy and 
the relationship between the governing party and its constituents.  
 
By all accounts, similar sentiments of triumph greeted the impending accession of 
ANC and PT to political power in South Africa and Brazil, respectively. Both are 
parties historically identified with the struggle for democracy in their respective 
polities.203 And both parties have been closely associated with workers’ movements: 
the ANC with the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), with which 
it is currently in a governing alliance; and PT with the Central Única dos Trabalhadores 
                                                
203 More detailed accounts of each case will be provided in Chapters 5 and 6, 
respectively.  
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(CUT), the main trade union confederation of Brazil204. Foreign policy has 
presented something of a dilemma for each party, as their legacy of struggle has 
incurred debts in inconvenient places. At the same time, their professed 
commitments to social and political rights domestically have generated high 
expectations about their conduct in international affairs. Each party has sought to 
meet this challenge by proclaiming foreign policies based on the internationalist 
principles of solidarity with the developing world; the peaceful resolution of 
conflicts; the primacy of multilateralism; and, the promotion of democracy and 
human rights.205  
 
This chapter is divided into two main sections, dealing with South Africa and Brazil, 
respectively. Each section details the institutional arrangements for foreign 
policymaking and the constitutional and intra-party dynamics affecting foreign 
policymaking, before discussing the general historical international outlook of each 
state. The central aim of this chapter is to highlight the institutional framework 
within which each governing party operates regarding foreign policymaking. The 
question of the evolution of each individual party’s foreign policy positions will be 
addressed in the case study chapters.  
 
4.1. South Africa: Internationalism, all the ANC’s way? 
 
Foreign policy has famously been a non-issue in the electoral politics of South 
Africa. Analysts noted how even the government’s policies on Zimbabwe and 
HIV/AIDS – which saw it fall foul of its allies in COSATU and the South African 
Communist Party (SACP) – failed to put a dent in its showing in the 2004 general 
election, which it won by a margin of 69,68 percent.206 By the same token, the 
persistence of the ‘quiet diplomacy’ policy in the face of opposition from the ANC’s 
alliance partners in an election year gave a fair indication of the locus of foreign 
policymaking, and how much would be yielded by state president Thabo Mbeki. 
                                                
204 PT itself was born of trade union activism. This is elaborated upon in later sections. 
205 African National Congress, 1994, “Foreign Policy Perspective in a Democratic South 
Africa”, accessed online at: http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/policy/foreign.html on 12 
August 2010; Partido dos Trabalhadores, 2010. “The Workers’ Party (PT) international 
policy”, PT Secretaria de Relacoes Internacionais, p15.  
206 Roger Southall and John Daniel, “Chapter 2: The state of the parties post-election 
2004: ANC dominance and opposition enfeeblement”, State of the Nation: South Africa 
2004-2005 (Durban: HSRC Press, 2005).   
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Indeed, on the subject of Zimbabwe, the positions of the ANC and COSATU were 
especially polarised, with the union movement taking strong stances on Zimbabwe’s 
crisis, while the South African government preferred more muted options. 
 
Contrary to what may have been expected, the foreign policy of the new South 
Africa, as crafted by the African National Congress in cooperation with the 
apartheid-era Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), did not depart in substance 
too far from the geopolitical thrust of the outgoing National Party (NP). As noted 
by Evans, “In a series of policy documents and statements during 1992-3, the 
leaders of the organisation ditched their long-standing commitment to ‘liberation 
politics’ and began the process of policy convergence with the New Diplomacy [of 
the outgoing NP]”.207 This was facilitated by intensive international involvement in 
South Africa’s policymaking processes, and the Party’s concern not to lose foreign 
commitment to its reconstruction plans. The ANC was also hamstrung by the 
transitional arrangements it inherited. These included the Government of National 
Unity (GNU), which was in place from the first democratic election in 1994, until 
the close of the first Parliament in 1999.208  
 
Nonetheless, the complexities of regional politics aside, the ANC stated at its 
National Conference in 1992, that “The foreign policy of a democratic South Africa 
will be primarily shaped by the nature of its domestic policies and objectives 
directed at serving the needs and interests of our people”.209 It was re-iterated by 
the Deputy-Director General of DFA in 2004, that South Africa’s international 
involvements in continental peacemaking initiatives, for example, were “an 
extension of South Africa’s domestic policy”, and aimed in the long-run “at 
promoting the creation of wealth and peace and security in South Africa”.210  
                                                
207 Graham Evans, “South Africa in Remission: the Foreign Policy of an Altered State”, 
The Journal of Modern African Studies, 34 (1996): 258. The New Diplomacy, crafted by 
the then-Director General of DFA, Neil van Heerden, was a means for the National Party 
to ‘lock-in’ South Africa’s commitment and hegemony in Southern Africa, by committing 
the state to greater economic involvement, regardless, it was reckoned, of its political 
leadership.  
208 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 (Interim Constitution).  
209 African National Congress, 1992. “Ready to Govern: Policy guidelines for a 
democratic South Africa”, adopted at the National Conference, 28-31 May, 1992. 
Accessed online at: http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/readyto.html, on 7 January 
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210 Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 1999. “Minutes of meeting: Economic Affairs Select 
Committee: Briefing by the Department of Minerals and Energy and the Department of 
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These incipient foreign policy principles were born of uncertainty. One aspect of 
this uncertainty in the closing stages of the apartheid era derived from the party 
level. Evans interprets the ANC’s failure to come to terms with balancing its 
loyalties to the anti-colonial struggle and choosing its own economic path on one 
hand, and to advancing development domestically, along widely accepted standards 
(global capitalism) internationally, to the failure of the organisation to re-calibrate its 
loyalties and theoretical bearings after the fall of Communism in 1989.211 (This will 
be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5).  
 
The policymaking process since the end of Apartheid may usefully be divided into 
two distinct phases: a phase of transition and a phase of consolidation.212 During 
the transition, which lasted roughly from the end of the 1980s with the first 
overtures by South African government intelligence personnel to the ANC in exile, 
neither side could claim an outright victory. The consequent political settlement, 
referred to variously by analysts as a ‘pacted transition’213 and an ‘elite transition’214, 
entailed a number of far-reaching compromises by the African National Congress, 
most notably, and crucially, in the economic sphere. Nonetheless, transformation – 
of policymaking instruments and outcomes – was a priority for the incoming 
Government of National Unity, of which the ANC was a majority member. 
According to van Nieuwkerk, a number of immediate policy changes were 
introduced. Importantly, the focus of government policy across all sectors became, 
at least in theory, the needs of the black majority.215 Consolidation, meanwhile, 
                                                                                                                               
Foreign Affairs”, 31 August 1999. Accessed online at: 
http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/19990830-departments-mineral-energy-and-foreign-
affairs-briefing on 7 April, 2010.  
211 Evans, “South Africa in Remission”, 255.  
212 Comprehensive overviews are provided in Chris Alden and Garth le Pere, “South 
Africa’s Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy – From Reconciliation to Revival?”, Adelphi 
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entailed the restructuring of certain government processes, in a process called 
‘integrated governance’, and in foreign policy, the development of a more visionary 
and settled international outlook.  
 
Yet there is a persistent sense, in numerous analyses of South African foreign 
policy, that an expansive, activist foreign policy was expected of South Africa. In 
spite of its state of internal fluidity and transformation, South Africa’s 
overwhelming dominance of Southern Africa – the cessation of military campaigns 
notwithstanding – created expectations of its responsibilities in the region and 
beyond.216 But why did the state opt instead for a middle-range foreign policy, 
heightening its diplomatic presence, but remaining muted in its projection of 
material power? 
 
 
4.1.1 Institutional Arrangements for Foreign Policymaking: Consolidation 
under Mbeki 
The role of the Legislature  
In South Africa, legislative power is held by a parliament composed of two 
chambers, the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces (NCOP). 
The National Assembly represents the people, while the NCOP represents the 
provinces in a decentralised (yet unitary) system of government.217 The National 
Assembly can pass legislation on any matter. Such legislation must then be ratified 
by the upper house. According to the Constitution, when exercising its legislative 
authority, Parliament “is bound only by the Constitution, and must act in 
accordance with, and within the limits of, the Constitution”.218 The National 
Assembly is comprised of 350-400 members who serve for 5-year terms, on the 
basis of proportional representation. It maintains the power to consider, pass, 
amend or reject legislation, as well as the duty to retain oversight of the executive, 
and any other organ of state.219 The NCOP is comprised of a single delegation from 
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each province, consisting of 10 delegates. Proportional representation ensures that a 
number of parties may compete for seats in the legislature, and results in a fractured 
and populous party-system, in contrast to first-past-the-post electoral systems. In 
South Africa, this situation is over-compensated for by the dominance of the ruling 
African National Congress, which, by virtue of its overwhelming election victories 
and the weakness of the opposition, dominates Parliament.220 
 
The nature of South Africa’s multiparty transition from apartheid rule meant that a 
multiplicity of voices, especially those of the ANC and its alliance partners, weighed 
in on the initial foreign policy-making process. After 1994, the Government of 
National Unity went as far as initiating a consultation process engaging civil society 
“through a series of public meetings and the circulation of a discussion 
document”.221 These inputs did not contribute to the publication of a White Paper 
on Foreign Policy as expected, but they helped to highlight new potential foreign 
policy directions (e.g. the human security paradigm), and also to legitimise the new 
foreign policymaking institutions.222  
 
In practice, parliament retains a largely reactive role in foreign policy, although the 
extent to which this is true depends on the issue.223 Parliament’s role was amplified 
somewhat in the past by the oversight function of the Parliamentary Committee on 
Foreign Affairs. As widely noted, for a brief period in the immediate aftermath of 
the first all-race elections, this committee under chair and ANC member Raymond 
Suttner was active in questioning the premises of South African foreign policy, as 
well as the pace of transformation of the Department of Foreign Affairs. For one 
thing, the Committee took a dim view of the small budget set aside for the 
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establishment of diplomatic missions in Africa early on.224 The predominant pattern 
since then, however, has been one of limited engagement. One parliamentarian has 
attributed this to “parliament’s uncertainty about its role in the foreign policy 
process”; and, also to executive domination of foreign policy.225 Another possible 
reason is the under-resourcing of parliamentarians’ capacity to develop the 
necessary expertise to play a more active role in foreign policy initiation. The 
proportional representation electoral system is another important political limitation 
on parliamentarians’ involvement on foreign policy issues. Because ANC MPs (who 
are in the majority and hence could prove most effective) are elected on a party list, 
they have little incentive to challenge government positions, or to champion specific 
issues,226 and so exhibit greater loyalty to the Party leadership.  
 
A further crucial dimension of Parliament’s activity (or more aptly, inactivity) on 
foreign policy is its inability to introduce money bills.227 This right is reserved for 
the executive, in the person of the Minister of Finance. Therefore, any foreign 
policy initiatives requiring large disbursements of funds, including those not related 
to any international crisis, may – if not introduced by the Department of Foreign 
Affairs - only be introduced by the Finance Minister, who is already a privileged 
associate of the President by virtue of his presidential appointment, further 
entrenching executive control of foreign policy. Parliament’s primary point of 
influence of foreign policy budgetary questions is the Department of Foreign 
Affairs Budget Vote, during which allocations of funds for the conduct of foreign 
relations are made. In accordance with South Africa’s growing continental and 
international responsibilities from 2001 onward, this amount grew incrementally 
each year, by an unusual 27% in 2001/2, 13,32% in 2002/3, and a sizable 35% to 
reach R5,6 billion (US$716m at 2011 rates) in Mbeki’s last year as president, 2008.228 
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While this figure is small in global terms, and in comparison to other state 
expenditure, it experienced rapid growth during Mbeki’s tenure.   
 
The role of the Executive: The Presidency 
As noted by a proximate observer, “…in the case of South Africa, it is not so much 
the executive branch overall that dominates foreign policy as the presidency”.229 
The Mbeki period was a period of centralisation and consolidation of foreign 
policymaking. This accompanied a sharpening of South Africa’s foreign policy goals 
and vision, along with institutional streamlining that centralised the policymaking 
power of the Presidency. Paradoxically, while this state of affairs had the potential 
to give the ANC a prime position in the formulation of foreign policy, it 
accompanied a process of distancing between Mbeki and the party’s rank and file, 
ultimately with disastrous results for his presidency.  
 
Mbeki presided over a restructuring of the Office of the President upon his election 
in June 1999. This process formed part of a broader move toward ‘integrated 
governance’, that brought the private offices of the President and Vice-President, 
the Cabinet Office and the Policy Coordination and Advisory Services Unit under 
the tutelage of a single Director-General (Chief Administrator) in the Presidency, 
the Mbeki-acolyte, Rev. Frank Chikane.230  
 
Key individuals involved in policymaking under Mbeki included: his Foreign 
Minister, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, who served throughout his two terms of 
office; Director-General of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Dr Ayanda Ntsaluba 
(2003 – 2011); Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aziz Pahad; and, Advocate 
Mojanku Gumbi, legal adviser to the president. At least two of these individuals, 
Zuma and Pahad, held high office in the ANC (as members of the National 
Executive Committee, or NEC). More than this, they emanated from ‘the same 
ANC political school’ as Mbeki, forging a strong strategic link.231 This ‘school’ 
comprises ANC cadres who spent a significant period of time living in exile during 
apartheid, and may be argued to have held more outward-looking (or, somewhat 
                                                
229 Ibid., p297.  
230 For a full discussion of ‘integrated governance’ in the context of foreign policymaking, 
see Van Nieuwkerk, “South Africa and African Crises”, 103-107.  
231 Van Nieuwkerk, “South Africa and African Crises”, 102.  
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Western-oriented) views of international affairs.232 Hence, Mbeki had managed, 
both politically and institutionally, to streamline the making of foreign policy 
virtually in his own image. As noted by van Nieuwkerk in 2006, “The Presidency as 
the primary locus of policy now sets goals and is the architect of an overarching 
vision and foreign policy philosophy”.233 
 
The role of the Executive: The Department of Foreign Affairs 
According to the Constitution, the national executive is responsible for the 
negotiating and signing of all international treaties. However, these agreements are 
only binding upon ratification by both houses of Parliament.234 The Department of 
Foreign Affairs is further tasked with the following key mandate: “To formulate, co-
ordinate, implement and manage South Africa’s foreign policy”.235 
 
In the years after 1994, not only was the transformation of government policy a 
requirement, but the very instruments of policymaking and implementation required 
substantial modification in order to carry out the new mandate of a democratically 
elected majority government. The DFA was a key instrument in reforming foreign 
policy. Transformation of this institution faced challenges on ideological and 
institutional fronts. This posed a particular problem given that the nature of the 
broader political transition had secured the jobs of apartheid-era civil servants for at 
least five years after the first democratic elections.236 This meant that “public 
policymaking had to involve new civil servants working next to apartheid-era 
functionaries”.237 Not only did this combine differing levels of experience and 
expertise, it also forced the co-existence of divergent worldviews. The differences 
between them have frequently been described as ‘internationalist’ vs. ‘neo-
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mercantilist’,238 or ‘revolutionary’ vs. ‘pragmatic’, with officials representing the 
apartheid state symbolised by the latter labels, and those who had participated in the 
liberation struggle represented by the former.  
 
The DFA as an institution was furthermore burdened with tensions surrounding the 
attainment of racial and gender equity. According to Alden and le Pere, “By 2000 
while most of South Africa’s career diplomats were black the total (non-politically 
appointed) staff complement of missions abroad remained skewed: 40% were black 
and 60% white”.239 With the appointment of ANC stalwart Alfred Nzo as the first 
post-apartheid foreign minister, the department was further perceived to be lacking 
in dynamic and assertive leadership. The institution, from a broader government 
point of view, had been weak and un-influential historically. This was especially the 
case since the early 1980s when PW Botha’s State Security Council became the 
locus of much of South Africa’s foreign policy decision-making in its campaign of 
military coercion across its borders. In addition, already evident in the last decade of 
apartheid “[p]arliament played no role in foreign policy and the role of Cabinet 
tended to be limited to acquiescence or approval’”.240  
 
During the transition, “[the Ministry’s] internal divisions and inertia, together with 
competition from other actors, conspired…to make it peripheral to the shaping and 
influencing of policy during the Mandela years”.241 Alden and le Pere characterise 
the multiplicity of actors attempting to shape, determine and implement policy as 
the main problem afflicting South Africa’s foreign policymaking in the immediate 
aftermath of apartheid. Nathan adds that some of these actors, particularly the 
apartheid-era officials “repudiated the need for a comprehensive and systematic 
foreign policy”.242 This resulted in a foreign policy that was frequently characterised 
as being ‘ad hoc’, ‘haphazard’, ‘inconsistent’, ‘ambiguous’, and lacking in 
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‘coherence’.243 DFA’s institutional weaknesses co-existed with its intensifying 
competition with sister-bureaucracies, the Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI)244 and the Department of Defense (DoD).  
 
4.1.2. ANC and foreign policymaking: Contradictory trends in a changing 
party 
A curious phenomenon that became increasingly apparent during the Mbeki 
presidency was that in spite of foreign policy decision-making and its broader 
formulation being centralised in the office of the State President (who was also the 
party president), the period also witnessed the gradual isolation of the African 
National Congress from the policymaking process. This is attributed by scholars to 
two parallel processes taking place within the organisation since at least 1997, the 
year Thabo Mbeki became ANC president, and two years before he became State 
President. They are: the modernisation of the party, and the growing distance 
between the party leadership and the rank-and-file,245 resulting in detrimental effects 
for accountability and internal democracy.  
 
In its seminal post-Apartheid document, ‘Ready to Govern’, published in 1992, the 
ANC announced that under its leadership, in the area of foreign policy, “(a) 
democratic South Africa will actively promote the objectives of democracy, peace, 
stability, development, and mutually-beneficial relations among the people of Africa 
as a whole, as well as a Pan African solidarity”.246 It also stated that “ANC policy 
will contribute to the democratisation of international political and economic 
relations, and so help secure a global context within which a democratic South 
Africa will be able to coexist peacefully and to cooperate on a democratic basis with 
its neighbours in the region and further afield”.247 
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The party’s commitment to the promotion of human rights in particular, as set out 
in Nelson Mandela’s article in Foreign Affairs in 1993, set it on a potential collision 
course with its African neighbours and other long-term supporters of the liberation 
struggle, such as Cuba and Libya. Following the public relations and foreign policy 
disasters over the Nigerian affair in 1995248, the South African government, sought 
to modify its principled stances on certain international issues by funnelling its 
responses through multilateral institutions. One observer went as far as to sketch 
the new-found emphasis on multilateralism close to the end of Mandela’s tenure as 
a ‘cover’ for the country’s retreat from its strong human rights position.249 
Nonetheless, the end of Mandela’s presidency saw South Africa’s status substantially 
elevated as a peace-broker, mediator and examplar of negotiated settlements, in the 
international community.  
 
Yet, a palpable tension remained between realism and idealism, between the 
country’s perceived commercial, trade and political interests and its aspirational role 
as a moral crusader for human rights and democracy. The institutions of foreign 
policymaking were seen by many in the ANC to be unresponsive to the concerns 
of the majority of South Africans, and dominated in the middle ranks by old-
regime officials. Reconciling these differing foreign-policy priorities and 
institutional tensions became an overriding objective of the incoming government 
in 1999.250 
 
With the consolidation of public policymaking after the ANC’s resounding victory 
in the 1999 general election, South Africa’s foreign affairs vision became the 
function of the insights and worldviews of a small number of individuals, most if 
not all of them, high-ranking members of the ANC. This exclusivity was 
underscored by the departure of the National Party, the former governing party, 
from the GNU in 1996, and by the expiration of this transitional condition in 
1999.251 The new institutional makeup, termed ‘integrated governance’ (see p114 of 
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this chapter) sought to streamline policymaking processes across all sectors, with the 
effect of centralising decision-making within an expanding Presidency. This was in 
sharp contrast to the multiplicity of voices mentioned earlier as having played a key 
role in the immediate aftermath of apartheid. 
 
All the while, the Party was growing gradually distant from the consolidated centre 
of power in the Union Buildings, the site of the Presidency. One of the main 
institutional links between the African National Congress and the foreign 
policymaking process remained the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on foreign 
affairs, as well as those committees that deal with cognate issues, such as trade and 
defense. Owing to the ANC’s sizeable parliamentary majority, however, along with 
strict party discipline and a lack of resources, the level of oversight provided by 
these committees is negligible. Even ANC MPs have lamented the limited extent to 
which they have influence over the foreign policy process.252 Indeed, the ANC’s 
head of International Relations for the period under consideration, Ms. Mavivi 
Myakayaka-Manzini, appeared to have very little to do with the intricate and 
centralised policymaking machinery during a July 2007 interview.253 Under Mbeki, 
there appeared also to be a fine dividing line between the ANC Executive (or NEC 
and National Working Committee members, to be discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter 5), and the rank and file of the ANC parliamentary caucus. Calland notes 
that “(t)here are…serious limitations on the power of the caucus, many of which 
reflect the same political constraints [as experienced by MPs more generally]”.254 
 
The following overarching substantive priorities were confirmed by Cabinet, and 
again in the President’s 2007 State of the Nation address, as guidelines for South 
Africa’s foreign policy:255 
 
1. Consolidation of the African Agenda 
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2. Strengthening of South-South Co-operation 
3. Strengthening of North-South Co-operation 
4. Participation in the Global System of Governance 
5. Strengthening of Political and Economic Relations 
 
South Africa’s gradual distancing from the explicit commitment to human rights in 
its foreign policy, and the strengthened commitment to more procedural features of 
internationalism can thus be read through the domestic process of change, which 
the ANC has undergone, along with the centralisation of political power in the 
office of the President. Foreign policy has not been immune to these tendencies. To 
minimise political risks stemming from reckless international action – such as 
actions that alienated South Africa’s neighbours – the ANC leadership looked to 
more muted action, such as a new focus on multilateralism, to project its foreign 
policy interests. As has been illustrated in the preceding chapter, however, 
internationalism does not obviate the interests of the state. It is possible both to be 
a ‘force for good’ in international politics, while pursuing state interests. However, 
the extent to which state interests and not party interests were being pursued is a 
question on which little light has been shed. Internationalism has been a response 
both to ideological components within the ruling party’s make-up, and to limitations 
imposed by the institutions of state. Hence, the party did not have its own way on 
foreign policy, but this did not imply the strength of the legislature or executive, 
broadly speaking. The Presidency, and especially the state president, came to play 
pivotal roles in foreign policy formulation.  
 
4.1.3. International Outlook 
The new South Africa was born in a specific international setting. The debates that 
had proceeded within the ANC were silenced – momentarily – by its unbanning, 
and the need to make rapid decisions about policy as the government of a new 
South Africa. The ANC had benefited from all of the liberal tendencies in a world 
that was rapidly becoming unrecognisable to the realist approach to international 
affairs. The beneficiary of the pressure exerted by a global human rights lobby that 
stretched from Lagos to London, and from New York to New Zealand; and of the 
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institutional power of ‘the darker nations’256 in the United Nations General 
Assembly; the ANC came to appreciate and value these components of the 
international system: the global human rights discourse, international civil society, 
and multilateral forums. Yet, the demands of national development, and its own 
electoral machine, placed new challenges in its way. While accepting funding from 
various quarters, and still under a self-imposed burden of obligation to its erstwhile 
supporters in Libya, Cuba and Indonesia, the ANC was forced to dilute some of its 
early commitments to human rights in its foreign policy. It also accepted, both 
domestically and internationally, the prevalence of the market economy, and 
globalisation, as the dominant factors in national development.  
 
The primary threat to South Africa, according to the Department of Foreign 
Affairs,257 was any threat posed to the newly-won democracy. The Department of 
Defence underscored this by noting in its 1998 Defence Review that for South 
Africa there is an “absence of a foreseeable conventional military threat”.258 For this 
reason, the ANC sought to make economics the focus of its relations with its 
neighbours, and also to ‘lock-in’ the support of neighbouring countries for 
democracy – and particularly the African National Congress as the government of 
South Africa. Democracy could only prosper, and not be overturned,259 by securing 
the acquiescence of neighbouring states. This is perhaps one major reason why 
South Africa has resisted antagonising Robert Mugabe. In fact, the South African 
government feared major security disturbances emanating from Zimbabwe during 
the height of state-society tensions in that country in 2008.260 Hence, the rationality 
that is frequently viewed as implicit to Realism, has not been far from South Africa’s 
calculations about its foreign policy. What has appeared to belong to the domain of 
ideology, the notions of ‘African solidarity’ and ‘liberation credentials’, disguise 
clear-headed calculations about South Africa’s security interests. Threat perception 
is therefore a function of both material and ideational factors of national security.  
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Some of South Africa’s accomplishments in the international arena under the Mbeki 
administration included the formalisation of a continental agenda resulting in the 
launch of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the 
creation of the African Union (AU) to replace the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU). Alas, the potential contradictions inherent in the principles underlying these 
projects appear not to have been examined closely by the engineers of the projects. 
Numerous commentators have described the ‘ambiguity’,261 ‘inconsistency’,262 and 
paradoxical nature263 of South Africa’s foreign policy. Foreign policy appeared to 
favour a number of different and often conflicting trajectories. Human rights and 
democracy promotion competed with African solidarity; and a tacit – though at 
times open - acceptance of globalisation was at times supplanted by virulent anti-
globalisation rhetoric. A few analysts sought to view these contradictions through 
the prism of competitive domestic politics, while others preferred to examine these 
tensions more broadly in terms of the long-overlooked facet of identity.264 A closer 
look at institutional dynamics brings a sense of constraint to the expectations 
created by South Africa’s expansive foreign policy pronouncements. With limited 
resources, contradictory political cultures and identities, and competing – and in the 
case of DFA, marginalised - bureaucratic agencies, South Africa’s haphazard 
internationalism since the end of apartheid becomes more intelligible.  
 
 
 
4.2. Brazil: The concession of foreign policymaking to Part ido dos  
Trabalhadores? 
 
In Brazil, the election of Luiz Inácio Lula Da Silva, leader of the Workers’ Party, in 
October 2002, upon his fourth attempt, signalled “paradigmatic change in the 
social, economic and political spheres” of Brazil.265 The popular euphoria that 
greeted this event – especially that of PT observers on the Left – buoyed far-
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reaching expectations of what PT was to achieve upon finally reaching the Palácio 
do Planalto, the seat of government in Brasília. One of Lula’s first tasks was to 
reassure the markets, which had expected the worst from the election of the former 
union leader. For a number of reasons, however, in spite of winning the election by 
the largest margin ever in Brazilian history, and securing the votes of some 52 
million voters, Lula and the PT were not autonomous in determining the outlines of 
Brazil’s foreign policy. 
 
As noted by Hurrell,  
“For many on the left (especially in Europe), for many inside Brazil, and for many 
in the developing world, the assertive foreign policy of the government of President Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula) is seen as a progressive force in global affairs”.266 
 
This distinctive assertiveness, compared to the preceding twenty or so years of 
foreign policy practice, has been attributed to a variety of factors. These include: 
Brazil’s search for recognition, its rapid levels of economic growth after a decade of 
stagnation in the 1980s, and in some cases, the influence of the governing party, PT, 
and the personal diplomacy of President Lula da Silva.267  
 
Typifying most accounts of Brazil’s international relations is a description of its 
search for international recognition, and to be accorded its ‘rightful place’ in 
international society. This is a goal that is seated at the centre of the psyche of the 
Brazilian nation, derived from the country’s auspicious beginnings as the seat of the 
Portuguese Empire in Latin America during the Napoleonic conquest of Europe in 
the first decades of the nineteenth century. As proclaimed by the famed abolitionist, 
Joaquim Nabuco, at the end of that century, “Brazil does not want to be a nation 
morally isolated, a leper, expelled from the world community. The esteem and 
respect of foreign nations are as valuable to us as they are to other people”.268  
 
This sentiment is common to a time when Brazil’s elite commenced its pre-
occupation with the country’s image in the world. The cultivation of this image also 
happened to be a strong argument against the maintenance of the slave trade and 
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slavery. Even Brazil’s participation in the two World Wars was coloured by the 
hope of increasing its international status through a valuable contribution to the 
Allied war efforts. So much so, that on the occasion of each War’s ending, Brazil’s 
leadership was deeply convinced of the country’s entitlement to permanent 
recognition of its status in the post-war institutions, the League of Nations, and the 
United Nations Organisation, respectively. The goal of recognition has continued to 
be a driver of Brazilian diplomacy, since the institutionalisation of the diplomatic 
service by the Baron de Rio Branco at the end of the nineteenth century, and 
throughout the independent republic’s history, to the present day. However, as 
noted by Celso Lafer, Foreign Minister under President Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso, for Brazil this was not an expansionist nationalism.269 For Rio Branco, 
Brazil’s primary goal was the reduction of power disparities that rendered Brazil 
vulnerable. These disparities were not to be conquered externally, through 
expansion, but internally, through development.270  
 
For this reason, Brazil’s search for international recognition has seldom been 
conducted with force, and has instead relied on a legalistic tradition of diplomacy 
and multilateralism. As noted by Lima and Hirst, “Brazil’s desire to influence 
international rules and regimes and to be considered a major player has been 
understood principally in terms of its soft power: it has consistently eschewed the 
development of hard power, and especially of military power”.271 The Brazilian 
elite’s concern with the country’s international image is even credited with the 
eventual return to democracy after two decades of military rule, from 1964 to 1985: 
“The elite was highly aware of their country’s image abroad, just as they had been 
since the nineteenth century. As a group, they identified strongly with the North 
Atlantic democracies”.272  
 
So how, then, has a rapidly growing Brazilian state resisted the temptation to exert 
its power in a militaristic and confrontational manner on the international scene, 
choosing instead the path of multilateral institutions, international law, peaceful 
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resolution of disputes, and solidarity with the developing world? Does the search 
for recognition capture this unexpected outcome accurately, or are there additional 
factors to consider? Before analysing the factors, it is necessary to examine the 
foreign policymaking machinery in Brazil during the period covered by this thesis, 
the first and second Presidential terms of Lula da Silva.  
 
In the first instance, as previously noted, despite winning the Presidency by a 
landslide margin, Lula’s party did not succeed in winning a majority in Congress. 
This meant that alliances had to be sought with a multitude of other parties in order 
for measures to be passed. Presidential powers were also curtailed by new legislation 
that sought to limit the President’s capacity to issue decrees, along with his influence 
over the Central Bank.273 These external limits, and discordant tendencies within 
the party itself, placed constraints on the extent to which a united PT could 
implement its vision for Brazilian politics, both domestic and international. By the 
time it won its first Presidential election, the Party had evolved considerably from its 
beginnings as a catchall socialist workers’ movement. In fact, by this time its foreign 
policy prescriptions did not deviate far from those traditionally emphasised in 
Brazilian diplomacy.274 These included national independence; sovereignty; non-
interference in the internal affairs of other states; and, equality with other states. The 
substance of PT’s imprint on foreign policy has been characterised as more evident 
in the area of rhetoric and the practices of the party leadership, than in any major 
changes in the grand lines of foreign policy.275 Yet, the ‘minor’ flourishes associated 
with PT’s influence have had a major impact on how Brazil is viewed 
internationally, and in the means it has chosen to project itself abroad.276 The 
significance of these ‘minor’ flourishes has been amplified by Brazil’s regional and 
contemporary global context. PT’s scepticism of the US-initiated Free Trade Area 
of the Americas (FTAA, or ALCA in Spanish and Portuguese), and its proximity to 
Hugo Chavez and Evo Morales assumed greater importance in a South America 
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that was seen to be experiencing a ‘Pink Revolution’ led by leaders of the political 
left, potentially threatening to US interests.  
 
 
4.2.1. Institutional Arrangements for Foreign Policymaking: Party above 
Policy? 
The role of the Legislature 
In Brazil, legislative power is exercised by the National Congress. The Congress is a 
two-house Chamber, comprised of a Chamber of Deputies and the Federal Senate. 
Members of the Chamber of Deputies are directly elected and serve for 4-year 
terms, while those of the Senate, also directly elected, serve for 8 years. Decisions of 
each house are by majority vote. Legislative power over the foreign policy process 
in Brazil tends to be more reactive than continuous. The legislature only possesses 
the competence to “decide conclusively on international treaties, agreements or 
international acts which result in changes or commitments that go against the 
national property”;277 and to “authorise the President of the Republic to declare 
war, to make peace and to permit foreign forces to pass through the national 
territory…”.278 Within the legislative branch of government, there are standing 
committees for foreign affairs in both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. 
The treaty approval prerogative of the Senate was expanded by the 1988 
Constitution. All international financial agreements, such as those with the IMF and 
foreign banks, must be approved by the upper house, whereas prior to the 1988 
Constitution, approval by the executive was exclusively required. Therefore, Lula 
entered the Palacio do Planalto with fewer executive powers over foreign policy than 
his immediate predecessor, Cardoso, and the Presidents of the military regimes, but 
this did not necessarily hamper his grasp on foreign policy formulation.  
 
According to the Brazilian Constitution of 1988, Brazil’s international relations are 
to be governed by the following principles:  
 
• National independence 
                                                
277 Constitution of Brazil, 1988: Section I, Article 49.1, accessed online at: 
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Brazil/english96.html#mozTocId732442 on 26 
July, 2010.  
278 Ibid., Article 49.2. 
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• Prevalence of human rights 
• Self-determination of peoples 
• Non-intervention 
• Equality among states 
• Defense of the peace 
• Peaceful settlement of conflicts 
• Repudiation of terrorism and racism 
• Cooperation among peoples for the progress of mankind 
• Granting of political asylum.279  
 
The 1988 Constitution is notable, furthermore, for in addition to having formalised 
democracy, it actually reflected the influence of conservative elements in Brazilian 
society – those who desired no, or only gradual change from military rule - for 
example by entrenching numerous military prerogatives that had the effect of 
freezing civil-military relations in democratic Brazil.280 This founding feature of 
modern democracy in Brazil should not be underestimated in calculations about 
foreign policy formulation in the democratic administrations since 1985.  
 
 
 
The role of the Executive: The Presidency 
As stated in the 1988 Constitution, the responsibility for formulating foreign policy 
is vested in the Executive. According to an early observer writing during the military 
dictatorship, “The Brazilian executive has exceptionally wide powers to handle the 
big issues of foreign policy and to shape Brazil’s foreign relations – powers that 
Western industrial countries customarily grant their leaders only in times of war”.281 
While much has changed since the dictatorship ended formally in 1985, this aspect 
of Brazilian policymaking by and large remains the same, in spite of the expansion 
of the Senate’s treaty approval prerogative. 
 
                                                
279 Constitution of Brazil 1988(English translation), accessed at 
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281 Ronald M. Schneider, Brazil: Foreign Policy of a Future World Power (Boulder: 
Westview Special Studies on Latin America, 1976): 2.  
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The Presidency makes foreign policy in consultation with the Foreign Ministry, 
represented by its Secretary-General, and on occasion by senior diplomats on their 
own geographical areas of expertise. While PT itself does not feature in an 
institutional sense during the foreign policymaking process, certain major PT 
figureheads retain some influence on the foreign policymaking process. Among 
these, in addition to the President and his international affairs adviser, is the 
disgraced former Presidential Chief-of-Staff José Dirceu,282 who is known to hold 
anti-America and anti-free trade positions283 and is a key figure in PT.  
 
The post of foreign affairs adviser in the Presidency has traditionally been occupied 
by a senior diplomat.284 This created a ‘natural bridge’ to the Foreign Ministry, as 
the office-holder would serve as a source of information for the President, in an 
almost perfunctory role. Under the Lula administration, since 2006, this position has 
instead been held by a member of the PT leadership, Professor Marco Aurélio 
Garcia. Garcia had previously served as interim leader of PT, and had been pro-
active in “defining and even implementing certain lines of Lula’s foreign policy”.285 
Strictly speaking, neither the President’s Special Adviser for International Affairs, 
nor the Secretary-General of Itamaraty have historically had substantive roles in 
forming or implementing foreign policy.286 Where the Secretary-General has played 
a role in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy, this has mainly 
served to support the diplomatic process. This departure under the Lula 
administration had reverberations within the foreign policy establishment, leading to 
early rumours of discord between Garcia and Foreign Minister Celso Amorim. A 
division of labour later evolved, which saw Garcia take responsibility for the more 
delicate ‘ideological’ aspects of Brazil’s foreign policy, such as relations with Hugo 
Chavez, and other issues involving fellow ‘Leftist’ governments of South America; 
while Amorim dealt with ‘technical’ aspects relating to international trade 
                                                
282 Personal communication with a senior Brazilian diplomat.  
283 See personal blog of Jose Dirceu: http://www.zedirceu.co.br  
284 Rex A. Hudson, Brazil: A Country Study. Washington GPO for the Library of 
Congress: Washington, DC (1997). Accessed online at: http://countrystudies.us/brazil/ 
on 20 April, 2010. The last time a non-diplomat held this post was during the Kubitschek 
presidency (1956-60), when it was held by the poet Augusto Frederico Schmidt. 
Vigevani and Cepaluni, “Lula’s Foreign Policy”,1316.  
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negotiations, for example.287 This division risked promoting two parallel, and 
potentially conflicting, foreign policy agendas for Brazil, while at the same time 
diversifying its diplomatic options.  
 
On the one hand is the party-to-party diplomacy of PT, exhibited to great effect 
during the Venezuelan crisis of 2002, the year of Lula’s ascent to power. This crisis 
saw the despatch of Garcia to Venezuela, even before Lula had assumed the 
Presidency, in an attempt to mediate between Hugo Chavez and the opposition. In 
addition, some reports stated that Lula had played a pivotal role in convincing 
President Cardoso to approve emergency shipments of 520,000 barrels of oil to 
Venezuela. The shipment helped to ease the effects of a crippling strike in protest at 
Chavez’s rule in December 2002.288  On the other hand is the official diplomacy of 
the Brazilian state that seeks to disavow entanglements in the domestic affairs of 
other states. Keeping these two ‘tracks’ of diplomacy separate has become 
increasingly difficult for the government, as it faces accusations of keeping ‘bad’ 
company on account of the Party’s relations with leaders of the Left in Latin 
America.  
 
 
 
The role of the Executive: Itamaraty (Ministry of External Relations, MRE) 
Itamaraty’s influence on the exercise of Brazilian diplomacy is a historical 
cornerstone of Brazilian foreign policy. The Foreign Ministry has a significant - yet 
not always decisive – role in the process of foreign policy formulation and 
implementation. The last major analysis in English of this formidable institution was 
conducted by the eminent Brazil scholar, Ronald M. Schneider, in 1976. Now as 
then, “Not surprisingly, the Foreign Ministry …tends to respond somewhat 
defensively to the suggestion or even the implication that it is not the central actor 
in the Brazilian foreign-policy process”.289 A commonly held view is that Itamaraty 
has been a conservative force in Brazilian foreign policy, owing to its recruitment 
                                                
287 Tullo Vigevani and Gabriel Cepaluni, “Lula’s foreign policy and the quest for 
autonomy through diversification”, Third World Quarterly, 28, Issue 7 (2007): 1316. 
288 Rohter, Larry. 2002. “Venezuela gets fuel aid / Brazil ships gasoline to show support 
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and socialisation practices, as well as to its relative isolation from other ministries 
and non-state actors. This aura of conservatism is underlined by a perceived respect 
for tradition, and an esprit de corps engendered by the diplomatic lifestyle and its steep 
requirements for entry.  
 
Fontaine described Itamaraty as follows:  
 
It is nationalist, but more pragmatic than romantic. It is oriented toward Europe 
and not America. It emphasizes preservation of good relations with old friends, but 
not at the expense of making new ones. It entails a desire for a larger Brazilian role 
on the world scene, but it does not exaggerate the nation’s present prospects for 
world power.290 
 
Itamaraty has indeed been a force for continuity in Brazilian foreign policy. In 
recent years, however, its autonomy and dominance over the foreign policy process 
– though never beyond question – have come under increasing pressure. While the 
Foreign Ministry’s influence has tended historically to wax and wane, depending on 
the personalities holding power in government, and in the institution, respectively, it 
has been noted that with the increasing demands on diplomacy brought by 
globalisation, Itamaraty has found it challenging to keep up. Already in 1976, once 
military ‘decompression’, or a moderate form of liberalisation, had been set in train 
by the government of Ernesto Geisel, ‘the foreign service [found] itself…becoming 
less important, not more important, at a time when foreign affairs [was] really 
beginning to matter for Brazil’.291 This loss of importance was attributed to the 
increasing mismatch between Brazil’s international economic goals, and its 
inadequate diplomatic capacity in this area.292 Itamaraty was not equipped to engage 
in the complex economic negotiations Brazil required to diversify its economic 
relations at the end of the 1970s, when the phenomenal growth from earlier in the 
decade was beginning to slow.  
 
This trend was strengthened in the early 1990s, under the leadership of Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso, who presided over an increasing internationalisation of the 
Brazilian economy, and therewith the diversification of Itamaraty’s role in 
international trade issues. Cardoso oversaw the inclusion of “new voices” in 
                                                
290 Fontaine, cited in Schneider, Brazil, 67.  
291 Schneider, Brazil, 95. 
292 Ibid. 
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consultative councils, as well as the strengthening of the Chamber of International 
Commerce (Câmara de Comércio Exterior, CAMEX), which was not linked to the 
MRE, but to the Ministry of Development, Industry, and Foreign Trade (MDIC).293 
The process was reversed, however, early in Lula’s tenure. Under pressure from 
domestic constituencies (primarily within PT) to take a tougher stand on the 
prospects for Brazil’s negotiation of the FTAA, Lula re-instated the leading role of 
MRE in trade policy and negotiations. According to Mario Marconini, former 
Brazilian Foreign Trade Secretary (1999) “By doing so, the President expected to 
end whatever power struggle might be occurring within the government while 
making clear to society who called the shots on the FTAA and related trade 
matters”.294 It would appear that for Lula, the task of maintaining a hold on the 
course of negotiations would have been easier to achieve by bringing it under the 
primary influence of MRE. Stemming from this decision, Brazil was represented in 
top-level international trade negotiations by the Foreign Minister, Celso Amorim.  
 
In areas other than international economics and trade, Itamaraty has had to share its 
workload. Some of the ministries concerned include: MDIC, the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Livestock and Supply (MAPA), as well as the Ministries of the 
Environment and Agrarian Development. Specifically, the Environment Ministry 
took the lead in formulating Brazil’s position in Copenhagen for the COP-15 
summit in 2009, while the Agrarian Development Ministry has shaped Brazil’s 
proposals on family farming in global trade negotiations.295  
 
In the past, Itamaraty has tended to act as a balancer in Brazilian foreign policy 
across a number of issues. Hudson notes Itamaraty’s role when in 1995 Brazil’s 
economic sector, led by the Department of Planning, decided to impose quotas on 
imported vehicles. Aware of the potential negative consequences for Brazil’s 
partners in the Southern Common Market, or Mercado Comum do Sul 
(MERCOSUL), Itamaraty intervened and lighter measures for MERCOSUL 
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members were negotiated.296 Recent research has tended to argue for a certain, if 
measured, decline in the relative influence of Itamaraty in foreign policymaking.297 
By the same token, as there are no political appointees below the strategic level of 
the organisation, it is an institution that is relatively difficult for new governments to 
penetrate, and remains a professional diplomatic corps.298 
 
The role of Secretary-General in Itamaraty was occupied for much of both the Lula 
administrations by Samuel Guimarães Neto. Guimarães was appointed within 10 
days of Lula’s accession to office in 2003, and proved a somewhat controversial 
choice. His activities breached the traditional limits of the Secretary-General role, as, 
while in office he occasionally took to writing299 on subjects in a manner deemed to 
be ‘beyond the limits of diplomacy’. This led to his characterisation by the 
conservative Brazilian press as an ‘ideologue’ of the new lines of foreign policy 
being promoted by PT.300 In actual fact, Guimarães ‘is not a PT man’.301 He may 
better be described as a career-diplomat ‘national-developmentist’ of the old 
‘independent foreign policy’ school, initiated during the Presidency of Getúlio 
Vargas. Guimarães, in this way, serves as a link between Brazil’s foreign policy 
under Lula, and earlier independent foreign policy postures from the middle of the 
twentieth century onward.  
 
The expansion of Itamaraty was expedited by Lula, and was evident in the growth 
of Brazil’s complement of representation abroad. In 2002, just before Lula took 
office, Brazil had 150 missions abroad. By the end of Lula’s tenure in 2010, this 
number had grown to 230. Accordingly, the number of diplomatic personnel 
increased from 1,000 prior to the Lula administration, to 1,400 by the end of 
2010.302 
                                                
296 Hudson, Rex A. (ed.). 1997. “Brazil: A Country Study”. Washington: GPO for the 
Library of Congress. Accessed online at: http://countrystudies.us/brazil/ on 27 August, 
2011.  
297 Cason and Power, “Presidentialization”,135.  
298 Lilian Duarte, Brazilian Political Officer, Brazilian Mission in London, interview March 
2010.  
299 Guimarães had made numerous public pronouncements in which he spelled out his 
opposition to the FTAA, and to Brazil’s participation in the negotiations.  
300 Cason and Power, 2009: 98.  
301 Interview with Giancarlo Summa, former head of external communications, PT, July 
2010.  
302 Celso Amorim, “Brazilian Foreign Policy under President Lula (2003-2010): an 
overview”, Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, 53 (special edition) (2010): 226.  
 133 
 
4.2.2. What is good for the party is good for the state? PT’s influence on 
Brazil’s foreign policy 
 
To which extent has PT been able to influence foreign policy, and by which means? 
Schneider noted in 1976 that, “The political parties are not significant factors in 
foreign policy-making. In terms of influence, the parties range between nonexistent 
and marginal”.303 As an accompanying observation, scholar-diplomat Paulo Roberto 
Almeida noted in 1992 that parties paid similarly marginal attention to foreign 
policy issues in their manifestos and political platforms. This resulted from a 
number of factors: the primacy of domestic issues, the fluidity of the party system at 
the time, and the professionalism and impermeability of MRE. The increasing 
visibility of Congress in foreign policy issues has demanded greater involvement by 
political parties on foreign policy, however.304 
 
An important measure of PT’s influence on foreign policy is the extent to which 
‘class’ and redistributive issues have been raised to the level of foreign policy. 
Before this can be ascertained, it is important to examine the means of influence the 
party exerts on the policy process.  
 
PT’s founding documents made scant reference to international relations.305 Its 
Charter of Principles, which served as a precursor to its Manifesto released in 1980, 
stated simply that the Party were “looking to use [their] moral authority and politics 
to try to open a way for all workers”. Its manifesto stressed that workers desired 
‘national independence’, and that the only true condition for ‘national 
independence’ would be the rule of the State by the working masses. The manifesto 
concluded with an affirmation of PT’s “solidarity in the struggle of all oppressed 
masses of the world”.  It is telling that PT has only recently, close to the end of 
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President Lula’s second and last term in office, released a coherent foreign policy 
document, A Política Externa do Governo Lula.  
 
It may be argued that prior to this, PT’s foreign policy – to the extent that one 
existed - had been conducted in a haphazard fashion, adhering to the traditional 
positions of the party, dating from its incarnation as a militant socialist party. Much 
intellectual vigour and structure was provided by Itamaraty’s Secretary-General, 
Samuel Pinheiro Guimaraes,306 who issued a number of publications, while he held 
the post of Director of the Institute of International Relations of the Foreign 
Ministry’s training institute, dealing with various sensitive issues in Brazilian foreign 
policy, along lines highly synonymous with the PT position. For example, his 
dissident views on Brazil’s continued participation in FTAA negotiations with the 
United States were published while the negotiations were still ongoing. The 
publication of these views resulted in Guimarães’ redeployment by the Foreign 
Minister. 
 
PT’s former Secretary for International Affairs, Valter Pomar, admits that one of 
the key measures of influence of the party on foreign policy is the positioning of 
‘affiliated individuals in key posts’.307 Another instrument of influence is the party’s 
manifesto. The impact of party preferences on Brazil’s foreign economic policy 
have been uneven, with the translation of key constituents’ disapproval of the 
FTAA not extending to other areas, such as the continuation of the Doha Round. 
As noted in the PT document A política externa do governo Lula, the Brazilian 
government’s position on pressing toward the conclusion of the Doha Round, to 
include the positions of less-developed countries, is not supported by key sectors of 
the party’s social and political base, such as the CUT.308  
 
Another important contribution of the party, which depends heavily on party 
cohesion, is the voting patterns of members of Congress, and their activities in 
Congress’s Commission for International Relations and National Defense.  
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Interestingly, one proposal placed before the Commission by the PT representative 
for Rio de Janeiro State, Fernando Gabeira, called for the Government’s 
condemnation of the imprisonment in early 2003 of 77 Cuban dissidents, and for 
speedy action by the Government in pursuit of their release.309 What is interesting 
about the PT representative’s remarks on this matter, is that they show an 
awareness of, and intent to utilise, PT’s capacity to interfere in the domestic affairs 
of neighbouring states through party-political links. This is in stark contrast to 
Brazil’s official position of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states. 
PT recognises the governments of Colombia and Mexico, but holds strong links 
with opposition movements, namely Pólo Democrático Alternativo (PDA) and Partido do 
Acción Nacional (PAN), respectively.310  
 
As the state president cannot simultaneously hold executive office in a political 
party, this acts as a measure of limitation of party influence on foreign policy, as a 
measure of distance is created between the President and the party he represents. 
PT is adamant that Lula’s foreign policy has not been a petista foreign policy. “The 
foreign policy of the Lula government is positively evaluated by the PT 
membership, as there are many similarities between it and international policy 
advocated by the Party”.311 This is ostensibly in response to criticism that Brazil’s 
foreign policy has become highly ideologised under the Lula administration. This 
may be true as PT and its ideological soulmates, CUT and Movimento dos 
Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST), for example, have not had things their own 
way. MST have not succeeded in convincing the Lula administration to increase the 
pace of land redistribution. Instead, funds earmarked for the expropriation and 
redistribution of unutilised land were redirected toward the financing of Brazil’s 
external debt.312  
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4.2.3. International Outlook 
 
Brazil’s international outlook is coloured by a fervent nationalism and the 
accompanying desire to occupy a position of status in international society. Under 
Lula, a social agenda has risen to prominence within Brazil’s foreign policy. Threat 
perception, according to some analysts, is hence primarily in terms of “economic 
and not military/security motivations”.313 Yet, this perception makes light of the 
tense battles Brazil has engaged in over the potential diminution of its sovereignty in 
the Amazon, and other environmental questions. Security as a motive should not be 
discarded altogether, but should be expanded to take in Brazil’s concern with 
maintaining its freedom of action in the Amazon, and its desire to balance the 
influence of ‘the other Left’ represented by Chavez in Venezuela and Morales in 
Bolivia. Brazil has also been a thorny client of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, refusing to allow full access to nuclear facilities, and even labelled “a 
serious challenge to the IAEA’s authority”.314 There are some concerns over Brazil’s 
future nuclear intentions.315 
 
Considering the factors enumerated above, it appears that the monolithic 
impression created by Itamaraty’s longstanding prominence as the cornerstone of 
Brazilian foreign policy is being somewhat undermined. This position is being 
eroded by the profusion of new actors in Brazilian foreign policy, especially at the 
federal level. The inclusion of other ministries, which have the necessary skills at 
their disposal, means that Itamaraty requires an update of its relevance to the 
increased pace of economic, environmental and agricultural diplomacy in which 
Brazil is involved. Partido dos Trabalhadores has been able to manipulate neither 
foreign policy nor public opinion in its favour as easily as the expectation of its two 
comfortable electoral victories in 2002 and 2006 might generate. Brazilian foreign 
policy principles outstrip both Itamaraty and PT in longevity, and have served the 
country reasonably well over nearly two centuries. Therefore, there would be 
understandable reluctance to make major changes to these principles.  
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It may be the case that it is precisely this precarious balance of domestic forces, 
between conservatism and progressivism, that determines the Brazilian posture in 
international relations. Military governments of the 1964-1985 period were unable 
to pursue expansive foreign policies, beyond the extension of bilateral relations with 
certain countries of the developing world. Even under its period of dramatic 
economic growth, by 10 percent each year, during the first half of the 1970s, Brazil 
did not engage in excessively expansive foreign policy.  
 
It has been noted that the end of the Geisel presidency in 1979 brought ‘opening’ in 
Brazilian foreign policy; namely, a willingness to depart from the foreign policy 
influence of the United States and to consider the place of Africa and other parts of 
the ‘Third World’ in its foreign policy (terceiro mundismo). This may have been a 
consequence of Brazil’s economic shocks at the hands of the OPEC cartel during 
the 1970s, as well as a desire by the military leadership to chart a course 
independently of the US.  
 
Mullins highlights at least seven core influences on Brazil’s foreign policy: 
• Desire for recognition 
• The interests of Latin America 
• Its continental scale 
• The search for economic development 
• Its international environment, particularly its relationship with the US 
• Dealing with the legacy of the military, and  
• International/multilateral institutions.316 
 
Ideas of exceptionalism long present in Brazil’s foreign policy had their inception 
with the relative peace of Brazil’s independence from Portugal in 1822,317 compared 
to the bloody wars waged by its Spanish-speaking neighbours.  This exceptionalism 
has been articulated in a variety of postures since then. It was evident in Brazil’s 
continuation of the slave trade and slavery itself long after the practices became an 
international outrage in the mid-19th century.318 It was supported by Brazil’s 
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linguistic distinction from its Spanish neighbours. In the 20th century, Brazil’s sense 
of its own exceptionalism left political and diplomatic elites bitterly disappointed 
over the country’s failure to secure permanent seats in the post-war machinery for 
world peace, following both world wars. Brazilian exceptionalism continues in the 
21st century in Brazilian officials’ message that Brazil seeks friends in the 
international community, and in its commitment to global ‘social’ issues.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Both ANC and PT came to power with resounding popular mandates and with long 
histories of international activism in the name of democracy in their respective 
countries. Their prospective foreign policies were awaited with great expectation by 
observers who identified with the left, while others looked on with trepidation.  
 
Institutional dynamics long-present and some newly developed under their tutelage, 
along with structural constraints in the global political and economic environment 
have, however, circumscribed the extent to which each party could freely direct the 
foreign relations of the state. In Brazil, and in South Africa, while foreign 
policymaking is the preserve of the executive, the legislature retains weak 
constitutional powers, depending on their interpretation by the government of the 
day, to veto unpopular international commitments. The role of the political party is 
primarily to provide ideological and intellectual guidance to the overall vision of 
foreign policy.  
 
Based on the evidence presented in the preceding discussions, it appears that for the 
ANC, despite the centralisation of foreign policymaking power by Thabo Mbeki, 
and the appointment of high-level ANC members to key posts in the foreign policy 
bureaucracy and the Presidency, it was in Mbeki’s image, and not that of the party 
that foreign policy was made. By building the institutional context – a strong 
Presidency alongside subservient Ministries – Mbeki was able to exercise a high 
degree of autonomy over foreign policy priorities and commitments. The 
Department of Foreign Affairs has played a marginal role, along with Parliament.  
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For Brazil, meanwhile, while PT’s foreign policy ambitions have had to co-exist 
with Itamaraty’s foreign policy pedigree in managing Brazilian foreign policy, the 
party has contented itself with ‘parallel’ diplomacy based on party links for the more 
delicate aspects of its foreign policy innovation. Itamaraty has by and large been left 
to do what it does best, which is to defend Brazil’s national interests using the time-
honoured tools of traditional interstate diplomacy. These include, non-intervention 
in the internal affairs of other states; a commitment to the peaceful resolution of 
conflicts; and a commitment to the preservation and strengthening of 
multilateralism in international affairs. A clear recent addition under the guidance of 
a PT President has been the cultivation of South-South relations, a fourth 
component of internationalism.  
 
Where do these observations about South Africa and Brazil leave the discussion on 
neoclassical realism and the extraction and mobilisation of resources? Clearly, in the 
South African case, the Presidency is strong, but this does not imply state strength 
and the ease of resource mobilisation and extraction. The requirements for the 
conversion of national power to state power may be met by the ANC’s institutional 
freedom in the person of the President (reinforced by his status as Party president). 
This institutional freedom was strengthened by the continuing appeal of Mbeki’s 
foreign policy. On one hand, as the distance between Mbeki and the rank-and-file 
of the ANC increased, the legitimacy of his public policies declined. However, this 
was experienced to a lesser degree in foreign policy, compared to, for example, 
health policy, over the availability of HIV/AIDS treatments, and in economic 
policy, over the introduction of the neo-liberal Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution (GEAR) policy.319 Mbeki enjoyed some measure of support on his 
Zimbabwe policy as was evidenced by the resounding cheer that greeted Robert 
Mugabe’s attendance of his second inauguration in 2004. This was not a view shared 
by COSATU and the SACP, however, as will be seen in Chapter 5. 
 
In Brazil, meanwhile, PT was engaged in constant battles to win Congressional 
support for important domestic initiatives, such as political reform and social 
                                                
319 While the case of Zimbabwe may be cited as an example of Mbeki’s foreign policy 
winning ANC rank-and-file approval, this cannot be done with confidence. The position 
of the ANC, and indeed the tripartite alliance, was never monolithic on this issue, in spite 
of Mugabe’s rousing welcome at Mbeki’s second inauguration in 2004.  
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welfare measures. The party’s relationship with its constituency was changing 
rapidly in face of the needs of electoral democracy: PT crafted a move away from 
the left and toward the centre on economic policy. The increasing interest of 
important trade sectors in foreign policy meant that the government, in order to 
appeal to the right, had to make important concessions to the business sector. 
Hence, PT enjoyed less institutional freedom in deploying the state’s resources for 
foreign policy commitments. It held strong legitimating power to justify Brazilian 
commitments abroad, however, in the context of the Brazilian elite’s longstanding 
desire to win a more influential place for the country in international affairs.  
 
Under the Lula administration, balancing the requirements of international 
recognition and domestic alliance-building, while remaining true to at least some 
aspects of PT’s traditional posture, has led to a foreign policy that maintains the 
basic traditional principles of Brazilian foreign policy, yet leaves room for the 
freedom of action of the executive in determining the emphases of the foreign 
policy of a PT-led Brazil.  
 
In the case of South Africa’s foreign policymaking, the absence of a strong 
institutional counterweight in the executive (viz., a powerful foreign ministry) does 
not preclude the existence of basic foreign policy principles. However, by 
centralising the policymaking machinery, as well as narrowing the political base of 
influence, Thabo Mbeki was able to ignore critics of his foreign policy, from both 
left and right. The party’s influence was ultimately negligible compared with that of 
Mbeki’s ideas and subjectivities. Compared to Lula’s position, Mbeki enjoyed few 
institutional constraints. South Africa’s parliamentary system inherited with the 
political transition gave way to centralising moves by Mbeki in order to shore up the 
Presidency. This was not as simple in the Brazilian context, although key foreign 
policymaking functions did move to the Planalto Palace, and were embodied in key 
individuals appointed to strategic posts.  
 
The following two chapters, examining South Africa and Brazil, respectively, detail 
the limits and constraints on the projection of state power by these two 
intermediate states.  
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Chapter 5: Rhetoric and Restraint: The State, the ANC 
and Internationalism in South Africa’s Foreign Policy 
 
   “…South Africa will not be indifferent to the rights of others. Human rights 
will be the light that guides our foreign affairs”.  
Nelson Mandela, 1993, Foreign Affairs320 
 
When I look around the world, I see very few countries with greater potential to help shape the 21st century 
than the new South Africa. 
Warren Christopher, 1996321 
 
     
 
Introduction 
 
In terms of traditional, material, measures of capability, South Africa has fared 
relatively well over the last two decades. As the largest and most industrialised 
economy on the African continent, along with ever growing commercial interests, 
South Africa has been labelled an ‘emerging middle power’,322 a ‘continental 
powerhouse’ and ‘regional hegemon’, to name a few. These labels all point to the 
country’s position of pre-eminence in Africa, as a potential leader, engine for 
economic growth, and force for peace. South Africa experienced a surge in its yearly 
GDP growth rates, from negative territory (-0.3% in 1990) in the early 1990s, to 
4.3% by 1996, and 5.5% one year before the end of Thabo Mbeki’s presidency in 
2007.323 Most significantly, and controversially, the executive engaged in a strategic 
arms procurement exercise in 1999, initially valued at some R29 million (about 
US$4 million at the time), in spite of the contraction of its conventional forces in 
line with the defence posture outlined in 1998.324 The weapons procured were 
geared towards ‘primary’ missions, and deemed unsuitable to the ‘secondary’ 
missions in which South Africa was more likely to participate, i.e. peacekeeping 
                                                
320 Nelson Mandela, “South Africa’s Future Foreign Policy”, Foreign Affairs, 72, No.5 
(1993): 88.  
321 Warren Christopher, “The US View of South Africa”, International Update 19 (1996). 
Cited in Maxi Schoeman, “South Africa as an Emerging Middle Power: 1994-2003”, in 
State of the Nation, 2003-4, eds., John Daniel, Adam Habib and Roger Southall 
(Pietermaritzburg: HSRC Press, 2003). 
322 Schoeman, “South Africa as an Emerging Middle Power”. 
323 World Bank Data, South Africa: GDP growth (annual %), accessed at: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG on 23 November 2010.  
324 Department of Defence. 1998. South African Defence Review.  
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missions and disaster relief. Yet, in the 17 years since the first all-race elections held 
in 1994, inaugurating not only a new administration, but a new political dispensation 
for South Africa, there is broad agreement outside of government that the country 
has failed to project itself adequately as a positive, decisive influence in regional, and 
to a lesser extent, in continental, and global, affairs.325 In the latter two arenas, South 
Africa’s foreign policy has been deemed a measured success, through its expanded 
role in international politics following decades of isolation. 
 
This should not be a puzzle for a state emerging from decades of diplomatic 
isolation and economic underperformance, but for the fact that statements of 
expansive ambition are liberally scattered throughout South Africa’s post-1994 
foreign policy strategic plans.326 These include the centrality of human rights, 
conceived as ‘beyond the political, embracing the economic, social and 
environmental’; ‘the promotion of democracy world-wide’; and the striving for ‘the 
fundamental reform in the governance and management’ of global multilateral 
institutions.327 Yet, in a 1996 Green Paper policy document, the government 
recognised that  
 
the world’s reaction [of support and admiration for South Africa’s peaceful 
democratisation] does not represent an indefinite continuation of the unique 
relationship…Many expectations about South Africa’s international role have been 
created, but at the same time many demanding responsibilities have been 
assumed.328  
 
The literature on South Africa’s activist, internationalist foreign policy is 
extensive.329  Yet it curiously omits to examine the ideational and political role 
                                                
325 Raenette Taljaard, “Think Again: South Africa”, Foreign Affairs. April 14 (2009) 
accessed online at: 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/04/13/think_again_south_africa?page=full; 
Patrick Bond, Talk left, walk right: South Africa’s frustrated global reforms (Scottsville: 
University of Kwa-Zulu Natal Press, 2006); “Cosatu slams foreign policy”, in Business 
Day, 12 April 2011.  
326 See, for example, Department of Foreign Affairs Strategic Plans 2006-2009, 2007-
2010, 2008-2011.  
327 Department of Foreign Affairs, Stratregic Plan 2006-9, 2006: pp7-9. 
328 Department of Foreign Affairs, 2008. “Discussion Document: South African Foreign 
Policy”, accessed online at: http://www.info.gov.za/greenpapers/1996/foraf1.htm#1 on 
24 February, 2011.  
329 For a sample, see Janis van der Westhuizen, “South Africa’s emergence as a middle 
power”, Third World Quarterly, 19, No.3 (1998); Ian Taylor and Paul Williams, “South 
African Foreign Policy and the Great Lakes Crisis: African Renaissance meets 
Vagabondage Politique?”, African Affairs, No.100 (2001); Ian Taylor, Stuck in Middle 
GEAR: South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Foreign Relations (Westport: Praeger, 2001). 
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played in this foreign policy posture by South Africa’s dominant political party330 
and the only majority governing party of a free South Africa, the African National 
Congress. The ANC plays a key role in the generation of interests at the national 
level, by virtue of its dominance of South Africa’s political life, and by the ‘dual 
mandates’ of key government figures as central party figures. The governing party  - 
its culture, history and relations internally, and with other actors in society – plays a 
significant role in the mobilisation and extraction of resources for foreign policy.  
 
South Africa’s foreign policy has yet to be consolidated into a “codified foreign 
policy doctrine”, and each foreign policy decision is, as yet, still adopted “on its 
merits within a prescribed normative framework”.331 Indeed, it was a goal of the 
erstwhile Department of Foreign Affairs to enlist public engagement in the detailing 
of such a foreign policy doctrine. To this end, consultative exercises were conducted 
with non-governmental actors and intra-governmentally, in an attempt to streamline 
South Africa’s foreign policy goals, from 1994 onward. Nonetheless, the declared 
normative framework within which foreign policy decisions have been taken is 
made clear by documents available on the Department website and the repeated 
rhetorical declarations of state officials. For example, President Mbeki declared in 
his 2004 State of the Nation address:  
 
All major current international developments emphasise the importance of 
constructing a new world order that is more equitable and responsive to the needs 
of the poor of the world, who constitute the overwhelming majority of 
humanity.332 
 
Numerous authors have sought to explain what they perceive as incoherence and 
vacillation in South Africa’s foreign policy. There have also been a number of 
attempts to account for South Africa’s choice of a ‘middle power’ role in its 
                                                
330 On this point, Nathan is in agreement. See Laurie Nathan, “Interests, ideas and 
ideology”, African Affairs, 110, Issue 438 (2010): 17. Alden conducted an early analysis 
of the foreign policy of the ANC just before it assumed power, but there has been no 
consideration of the party’s influence on South Africa’s foreign policy since. See Alden, 
1993.  
331 DFA, 2008: Section 5.1. This situation is changing rapidly, though perhaps not 
substantively, with the publication in May 2011 of a White Paper on Foreign Policy. See 
“Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu”, White Paper on South Africa’s 
Foreign Policy. Accessed online at: 
http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=149749 on 5 September 2011.  
332 Thabo Mbeki, “State of the Nation Address”, Parliamentary Hansard, 6 February 
2004.  
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international orientation. Most of these accounts, in documenting South Africa’s 
increased international engagement since 1994, make the mistake of equating this 
activism with a role for South Africa as a ‘force for good’ in international society. 
Heightened engagement in international institutions is then held up as a standard 
against which South African foreign policy’s ethical outcomes are judged.333 This is 
not only to confuse cause and effect, but also to conflate two parallel, but not 
necessarily related, processes. Increased engagement in multilateral organisations 
and the signing of international agreements, while they serve to underwrite the 
existing normative international order, do not preclude self-interest on the part of 
an international actor. There exist a number of plausible reasons, often – but not 
exclusively - rooted in domestic politics, why a state would enmesh itself to a lesser 
or greater extent in international regimes. This observation calls into question an 
optic that has often been used in attempts to describe South Africa’s international 
re-integration: that of the uncomplicated diffusion of liberal values.  
 
This assumption acted as the backbone of critiques in the literature that viewed 
South African foreign policy as a failure in relation to liberal values propagated by 
Western states. Indeed, these values – such as respect for human rights - were 
incorporated within the country’s own renowned constitution, and the foreign 
policy statements of all governments since 1994, not to mention statements on 
continental governance that it has assisted in drafting.334 This notwithstanding, not 
enough attention has been paid to how decision makers perceive their environment, 
and to what extent they are able to extract resources for the implementation of their 
preferred foreign policy: the central questions of foreign policy analysis. This 
chapter makes an argument for the return of the state to analyses of South African 
foreign policy, incorporating the insight of perception as generated by key 
policymakers. The claim is made that the worldviews and interests of the governing 
party and its key members, form a central component of the perceptual lens 
through which foreign policy strategy is determined; and, that changes to the 
foreign policymaking process under President Thabo Mbeki greatly enhanced the 
extent to which the state was theoretically able to extract resources for its preferred 
                                                
333 For an example of analyses committing this error, see: Merle Lipton,” Understanding 
South Africa’s foreign policy: the perplexing case of Zimbabwe”, South African Journal of 
International Affairs,16, No.3 (2009).  
334 See, for example, the Constitutive Act of the African Union, 2000.  
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foreign policy. At the same time, the limits imposed by the international 
environment, at the regional level and further afield, as perceived by the decision makers 
should be taken into account for South Africa’s foreign policy choices in recent 
years.  
 
This chapter draws on the idea that identities generated at the domestic level 
influence how states behave internationally, by influencing perceptions of the 
external environment. The key identities generated at the domestic level in South 
Africa under the African National Congress governments may usefully be divided 
into three categories, according to different levels of analysis, which will be 
discussed in subsequent sections. 
 
This chapter has as its main objectives an outline of the internationalist position in 
South Africa’s foreign policy, and an analysis of how shifts in state power have 
affected the country’s ambitions in the international realm. A further objective is to 
analyse the means by which national resources for foreign policy were mobilised 
and extracted during Mbeki’s tenure as president.  The temporal focus is the 
presidency of Thabo Mbeki (1999-2008), the architect of South African foreign 
policy under the new South African regime, first as the ANC’s Head of Department 
of International Affairs in exile, then as Deputy President under Nelson Mandela 
(1994-1999), and finally as state president.  
 
The chapter is organised as follows: first links will be highlighted between South 
Africa’s current internationalism and historic internationalist trends in its foreign 
policy. This is done in order to pose the question whether South Africa is 
geopolitically predisposed to internationalism in its foreign policy, and to establish a 
continuous link spanning apartheid and democratic government. This is done in 
order to highlight the deeper structural factors at play in conditioning the 
international perspectives of South Africa’s foreign policymaking elites through 
time. This is followed by an exposition of ANC foreign policy evolution from the 
organisation’s time in exile to its assumption of power in South Africa in 1994. The 
evolution of ANC foreign policy has faced criticism both from within and outside 
the tripartite alliance (the ANC’s alliance with COSATU and the SACP), with intra-
alliance opposition proving more significant owing to the nature of South Africa’s 
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electoral system. The following section examines Nelson Mandela’s foreign policy 
legacy as a backdrop to the foreign policy approach of Thabo Mbeki. Next, using 
the categories of ‘institutional freedom’ and ‘legitimating capacity’, the ANC’s 
capacity for influencing foreign policy is measured. Finally, in the section ‘Resource 
Mobilisation and Extraction Under Mbeki’, Mbeki’s foreign policy trajectory is 
examined in terms of shifts in state power. ‘State power’ has previously been 
described as “the relative ability of the state to extract or mobilize resources from 
domestic society as determined by the institutions of the state, as well as by 
nationalism and ideology”.335  
 
The key claim made in this chapter is that while the African National Congress 
engendered great expectation by way of its liberation movement history, and the 
wide support it had garnered worldwide in the struggle against apartheid, it was only 
able to implement a foreign policy of measured ambivalence and restraint, given the 
nature of the highly unequal, and still divided, society it came to govern, in addition 
to its own capacity limits and the limited resources of the state.  
 
5.1. South Africa: A ‘structural’ internationalist? 
 
In a contribution to an edited volume on the early years of the presidency of Thabo 
Mbeki, Hein Marais cautions against a rush to ‘periodise’ the post-apartheid era. 
This is attributable to the importance of the ‘vector…of macroeconomic policy’ in 
the transformation, and this has not changed much at all.336 This observation 
prompts the broader reflection that South Africa’s foreign policy posture under a 
democratic dispensation should not be too readily divorced from historical trends in 
foreign policy and orientation, apartheid’s worst decades of 1950-1980 
notwithstanding. This is because South Africa’s material position in the regional 
division of labour has not changed significantly in the last century. The country is 
still the strongest economy in the region, and one of the most attractive destinations 
for foreign investment337 as well as a major consumer of immigrant labour. Yet, in 
                                                
335 Taliaferro, “State Building for Future Wars”, 467. See also Chapter 3 of current work.  
336 Hein Marais, “The Logic of Expediency: Post-apartheid shifts in macroeconomic 
policy”, in Thabo Mbeki’s World: The Politics and Ideology of the South African 
President, eds., Sean Jacobs and Richard Calland (Cape Town: Zed Books, 2003): 84.  
337 In 2009, South Africa was the third-largest recipient of FDI in Africa, with US$ 5.7b, 
behind Angola (US$13.1b) and Egypt (US$6.7b). African Economic Outlook. “FDI 
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global terms, it is not a major player on the international scene, ranked 31st in terms 
of GDP by the IMF, behind countries such as Turkey, Iran and Venezuela.338The 
country’s internal market is small by global standards, a situation compounded by 
high poverty rates, necessitating the cultivation of markets abroad.  
 
South Africa was a colonial possession first of the Netherlands, and then of Great 
Britain for most of its 300 years under white minority rule. The country became 
independent of Britain in 1910, and in 1961 it withdrew from the Commonwealth 
(under pressure from member states over apartheid) and became a republic, under 
its own head of state, a prime minister. This was done mainly with a view to 
protecting and enhancing the autonomy of Afrikaner development within South 
Africa, already predicated on the separate development and apartheid policies of the 
National Party. With the National Party’s entry into power in 1948, and its 
reprehensible policies of formal apartheid, the South African government became 
progressively more marginalised from international life. Campaigns against the 
treatment of Indians in South Africa were waged by the Indian government in the 
General Assembly of the United Nations. In addition, there was strident opposition 
to South Africa’s position on South West Africa (discussed below). The country was 
ultimately suspended from the UN General Assembly (in 1974) and never joined 
the Organisation of African Unity. However, the government maintained strong 
links with the Western capitalist powers, namely the US and UK, because of South 
Africa’s perceived role in inhibiting the spread of Communism in southern Africa, 
in the former case, and for various historical and economic reasons, in the latter.  
 
Because of its domestic policies, the South African government operated with a 
‘siege mentality’ in most of its international relations, seeking to defend itself from 
Communist and Black African subversion emanating from within the country or 
outside of its borders. As noted by Barber and Barratt, “The overriding aim of 
South African governments [between 1945 and 1988] was the preservation of a 
white controlled state, although the means employed to maintain white power and 
                                                                                                                               
destinations in Africa” (2011). Accessed online at: 
http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/outlook/external-financial-flows/direct-
investment-flows/fdi-destinations-in-africa/ on 24 June, 2011.  
338 IMF. 2009. “Gross Domestic Product”, World Development Indicators Database, 14 
April, 2011. Accessed at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf on 29 June, 
2011.  
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identity changed as the challenges increased”.339 Ideologically, any identification 
with the developing world was not compatible with the National Party’s policies of 
racial segregation at home. Nonetheless, South Africa did seek to foster relations 
with certain developing countries – African countries in particular - including some 
of its regional neighbours such as Botswana, Lesotho and Malawi, in order to shore 
up its diplomatic support in the UN, and on the continent. Some countries that 
maintained relations with South Africa included Ivory Coast and Israel. South 
Africa was regarded as a ‘pariah’ state in the developing world, however, and so was 
not in the position to claim any solidarity with it. Besides, under the National Party 
government, the Party identified with the West and saw itself as the ‘last bastion of 
Western civilisation’ in Africa. The various National Party governments did perceive 
a unified fate with Africa, however. This was entwined, at times, with the future of 
the Portuguese colonies to the east (Mozambique) and west (Angola); and, in a 
broader and more pertinent sense, in the economic prospects represented by Africa 
as a market for South African commerce. This position had been formalised by 
Prime Minister BJ Vorster’s ‘outward movement’ pro-Africa foreign policy, 
launched in 1966.340 Indeed, as noted by Vale and Maseko, underlining the argument 
advanced here,  
“The notion that their presence should feature in African affairs seems to…have 
been a constant thread in the rhetoric of successive South African leaders, irrespective of 
colour or ideological hue”.341 
 
From 1980 onward the country was active in a policy of ‘destabilisation’ of its 
neighbours in Southern Africa, turning increasingly to “force rather than 
diplomacy”342 to quell the threat posed by the ANC in exile. The latter was hosted 
by Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, among others.  South Africa 
was also involved in military operations in Angola and South West Africa. South 
Africa illegally retained South West Africa after World War II, despite an 
International Court of Justice advisory opinion and General Assembly resolution 
                                                
339 James Barber and John Barrat, South Africa’s foreign policy: The search for status 
and security 1945-1988 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990): 1.  
340 The aims of ‘outward movement’ were to diversify diplomatic and trade links, but this 
was not limited to Africa. Africa formed the focus of the policy, however, where the goals 
were to promote peace and mutual interests, while refraining from interference in 
domestic affairs. See Barber and Barratt, Search for Status and Security, 125.  
341 Peter Vale and Sipho Maseko, “South Africa and the African Renaissance”, 
International Affairs, 74, No. 2 (1998): 274.  
342 Barber and Barratt, Search for Status and Security, 11.  
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(449 A of 1950) on the illegality of South Africa’s continued presence there.343 
While South Africa retained its UN membership until 1974, and thereby benefited 
from the legitimacy afforded by multilateralism, it undermined the concept by 
failing to implement the opinions of the international community regarding both 
Namibia and its own domestic policies. 
 
The African National Congress came to power in South Africa following the first 
all-race election in 1994. The relative calm surrounding the electoral process – 
which was, however, not without its own controversy and low-grade civil violence – 
marked the high point of a period of intense struggle between revolutionary and 
reactionary forces, underscored by race - in South African society that had 
continued for much of the twentieth century. These forces have continued to 
animate South African politics well into the first two decades of democratic 
governance. The question of how to manage national economic development has 
featured as a major sticking point in the struggle, where revolutionary forces are 
represented by those desiring far-reaching redistributive change in society, and 
reactionary forces represented by those who seek the maintenance of the market-
oriented status quo, whether whites or blacks hold the levers of economic power.  
 
Yet the foreign policy of the African National Congress upon its accession to power 
in 1994 did mark, in some respects, a sharp turnaround in South Africa’s 
international posture. The country eschewed military means of resolving conflicts, 
and in a decision taken under the last apartheid government in 1990, its nuclear 
capability was unceremoniously dismantled.344 Although this decision was not taken 
by the new ANC government, and was in fact taken, in the view of some, to 
forestall the possibility of an ANC government possessing nuclear weapons,345 no 
attempt was later made to reverse it. In fact, the ANC took a principled decision in 
favour of ‘blending down’ South Africa’s enriched uranium, rather than see it sold 
                                                
343 UN General Assembly, Resolution 449 (V), “Question of South West Africa”, 13 
December 1950. Accessed online at: http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/060/47/IMG/NR006047.pdf?OpenElement on 
15 October, 2010.  
344 J.W. De Villiers, Roger Jardine, and Mitchell Reiss, “Why South Africa Gave Up the 
Bomb”, Foreign Affairs, 72, Issue 5 (1993): 98. 
345 See David Albright and Mark Hibbs, “South Africa: The ANC and the atom bomb”, 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 49, No.3 (1993). 
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to the United States, with the attendant possibility that it could still be used in 
nuclear weapons later on.346  
 
With the end of apartheid, South Africa immersed itself in a reinvigorated 
international role. Following its marginalisation as a pariah state, the country’s image 
was rehabilitated as the transition to democracy progressed, sometimes too rapidly 
for the ANC’s purposes or preparedness. Between 1994 and 2000,  
 
South Africa … joined, rejoined, or acceded to around forty-five 
intergovernmental organizations and multilateral treaties. It also 
committed itself heavily to the reform of the UN, the International 
Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, and to the possibilities of South-
South cooperation in the framework of the Indian Ocean Rim Association 
for Regional Cooperation and the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the 
South Atlantic.347  
 
The country also accepted a number of multilateral leadership responsibilities and 
the hosting of a number of important international meetings. (For these, and a list 
of internationalist actions taken by the South African government under Mbeki, see 
Appendix 5). For analysts, dual state-level and systemic influences were at play: 
“This wider multilateral role [was] both a function of a deep-rooted internationalist 
commitment among the ruling party and a reflection of responsibilities being foisted 
on South Africa by high peers…”.348  
 
Similarly, for Alden and le Pere,  
 
This acute sense of global mission, in contrast with other post-transition regimes in 
Eastern Europe and Latin America, is the product of South Africans’ own sense of 
accomplishment in having successfully navigated the transition, coupled with the 
international expectations of its continental role, as well as liberation-movement 
idealism and residual solidarity politics.349   
 
Therefore, South Africa’s internationalist posture was to some extent ‘built-in’ to 
the country’s geopolitical positioning and its natural endowment of resources, along 
                                                
346 Ibid., 33. 
347Philip Nel, Ian Taylor, Janis van der Westhuizen, South Africa’s Multilateral Diplomacy 
and Global Change (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001): 47-48. For a list of multilateral 
organizations and treaties acceded to by South Africa between 1994 and 2000, see 
‘Appendix’, in Nel et al.  
348 Ibid., 48.  
349 Alden and Le Pere, “South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy”, 71.  
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with successful industrialisation that had taken place under the apartheid 
governments from the 1960s onward. By the turn of democracy in 1994, it was thus 
a classical realist candidate for expansion, especially given the absence of any major 
regional challenger, and its economic predominance over the region, and much of 
the continent. Not only did it appear that greater engagement by South Africa in 
African – especially Southern African - and global affairs would not be discouraged, 
it was expected.  
 
As noted by then-Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki, in 1995,  
 
A distinguishing feature of South Africa is the sustained interest of the rest of the 
world in the future of South Africa. The depth of this interest is not only confined 
to government but includes ordinary people. They have not disengaged from South 
Africa. The strength and the persistence of the international focus on South Africa 
puts the South African government under pressure to contribute positively and 
constructively to the global community.350 
 
“Thus, observers point to a striking continuity in foreign policy praxis (though not 
in its rhetoric) between the final years of the apartheid regime and the succeeding 
ANC government”.351 The continuities in objectives and foreign policy behaviour 
include the mercantilist thrust of foreign policy in southern Africa. Döpcke shows 
how South Africa’s Africa policy could actually have structural roots, founded in the 
economic relations with African states that were cultivated by the Apartheid regime, 
especially in terms of exports in the early 1990s.352 He argues, in fact, that foreign 
policy reorientation (especially with respect to Africa) took place “well before the 
regime change”.353 More than this, the foreign policy reorientation under the last 
apartheid administrations, away from military coercion, in favour of more political 
and diplomatic means, had the added – not insignificant – benefit of bringing about 
a shift in the balance of forces in the Botha government that eventually paved the 
way for more determined efforts in reaching out to the ANC, and the minor 
                                                
350 Thabo Mbeki. 1995. Cited in Address by Deputy Minister Pahad to the Heads of 
Missions Conference, 18 January 1999. Accessed online at: 
http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/1999/paha0118.htm on 9 March, 2011. Emphasis 
added.  
351 Wolfgang Döpcke, “Foreign Policy and Political Regime: The Case of South Africa”, in 
Foreign Policy and Political Regime, ed., José Flávio Sombra Saraiva (Brasília: Instituto 
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352 Ibid., 281.  
353 Ibid., 302. Emphasis added.  
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reforms undertaken in the mid-1980s. It fell to de Klerk to complete the power shift 
and reduce the influence of the State Security Council in the foreign policymaking 
decision-making process. This held major significance for the political future of 
South Africa, as it reduced the influence of ‘hawks’ in government decision-making.  
 
But why, armed with this sense of mission, the ANC’s heritage as Africa’s foremost 
liberation movement and a fair amount of international goodwill, did South Africa 
not always act in accordance with the expectations its policies generated? In order to 
answer this question, it is necessary first to interrogate the internationalist history of 
the ANC and its early years in government.  
 
5.2. ANC’s foreign policy evolution and its critics: institutional freedom and 
legitimating power 
 
5.2.1. Old wine into new bottles: External Mission into ‘national’ mission 
 
One of the key observations about the African National Congress in the closing 
years of apartheid and its aftermath is the organisation’s struggle, not unlike other 
African liberation movements, to conduct the transformation to political party.354 
This observation holds resonance for the ANC’s conduct of foreign policy because 
it speaks to the enduring perceptions utilised by key foreign policy decisionmakers 
in all of the ANC administrations since the end of apartheid. This section traces the 
evolution of the foreign policy positions of the African National Congress, with 
special reference to the closing years of apartheid and the early years of its role as 
the governing party of South Africa.  
 
What are the key perspectives of the African National Congress on South African 
foreign policy, and how has the organisation’s recent history influenced these 
perceptions? This section argues that the nature of the ANC’s international agency 
in exile; and, the variable and intermingling cultures of the organisation in recent 
decades, have resulted in a particular organisational outlook, and specific 
                                                
354 See Marina Ottaway, Marina, “Liberation Movements and Transition to Democracy: 
The case of the ANC”, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 29, No.1 (1991); and on 
foreign policy specifically, Chris Alden, “From liberation movement to political party: ANC 
foreign policy in transition”, South African Journal of International Affairs, 1, No.1 (1993).  
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perspectives on international relations. Because of Thabo Mbeki’s central role both 
in government and in the ANC during his presidency, along with his many writings 
available on the ANC’s website, it is possible to reconstruct some of the key 
perceptual lenses employed in foreign policy decision making.  
 
The ANC had of necessity to evolve a more sophisticated agency as a foreign policy 
actor because of its banning by the Apartheid state in 1960. The organisation 
subsequently moved underground and into exile, with the bulk of the responsibility 
for maintaining its existence in the hands of its External Mission.355 The initial tasks 
of the External Mission were to establish and consolidate itself; raise funds; 
represent the ANC at international organisations; and, attend to the more secret 
task of arranging training bases in a number of African countries for recruits of 
Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation, also referred to as MK), the armed wing of 
the ANC.356 The need for international support, both material and ideological, 
compelled the organisation to clarify its ideological standpoints and political 
approaches early on. Two concepts gained central importance: those of non-
racialism, engineered to no small extent by the ANC’s alliance partner, the South 
African Communist Party, and ‘Marxist Pan-Africanism’, also a consequence of 
SACP influence. The ANC came under fire for its non-racial stance in an African 
atmosphere of independence from colonial rule and fervent Pan-Africanism in the 
1960s, and struggled to win recognition as the sole representative of South Africa’s 
oppressed Black population. Meanwhile, the ANC-in-exile’s Marxist orientation 
secured the crucial support of the Soviet Union, but did not win it any favours 
among Africa’s pre-eminent ‘Nationalist Pan-Africanists’ of the 1950s and 1960s, 
namely Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere.  
 
For much of its existence prior to its unbanning in 1994, the main focus of ANC 
foreign policy, as such, was three-fold: “to isolate South Africa by publicising the 
injustices of apartheid and to call for the imposition of sanctions, while also forging 
political and ideological alliances with sympathetic states and other liberation movements 
in support of the armed struggle”. A third objective was that the ANC be 
                                                
355 For an account of the ANC’s diplomacy in exile, and the centrality of the External 
Mission, see Scott Thomas, The Diplomacy of Liberation: The Foreign Relations of the 
ANC Since 1960 (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1996).  
356 Thomas, The Diplomacy of Liberation, 26.  
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recognised as the ‘sole legitimate representative’ of the ‘oppressed people’ of South 
Africa.357  This last objective was by no means easy to attain, as the ANC competed 
among African states with the splinter group, the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) 
for this title.358 This outward orientation, indeed placement of the ANC outside the 
key arena where it was attempting to bring about change, had some impact on the 
subsequent policies of the ANC in government, and resulted initially in great 
dislocation for the Party regarding the type of foreign policy an ANC-in-
government would pursue. Hence, while the organisation’s foreign policy had been 
fine-tuned by the middle of the 1990s, the ANC itself had not given enough 
thought to the nature of the external relations of a ‘normalised’ South African 
state.359 
 
Uncertainty over which policy direction to take – and significant identity-influencing 
factors - derived from the party, national and international levels, as well as 
historical context.  
 
Party  leve l  
At the party level, three distinct ideological traditions on international affairs have 
been noted: the liberal internationalist (1912-1960); the socialist/Marxist-
Leninist/solidarist (1960-1993); and the neoliberal/pragmatic (1993 onwards).360 
“While these paradigm shifts correspond to a chronological progression with one 
phase periodically succeeding the other, usually in response to external stimuli…in 
policy terms they overlap”.361 ‘Liberal internationalism’ in the early years of the 
ANC’s existence was conditioned by a domestic policy of peaceful petition of the 
South African government. The ANC was at this time still an elitist political 
association, with limited political goals. Failing to obtain opportunities to meet with 
                                                
357 Van der Westhuizen, “South Africa’s Emergence”, 440; Scott Thomas, “The 
Diplomacy of Liberation: The ANC in Defence of Economic Sanctions”, in From Pariah 
to Participant: South Africa’s Evolving Foreign Relations 1990-1994, ed., Greg Mills 
(Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1994): 169. Emphases 
added. 
358 See Roger Pfister, “Gateway to international victory: the diplomacy of the African 
National Congress in Africa, 1960-1994”, Journal of Modern African Studies, 41, Issue 1, 
(2003), and Thomas, The Diplomacy of Liberation.  
359 Interview with Prof. Anthoni van Nieuwkerk, January, 2010.  
360 Graham Evans, Graham, “The End of the Rainbow,” The World Today (January 
1999): 10-12; James Hamill and Donna Lee, “A Middle Power Paradox? South African 
Diplomacy in the Post-apartheid Era”, International Relations, 15, No. 4 (2001). 
361 Graham Evans, “South Africa’s Foreign Policy After Mandela: Mbeki and His Concept 
of An African Renaissance”, The Round Table, 88, No. 352 (1999).  
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SA government representatives in South Africa, the ANC sought common cause 
with independence and anti-colonialist movements elsewhere in Africa, and in Asia, 
and also to make its case to Western powers. In 1919, an ANC delegation made the 
journey to the Paris Peace Talks at Versailles. In 1927, the ANC’s Josiah Gumede 
travelled to Brussels to represent the organisation at the League Against 
Imperialism. In the midst of World War II, basing their arguments on provisions 
for self-determination contained in the 1942 Atlantic Charter, the ANC leadership 
sought to internationalise its struggle, as encapsulated in the document, Africans’ 
Claims in South Africa362, adopted at the Annual Conference of the ANC in 1943.  
 
Ever more heavy-handedness by the state and the eventual banning of the ANC in 
1960 prompted a crucial change in its international approach, already alluded to in 
earlier paragraphs: the ANC in exile became responsible for the continued existence 
of the organisation as a whole. Alliance with the superior strategic and 
organisational capabilities of the SACP imbued the ANC with an ideological hue at 
a decisive point in world history, the height of the Cold War. Organisational culture 
and processes also underwent dramatic change, inspired by Leninist vanguardism 
and democratic centralism, and well as the basic necessity of survival in exile. This 
period, which would last until the closing years of apartheid, derived its international 
successes in part from the ANC’s successful framing of apartheid as a ‘crime against 
humanity’. While the ANC would not have described itself as such, it was adopting 
a solidarist363 conception of international society. While suspicious of the West and 
aware of the limits of the United Nations - the main propagators of ‘human rights’ - 
the organisation nonetheless subscribed to a view that human rights were 
indivisible, and that the South African situation impinged on the morality of the 
                                                
362 Ellis and Sechaba argue that the ANC was, in fact, uncomfortable with the 
internationalization of its struggle, given that this “ran somewhat counter to its nature 
and tradition. It had always been an organisation little concerned with events outside 
South Africa and without any ideology or political programme beyond a broad African 
nationalism.” See Stephen Ellis and Tsepo Sechaba, Comrades against Apartheid: The 
ANC & the South African Communist Party in Exile (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1992): 42. Nonetheless, circumstances compelled it to adopt this mode of action. 
See the document at: http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/library-
resources/official%20docs/preface-african-claims.htm. 
363 ‘Solidarism’ is defined as a conception of international society that “assumes that 
individuals are its ultimate members and that they have rights and duties in international 
law: individuals are legitimate subjects and not objects of international society…[it 
implies] a universal standard of justice and morality”. See Nicholas J. Wheeler, “Pluralist 
or Solidarist Conceptions of International Society: Bull and Vincent on Humanitarian 
Intervention”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 21, Issue 3 (1992): 468.  
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whole world. ANC solidarity was not only born of principle, but of necessity, as it 
drew upon the expertise and material assistance of patrons as far afield as Northern 
Ireland (the IRA)364 and Cuba.  
 
The assassination of the military leader, Chris Hani, in April 1993 muted the voice 
of an important constituency in the ANC, namely the MK cadres who had gone 
into battle for the liberation movement and endured many arduous years in exile in 
various African countries. In fact, “(w)ith Hani’s untimely death the ANC was 
burying not only …one of the most ardent voices of radicalism in the organization, 
Mandela was also symbolically burying the organization’s previous incarnation as a 
liberation movement”.365 However, this was not a clean break, as exile and 
underground cultures have continued to vie for dominance in the ANC as a political 
formation.  
 
Mandela’s personal prestige and international status helped to mask many of the 
contradictions in thinking within the organisation at the time. As a sample, there 
were the differences between those who had been socialised politically within the 
country – the so-called ‘in-ziles’ – and those who had been active in conducting the 
struggle abroad, the exiles, which heavily influenced the political culture within the 
party. The ANC leadership realised in 1991 that it required a “systematic reappraisal 
of foreign policy”.366  
 
The third period, labelled ‘neoliberal/pragmatic’ by Evans, cannot be neatly 
encapsulated, as it is still in progress, with its postulates hotly contested by the ANC 
and its allies. While it appears that in the aftermath of apartheid the ANC did come 
under the influence of global neoliberal ideology as diffused by training programmes 
of the IMF and its loan disbursement requirements, this was not an unproblematic 
acceptance by the Party.367 This periodisation brings the narrative more or less up to 
date with the chronological focus, and the analytical subject, of this thesis.  
 
 
                                                
364 Ellis and Sechaba, Comrades Against Apartheid, 106 
365 Alden, “From Liberation Movement to Political Party”, 78.  
366 Evans, “South Africa in Remission”, 255.  
367 See Taylor, Stuck in Middle GEAR.  
 159 
 
National leve l  
At the national level, ANC foreign policy was confounded by two factors: a lack of 
resources and the new democratic political environment. The demands of economic 
development at home had to be balanced with the demands of an activist foreign 
policy in defence of human rights and towards promoting democracy. Conceptions 
of the national interest had to be subjected to democratic scrutiny as one important 
component of a progressive foreign policy. In addition was the suggestion that for a 
society characterised by inequality, foreign policy should take a low priority in the 
allocation of national resources, giving higher priority to distributive justice 
domestically.368 
 
It is generally underestimated, or underplayed, just how contingent were the 
negotiations and transition processes in South Africa. Southall has noted that 
predictions about post-Apartheid South Africa’s foreign policy were ambitiously 
predicated on the assumption that democracy was assured. Neither analysts nor 
practitioners took into due account the extent to which South Africa’s incremental 
moves toward a democratic dispensation (and of which type) that was at no point 
irreversible, had an impact on the type of foreign policy the country was able to 
pursue.369 This view provides a valuable insight into why South Africa’s ‘human 
rights’ foreign policy gradually became one of measured pragmatism, in response to 
various domestic economic imperatives, from investment opportunities, to funding 
prospects for the ANC. It also provides some idea of the resource mobilisation and 
extraction challenges posed for the ANC by its assumption of power in a country 
almost on its knees economically, and in dire need of social and political reform. As 
an indication, between 1985 and 1994 South Africa was a net exporter of capital. 
The country declared a debt standstill in 1985 and faced an unfriendly international 
environment in the last days of apartheid, with IMF loans drying up and the 
maturity structure on older loans shortening owing to political pressure from the US 
anti-apartheid lobby. The country ran a current account deficit of some R2bn in 
                                                
368 Alexander Johnston, “Democracy and Human Rights in the Principles and Practice of 
South African Foreign Policy”, in South Africa’s Foreign Policy: Dilemmas of a New 
Democracy, eds., Jim Broderick, Gary Burford and Gordon Freer (Houndmills: Palgrave, 
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369 Roger Southall, “The New South Africa in the New World Order: Beyond the Double 
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1994,370 placing tangible limits on the ambitious agenda of the future foreign policy 
of the incoming government.  
 
 
Internat ional l eve l  
Internationally, ANC foreign policy was on the back foot by the time the party 
came to power in 1994. During apartheid, the ANC’s relations with wealthy 
Western nations were based on the mobilisation for sanctions aimed at crippling the 
South African economy. When Western governments lifted sanctions soon after De 
Klerk’s 1990 speech unbanning the ANC, well ahead of the ANC’s timetable, and 
with disregard for its stated conditions for their removal,371 the party’s position was 
weakened and it was forced to adapt rapidly to new international realities. These 
included the supplanting of ‘geopolitics’ by ‘geo-economics’ in the aftermath of the 
Cold War (meaning less support for its cause) and, probably most importantly, the 
realisation that the economic and political alternatives represented by the Soviet 
Union had disappeared. This meant that the ANC did not find much support in the 
West, not only for its plans for keeping pressure on the government during the 
crucial negotiations phase,372 but also for its proposed interventionist economic 
policies at home.  
 
The organisation accordingly amended its foreign policy to accord more closely with 
the dictates of the ‘New Diplomacy’ paradigm of the then-Director-General of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs, Neil van Heerden.  This policy was one of the first 
efforts by the apartheid regime to change its approach to Southern Africa following 
the destabilisation of the 1980s. Henceforth, the security apparatus was marginalised 
in determining foreign policy (as discussed in section 5.1, p154), leading to a more 
conciliatory, economics-focused foreign policy in the region. “The ostensible 
objective of the New Diplomacy was to open up the region to South African 
                                                
370 See Vishnu Padayachee, “The Evolution of South Africa’s International Financial 
Relations and Policy: 1985-95”, in The Political Economy of South Africa’s Transition: 
Policy perspectives in the late 1990s, eds., Jonathan Michie and Vishnu Padayachee 
(Hinsdale, Illinois: Dryden Press, 1997): 29, 39. Financial inflows and IFI assistance 
resumed when the political crisis eased, however.  
371 These conditions were contained in the ANC’s ‘Harare Declaration’, which outlined 
the ANC’s negotiating plan with the South African government. They included: ‘the 
adoption of a new constitution and the termination of all armed hostilities’ (Articles 21.6 
and 21.7). See Thomas, The Diplomacy of Liberation, 170.  
372 Alden, “From Liberation Movement to Political Party”, 74.  
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commerce and trade, but the ulterior goal was undoubtedly to tie the hands of any 
future ANC-led government with respect to South Africa’s geopolitical position as 
regional hegemon”.373 It represented a shift of style (diplomacy instead of coercion) 
by the National Party government, but the ‘substance’ of regional economic 
hegemony remained in place.374 It sought to establish South Africa’s role as the pre-
eminent power in southern Africa. Meanwhile, “(i)n a series of policy documents, 
the ANC recognized the dramatic changes in the international society, the collapse 
of its long-time ally, the Soviet Union, and the rise of a new multi-(or uni-)polar 
international order under capitalist socio-economic hegemony and dominated 
politically by the United States”.375 Thabo Mbeki, the Head of the ANC’s 
Department of International Affairs, recognising, for the time being, the importance 
of ‘world opinion’, pronounced on the country’s future prospects and its context, 
 
South Africa will achieve a transition to a non-racial democracy during a period 
when there is a general universal tendency towards the establishment of political 
systems whose features include multi-party democracy, respect for individual 
human rights and movement away from centrally planned economies.376  
 
There is agreement by some authors that “an internal ANC consensus has proved 
to be elusive on issues such as the role which human rights considerations should 
play in the conduct of external relations”.377 To complicate matters, the ANC as a 
political party sought to continue its own track of foreign relations, albeit with 
changed priorities from the struggle era. Even once in government, it viewed inter-
party relations at the international level as an important means of achieving some of 
its international (and party political) objectives.378 This enabled the party to 
continue many of its more controversial relations, especially with leaders such as 
Suharto, Castro and Qaddafi, keeping them ‘separate’ from questions of national 
foreign policy.  
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The organisation’s main shortcoming was thus in failing to separate its state 
responsibilities from its commitments as a political party and again, from its politics 
as a liberation movement. Although its identity as a ‘liberation movement’ was the 
basis for high expectations from the international community about the ANC’s 
approach to human rights, it was, paradoxically, used by the party to justify a 
number of associations considered ‘dubious’ by the West, and human rights activists 
globally.  
 
As the party entered Mbeki’s two terms as state president, its internationalist stance 
was exposed to the harsh light of day by the growing tensions within the tripartite 
alliance. The ANC’s allies further to the left of the political spectrum, and those 
based in civil society, were progressively seen as the carriers of the banner of 
internationalism and progressivism, while the party itself acted within the limits and 
upon the motivations of governing power. “In this sense, the changes wrought by 
Mbeki have been inspired by large doses of pragmatism and moderation in recasting 
South Africa’s role in a manner more commensurate with its size”.379 
 
To appreciate Mbeki’s task, however, it is worthwhile to consider the institutional 
and policy context that served as a backdrop to his modifications, by analysing the 
Mandela foreign policy.  
 
 
5.3. Mandela’s foreign policy: unsettled notions of security, the national 
interest, and the limited resource of international acclaim 
 
By 1994, the year of the first all-race elections, it was generally expected in the West, 
given the role played by one of the largest international advocacy campaigns in 
history, and the nature of the ANC’s struggle, that human rights and democracy-
promotion and protection would form a cornerstone of the new government’s 
foreign policy, or at least that South Africa would be a force for positive change in 
Africa. As noted by The Economist in 1995, “Ever since Nelson Mandela was 
elected…foreigners have dreamed of him as a continental troubleshooter”.380 
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380 The Economist, “Too gentle giant”, November 18th 1995: 81. 
 163 
Hopes were pinned on more than Mandela, however, as the country’s successful 
“negotiated revolution” raised hopes that the model itself could be emulated 
elsewhere in Africa.381 The general warmth and sense of goodwill that attended 
South Africa’s emergence from decades of isolation obscured the tensions that 
would be inherent in a position of international messianism, and which would raise 
thorny challenges for the country’s political leadership for some years afterward. 
These tensions mainly revolved around what the ‘national interest’ would comprise. 
For example, would ‘national development’ take precedence over repaying debts 
incurred by the apartheid state? In addition, there was the debate between the 
competing normative regimes of the global human rights discourse on one hand, 
and African/liberation movement solidarity, on the other. In the final analysis, this 
debate concerned who the ultimate referents of national security doctrines were, 
states or people. Thus, while there was great expectation, there still remained the 
questions of which norms to adopt, and the difficult discussion of which 
commitments would take precedence was continually postponed.  
 
At an institutional level, it has been well-documented how little the executive was 
accountable to the legislature as Mandela’s presidency wore on. This did not present 
much of a change from the pre-1994 scenario, however. As noted by Raymond 
Suttner, former chair of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs 
(1994-1997), the executive’s foreign policy decisions under apartheid were highly 
insulated from parliamentary scrutiny and input. This was owing to a tradition of 
exclusive foreign policymaking, involving the Head of Government and the Foreign 
Minister; as well as the secrecy that attended South Africa’s foreign policy decisions 
in the dying days of apartheid. Suttner linked the institutional weaknesses and 
disjuncture during Mandela’s presidency to the incoherent foreign policy that 
resulted:  
The failure to talk to one another before important decisions makes it harder to 
have good relations [between the Foreign Ministry and Parliament]. It impedes the 
type of common reflection on policy that is needed to move away from ad hoc 
approaches to foreign relations.382   
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Much of Mandela’s tenure as President of South Africa is portrayed as a period of 
fluidity with respect to public policy, especially foreign policy, during which greater 
emphasis was placed on national reconciliation. Mandela’s 1993 article in the journal 
Foreign Affairs is routinely cited as the starting point of the story of post-apartheid 
foreign relations.383 There are very few discussions that consider how the choice of 
a human rights-based foreign policy became a plausible – or even an expected  - one 
for the African National Congress (ANC), given its close relations with states such 
as Cuba and Libya, during its three decade-long liberation struggle; and its lukewarm 
relationship with the United States and United Kingdom, owing to their 
accommodation of South Africa’s apartheid regime; not to mention the 
organisation’s own patchy history of human rights abuses in exile, and in its 
prosecution of the armed struggle.384 There is the additional factor of competing 
cultures and ideological traditions within the ANC that rendered policy coherence 
difficult at the best of times.  
 
For Nelson Mandela,385 the six pillars of South Africa’s future foreign policy were 
to be:  
• The centrality of human rights to international relations, embracing 
economic, social and ecological rights, in addition to political rights; 
• The value of democracy promotion  
• The centrality of justice and international law in the relations between 
nations 
• Internationally-agreed, non-violent conflict resolution mechanisms 
• The centrality of Africa to South Africa’s foreign policy concerns 
• The dependence of economic development on international cooperation 
in an ‘interdependent’ world.  
 
This ambitious list sought to balance state rights with human rights, and economic 
rights with political rights. It served to notify the international community that the 
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‘new’ South Africa would be a different kind of state from apartheid South Africa; 
and almost seamlessly positioned the country within the prevailing international 
discourse on a ‘new world order’, characterised by the rule of international law, the 
primacy of human rights and great power peace. Moreover, the sixth point on the 
list conceded – albeit without labelling it as such - the constraining influence of 
‘globalisation’, whose perceived all-pervasiveness was gradually to take hold of the 
collective imagination of the top ANC leadership through the early 1990s and 
beyond.386  
 
Two elements of the post-liberation history of the ANC combined to create 
dilemmas for the organisation, however. These were: its dubious legacy of a 
‘miracle’ transition from apartheid, which was set up as an example to others; and, 
South Africa’s material power, which resulted in high levels of dependence by other 
countries in the region, along with trepidation concerning how the government 
would conduct itself in its ‘backyard’.  
 
In one sense, much was expected of South Africa, both in its immediate region, and 
on a global scale, because of its relatively peaceful transition; and because of its 
position as the pre-eminent power in sub-Saharan Africa. It was expected to be a 
positive ‘force’ and yet it had to show great sensitivity and circumspection in how it 
projected this force. In the few years on either side of the transition, because there 
was a great deal of uncertainty and a lack of clarity about the form that the ‘moral 
high ground’ would take – whether loyalty to African politics or to new global 
norms – this was a period of uncertainty, and great expectation – for South African 
policymakers and practitioners.  
 
An early indicator of the direction South Africa was inclined to take was given by 
the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). Before this state-driven 
development programme was shelved in June 1996, it featured prominently in the 
self-perception of the South African government. This was most noticeable in the 
1996 Department of Foreign Affairs Green Paper (Discussion Document). The 
RDP was central in positioning South Africa’s relations with its neighbours, and 
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with more wealthy donors in the Global North, adding “a further dimension…to 
South Africa’s relations with the international community”.387The Document sought 
the regionalisation of the programme for broader impact in Southern Africa, as well 
as the popularisation of the goals of the RDP in a bid to win financial support. A 
member of DFA was seconded to the RDP office to strengthen coordination 
between the two areas of government, giving an indication of the need for 
pragmatism and planning in South Africa’s foreign policy.  
 
In spite of new policy directions, however, Mandela was seen as making important 
foreign policy decisions by relying largely on his own instincts and judgements.388 
An anecdote told by Raymond Suttner bears out this contention. Suttner, the first 
Chair of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs, and a long-time 
ANC member, asserts that the timing of South Africa’s switching of official 
diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China in 1996 was the sole prerogative of 
Mandela.389 While Mandela as an individual became a valuable resource in the 
diplomacy of the first ANC government, this was a double-edged sword as 
illustrated when limits to his usefulness became apparent, as in the Saro-Wiwa crisis 
in Nigeria; and his stature also delayed South Africa’s mutation into ‘just another 
country’,390 relieved of the baggage of high international expectation. Perceptions by 
decision makers of South African ‘exceptionalism’ both posed the potential for 
overstated foreign policy ambitions, and for the appearance of ‘smugness’ about 
South Africa’s relatively peaceful transition and elevated position in international 
society.391 
 
Hence, Mandela’s presidency, steeped in moralism and an almost cosmopolitan 
international outlook that was supported by a degree of international goodwill, 
provided the perfect foil for what was to come in the pragmatic foreign policy of 
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Mbeki. In a condition of flux, with state institutions still being formed, Mandela was 
in no position to allocate resources to foreign policy projects of whatever type. 
Moral stands were by then not as costly as they would later become, with the 
exception of the Nigeria debacle which indeed proved politically costly, and foreign 
policy itself was still characterised by uncertainty and the personal magnetism and 
impact of Mandela.392  
 
5.4. Influence as a function of institutional freedom and legitimating power 
 
Measuring the ANC’s influence on foreign policy outcomes is facilitated by an 
analytical division between various points of contact between the Party and the 
policy process. These include, 
a. party diplomacy; 
b. the personal or presidential diplomacy of Mbeki, and other key individuals; 
c. the party policy-making process; and, 
d. State Institutions: The Department of Foreign Affairs and Parliament. 
 
Influence over foreign policy implies that foreign policy would change from an 
expected starting point, after interventions by the party structure or leadership. The 
proposed starting point is the classical realist prediction of international expansion 
following growth in national power evident during Mbeki’s terms of office (1999-
2008). Each of the aforementioned analytical categories will be discussed in turn.  
 
a. Party diplomacy 
While diplomacy is considered to be “negotiations between political entities which 
acknowledge each other’s independence”,393 this level of the ANC’s international 
relations merits attention. The primary reason for this is that the by now well-
known ‘symbiotic’ relations between political and business figures in South Africa 
leave the democratic system open to exploitation by less-than-savoury transnational 
interests, and pose the potential for undue influence of the country’s foreign policy 
in ways that benefit the party, to the detriment of state interests. This reality also 
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complicates the task of separating clearly the ANC’s foreign policy from South 
Africa’s foreign policy.  
 
The ANC runs a sophisticated network of party-to-party and party to business 
contacts worldwide. Some of these links have been revealed in insalubrious 
circumstances, as for example, the ANC’s alleged ‘diplomacy’ in the Iraq ‘Oil for 
Food’ scandal (as detailed below). Other links are more in line with the party’s 
progressive image, such as its membership in the Socialist International (SI), a 
worldwide organisation of some 170 social democratic, socialist and labour 
parties.394 The centre-left orientation of the party also secured the South African 
government’s participation in successive Progressive Governance Summits.395 
 
In recent years, especially in light of a number of corruption scandals, such as the 
involvement of an ANC front company, Imvume, in the Iraq Oil for Food scandal, 
and the allegations of funds derived from wrongdoing in the notorious 1999 arms 
deal destined for the ANC, much of this aspect of the party’s relations with the 
outside world have been wrapped in an ever tighter veil of secrecy. This has 
prompted calls by domestic civil society actors for transparency in the allocation of 
funds by private donors to political parties, a call that is resisted by the major South 
African political parties, including the ANC.  
 
The ANC has conducted diplomacy on the Zimbabwe issue, through direct party 
contacts with both ZANU-PF and the opposition Movement for Democratic 
Change (MDC). This has formed part of a ‘good cop, bad cop’/ ‘quiet diplomacy’ 
approach under Thabo Mbeki,396 which nonetheless bore little fruit. This approach 
was vindicated to some extent, however, by showing that indeed, the ANC was 
keeping channels of communication with Robert Mugabe open by refraining from 
                                                
394 Website of the Socialist International (SI), accessed at: 
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engaging in ‘megaphone’ diplomacy. This in itself, Mugabe’s continuing disastrous 
rule notwithstanding, may be considered a measure of success in an otherwise 
cheerless effort, considering that any more strident measures might have had 
altogether more disastrous consequences.397 ANC also maintains links with 
numerous other former liberation movements in Africa and abroad, that potentially 
influence the direction of South African foreign policy. Examples of this include its 
links with MPLA (Angola), FRELIMO (Mozambique), SWAPO (Namibia) and 
even the SPLM in Sudan. The Party’s historical links with ZANU-PF’s liberation-
era rival, ZAPU, have been partially blamed for Mbeki’s failure to win the respect 
and cooperation of Mugabe during his facilitation of a resolution to the Zimbabwe 
crisis.  
 
b. Personal and presidential diplomacy 
Nelson Mandela’s renown as a statesman of global acclaim lent itself to personal 
diplomacy to such an extent that he was able single-handedly to spearhead DFA’s 
mediation in the extradition of the Lockerbie bombers from Libya for trial at 
Scottish courts in The Hague.398 The institutional obstacles encountered by the 
Department of Foreign Affairs during the transition to democracy and afterward, 
lent Mandela the ability to act independently in implementing South Africa’s foreign 
policy. While for his part, Mbeki attempted to rely more on multilateralism, the 
centralisation of foreign policy formulation in the presidential office afforded South 
Africa’s second democratically-elected president a central role in this process. 
According to one observation, “The presidency, the primary locus of policy, has 
been entrenched through formal institutionalisation and a marginalisation of party 
interests, so that it now sets not only foreign-policy goals, but is the sole architect of 
an overarching foreign-policy vision”.399 This is not to be confused with the role of 
the party, as it is widely noted that Mbeki effected a gradual distance between 
himself and the party in the making of public policy. This distance became 
increasingly apparent in the disjuncture between the ANC and Mbeki on important 
foreign policy issues, such as Zimbabwe, for example.  
                                                
397 For the debate on the merits of South Africa’s ‘quiet diplomacy’ approach, see James 
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towards Zimbabwe”, The Round Table, 98, Issue 402 (2009).  
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Thabo Mbeki was frequently lampooned in the press for being a ‘foreign policy 
president’ or ‘absentee president’, and indeed was widely seen as being more adept 
at dealing with foreign affairs than with domestic issues. While this criticism was 
often justified, it missed a valuable point about Mbeki. In the aftermath of the 
Mandela presidency, and the deep affective and ideological resources Mandela had 
access to, Mbeki succeeded in articulating a broad, and possibly more sustainable, 
vision for South African foreign policy, and much of his early presidency was spent 
publicising, and cultivating support for, this vision. The merits of his ideas, as well 
as those of his approach, along with their personal and institutional underpinnings, 
have been debated at length,400 but these ideas contributed substantially to the 
formation of a distinct South African state identity. Mbeki’s personal and 
presidential diplomacy were infused with the ideas of race, African nationalism, and 
what some have termed “racial nativism”, “an idea that the true custodians of 
African culture are the natives”.401 These ideas coloured key decisionmakers’ views 
of South Africa and its place in the world.  
 
Mbeki’s ideas about Africa’s insertion as an active player in international affairs, 
which gave rise to his African Renaissance project, have also been linked to the 
more imprecise idea of personal, national and continental ‘self-determination’.402 
The African Renaissance had three aims: to prove Africans’ ability to govern 
democratically; to assert the value of African-ness; and, to restore African agency to 
the decisions over its destiny, for example in the resolution of conflicts (‘African 
solutions to African problems’) and in the cultivation of the economic conditions 
for prosperity.  
 
These notions informed the implementation of foreign policy at the departmental 
level, as Dr Manelisi Genge, Head of the Policy, Research and Analysis Unit in the 
Department from 2002 to 2008, affirmed. He noted that under Mbeki ‘colonialism’ 
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Calland, eds., Thabo Mbeki’s World: The Politics and Ideology of the South African 
President (Cape Town: Zed Books, 2003); William Gumede, Thabo Mbeki and the Battle 
for the Soul of the ANC (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2007).  
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and indeed, ‘anti-imperialism’ had attained new significance in South Africa’s state 
identity,403 as domestically, Mbeki had resuscitated the label of apartheid as 
‘colonialism of a special type’.404 Indeed, Mbeki and the ANC also used this 
terminology (‘global apartheid’) to describe the state of global socio-economic 
inequality. Use of the term almost immediately forged solidarity between other 
formerly colonised states, particularly those still undergoing development. 
 
Unfortunately for Mbeki and for the fate of South Africa’s image abroad, this new 
state identity was not an uncomplicated one, and the very image of corrupt and 
inept African leadership Mbeki had attempted to challenge was confirmed, and 
indeed caricatured, by his own action and inaction, notably on AIDS and 
Zimbabwe. This does not diminish the power of this identity as a perceptive lens 
through which Mbeki and his closest advisers weighed decisions about South 
Africa’s international activism, however. In fact, Western criticism may have 
strengthened these perceptual lenses.  
 
c. The party policymaking process 
 
The African National Congress’s highest decision-making body is the 5-yearly 
National Conference. One close observer of the ANC draws a distinction between 
decisions taken by government office-holding party members, and those taken by 
the decision-making structures of the ANC as a whole.405 This means that major 
decisions that do not form part of resolutions emanating from National 
Conferences, or that are collective decisions of the NEC (the highest decision-
making body between Conferences), are in fact the decisions of components of the 
organisation that do not necessarily enjoy the assent of the broader membership. 
This was most clearly evident in the monumental struggle over the replacement of 
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the social-democratic Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) national 
economic development programme, with the neoliberal GEAR economic policy. As 
a prominent and notorious example, Mandela and Mbeki had presented GEAR in 
1996 as a fait accompli, citing the non-negotiability of ‘globalisation’ when it was 
clearly the position of the organisation at large that “(w)hile globalisation is a reality, 
it is not a fixed and unchallengeable process in which there are no alternatives”.406 
The introduction of GEAR heightened an already-simmering debate within the 
tripartite alliance about the future direction of domestic economic policy, and 
started to strain relations between the ANC and its alliance partners.  
 
The ruling party exercises significant influence on decision-making structures, 
notwithstanding the occasional independent political stances of individual senior 
party members. This is because the same individuals occupy key decision-making 
positions in both the Executive (President, Deputy President, most Cabinet 
Ministers and some Directors-General) and in the ruling party, especially the 
National Executive Committee and the smaller National Working Committee.407 
According to Ebrahim Ebrahim, a senior ANC member, who also served as Chair 
of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs,  
 
Policy comes from the ANC, from the resolutions passed at the ANC congress, to 
the NEC (it has a subcommittee on foreign affairs) which meets every 2 months. It 
starts with the President’s report, which always includes international affairs. Then 
there is general discussion. It can make recommendations, amendments, and 
critiques. For example, on the question of Nepad and the Renaissance, which came 
from the Presidency, it was discussed by the NEC and then endorsed.408 
 
While the Party’s apparently democratic policymaking processes may allow for 
considerable grassroots input on a wide array of policy questions, from local branch, 
to Regional Executive Committee, to NEC, Lodge identifies an important anomaly 
in the social identity of the ANC:  
The social character of its following prompts the ANC to maintain that it provides 
‘a disciplined force of the left’, representing ‘the needs and aspirations of the 
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overwhelming majority of South Africans, many of whom are poor’, despite its 
growing financial dependence on big business.409 
 
 In this way, the party’s policymaking system is somewhat vulnerable to the 
influence of well-resourced lobbyists and campaigners.  
 
However, not only is the ANC party machinery, especially at election time, highly 
dependent on large disbursements from the private sector within South Africa that 
remain undisclosed. It is also the beneficiary of funding from other controversial 
sources, such as the governments of China and Malaysia, with at times negative 
consequences for transparency in policymaking. (See sub-section a.) 
 
 
d. DFA and Parliament 
 
There are thus two competing trends at play: on one hand, institutional freedom 
was gradually won as the consequence of the African National Congress’s 
unquestionable political hegemony in South African society, and the increasing 
blurring of the lines between state and party, with the appointment of central party 
figures or people close to the President in pivotal state institutions. At the polls, the 
party regularly won majorities in excess of 66%, translating into overwhelming 
majorities in parliament. On the other hand, this freedom was not necessarily won 
for party positions, as Luthuli House (as ANC party headquarters in Johannesburg 
is known) became increasingly marginalised from the policymaking apparatus with 
Mbeki’s consolidation of his own political position. Thus, while the ability to act 
with progressively less opposition to policy proposals was being enhanced, this was 
not necessarily in favour of the party. As Chothia and Jacobs note, 
 
The major losers in the restructuring of the presidency, and its effects on policy-
making and the exercise of political power, are parliament and the ANC…But it is 
the position of the ANC as a political entity relative to the presidency that has been the most 
negatively affected. As the president builds the capacity of his executive office, so the 
ANC’s capacity dwindles. Mbeki wants officials at ANC headquarters to be 
managers, dealing with organisational matters such as errant branches and building 
election machinery rather than with political issues.410   
                                                
409 Ibid., 192.  
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At the helm of DFA were two individuals who were seamlessly aligned with Mbeki’s 
foreign policy vision, Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma as Minister, and Ayanda Ntsaluba 
as Director-General, or administrative head, of the Department. Aziz Pahad, 
brother of Mbeki’s closest confidant and Minister in the Presidency, Essop Pahad, 
served as Deputy-Minister, joined by Sue van der Merwe, who has never enjoyed a 
high political profile, for Mbeki’s second term. This ensured that there were few 
bureaucratic struggles between the Presidency, the Party and the Department of 
Foreign Affairs over the direction of foreign policy during Mbeki’s term of office. 
DFA remained largely inconspicuous.  
 
The National Assembly was similarly sidelined. In the 1999 election, the ANC won 
266 out of 400 possible seats in Parliament. The Party gained 13 more seats in the 
overwhelming 2004 election victory, taking its tally to 279. This means that ANC 
members, elected to parliament on a party-list basis, and hence more accountable to 
party bosses than to local constituencies, comprise the bulk of parliamentary 
committee membership, intended as oversight of the Executive. However, a 
member of parliament has recently noted that “parliament’s role in the foreign 
policy decision making process is virtually absent”, and that, “(e)ven parliamentary 
debate between the ruling and opposition parties on matters of foreign policy tends 
to be limited with one or two exceptions”.411 Instead, it seems that debates between 
the ANC and the opposition regarding foreign policy are conducted in the media, 
with each attempting to score political points against the other for an apparently 
more ‘principled’ stance adopted. While the Parliamentary Hansard records that 
searching questions were raised by opposition parliamentarians, they were often 
treated with disdain, and even annoyance, by the Executive. For example, in 
response to the question raised by leader of the Official Opposition (Democratic 
Alliance), Tony Leon, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs,  
 
What is the total cost to date to the Government for:  
 
(a) Accommodation, 
(b) Living expenses, 
(c) Transport, 
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(d) And other associated costs relating to the residence in Pretoria of Jean-
Bertrand Aristide, former president of Haiti?,  
 
the following response was given:  
 
1. The South African Government provides accommodation and services to former 
president Jean-Bertrand Aristide equivalent to those provided to a South African 
cabinet minister. 
2. The South African Government generally owns the accommodation and assets 
provided for utilisation with regard to the residence in Pretoria of former president 
Jean-Bertrand Aristide and the costs related thereto, like those of Cabinet Ministers, are 
integrated into the operations of Government.412 
 
Transparency is increasingly becoming an issue in the framing of South African 
foreign policy priorities, as few answers have come to light about the hosting of 
former President Aristide, for example, as well as the alleged intended despatch of 
weapons to Haiti at the height of that country’s political strife in 2004.413 The South 
African Ministry of Defence made fleeting reference, however, to a request from 
CARICOM for arms for Haiti.414 In addition, in spite of a general public outcry over 
the denial of a visa to the Dalai Lama by the South African authorities in March 
2009, the decision was not reversed. This heightened speculation that South Africa’s 
foreign policy was being heavily influenced by consideration for its extensive trade 
relationship with China.415 
 
5.5. Criticism from other political parties and movements 
 
The legitimating power of the ANC, whether the party as a whole, or Thabo Mbeki 
its leader, to frame threats to South Africa’s security, and to mobilise resources for 
its preferred foreign policy outcomes was further limited by political opposition, 
depending on its source. There are two main sources of criticism of overall policy 
direction, or more broadly, ‘opposition’, to South Africa’s internationalist foreign 
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policy. One, which is less significant from the Party perspective, is the opposition 
from those outside the tripartite alliance. This strand of opposition includes, but is 
not limited to, the parliamentary opposition, which is led by the Democratic 
Alliance (DA), a right-of-centre political assemblage of traditionally-white, middle 
class opposition to the ANC. It can, however, “trace its lineage through a liberal 
tradition of parliamentary opposition to apartheid”.416 One of its progenitors, the 
Liberal Party of South Africa, was headed by the esteemed politician, Helen 
Suzman.  
 
In August 2007, the DA leader, Tony Leon, lamented the loss of South Africa’s 
‘reputation as an international moral beacon’.417 This was evident, he claimed, in 
South Africa’s ‘misplaced solidarity’ with governments such as those of Cuba and 
Iraq; and also in the South African government’s unhappy record on Zimbabwe. 
However, by this time, the ANC, and Thabo Mbeki in particular, had become quite 
impervious to the criticisms of the media and the parliamentary opposition. 
Contrast this with a time, at the height of the Abacha crisis in Nigeria under 
Mandela, when the government switched policy to take a tougher line against the 
Abacha regime. Black noted,  
With domestic critics decrying the apparent naivety and ineffectiveness of its quiet 
diplomacy, South Africa’s government now became an international hard-liner in the 
call for stern punitive measures against the Nigerian regime.418 
 
The second source of opposition emanates from within the tripartite alliance. While 
this opposition reached its apex on the Zimbabwe issue, its effects were minimal, as 
they did not threaten the alliance in any significant sense. COSATU has remained a 
member of the alliance and as noted earlier, the ANC performed even better in 
subsequent elections. In direct contravention of government’s ‘quiet diplomacy’ on 
Zimbabwe, COSATU staged a ‘fact-finding’ mission to Zimbabwe in 2004. The 
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trade union federation, in an embarrassing episode for the ANC, was deported from 
Zimbabwe.419 
 
5.6. Resource Mobilisation and Extraction under Mbeki (1999-2008) 
 
Struc tural con text  
In terms of a neoclassical realist analysis, the starting point is a change in relative 
power distribution; or at least a perception by decisionmakers of such change. The 
structural environment that greeted Thabo Mbeki’s ascent to power in 1999 was 
riven with challenges. Domestically, the economy was attempting a recovery from 
the global financial crisis of 1998, inflation stood at around 8 percent, and the 
country had endured its first experience of the vagaries of the international capital 
markets, as R42 billion in investment capital (inflows and outflows) changed hands 
over 7 months in 1998.420 Politically, Mbeki had just won a resounding mandate as 
President of the ANC at the organisation’s National Conference of 1997.  
 
Meanwhile, US President Bill Clinton had, in April 1998, completed the first African 
tour by a sitting US President for 20 years. The visit was aimed at promoting the 
Africa Growth and Opportunity Bill, a trade facilitation policy for African states to 
enjoy preferential treatment in the US market; and democratisation on the 
continent.421 Nigeria, one of Africa’s largest states and a competitor with South 
Africa for continental leadership, was in the throes of post-Abacha reconstruction, 
and Uganda, another potential rival, was engaged in talks aimed at resolving its 
domestic conflict with the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). South Africa’s immediate 
neighbourhood was simmering in the aftermath of the Lesotho crisis, which saw 
South Africa intervene in the neighbouring state under the auspices of the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) to support the government of Pakalitha 
Mosilili in September 1998, resulting in the deaths of some 130.  
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Globally, the United States and its allies were comfortably ensconced at the pinnacle 
of a world order they felt increasingly confident to design. This was the case to such 
an extent that NATO authorised an attack on Yugoslav (Serbian) troops in Kosovo 
in March 1999, in a bid to end the humanitarian crisis there. The post-Cold War 
world appeared to be ripe for the long-awaited ‘democratic peace’, facilitated by the 
diffusion of liberal values and the growing interdependence of the global 
economy.422 Yet, the growing economic strength of China, displacing the threat 
posed by Japan in the 1980s, was a harbinger of future challenges to US supremacy.  
 
Through a neorealist lens, hence, the world was in the midst of a ‘unipolar 
moment’423 – the duration of which, in any event, could only be short-lived as new 
challengers emerged. This scenario, as discussed previously, implied new 
responsibilities for intermediate powers and strong states in different regions of the 
world. While the US and its allies were interested in the promotion of democracy 
and a world safe for commerce, they showed in their reluctance to act in Rwanda in 
1994, that they would be selective in their engagements in far-flung crises. It is in 
the context of this structural environment that Mbeki commenced his tenure as 
President of South Africa, and in which the present analysis begins. The discussion 
in the next two sections follows a chronological order, and discusses events and 
factors affecting state institutions related to foreign policy formulation; ideology and 
nationalism, all determinants of state power.  
 
 
National Power and State Power in Mbeki ’s  First  Term: 1999-2004 
After reconciliation, delivery: Consolidation of the State and a Visionary 
Foreign Policy 
 
A barely noted historical fact is that the South African state inherited by the African 
National Congress when it assumed power was little more than an apartheid-era 
relic. To the first democratic parliament, under the presidency of Nelson Mandela, 
fell the enormous task of reworking the country’s statutory environment, to 
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“elaborate and put in place the transformation policies [the country] needed”.424 
While an interim constitution had been devised by the Conference for a Democratic 
South Africa (CODESA) in 1993, prior to the drafting of the new Constitution, 
adopted in 1996, policies to guide the transformation of South Africa’s political, 
economic and social environment had now to be devised, and implemented.  
 
Hence, the key aim of Thabo Mbeki’s first term as state president was the 
‘implementation’ of various policy proposals developed during his tenure as deputy 
president under Nelson Mandela. While Nelson Mandela’s term of office was seen 
as emphasising ‘reconciliation’, Mbeki’s was widely expected to be characterised by a 
more ‘normal’ approach to political conflict and the building of political support.425 
However, Mbeki’s tenure started uncertainly in spite of his overwhelming 
predominance within the ANC. This seemingly strong position saw him propelled 
to the Party leadership at the 50th National Conference at Mafikeng in 1997.426 A 
demanding context shaped by three factors marked the uncertainty of the early days 
of his administration: succeeding the superlative statesman, Nelson Mandela; the 
dramatic and exaggerated impact of increased global economic interdependence, or 
‘globalisation’; and, the intractability of South Africa’s own socio-economic 
problems.427 
 
Mbeki’s sense of purpose was revealed in a far-reaching restructuring of the state’s 
policymaking organs during his first term (see Chapter 4). In terms of its overall 
vision and mission, foreign policy appeared to acquire a clearer rationale, as it 
became more aligned with the ANC’s dramatic switch from its domestic 
Reconstruction and Development Programme, to the Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution Strategy in 1996.  In foreign policy, this shift signalled that  
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South Africa under Mbeki had decided to engage more earnestly and vigorously 
with the forces of globalisation as a means of improving economic growth, 
generating employment and addressing inequality.428   
 
In other words, this contentious domestic shift was designed to align South Africa’s 
development model, in its domestic and international dimensions, with the 
perceived requirements of globalisation. This meant greater openness to new 
economic partnerships with ‘non-traditional’ partners, and a new quiescence on the 
part of South Africa’s foreign policy, in a bid to win foreign investment.  
 
The new president appeared to limit the impact of this demanding context by 
consolidating his own political position, and by strengthening the ANC’s political 
hegemony in South African society. This was achieved by wholesale changes to the 
management and organisation of the ANC: the party’s ‘modernisation’429. In 1998, 
the Secretary-General, deputy Secretary-General, and Treasurer positions within the 
organisation became full-time positions, and became competitively remunerated.430 
Moreover, the Presidency of the ANC likewise became more powerful, with the 
president accorded the responsibility of appointing leaders of provincial 
administrations, over and above the wishes of ANC provincial party structures, 
which were usually under their own elected leadership. Contrary to views that 
prevailed by the end of his presidency, Mbeki presided initially over a 
professionalisation of the bureaucracy at Luthuli House, and was seen to be 
“governing South Africa more through the organization”.431 Indeed, it may be 
argued that Mbeki sought out the ANC less and less as his tenure wore on because of 
its culture of democracy. Some research on mass parties has argued that where there 
is a tension in a mass-based party between ‘ideological’ activist community and 
‘pragmatic’ electorally oriented leadership, a loose coupling emerges, where it is 
quite easy for example, for delegates to participate in conferences, but the 
importance of conferences as decision-making bodies diminishes.432 Indeed, Mbeki 
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initiated a proposal to make National Conferences five-yearly instead of three-yearly 
occasions.433  
 
Meanwhile, the decade following the implementation of the government’s 
controversial GEAR macroeconomic policy in 1996 proved to be one of the best in 
terms of macroeconomic indicators in South Africa’s history since the 1960s. The 
budget deficit and inflation were brought to sustainable levels, along with the level 
of public debt.434  
 
However, these years were also marked by straitened times in the tripartite alliance 
between the ANC, COSATU, and the SACP. The clearest example of the limits on 
expendable state power to effect a certain policy outcome is South Africa’s position 
with respect to the Zimbabwe question, a crisis that became increasingly heated 
with that country’s 2000 Parliamentary elections. While South Africa was widely 
deemed to be the country most likely to be able to exert the leverage on Zimbabwe 
required to bring about change in Mugabe’s actions and policies, it was hamstrung 
in its capacity to conduct active intervention in the travails of its neighbour to the 
north.  
 
According to a number of analysts, a major factor preventing Thabo Mbeki from 
supporting the position of the MDC, was his hesitance to be seen to be approving 
the rise of a union movement to political prominence, and potential leadership of 
Zimbabwe, during a time of heightened dissent within the tripartite alliance at 
home.435  
 
In 2000 Mbeki’s relationship with the union movement was dismal. They had been 
on opposite sides of the macroeconomic debate for years; the unions were public 
in their criticism of Mbeki’s stance on HIV and AIDS and were hardly thrilled by 
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his support for Mugabe against the MDC. Some in the ranks of COSATU and the 
ANC spoke covertly of whether Thabo should even see out his two terms.436   
 
Indeed, by the first half of 2005, the SACP was ‘examining its options’ regarding 
remaining in the alliance, even prior to Mbeki’s dismissal of Zuma in mid-2005, to 
which it was opposed. Yet, the organisation decided against abandoning the ANC at 
a congress held in April that year.437  
 
Mbeki’s first term presented a perfect opportunity for the launching of a number of 
key foreign policy initiatives. First among these was the adoption of the AU 
Constitutive Act in July 2000, in which Mbeki was instrumental. Mbeki was also at 
this time constructing his socio-economic plan for Africa, which would later 
metamorphose into NEPAD. This was the foreign affairs project on which Mbeki 
expended much of his time and energy, travelling in Africa, and making 
representations to the G8 and the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN) 
to obtain global support. South Africa also took a leading role in establishing the 
Pan-African Parliament, one of the new continental institutions, and won the right 
to host it. Further resources were allocated to Mbeki’s African Renaissance when 
the African Renaissance and Co-operation Fund Act was promulgated in 2001.438 
Although this Fund does not utilise South African resources exclusively, they do 
comprise a substantial component. Mbeki’s first term was also marked by South 
Africa’s leading role in mediating an ending to the civil war in the DRC.  
 
In summary, Mbeki’s first term saw him preside over an increasing centralisation of 
political power in the Office of the State President. This started a process of 
alienation between himself and the ANC rank-and-file and alliance partners. 
Mbeki’s strengthened position enabled him to mobilise resources for grand gestures 
at the continental level, such as initiating the African agenda, and presidential 
diplomacy associated with it. He was unable, however, to deal successfully with 
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South Africa’s major foreign policy pre-occupation, Zimbabwe. This was owing to 
the sensitivity of the Zimbabwe issue for domestic politics, given that a key 
protagonist in the crisis was a political party with roots in the labour movement, the 
very type of opposition Mbeki feared most at home.  
 
 
National Power and State Power in Mbeki ’s  Second Term: 2004-2008  
Material Power into Political Interests 
 
The dual themes of the ANC’s 2004 election campaign were “A Better Life for All” 
and “A People’s Contract”.  These slogans signalled the urgency with which the 
party would seek to fulfil its domestic and international goals in its third term as the 
governing party of South Africa. For foreign policy this was interpreted as 
incremental increases in the annual appropriation to the Department of Foreign 
Affairs (from R2,3 billion in 2003/4 to R4,3 billion in 2007/8).439 Large amounts of 
funding were also made available by the National Treasury for additional spending, 
such as the construction of the Pan-African Parliament (R113 million), which South 
Africa won the bid to host. Additional resources were allocated to South Africa’s 
incipient development aid initiative, the African Renaissance Fund. 
 
Thus, the executive faced little credible opposition in securing funds for the 
expansive goals of South Africa’s foreign policy. The Department of Foreign Affairs 
was not the only beneficiary, as the Department of Defence also received 
allocations which underwrote the maintenance of South African troops in at least 
four countries, Comores (2006), Burundi (2006-7), DRC (2006-7) and 
Darfur/Sudan (2006). ANC dominance in parliament was a secondary factor in this 
low level of opposition, as Parliament, too, voiced concerns about its 
marginalisation in deployment decisions.440 More important was the integrated 
governance system, and the dominance by the ANC’s NEC of the Executive. A key 
step in favour of solidifying South Africa’s capabilities and modalities for 
participating in international peacekeeping operations was the 1999 “White Paper 
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on Participation in International Peace Missions”.441 This document sought to 
clarify the terms of engagement of South African troops, police and civilians in 
international peace missions. Yet, within a decade, it was up for review, owing to 
the rapid growth of South Africa’s continental peacekeeping responsibilities.442 (See 
Table 2) 
 
 
 
Personnel 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
DRC 1 113 161 164 1 455 1 430 1 230 1 242 1 248 1 248 
Eritrea 
and 
Ethiopia 
0 5 8 11 11 14 7 7 7 2 
Burundi 0 0 701 750 1 500 1 437 1 267 1 202 751 1 000 
Liberia 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 
Sudan 0 0 0 0 0 10 339 620 626 604 
Total 1 123 1 579 1 686 4 477 4 358 4 462 4 900 4 016 4 860 
 
Table 2 : South African participation in peacekeeping operations443 
 
 
 
While South Africa’s continental activities, and broader multilateral action 
proceeded apace, there was one issue on which the government was consistently 
understated in its public diplomacy: Zimbabwe. This culminated in Mbeki’s often 
quoted “Crisis? What Crisis?”, remark in relation to the withholding of election 
results by Zimbabwe’s Electoral Commission (ZEC) after the 2008 presidential 
poll.444  
 
By 2005, however, serious disagreements between COSATU and the government in 
the international arena were tabled in COSATU’s Review of 2004. These included 
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COSATU’s disapproval of free trade agreements slated for conclusion with India 
and China, as well as the policy of ‘quiet diplomacy’ with respect to Zimbabwe. To 
cap a difficult year for Mbeki, he was forced to dismiss his deputy president, Jacob 
Zuma, following the guilty verdict in the trial of Zuma’s financial adviser, Schabir 
Shaik. Zuma’s dismissal dealt a serious blow to Mbeki’s already questionable 
popularity within the ANC’s traditional constituency, and marked the beginning of a 
downward spiral for Mbeki’s own political fortunes, and, some have argued, for the 
ANC itself. In the press, and among religious groups, Mbeki was lauded for his 
decision on Zuma, however.445  
 
In September 2005, some of the ANC’s more nefarious links to international crime 
and corruption were exposed in a UN report on the Iraqi Oil-for-Food scandal. The 
ANC’s involvement in this issue, through a front company tasked with raising 
money for the party, Imvume, shed new light on the party’s (and the South African 
government’s) position against the invasion of Iraq in 2003, as the UN inquiry 
claimed that the Iraqi government had used its dealings with Imvume as a lever to 
influence South Africa’s foreign policy.446 Indeed, the report shed light on the 
significance of the fact that, in April 2003, during the invasion of Iraq that had 
commenced in March, the ANC launched a vociferous popular campaign, titled 
‘Stop the War’, the first and only international issue it had seen fit to mobilise on 
since the end of apartheid. 
 
By the end of 2006, Mbeki was in a stronger position on international affairs, 
however. South Africa strengthened its ties with two major non-Western powers, 
Russia and China. Mbeki hosted Vladimir Putin on a state visit, which addressed, 
among other issues, the sale of nuclear fuel and technology to South Africa. South 
Africa had also managed to secure a deal with China, limiting the latter’s textile 
exports to South Africa, preceded by the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
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(FOCAC) Conference in November. The year ended with an announcement by 
UNCTAD that South Africa was the largest recipient of FDI in Africa in 2005, 
spurred mainly by the acquisition by Barclays plc of South Africa’s ABSA bank.447 
On the flipside of the coin, South African commerce was also extending and 
diversifying its role in the African market, including acting as a valued partner to 
commercial interests from outside the continent.448 
 
Also in 2007, the Heiligendamm Process had begun to entrench South Africa’s 
position, along with that of other intermediate states, as important partners in global 
governance. Domestically, the South African economy was at a high point, enjoying 
growth rates of some 4,9 percent for 2006. This was accompanied by growth in a 
number of sectors crucial to the South African economy – namely, construction, 
finance, transport and communication – and, a decline in unemployment figures.449 
Yet, the relevant decisionmakers remained cognisant of the danger of over-
extending South Africa’s capabilities. In responding to questions regarding possible 
South African military involvement in Somalia, the Minister of Defence noted,  
“(I)t is not in the interests of Africa, nor South Africa, that we over commit 
ourselves seeing that South Africa is already rather over committed in Darfur, Burundi, the 
DRC, the Comoros.”450 
 
At the same time, South Africa’s multilateralism started to assume a strong legalist 
complexion as Mbeki’s second term progressed. Representations made by South 
Africa’s ambassador to the United Nations, Dumisani Kumalo, increasingly brought 
down the wrath of Western powers and international human rights organisations 
during the country’s tenure as a non-permanent member of the Security Council 
(2007-8). South Africa’s position in the UN, was repeatedly seen as giving cover to 
governments of dubious reputation, such as the military junta in Myanmar and 
South Africa’s neighbour to the north, Zimbabwe. South Africa acted to preclude 
draft resolutions condemning human rights abuses in both states on the pretext that 
the Security Council was not the appropriate forum for the discussion of the human 
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rights situation in these countries. Giving South Africa’s reasons for refusing to 
endorse the resolution against Myanmar, which called for the release of all political 
detainees and an end to military sexual violence, proposed in January 2007, 
Ambassador Dumisani Kumalo stated the following: 
 
• That it would compromise the “good offices” of the Secretary General, at that 
time providing a ‘channel for private and confidential communication’ by 
Professor Ibrahim Gambari, the UN’s special envoy to Myanmar; 
• That the matters raised in the resolution would “be best left to the Human 
Rights Council”; and,  
• That the resolution would take the Security Council out of its mandated 
jurisdiction of ‘dealing with matters that are a threat to international peace and 
security’451. 
 
Mbeki underscored this statement in an interview with the national broadcaster, 
affirming that,  
I am sure we will continue to insist…that the Security Council functions in a 
manner within a framework that is defined by international law. It can’t be the first 
one to break the law and put any matter on the agenda that it wishes.452 
 
South Africa’s multilateralism also favoured regional actions over multilateral 
interventions. This was also adduced as a reason for the country’s refusal to support 
the resolution against Myanmar. In the statement declaring its non-support of the 
UNSC Resolution against the military junta, Kumalo noted that a further factor 
influencing South Africa’s stance was the fact that ASEAN Ministers, meeting on 
11 January 2007, had stated that Myanmar was not a threat to its neighbours.  
 
Likewise, Mbeki promoted the idea of ‘African solutions to African problems’. 
South Africa deferred to the African Union’s decision not to abide by the ICC 
indictment of Sudanese president Mohammed al-Bashir, in spite of being a 
signatory to the Rome Statute.  
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Mbeki’s last full year in office, 2007, represented a bleak point in an already 
checquered tenure. While real GDP was growing at a steady pace, and the SACP 
had decided in favour of the tripartite alliance in the first half of the year, Mbeki was 
ousted as ANC president in a shocking, but not entirely unexpected, defeat at the 
ANC’s 52nd National Conference at Polokwane in December. Thus commenced a 
period of ‘lame duck’ presidency that was to end with his unceremonious dismissal 
by the ANC, presented as a ‘resignation’, on 20 September, 2008.  
 
In summary, Mbeki’s second term witnessed a consolidation of South Africa’s 
international profile, with an increase in South Africa’s engagements in Africa, and a 
concern by top officials to engage in manageable operations in which South Africa 
could make a difference. Mobilising and extracting resources for these purposes was 
not hindered by any meaningful opposition. South African policymakers committed 
to giving meaning to the phrase ‘African solutions for African problems’ by 
engaging in peacekeeping and police reform in a number of African states. The need 
for international validation appeared to be dispensed with as the country adopted 
stronger stances against ‘Western unilateralism’, especially during its term of non-
permanent membership of the UN Security Council.  
 
 
Conclusion  
 
Bringing back the state to analyses of South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy 
entails an engagement with issues of state capacity, and the ability of the governing 
class to mobilise and extract resources for foreign policy, based on its perceptions 
of relative power shifts in international relations. South Africa’s internationalism 
has, to a significant extent, been influenced by its position in the global political 
economy, as a small industrialising state, highly dependent on capital from the 
developed world, and on the markets of its neighbours for manufactured goods and 
commodities. This positioning and level of development predisposes the state to an 
outward posture, and one that seeks to limit conflict, especially destabilising violent 
conflict.  
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The ascent to power of the African National Congress, Africa’s oldest liberation 
movement, complicated its assessment of South Africa’s post-apartheid external 
environment. From viewing important sections of the international community as 
ideologically opposed to it, it needed to begin to cultivate links with global powers 
as potential markets and investors in South Africa’s reconstruction. This challenge 
endured, along with durable – and often contradictory - perceptual lenses, to 
confuse South Africa’s early foreign policy under Mandela. Mbeki’s presidency 
wrought fundamental changes in both the vision guiding South African foreign 
policy, and the institutional machinery for its implementation. Available resources 
for an ambitious foreign policy outlook that included the African agenda, reform of 
the multilateral institutions, and South-South cooperation, however, remained in 
short supply.  
 
Owing to the nature of South African politics, in which the ANC, and its alliance 
partners, COSATU and the SACP, comprise the dominant political formation in the 
country, it is within the limits of this alliance that the process of legitimation is most 
significant. In other words, intra-alliance opposition is the main source of 
opposition to the ANC. Thus, to answer the question: to what extent does 
internationalism influence the foreign policy of South Africa, it is required to work inside the 
context of the dynamics of the tripartite alliance, and the room for manoeuvre of 
the ANC within bureaucratic institutions, especially the Department of Foreign 
Affairs, during the two terms of Thabo Mbeki, the most activist period of post-
apartheid South Africa’s foreign policy. 
 
The strengthening of the state machinery in relation to society, and the 
centralisation of foreign policy to an ever greater extent in the President’s office 
create the expectation of sharper perception and more purposive action on 
international questions, away from internationalism. However, this did not occur in 
South Africa, owing to resource constraints, and the domestic political context, in 
which the ANC was dominant, but still required the support of its political allies.  
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Chapter 6: Rising without sabre-rattling? The PT and 
Brazil’s internationalist foreign policy 
 
“…Brazil has asserted its international ambitions without rattling a saber.” 
Newsweek, April 18, 2009 
 
“It appears that Lula has given economic policy to Wall Street and foreign policy to PT.” 
Moisés Naím, editor of Foreign Policy, March 2008 
 
“What is striking about Brazil’s great-power claims is that they are framed almost entirely in economic (and, to a 
lesser degree, cultural) terms. Whereas the other BRICs have invested in hard power, Brazil has traditionally devalued 
its military, instead emphasizing multilateral cooperation within international institutions.” 
Patrick Stewart, The National Interest, July 7 2010453 
 
Introduction 
 
Brazil is the largest economy in South America, and the tenth-largest in the world. 
The country’s diplomatic elite has long been guided by the ‘continental proportions’ 
of Brazil, and the ever-present foreign policy objective of winning for Brazil its 
‘rightful place’ in international politics. Referring to Brazil as the ‘country of 
tomorrow’ has become a truism. Yet, even under a number of military governments 
from 1964 to 1985, Brazil’s changing power profile did not lead to aggression in the 
projection of its power abroad. This is a function both of how threats are perceived 
by the political class, and of Brazil’s relatively peaceful relations with all ten of its 
neighbours. Furthermore, Brazilian decision-makers have long been divided in their 
allegiances to a bifurcated national identity: identification with the West, and with 
the Third World. 
 
Under Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Brazil’s president from 1995 to 2002, foreign 
policy assumed a posture of what some analysts term ‘autonomy through 
participation’. This was a way, according to the policy’s proponents, for Brazil to 
exercise more control over its future, by actively participating in the framing of new 
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international norms and regimes.454 This was in contrast to the President’s 
predecessors’ proclivities to distance Brazil from the overweening influence of great 
powers. In doing so, the Cardoso foreign policy, implemented by his foreign 
ministers Luiz Felipe Lampreia (January 1995-January 2001) and Celso Lafer 
(January 2001 – December 2002), sought to foster an international environment 
that was “as institutionalized as possible”.455 This form of foreign policy projection 
was based on Cardoso’s overriding conviction that a paradigm shift had occurred in 
international relations. This shift entailed the necessity of seeing movement in the 
global power balance less in terms of military or strategic influence, and more in 
terms of economic, commercial, and cultural projection:456 the ascendancy of so-
called ‘soft power’. This view came to epitomise the international outlook of those 
sectors of the Brazilian economy with external exposure. It also culminated in an 
acceptance of US primacy in international affairs, and the concomitant need to 
foster a strong, close relationship with the White House. It was not completely 
pliant, however, as Cardoso’s foreign policy, dubbed ‘critical convergence’ by 
Lampreia457 emphasised liberal convergence, but was still wary of international 
power asymmetries.  
 
For Lula, on the other hand, foreign policy came to be characterised as ‘autonomy 
through diversification’ defined as follows: 
an adherence to international norms and principles by means of South-South 
alliances, including regional alliances, and through agreements with non-traditional 
partners (China, Asia-Pacific, Africa, Eastern Europe, Middle East, etc.), trying to 
reduce asymmetries in foreign relations with powerful countries; at the same time, 
the maintenance of regular and good relations with developed countries, 
cooperating with them in international organizations and reducing their power.458 
 
This signified a change in international outlook for Brazil, with South America, 
South-South partnerships, and an ‘anti-imperialist’ inclination assuming new 
primacy in Brazilian foreign policy. This is in contrast to Brazil’s ‘traditional’ foreign 
policy principles centred upon a legalistic, ‘Grotian’ approach to international 
affairs, one that prizes multilateralism, non-intervention and the ‘sovereign 
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integration’459 of the state in foreign relations. This prompts the question to which 
extent PT has influenced Brazil’s foreign policy trajectory, and in which ways the 
governing party has conditioned the responses of the Brazilian state to external 
challenges and threats.  
 
The literature on Brazil’s foreign policy has by and large neglected the role of the 
governing PT in the formulation of foreign policy options and the ratification of 
foreign policy means. Furthermore, it is only in recent years that greater attention 
has begun to be paid to the ‘realist’ dimension of Brazilian foreign policy, firmly 
attached to notions of ‘the national interest’.460 Many analyses have, however, 
chosen to focus on ‘soft power’ in Brazilian foreign policy, and on the country’s 
distinctiveness as a ‘peaceful’ rising power.461  
 
Foreign policy is, of course, not a blank slate on which PT has been able to write its 
own account. A constant and moderating force in Brazilian foreign policy is the 
highly-respected Ministerio dos Relaçoes Exteriores, which has managed the 
country’s foreign relations with professional astuteness and competence since the 
days of the Baron do Rio Branco, at the turn of the twentieth century. However, the 
extent to which even this venerable institution, colloquially known as Itamaraty, has 
been permeated by the ‘ideological’ tendencies of PT, and its consequent effects on 
foreign policy, came increasingly under the spotlight during the two Lula 
administrations.  
 
This chapter operationalises the neoclassical realism (NCR) framework established 
in Chapter 3, along with the institutional dynamics described in Chapter 4, to 
conduct an analysis of the extent of internationalist influence on the foreign policy 
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of Brazil. In this discussion, Brazil’s experiences with internationalism in historical 
perspective are analysed. This will facilitate an appreciation of the longstanding 
traditions and cyclical nature of some ideas in Brazilian foreign policy. An 
examination of the salient features of Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s foreign policy 
will be conducted. This is followed by an analysis of Partido dos Trabalhadores in the 
foreign policy field. The third section discusses resource mobilisation and extraction 
for Brazil’s activist foreign policy under Lula. 
 
What is the connection between Brazil’s chosen method of power projection and 
the influence of a new governing party, PT, on foreign policy? How can neoclassical 
realism explain Brazilian foreign policy under the Lula administrations? The two 
Lula administrations, which governed Brazil from 2003 to the end of 2010, 
constitute the period under consideration for this case study. ‘Major foreign policy 
actions’ are classed as those that entailed the deployment of military forces, or the 
allocation of monetary and other (i.e. personnel) resources, by the Brazilian state. 
An internationalist approach to foreign policy does not make cast-iron predictions 
about foreign policy. Nonetheless, it claims that international disputes will be settled 
by non-violent means; that military deployments will be made multilaterally, rather 
than unilaterally; that solidarity with the developing world will be favoured; and, that 
the diplomatic norm of non-interference will be adhered to in most cases.  
 
6.1. Brazil: An ideological internationalist? 
Brazil’s continental dimensions, plentiful natural resources, and linguistic singularity 
in Spanish South America render it a rather insular national community. This 
insularity has led Brazilian political leadership throughout the last two centuries to 
cultivate for the nation an identity of exceptionalism and potential grandeur in 
international affairs.462 Brazil’s beginnings as a Portuguese colony, the temporary 
establishment of the Portuguese court at Rio de Janeiro during the Napoleonic 
campaigns in Europe, and its relatively peaceful experience of nation-building, are 
all factors in this pervasive sense of exceptionalism.  
 
                                                
462 Lima and Hirst, “Brazil as an intermediate state”, 21.  
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Brazil’s foreign policy history into the first decade of the 21st century could usefully 
be divided into 6 significant phases463, some overlapping (see Figure 4). The first 
phase, initiated by the birth of the republic in 1889 and terminated by the outbreak 
of World War I in 1914, represented a period of unquestioned proximity to the 
United States, under the tutelage of the Baron do Rio Branco. As Rio Branco, 
Brazil’s first Minister of Foreign Affairs, sought to wean Brazil from dependence on 
the United Kingdom, he forged closer relations for Brazil with the United States.  
 
 
Phase 1: Territorial Diplomacy 
(1889-1917) 
Phase 2: Limited Outward 
Projection (1917-1945) 
Phase 3: Active Outward 
Projection (1960-1963) 
Phase 4: Withdrawal and 
Conservatism (1964-1966) 
Phase 5: Commercial expansion 
and pragmatism (1966-2002) 
 
 
 
 
Phase 6: Active outward 
engagement (2003-present) 
 
Figure 4: Phases of Brazilian Foreign Policy, 1889-present464 
                                                
463 Greater detail has been entertained in discussing the history of Brazilian foreign 
policy, than has been on South African foreign policy, in the belief that there exists a 
stronger – though still contested - ideational continuity in Brazilian foreign policy from the 
days of Rio Branco to the present, than existed in South African foreign policy over the 
course of the twentieth century, owing to minority rule.  
464 Periodisation derived from Wayne Selcher, The Afro-Asian Dimension of Brazilian 
Foreign Policy 1956-1972 (Gainesville: The University Presses of Florida, 1974): 9-19. 
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This period came to an end during the First World War as Brazil sought a more 
assertive and independent role for itself in international affairs. Underpinning this 
shift was a renewed sense of recognition-seeking, both for Brazil’s membership of 
the Western world, as well as for its contribution to the war effort on the side of the 
Allies. In a deeper sense, the 1920s marked the birth of a truly indigenous Brazilian 
cultural awareness, which “rejected further imitation of foreign models”.465 This 
rejection was accompanied by a newfound sense of disillusionment with the 
structure and process of international politics. The disappointment of their failed 
attempts to secure a permanent seat on the Council of the League of Nations 
highlighted the hierarchical nature of international relations for Brazilian diplomats. 
This hierarchical view of the international system permeated their views on 
disarmament, as well as their suspicion of the great powers more generally.466  
 
From the 1920s onward, the pattern of Brazil’s foreign policy may usefully be seen 
as a contest between the two concepts of selfhood entertained by its elites for much 
of the twentieth century. On one hand, the country sought its identity and physical 
security in close alliance with the US, and the ‘Western’ world more generally. On 
the other, leaders during certain periods sought to construct Brazil as a member of 
the Third World, emphasising its commonalities with Africa and Asia, by way of 
poverty and underdevelopment. Both approaches had their sources in domestic 
politics, and also served divergent functions on the domestic scene. While 
identification with Africa, and the Third World more broadly, served to underscore 
the regime’s foreign policy autonomy, close association with Western powers served 
to underline Brazil’s exceptionalism and distinctiveness in Latin America, and its 
upward development trajectory.  
 
The overarching structure of the Cold War drew important distinctions between 
domestic groups on foreign policy. Those who favoured proximity with the US, and 
hence, ‘traditional’ foreign policy, saw the Cold War in terms of a struggle between 
Communism and capitalism. Those who adopted the ‘nationalist’ position, on the 
other hand, saw the primary conflict as one between the developed and developing 
                                                
465 Stanley. E. Hilton, “Brazil and the Post-Versailles World: Elite Images and Foreign 
Policy Strategy, 1919-1929”, Journal of Latin American Studies, 12, No.2 (1980): 341.  
466 Ibid., 342. 
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nations.467 What emerges from an examination of Brazil’s foreign policy throughout 
the twentieth century is that the ‘departures’ identified as novel in the twenty-first 
century are really a return of tendencies in Brazilian foreign policy that started to 
emerge in the 1950s, during the presidency of Juscelino Kubitschek (JK) (1956-
1961).  
 
During JK’s presidency, a number of large industrial projects were undertaken in 
Brazil, including the construction of the new capital city, Brasília, in the interior. 
These public works projects resulted in large balance of payments deficits for Brazil, 
which JK sought to alleviate by seeking new opportunities for Brazilian commerce 
in overseas markets. This initiated a period of tentative outward expansion for 
Brazil, especially in the direction of the hitherto neglected continents of Africa and 
Asia.468 This was a marked difference from its main foreign policy thrust for the 
first half of the twentieth century, which sought to avoid the uncertain 
consequences of action, and preferred a measured ‘inaction’,469 and focus on 
established Western powers.  
 
Brazil’s ‘traditional’, risk-averse mode of conducting its international diplomacy had 
many critics, however. At the ideational level, Brazil’s unquestioning allegiance to 
the US was seen as problematic by the new breed of Brazilian nationalists. Also, 
those who sought more pragmatism and the pursuit of Brazil’s national interests 
grew increasingly frustrated by Itamaraty’s ‘legal-historical’ approach to international 
diplomacy. At the national socio-economic level, the exigencies of economic 
development were placing pressure on the government to seek new outlets for 
Brazilian commerce.470 The concepts of ‘National Security’ and ‘Development’ 
became virtually entwined around this time, emphasised by the Doutrina de Segurança 
Nacional (DSN). This National Security Doctrine, as embellished by the military 
Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG) – the repository of strategic thinking in Brazil – 
could “be summarised into the “binomial” of security and development”,471 that 
has played a role in the formulation of Brazilian foreign policy guidelines ever since. 
                                                
467 Selcher, The Afro-Asian Dimension, 14.  
468 Ibid, 80. 
469 Ibid. 
470 Ibid., 12-13.  
471 Kai Michael Kenkel, “New tricks for the dogs of war, or just old w(h)ine in new 
bottles?  - securitisation, defence policy and civilian control in Brazil, 1994-2002”, 
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This dilemma – the choice between conservatism and diversification - influenced 
much of Brazil’s foreign policy outlook, from the time of the Kubitschek presidency 
into the twenty-first century. Along with the establishment of Petrobrás in 1953, JK 
ushered in a period of greater national awareness, amplified popular interest in 
foreign policy, and an expanded internal market. Most importantly, “nationalism 
gained converts and influence in policy formation”, at least until the coup in 
1964.472 Traits of the political left in foreign policy, evident in the rejection of 
foreign economic control, also began to make their appearance.473  
 
The security/development binomial was notably less perceptible during periods of 
high ideological fervour in foreign policymaking, such as characterised the 
presidency of Jânio Quadros and his successor, João Goulart (1961-1964). During 
this period some decisions – viewed as extreme by conservative factions among the 
Brazilian elite – were taken that jeopardised Brazil’s standing with its most 
important strategic partner, the United States. This included the granting of a 
national order of honour to Ché Guevara, and a refusal to toe the US line on Cuba. 
Brazil maintained an independent foreign policy under Quadros (it resisted even 
joining NAM, although it became an observer), to the consternation of the United 
States, which was funnelling resources to the country in the form of the ‘Alliance 
for Progress’, designed to win Brazil’s and other Latin American countries’ 
compliance during the Cold War.  
 
The foreign policy of the military regime was by no means uniform, but withdrawal 
and conservatism in the immediate aftermath of the coup of 1964 until about 1967, 
was succeeded by commercial expansion and pragmatism which lasted, arguably, 
well into the period of democratic government. The ‘national interest’ and the 
‘diplomacy of prosperity’ were permitted a return to the focus of foreign policy by 
the East-West détente of the late 1960s-1970s.474  
 
Under the first military government of Castello Branco, Afro-Asian relations were 
demoted in favour of a rapprochement with the United States, which had offered 
                                                                                                                               
unpublished manuscript (2006). Accessed online at : 
http://liu.xplorex.com/sites/liu/files/Publications/KenkelSixSteps.pdf on 21 July, 2010.  
472 Selcher, The Afro-Asian Dimension,10-11. 
473 Ibid.,: 11. 
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support for the military coup.475 From 1967, however, under Arthur da Costa e 
Silva, a return was made to ‘independent foreign policy’, although the term was only 
used again in 1970 by Emílio Médici. During this period, Brazil adopted a more 
assertive position in international affairs. Among others, it adopted a stance against 
industrialised nations on pollution at the 1972 UN Conference on the Human 
Environment; refused to sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; and, concluded 
a nuclear deal with West Germany in 1975. With impressive economic growth in the 
early 1970s, Brazil was able to establish its incipient foreign aid programme, thereby 
adding financial resources to its global outreach begun so tentatively under 
Kubitschek in the 1950s and Quadros and Goulart in the early 1960s.476 
 
Assessing Brazil’s foreign policy posture over time, therefore, there are two key 
observations that can be made about the country’s foreign policies with respect to 
the developing world. First, the ‘social’ dimension evident in Lula’s foreign policy is 
not new to Brazil’s foreign policy tradition. There has long been a focus on 
economic development, and, moreover, viewing underdevelopment as a function of 
disadvantageous global economic structures. What has changed from one 
administration to the next is the perception of the extent of the required reform. 
Second, solidarity with the South appears to be more of an elite interest (limited 
sections of the elite) than an organic national concern in Brazil. For much of the 
twentieth century, Brazil’s interests did not coincide neatly with those of the 
developing world, with the result that Brazilian policymakers were utilising the idea 
of Southern solidarity for purposes of launching commercial programmes of 
international penetration, or, as in the case of trade in agricultural goods, building a 
core of support in multilateral negotiating forums for wholesale change of trading 
practices that were disadvantageous to its own trade. An example of conflicting 
interests was the competition in cocoa and coffee exports, on which the Brazilian 
economy was heavily reliant until the 1960s.477   
 
Southern solidarity was also important, in the Cold War context, in terms of 
enacting an independent foreign policy. This policy was initially run ‘cheaply’ based 
                                                
475 National Security Archive. 2004. “Brazil Marks 40th Anniversary of Military Coup: 
Declassified Documents Shed Light on US Role”, accessed online at: 
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on so-called ‘cultural diplomacy’, with few resources available to commit to the 
opening of new embassies and material assistance to developing countries. This 
position only started to change in the 1970s, with the dramatic change in Brazil’s 
own domestic economic situation, which saw GDP growth rates in excess of 10 per 
cent per year. As a corollary to this, Brazilian society has not changed sufficiently 
for broader changes in identity to take place, identity changes that would underpin 
stronger solidarity with the Third World in foreign affairs.  
 
Fry has noted that the manner in which ‘race’ is constructed in Brazil militates 
against the mobilisation of ‘blackness’ even in domestic Brazilian society:  
 
The history of the black movement in Brazil has largely been the history of not-
resoundingly-successful attempts to construct a black identity to which people of 
color would feel impelled to adhere.478  
 
Hence ‘solidarity’ has been carefully crafted as a tool for building consensus and 
broad-based support for the country’s initiatives in multilateral organisations. The 
domestic political tensions over Brazil’s leading role in the establishment of 
UNCTAD in 1964 bore testimony to this divide. While those who favoured strong 
ties with the US feared UNCTAD’s founding would antagonise the US, those in 
favour of an independent foreign policy (política externa independente, PEI), were 
content with the prospect of demonstrating autonomy in foreign policy, and playing 
a strong hand in negotiations with developed countries over the structure of the 
international trading system. Brazil hoped, especially in the mid-1960s, to build 
hard-line coalitions on trade (with other developing countries). This would serve a 
dual purpose of using multilateralism as a ‘battering ram’ in negotiations with the 
US, and opening the way at home for the introduction of far-reaching reforms, a 
political goal of the Goulart government.479  
 
The two concepts of selfhood – Western and Third World - in Brazilian foreign 
policy that have vied for primacy in the twentieth century have been brought into 
sharp relief by the juxtaposed presidencies of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC), 
and Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva. While both leaders claimed to be flying the flag of 
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‘progressive’ politics internationally, some salient differences in their approaches to 
foreign policy are identifiable. The following section will analyse some pervading 
features of diplomacy and foreign policy under FHC as a backdrop to the analysis 
of PT and its role in Brazil’s internationalism under Lula.  
 
6.2. Changing perceptual lenses from FHC to PT 
 
The claim has been made often enough that Brazilian foreign policy has tended at 
times to neatly reflect the requirements of domestic economic models. This was 
evident during the pursuit of Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI), whose 
emphasis on domestic production and technological development underpinned the 
drive in the 1960s for a number of foreign policy initiatives, especially independent 
foreign policy and the diversification of overseas trade partners.480 
 
In this light, Cardoso’s foreign policy can be seen as an external support for the 
domestic policies of trade and investment liberalisation, encapsulated in the phrase 
‘economic pragmatism’. Economic pragmatism was characterised by an “emphasis 
[on] monetary stability and external constraints, even at the expense of growth, 
increased employment, and the redistribution of income”.481 Its international 
dimension – a key component of the approach - was the search for international 
credibility, especially with the international financial institutions (IFIs) (which 
entailed loyalty to structural adjustment programmes); and, an emphasis on 
multilateral trade negotiations and trade conflict resolution.482  
 
For at least one observer, foreign policy under Cardoso had “evolved under a 
predominantly reactive and defensive pattern”.483 The economic model 
implemented by the Cardoso regime tended heavily toward neo-liberalism. The 
measures enacted, including “the liberalisation of domestic finance, foreign trade, 
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exchange rate movements and the capital account of the balance of payments”,484 
left the Brazilian economy increasingly vulnerable to international political and 
economic changes, and to the exigencies of international finance. Thus, the 
Brazilian analysts, Vigevani and Cepaluni, argue that Cardoso’s foreign policy 
“sought to internalize, absorb, and consolidate the liberal changes that globalization 
brought to international society during the 1990s, in contrast with the failure of the 
Collor de Mello administration and the hesitancy of the Itamar Franco 
administration in this regard”.485 In spite of Collor conducting far-reaching 
economic liberalisation, this was not seen to ‘pay off’ with regard to Brazil’s 
relations with the US. The country was still placed on the US Trade Representative’s 
(USTR) ‘watch list’ in 1991 for its position on the manufacturing of pharmaceutical 
products under patent.486  
 
The overarching premises of Cardoso’s foreign policy posture were:  to increase 
Brazilian participation in the framing of international norms and regimes in order to 
institutionalise the country’s external environment as far as possible, with Brazilian 
interests in mind (with MERCOSUL having a central role); and, extending 
opportunities for trade with the largest international markets. This meant that 
‘legalisation’ of the international environment – both by Brazil’s increasing 
adherence to international regimes, and by its increased participation in the 
formulation of such regimes – would provide Brazil with an “international legal 
reference point”487. This move ostensibly sought to remove ‘politics’, at least 
superficially, from Brazil’s international actions, thus maintaining its good relations 
with as many nations as possible. By way of example, Brazil has famously been one 
of the states parties to have made most frequent recourse to the Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism (DSM) of the WTO.  
 
In keeping with the first premise, even the institutionalisation of Mercosul was left 
to wane relative to the higher priority of institutionalising the rapidly evolving global 
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multilateral trade liberalisation organisation, the WTO.488 In pursuit of the latter, 
relations with smaller markets were downgraded, while those with traditional trading 
partners were prioritised. In fact, the WTO was underlined in Brazil’s national 
planning document, PPA 2000-2003, as a vital component of the country’s 
economic diplomacy.489 It may be argued that under Cardoso, Brazil’s perception of 
its place in the international balance of power was a conservative one. This was 
underpinned by a precarious exit from a dire domestic economic situation, 
engineered by Cardoso himself during his tenure as Finance Minister in the last 
years of the Franco administration.  
 
As far as relations with the US were concerned, Cardoso enjoyed warm personal 
relations with US president Bill Clinton, and more broadly recognised the primacy 
of the United States in international affairs following the fall of Communism and 
the successful Gulf War campaign of 1990. Brazil maintained a ‘critical 
convergence’,490 however, which entailed broad agreement with the dominant 
liberal tendencies in international society, alongside a strong adherence to the goal 
of increasing Brazil’s autonomy and freedom of action in international affairs. In 
this way, Cardoso was hesitant to be seen to be fulfilling US policy interests in 
South America, such as assisting Colombia in its battle against FARC.  
 
Cardoso’s foreign policy did not stray far from the traditional paradigm of Brazilian 
foreign policy, based on historico-legalism and economic diplomacy. It tended more 
toward a ‘moderate multilateralism’, and a dialogue with a number of international 
partners, while emphasising the primacy of the US among international partners.491 
The clear divide between the multilateral trade negotiating tactics of the Cardoso 
and Lula administrations was the shift away from “arid technocratic negotiations 
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and conflict resolution under the WTO”, toward greater emphasis on the social and 
environmental implications of multilateral trade policy.492 Under Lula, critiques of 
the multilateral trade and finance systems were linked to greater calls for 
international social projects, such as hunger and disease eradication, and the broader 
consideration of the challenges of the developing world. 
 
The competence of Itamaraty, in whom much of the initiative for Brazilian foreign 
policy rested, was seen by Cardoso as a means of exploiting niches in international 
politics. It helped that Cardoso held a special affection for the institution, having 
acted as Minister of Foreign Affairs under Itamar Franco for a brief period from 
1992 to 1993. In addition, Cardoso’s own reputation as a social scientist of some 
international standing – in spite of what seemed like a wholesale migration in his 
ideological perspective – assisted in ‘rehabilitating’ the international image of Brazil, 
ushering in a period of ‘presidential diplomacy’ that would continue during the Lula 
administration.  
 
Presidential diplomacy under Cardoso and Lula have been marked by divergent 
tendencies, however, as Cardoso prioritised relations with developed countries, 
while Lula has placed greater emphasis on South-South cooperation.493 According 
to Lula’s international relations adviser and one-time President of PT, Marco 
Aurelio Garcia, Cardoso’s presidential diplomacy was a ‘masking’ mechanism, 
which ensured the visibility of the leader of the government, even while this failed 
to lend strength to the country. Presidential speeches, so often celebrated abroad, 
proved little more than rhetoric.494  
 
While Cardoso frequently spoke out against the effects of globalization, 
furthermore, his domestic policies went far in facilitating them. This fact limited the 
Cardoso government’s ability to mobilise and extract resources for expansive 
foreign policy actions. Domestic economic stability was a priority.  
Put differently, the readiness to accept the costs and obligations of the pursuit of 
international objectives did not gain significant ground during the Cardoso era, 
either among Brazilian society or within the State.495 
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Brazil under Cardoso thus required a low-cost means of defending its national 
interests; this meant that it could not accept large costs for the provision of regional 
or global goods, such as institutionalising MERCOSUL.496 During Cardoso’s term, 
external threats to Brazil were minimal, and the primary policy issue for the 
Brazilian government was the task of stabilising the domestic economy. This 
entailed considerable limits on Brazil’s foreign policy, including only muted 
opposition to increasing US unilateralism by the end of Cardoso’s presidency in 
2002.497 Nonetheless, Brazil grew increasingly obdurate in the FTAA negotiations, 
citing differences with the US on intellectual property rights, and access to US 
markets in steel and farm produce.498  
 
A number of factors combined to ease Brazil’s external environment under 
Cardoso. While the US was less able to exert influence on South American affairs, 
having its hands full with the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) 
and Haiti,499 Brazil was slowly emerging as a regional hegemon, as it managed to 
break away from decades of parity with Argentina, owing to the latter’s economic 
woes. Rapprochement with Argentina was a primary factor in Brazil’s continental 
rise. Lesser regional actors, while expanding their capabilities, were highly 
constrained by incomplete political transitions and rampant poverty. Two further 
factors in the regional balance of power were the increasing prominence of 
geostrategic issues, such as control of certain ocean passes, and the incipient 
involvement of external powers,500 such as China. As noted by Morris as early as 
1989 in his discussion of the geostrategic significance of the Straits of Magellan, 
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Brazil’s military capabilities are growing more potent. So too are other states of 
South America, including Argentina and Chile, improving their armed forces. This 
proliferation of military power throughout the region tends to offset Brazil’s 
emergence by building a new regional balance of power around military deterrence 
rather than Brazilian pre-eminence. Greater autonomy of all regional actors tends 
to result, which is reinforced by the decline in the traditional U.S. hegemonical (sic) 
role.501 
More than two decades later, Brazil has continued to capitalise on its continental 
scale and expansive domestic market to be not only the largest economy by some 
distance in Latin America, but also one of the top ten economies worldwide. In 
2008, Brazil boasted a GDP of USD1.5 trillion.502 This dwarfed that of its 
neighbours (see Table 3 below). However, it is in the diplomatic arena that the most 
significant shifts in the balance of power have occurred. The primary ‘objective’ 
threats facing Brazil in the security sphere, during Cardoso’s presidency, as in Lula’s, 
were those posed by transnational movements of people, drugs and small arms and 
light weapons. In the meantime, Brazil has also found itself, as a consequence of the 
PT presidential election victories of 2002 and 2006, at the centre of an ideological 
battle for the left of regional and hemispheric dimensions.503  
 
The rise of Hugo Chavez’s ambitions for a Bolívarian revolution in Latin America 
has set the Brazilian cat among the populist left pigeons of Venezuela, Bolivia and 
Ecuador. This ‘battle’ acquired further significance with the rising tensions between 
US-backed Colombia and Venezuela in 2009-10.  
 
Thus Cardoso’s approach to foreign policy was clearly more conservative, and 
respectful of US hegemony in international affairs. Indeed, the first task of 
diplomacy was seen as being “primarily didactic in nature”, educating national actors 
about globalization and facilitating its acceptance as an international (and domestic) 
‘reality’.504 Indeed, Hurrell has suggested that in terms of his view of the impact of 
globalisation, Cardoso should be classed a ‘hyperglobalist’: the pressures on states to 
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converge in policy were substantial, as was the need to seek the approval of the 
markets.505 
 
 
 
Country 
Population 
(millions)  
GDP 
(current 
US $ 
millions) 
Annual 
Growth 
Rate 
(%),  
Per 
Capita 
Income 
(US$) 
% GDP 
spent 
on 
military 
% GDP 
spent on 
social 
services506 
Argentina 39,882 328,465 6.8 7,190 0.761 10%+5.5% 
Bolivia 9,694,113 16, 674 6.1 1,460 1.5 5.0%+nd 
BRAZIL 191,971,506 1,575,150 5.1 7,300 1.48 8.4%+nd 
Colombia 45,012,096 243,765 2.5 4,620 3.72 6.1%+4.1% 
Guyana 763,437 1,155 3.0 1,450 No data 8.2%+6.1% 
Paraguay 6,237,855 15,976 5.8 2,110 0.828 5.7%+nd 
Peru 28,836,700 129,109 9.8 3,990 1.24 4.3%+2.5% 
Suriname 515,124 3,033 5.1 4,760 No data 7.6%+nd 
Uruguay 3,334,052 32,186 8.9 8,260 1.22 8.0%+3.5% 
Venezuela 27,935,000 314,150 4.8 9,230 1.06 5.8%+3.7% 
Table 3: Brazil’s neighbours: Economic Statistics (correct as at 2008).507  
 
 
 
While the Cardoso administration was coming under increasing pressure for its 
handling of various domestic issues, including the economy and the issue of land 
redistribution, PT was preparing itself for a more prominent national role, by 
attempting finally to secure victory in the 2002 elections, after 3 previous failed 
attempts. This included relaxing its policy on cross-party alliances, and generally 
‘normalising’ its approach to Brazilian politics.508 It also made room for moderate 
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shifts in its approach to Brazil’s international relations. This evolution is the focus 
of the following section.  
 
6.3. PT’s foreign policy evolution and its critics: institutional freedom and 
legitimating power 
 
‘Rupture  i s Necessary ’? PT and the  l imi ts  to change  in  Brazi l ian Fore i gn  
Pol i cy  
In January 2003, Lula and the Workers’ Party entered government in a two-fold 
straitjacket, imposed by IMF austerity on one hand, and its own domestic deals with 
centrist parties in order to be able to pass legislation in Congress, on the other. As 
an internal party matter, foreign policy had come a long way from the party’s clear 
distaste for ‘imperialism’ in its founding document from 1980, and its later promises 
to place a moratorium on foreign debt payments if it came to power. While foreign 
policy was not one of the party’s key platforms in its four presidential campaigns 
(three of them unsuccessful), it was one of the fronts on which PT had to fend off 
attacks on its presidential ambitions, especially in the 2002 campaign. These attacks, 
admittedly, were sparked in response to calls by the far left in PT for Brazil to 
terminate its arrangements with the IMF and renounce the repayment of Brazil’s 
foreign debt509.  
 
The domestic context, especially Brazil’s political system, militates against rapid and 
far-reaching policy changes in any public sphere. This is in part a vestige of the 
transition to democracy, which allowed much of the old elite to retain positions of 
power and prestige in national, state and local government.510 Furthermore, national 
and state politics sometimes appear to operate on different axes, especially given 
wide income and education-level disparities in Brazil. Institutional freedom in terms 
of formulating and implementing foreign policy is thus limited for any governing 
party, owing to the Congressional system, and the primacy of Itamaraty in foreign 
policy implementation. The state, with PT in government, also laboured under a 
legitimacy deficit in foreign policy, as notable sections of the foreign policy 
                                                
509 Statements to this effect were contained in the document “A Ruptura Necessária” (A 
Necessary Break), discussed at PT’s XII National Convention in December 2001. See 
Graieb, 2002.  
510 Francisco Panizza, “Is Brazil becoming a “boring” country?”, Bulletin of Latin 
American Research, 19 (2000): 503.  
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community continually questioned the wisdom of the PT government’s 
international stances. This section traces the evolution of the foreign policy 
positions of PT, with special reference to its transition from opposition party to 
governing party, and particular individuals who have played a key role in foreign 
policy decision-making in the two Lula governments.  
 
The evo lu t ion  o f PT’s  fore i gn  pol i cy pos i t ions  
Partido dos Trabalhadores was established in the forge of union politics in the 
industrial heartlands of São Paulo in 1980, under a lathe-operator who would 
eventually become president of Brazil, Luiz Inacio ‘Lula’ da Silva. PT’s foreign 
policy platform during its early years was based on autonomy for Brazil, which 
included distancing the country from international commitments, such as the 
repaying of debts, along with adherence to certain international agreements such as 
the NPT.  
 
As noted by Almeida, PT itself gradually became reconciled to greater responsibility 
for Brazil in the international arena, in a long journey from its inception with 
socialist undertones in the early 1980s, to its presidential campaign of 2002.511 This 
change was characterised by a perceptible shift from ‘the battle against imperialism 
and global capital’, to an outlook more accommodating of the international order 
and international finance. This was clearly necessitated by the demands of electoral 
politics (extending the party’s electoral appeal) and coalition-building, as well as 
Brazil’s external economic context at the end of the 1990s. PT needed both funds 
and allies to run successful campaigns in the weak Brazilian electoral and party 
system.512  
 
In addition, Brazil’s precarious international financial predicament by the early years 
of the 21st century meant that any Brazilian government would have to be on good 
terms with the international financial institutions, and take a more accommodating 
view of global capital. Authors have noted the changes and concessions that have 
                                                
511 Almeida, “A Política Internacional do PT”, 88.   
512 The key text on the nature of Brazil’s political party and electoral systems is Scott 
Mainwaring, Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case 
of Brazil. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).  
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been required of PT as a party of the opposition entering government513. This story 
has been told from various angles as it affects PT’s domestic policies, but few 
analyses examine its impact on PT’s, and Brazil’s, foreign policy.514  
 
PT’s policies and pronouncements in the early 1980s characterised it as a typical 
Latin American party of the left. While foreign policy was not explicitly mentioned 
in the Party’s founding document, the ‘Plan of Action’ appended to it enumerated 
solidarity with all oppressed peoples; mutual respect between nations; the deepening 
of international cooperation; and, the promotion of world peace as the Party’s 
primary international concerns.515 Chief among the party’s guiding principles was 
that of solidarity, solidarity stemming both from struggles over workers’ rights in the 
party’s early years, and from later struggles as part of a more unified Brazilian 
opposition movement.516 However, “the assumption of executive responsibility at 
the state and municipal levels, and gradually increased contacts with like-minded 
political parties and syndicates of the northern hemisphere, helped to give PT’s 
leadership an appreciation of the limits and possibilities of governmental action”.517  
 
In a general sense, the prior tone of recriminations and critiques, containing 
negative and accusatory proclamations, with respect to “markets”, the international 
financial institutions, and the policies of the United States, became more measured 
and balanced, revealing a genuine preoccupation with governabilidade and foreign 
relations, from the perspective of the real possibility of victory in the elections of 
October 2002.518 
 
The year 2010 marked the first appearance in the Party’s history of a comprehensive 
PT foreign policy document, The Workers’ Party International Policy (A política 
                                                
513 See Csaba Deák, “Brazil: The Partido dos Trabalhadores in government”, Soundings, 
(2003); David Samuels, “From Socialism to Social Democracy: Party Organization and 
the Transformation of the Workers’ Party in Brazil”, Comparative Political Studies, 37, 
No. 9 (2004); Wendy Hunter, “The Normalization of an Anomaly: The Workers’ Party in 
Brazil”, World Politics, 59, No.3 (2007).  
514 An exception is the discussion by scholar-diplomat Prof. Paulo Roberto de Almeida. 
“A política internacional do PT”.  
515 Almeida, “A Política Internacional do PT”, 88.  
516 Keck notes how the labour movement was not initially as enamoured of the idea of a 
‘unified opposition’ as perhaps other segments – the liberal elites, students and 
intellectuals – of the opposition to the military were. However, “There was a 
convergence between the opposition elites’ need for mass momentum and the new 
labor leaders’ need for recognition; they helped each other.” This is an important 
secondary source of the commitment to solidarity in PT. See Margaret E. Keck, The 
Workers’ Party and Democratization in Brazil. (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 1992): 41.  
517 Almeida, “A Política Internacional do PT”, 90.  
518 Ibid., 93.  
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internacional do PT), published by the Party’s International Relations Secretariat. 
The document was debated and approved at the Party’s fourth Congress, held in 
February 2010. In addition to solidarity, the policy mentions two further central 
principles of PT foreign policy: plurality and Latin-Americanism. PT argues that owing 
to its own history of plurality, of bringing together numerous ideological and 
political strands, it prizes plurality in international life. It also claims a significant 
difference in Brazilian foreign policy in this regard since 2003: “We do not have 
relations only with those who “think like us”; but also with those who, regardless of 
minor or major ideological differences, face political problems similar to those we 
face in the international arena”.519  
 
Underlining the Party’s promotion of Latin Americanism, there is the recognition 
that Brazil’s global role is strongly linked to the future of Latin and South 
America.520 In addition, regional integration is considered an integral dimension of 
Brazil’s foreign policy for the purpose of building regional autonomy and resisting 
“foreign meddling”,521 as well as to safeguard and fortify national development 
strategies which would eventually founder in isolation.522 The emphasis on regional 
integration is framed in the assumption that “the development of Brazil is linked to 
the development of its neighbouring countries, [and] is the best way to overcome 
some of the fears and prejudice that exist in some neighbour (sic) countries”.523  
 
For Marco Aurélio Garcia, adviser to the President on foreign policy, the national 
project embraced by PT called for the framing of a new foreign policy. This policy 
has three central components, namely: social inclusion; a more wide-ranging 
democracy; and the assertion of national sovereignty “within a Latin American 
context”.524  
 
                                                
519 PT, 2010: 13.  
520 Ibid., 32.  
521 Ibid., 31. 
522 Ibid., 7.  
523 Ibid., 31. This view is confirmed by Marco Aurelio Garcia, who writes that, “...any 
national project had to be coupled with the regional, for sustained national development 
now needs to be closely linked to the growth of the whole South American zone”. See 
Marco Aurélio Garcia, “Brazilian future”, in OpenDemocracy, 16 July 2003, accessed 
online at: http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-think_tank/article_1367.jsp on 30 
September, 2010. 
524 Garcia, “Brazilian future”.  
 212 
A number of scholars are agreed that the ascent of Partido dos Trabalhadores to power 
in 2003 after three prior attempts at winning the presidency, signalled a perceptible 
change in Brazil’s foreign policy. There is less agreement on the extent of these 
changes. For Soares de Lima and Hirst changes are embodied in “the inclusion of 
the social agenda as a major topic of foreign affairs”, along with Brazil’s greater 
emphasis on the reform of the major multilateral institutions and its unease with the 
unequal distribution of power and wealth in these institutions.525 For Vidigal, the 
changes are four-fold, both diplomatic and economic in nature, and characterised 
by: 
 
• Greater emphasis on the internationalisation of Brazilian firms;  
• Diversification of the country’s international ties; 
• Stronger action in multilateral organisations; and, 
• Adoption of the non-indifference principle.526  
 
For Almeida, the greatest changes occurred in discourse and in practice, rather than 
in the broad lines of Brazilian foreign policy.527 While juridical commitments to 
principles such as ‘non-interference’ and respect for state sovereignty remained, it 
was in implementation that new divergences appeared.528  
 
Even heading into Lula’s (relatively late) campaign for re-election in 2006, PT was 
subdued on the international goals of the party, apportioning only a small section of 
the party manifesto to this topic. It limited these to Brazil’s accentuation of its 
sovereign presence in the world; the continued importance of multilateralism 
through reform of the UN and UNSC; and, the campaign for fairer economic, 
financial and commercial arrangements to benefit developing countries. Other goals 
included the commitment to the fight against world hunger, and in favour of peace, 
as well as the perennial priority of South American integration. Relations with 
African countries were singled out for special importance, while relations with 
                                                
525 Lima and Hirst, “Brazil as an intermediate state”, 22.  
526 Carlos Vidigal, “Brazil: a cordial power? Brazilian diplomacy in the early 21st century”, 
in RECIIS, 4, No.1 (2010): 33-41, passim.  
527 Almeida, “A Política Internacional do PT” 88.  
528 See PR Almeida, “Brazil and Non-Intervention”, 3 March, 2010. Accessed online at: 
http://textospra.blogspot.com/2010/03/569-brazil-and-non-intervention-paulo-r.html on 7 
March, 2011.  
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developed countries would continue on the basis of sovereignty and mutual 
respect.529  
 
By 2010, according to the Party, the main areas of thematic consonance between the 
Party and the Brazilian government were: 
 
the defence of world peace, respect for the sovereignty and self-determination of 
peoples and nations, the democratic reform of international institutions, advocacy 
of regional integration, south-south alliances and relations, and the promotion of 
human, economic, cultural, environmental and social rights.530  
PT affords the Brazilian government the opportunity to operate a parallel foreign 
policy. How it does this and to what effect are important questions. By engaging the 
opposition parties in neighbouring countries with governments led by the right, 
such as Colombia and Mexico further north, PT maintains a presence in the politics 
of neighbouring countries through its quiet support of leftist movements. As 
affirmed by its foreign policy statement of 2010,  
From the regional point of view, the PT will strive – in compliance with the 
Brazilian and each country’s law – to make sure that the Latin-American left will 
not lose any government to the right; and will also contribute to accelerate the 
regional integration process and persist on the road to structural changes.531  
 
A survey of the literature on PT’s evolution as a political party, particularly after its 
ascent to power in 2002, almost creates the illusion of inevitability of the changes 
PT has experienced. First, in its efforts to become a vote-maximising party, and 
then as a party-in-government, PT’s adaptations have been numerous and well-
documented.532 It is important not to lose sight, however, of the historical 
contingency of PT’s accession to power, and of its conduct in power. Just a few 
months prior to Lula’s election victory in 2002, “the BBC compared Lula to Cuba’s 
Fidel Castro and Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, calling him a “veteran left-wing 
                                                
529 Partido dos Trabalhadores, Lula Presidente: Programa de Governo: 2007-2010 
(2006): 14.  
530 PT, “The Workers’ Party International Policy”, 21.  
531 Ibid., 26 
532 For a selection, see Keck, The Workers’ Party; Michael Lowy, tr. Arthur Denner, “A 
New Type of Party: The Brazilian PT”, Latin American Perspectives, 14, Issue 55, No.4 
(1987): 453-464; David Samuels, “From Socialism to Social Democracy: Party 
Organization and the Transformation of the Workers’ Party in Brazil”, Comparative 
Political Studies, 37, No.9 (2004); Richard Bourne, Lula of Brazil: The Story So Far, 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2008).  
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leader…espousing a populist political agenda””.533 A Lula presidency was feared for 
the possibility that he might “try to mobilize a region-wide, populist, antimarket, 
and anti-American movement”.534 Moderation in Brazilian foreign policy, the 
watchword of its Foreign Ministry for most its history, was absent from the 
extrapolations of the mainstream media in the US and elsewhere. While PT has 
suffered charges of ‘ideologising’ foreign policy, it would seem that the foreign 
policy favoured by its candidate has remained in step with the broad contours of 
Brazilian foreign policy.  
 
However, as noted previously, PT does not have things all its own way. Andrew 
Hurrell sees Brazilian foreign policy over the two Lula terms as the result of a 
confluence of two traditions: those of PT and Itamaraty. One strand draws on what 
is referred to here as the ‘internationalist’ worldview of the Party, while the second 
emanates from the more traditional, ‘nationalist’ approach of the Foreign 
Ministry.535 In terms of PT’s internationalist worldview, Lula’s legitimacy to act 
purposively on the world stage and his own personal standing derive from PT’s 
social commitments at home and its efforts to fulfil these commitments. According 
to Marco Aurélio Garcia, “Without the successes of his social policy, Lula would 
not be as respected internationally”.536 PT’s worldview has ultimately combined with 
Itamaraty’s unique brand of nationalism that emphasised Brazil’s national identity as 
an autonomous, peace-loving nation, and its interests as a developing country in 
solidarity with other developing countries. The extent to which this confluence 
supports expansionism and activism in international politics, is, however, a function 
of decision-makers’ power to mobilise and extract national resources for foreign 
policy. This, in turn, hinges upon the extent of their institutional freedom and 
legitimating power, the subject of the following section.   
 
 
 
 
                                                
533 Peter Hakim, “The Reluctant Partner”, Foreign Affairs, 83, Issue 1 (2004): 116.  
534 Ibid. 
535 Hurrell, “Brazil and the new global order”, 60-61. 
536 Interview with Garcia cited in Der Spiegel. 2009. “Brazil Flexes Muscles over 
Honduras Crisis”. 10 September, 2009. Accessed online at: 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,653753-2,00.html on 7 March, 2011.  
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6.4. Influence as a function of institutional freedom and legitimating power 
 
As noted by Almeida, in his analysis of the political and institutional role played by 
Brazilian political parties in the formulation of foreign policy, political parties – 
ruling or otherwise – have had minimal to marginal influence on the making of 
foreign policy in the Brazilian system. This is not a Brazilian curiosity, but a 
phenomenon that occurs across a wide spectrum of state types and political 
regimes. Ronald Schneider first noted of Brazil that, “Political parties are not 
significant factors in foreign policy-making”.537 The main contact that political 
parties had with foreign policy issues occurred in the institutional context of 
Congress, where members of the legislature could veto any international accords 
entered into, or actions conducted, by the state.538  
 
As the ruling party, however, PT has had the opportunity to shape foreign policy in 
a more direct manner, an opportunity that it has seized. This has been the result of 
the fluid international environment that the party entered, as well as the change 
represented by Lula in the form of his personality and his political heritage. Under 
Lula, it was noted, for the first time in decades, if not ever, “foreign policy was 
conceived and conducted under the overriding influence of non-professional 
diplomats”, “with PT’s ‘foreign policy’ as the dominant element in Brazilian foreign 
policy since the beginning of the da Silva government…”.539 
 
Other observers are at pains to point out, meanwhile, that national policy can never 
be held hostage to party dictates. This holds true on certain questions. The Brazilian 
state has had to tread cautiously around Hugo Chavez, for example, while PT as a 
political party  - prior to its migration to the political centre - once held ideals not 
dissimilar to Chavez’s. However, PT has continued its own brand of diplomacy by 
strengthening relations with Leftist governments in South America, in countries 
including Venezuela, Cuba and Bolivia. The party has also worked to strengthen 
relations with other parties and movements of the left in South America, through its 
establishment of the Foro do São Paolo in 1990. As claimed in PT’s most recent 
                                                
537 Schneider, Ronald, (1976: 137), cited in Almeida, 1993. A Política da Política 
Externa: Os Partidos Politicos Nas Relacoes Internacionais do Brasil, 1930-1990. A 
Seminar at the Ministry of External Relations, Brasilia.  
538 Almeida, “A Política da Política Externa”, 57.  
539 Almeida. “Brazil and Non-intervention”, 162.  
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foreign policy document, it was the first Brazilian political party to include the goal 
of regional integration in its political agenda.540  
 
Measuring PT’s influence on foreign policy outcomes is facilitated by an analytical 
division between various points of contact between the Party and the policy 
process. These include,  
a. party diplomacy;  
b. the personal or presidential diplomacy of Lula, and other key individuals;  
c. the party policy-making process;  and,  
d. Congress.  
Each of these will be discussed in turn.  
 
a. Party diplomacy 
There is barely any scholarly consideration of the international policy of PT.541 Yet, 
PT has maintained a concern with the international dimensions of its domestic 
struggle since at least the establishment of its Secretariat for International Affairs in 
1984. The Party was deeply involved in providing solidarity and material support to 
anti-dictatorship struggles throughout Central and South America and the 
Caribbean during this decade542. This ‘party diplomacy’ is made possible by a series 
of “privileged links and alliances between the progressive and leftist movements 
which were formerly in the opposition [in Latin America]”.543 PT has been involved 
in party-level diplomacy in a number of ways. It maintains a network of relations at 
the regional level with other political parties, social movements, intellectuals and 
institutions in an effort to pluralise the regional integration process.544 Important 
initiatives in this regard are the Foro de São Paulo, the World Social Forum (WSF), 
and the Hemispheric Social Alliance.  
 
                                                
540 Secretaria de Relações Internacionais, “The Workers’ Party (PT) international policy”, 
Text submitted for debate and decision of the IV Congress of the Workers’ Party in 
February 2010.  
541 One exception is the aforementioned text by Almeida, “A política internacional do 
partido dos trabalhadores”. The following analysis draws upon this work to some extent.  
542 PT. “The Workers’ Party International Policy”, 6.  
543 Almeida, “Regional and Global Strategies”, 173.  
544 PT, “The Workers’ Party International Policy”, 10.  
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Foro de São Paulo’s establishment was sponsored by PT in 1990, around the same 
time that PT’s international profile was on the ascendant due to Lula’s strong 
showing in the 1989 Presidential election. This was a difficult period for political 
parties of the left in Latin America, owing to the adoption of neoliberal economic 
policies by many governments of the region. In addition, socialism faced a global 
crisis initiated by the fall of the Soviet Union.545 The forum is a gathering of leftist, 
progressive, and popular political parties and other organizations from Latin 
America. It has come under fire from Brazilian critics because of the membership 
of Colombia’s guerilla movement, FARC.  
 
PT was indirectly instrumental in the establishment of the WSF. Although the Party 
does not formally belong to the Organizing Committee of the Forum, “[i]ts 
importance stems from the fact that many of the key civil society organisations 
involved in the process are somehow related to or sympathetic towards it, and that 
it control[led] the hosting city and state governments” at the time of the inaugural 
meeting.546  
 
The Hemispheric Social Alliance, meanwhile, was a network of “trade unions, 
NGOs and social movements”, spanning North and South America, that formed in 
1997 to oppose corporate agendas in the negotiations for the FTAA initiated in 
1994 in Miami.547According to PT, “[the Alliance] strives to foster exchange and 
consensus-building regarding the design of an in-solidarity regional integration 
project”.548  
 
Domestically, PT militants (militantes), as party members are referred to, have been 
instrumental in the organisation of unofficial referendums on major international 
questions, such as Brazil’s position on its foreign debt obligations when Lula came 
to power in 2002; as well as whether or not negotiations for the FTAA should 
proceed, also in 2002. In fact, the FTAA was a significant theme in Lula’s 2002 
                                                
545 Valter Pomar cited in Agência Brasil. 2010. “Secretário-geral diz que Foro de São 
Paulo é espaço apenas para debates”, in Correio Braziliense, 20 August 2010 
546 Teivo Teivainen, “The World Social Forum and global democratisation: learning from 
Porto Alegre”,Third World Quarterly, 23, No.4 (2002): 625.  
547 See Marcelo I. Saguier, “The Hemispheric Social Alliance and the Free Trade Area of 
the Americas Process: The Challenges and Opportunities of Transnational Coalitions 
against Neo-Liberalism”, Globalizations, 4, No.2 (2007): 252, 256.  
548 PT. “The Workers’ Party International Policy”, 10.  
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election campaign, a rarity for a foreign policy issue in Brazilian politics, with the 
party committed to Brazil’s withdrawal from the negotiations should it enter power. 
Other international goals were evident during the campaign:  
PT’s discourse also included the need for Brazil to diversify its bilateral relations 
with large countries and regional powers, clearly with counter-hegemonic ends in 
mind, and the sense of strengthening multilateralism in the economic, political and 
strategic-military arenas.549 
  
b. Party individuals in key posts 
In a far less documented fashion, moreover, PT – more in the person of Lula da 
Silva, than by any overarching party machinery – has managed to steer Brazil’s 
esteemed Foreign Ministry in its preferred direction. With the appointment of 
sympathetic individuals to key posts, such as Celso Amorim as Minister of External 
Relations, and Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães as Secretary-General of Itamaraty550, 
Lula ensured that his vision for Brazilian foreign policy would be in safe hands. 
Guimarães, a career diplomat of 40 years by the time of his appointment as top 
administrator in Itamaraty has been described as a throwback to another era. As an 
uncharacteristically outspoken diplomat, he held some strong views during his 
tenure as Secretary-General of Itamaraty, from 2003 to 2009. According to Brazil’s 
Veja magazine, he “hates the idea of FTAA, detests globalisation, doesn’t like 
economic liberalisation, and believes in imperialism…”.551 He is also described as 
being a ‘militant defender of the Third World’. However, Guimarães’ role has been 
likened more to ‘executor’ than ‘formulator’552 of foreign policy, when compared 
with those of his then-superior, Celso Amorim, and Marco Aurélio Garcia, foreign 
affairs advisor in the presidency. Another individual whose name is mentioned as 
part of the President’s close foreign policy circle is José Dirceu,553 who was Lula’s 
former Chief of Staff and resigned following the mensalão scandal554 of 2005. In 
                                                
549 Amâncio Jorge Oliveira, “O governo do PT e a Alca: política externa e pragmatismo”, 
Estudos Avançados,17, Issue 48, (2003): 319. 
550 Guimarães had previously been dismissed under Cardoso as president of the 
Institute for the Research of International Relations (IPRI) of the Foreign Ministry, under 
pressure from the US, for his views on the FTAA.  
551 Veja online. 2003. “Um diplomata alternativo”, in Veja on-line, 22 October 2003, 
accessed online at: http://veja.abril.com.br/221003/p_040.html, on 15 July 2010.  
552 Ibid. 
553 Almeida, Paulo Roberto. 2010. Email correspondence with author. 
554 The mensalão scandal took place in 2005. It involved the alleged payment, with the 
knowledge of senior PT party figures, of governing coalition members in the Chamber of 
Deputies, in order to persuade them to vote for legislation proposed by PT. The scandal 
came close to threatening Lula’s re-election in the 2006 presidential election.  
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spite of his resignation, Dirceu retains a prominent role in Brazilian politics. He was 
a key member of Lula’s centrist Articulação faction in PT.  
 
Foreign Minister Amorim had previously served in the post during the Itamar 
Franco administration, from May 1993 to December 1994. Already during this 
period, observers noted that elements of política externa independente returned. Also, 
Mercosul came to be seen more as a balance to the US in the Southern Cone, rather 
an instrument for international insertion, as it had previously been seen.555 Amorim 
is highly-regarded for his role in spearheading Brazil’s multilateral negotiating 
position in the WTO, which saw higher levels of confrontation with the US and the 
EU over the content of the Doha Development Round. The Minister openly 
declared his affiliation with PT in September 2009.556 
 
Operating beyond Amorim and the confines of Itamaraty, in the President’s Office 
was Marco Aurélio Garcia. The significance of Garcia’s position as Presidential 
International Relations Advisor is that he has frequently played an ambassadorial 
role on behalf of the President, but has not faced the requirement of approval by 
Congress, which is the fate of all potential Brazilian ambassadors. Garcia has been 
credited with conducting some of Brazil’s key diplomatic endeavours in South 
America on behalf of the President, but beyond the limits of traditional diplomacy. 
A key example of this was his despatch to Venezuela in the midst of the political 
crisis in that country in March 2002, even before Lula’s inauguration as President. 
This was an initiative that, unsurprisingly, stoked the ire of experienced 
diplomats.557  
 
The sociological aspect of these relations is highlighted by Giancarlo Summa, a 
close observer of PT in Brazil.558 Summa sketches the picture of ‘leftist’ movements 
in South America, and the nature of relations between leading figures. These close 
networks, he argues, which were scarcely written about when they concerned the 
spread of the ‘neoliberal’ orthodoxy in the 1990s between Harvard and Chicago 
                                                
555 Vigevani and Cepaluni. Changing Times, x. 
556 UOL Notícias. 2009. “Celso Amorim filia-se ao PT, afirma presidente do partido”. 30 
September, 2009. Accessed online at: 
http://noticias.uol.com.br/politica/2009/09/30/ult5773u2621.jhtm on 6 September, 2011.  
557 Veja-online. 2003. “Brazilians, go home?”, 22 January, 2003. Edition 1, 786. 
Accessed online at: http://veja.abril.com.br/220103/p_068.html on 29 July, 2010.   
558 Interview, Giancarlo Summa, Rio de Janeiro, July 2010.  
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alumni, have been the subject of much recent conjecture about the contemporary 
Latin American left by those who fear its influence. It is by virtue of such networks 
that Marco Aurélio Garcia, Lula’s foreign policy advisor, has been able to maintain 
good relations, and further Brazil’s national interests, along with PT’s, in 
neighbouring countries.  
 
However, the prominence of these individuals tends to overshadow an important 
factor, namely the lack of depth in PT’s foreign policy expertise. With the 
publication of a comprehensive foreign policy document for the first time in 2010, 
the relative unimportance of this policy area to PT’s fortunes (compared to more 
pressing domestic issues of education, land redistribution, and social welfare) was 
underscored.  
 
c. The party policymaking process 
 
Positions on foreign policy are developed in cooperation with the International 
Relations office of PT. They are submitted to the Congress of the Party and the 
Party’s National Directorate for ratification. The International Relations office has a 
broad mandate to propose, develop and maintain Workers’ Party positions on 
international issues, ranging from regional integration, to PT positions on foreign 
elections.559 More than this, it is responsible for a range of international activities to 
sharpen the profile of PT abroad. It is not clear to which extent Lula initiated 
policy, or whether the bulk of this responsibility fell to Garcia and the Party 
leadership560, and to a lesser extent, Pinheiro. Once Party positions were established, 
however, it is reasonable to assume that they became subject to the twin dynamics 
of institutional freedom and legitimating capacity outlined more broadly in this 
section.  
 
 
                                                
559 PT, 2010: 38-39.  
560 It should be noted that Lula was not PT president while he was President of Brazil. 
While he remains an Honorary President of PT – a position he could not hold while 
serving as Brazilian President – the following served as party presidents during his two 
terms as State President: José Genoino (2002-2005), Tarso Genro (2005) (interim), 
Ricardo Berzoini (2005-2006), Marco Aurelio Garcia (2006-2007) (interim), Ricardo 
Berzoini (2007-2010), and José Eduardo Dutra (2010-2011). List obtained from 
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d. The Party in Congress 
While PT was the largest party in Congress following the 2002 elections with 81 
seats, increasing to 83 seats in the 2006 election, it required the cooperation of other 
parties to pass legislation in the 513-seat Chamber of Deputies.  As noted in 
Chapter 4 (p.126), Congress has largely had a retroactive role in foreign 
policymaking, so the Party’s role is limited to providing and winning cross-party 
support for treaties and agreements entered into by the executive, as well as for the 
approval of the President’s selection of ambassadors. Nonetheless, this has not 
diminished the role of the legislature in foreign policy.  
 
One prominent example is the Chamber of Deputies’ long and drawn-out process 
of confirmation of the Executive’s approval of Venezuela’s accession to Mercosul 
in June 2006.  The Chamber of Deputies, controlled by PT and parties allied with it, 
ratified Venezuela’s accession within a year of the accession protocol being agreed 
by Heads of State. With potentially far-reaching effects for Brazilian trade with 
Venezuela, regional relations, and the promotion of democracy in South America, 
the Senate delayed the vote on Venezuela’s accession to Mercosul. Approval was 
only secured in December 2009,561 prompting searching questions for Brazil’s role 
in the regional integration process in South America. Among these are how 
democracy can be strengthened from the regional perspective in the face of 
compelling economic motives for increased trade and enhanced regulation of 
commercial relations. As an indication of this dilemma, Venezuela was at this time 
extending its reach into the Brazilian extractive industries, with a 40% stake in a new 
oil refinery in north-eastern Brazil.562 Opposition Senators had cited the increasing 
suppression of democratic liberties in Venezuela as not being consonant with 
Mercosul’s democracy requirement for member states. The episode also revealed 
the limits of Lula’s and PT’s control over foreign policy after the taking of initial 
decisions by the executive.  
 
 
                                                
561 Rabello, Maria Luiza, “Brazil Senators Approve Venezuela Entry Into Mercosur”, 
Bloomberg, 15 December, 2009. Accessed online at: 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aKMncefxQsq4 on 10 
October 2010. 
562 BBC News, “Brazil and Venezuela link trade” (2007)accessed online at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7143728.stm on 1 March, 2011.  
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6.5. Criticism from other political parties, movements and diplomats 
 
Brazil’s ‘adventurous’ foreign policy under Lula came under attack from various 
quarters. The most vocal of these were the political right – embodied by the media, 
political figures from the opposition, and career diplomats – as well as certain 
components of the business sector. Roberto Abdenur, Brazil’s ambassador to the 
United States until 2007 and a 44-year career diplomat, for example, expressed the 
view that, “There is a generalised sentiment that today diplomats are promoted 
according to their political affiliation and ideology, and not according to their 
competence”.563 Abdenur saw Lula’s foreign policy as ‘contaminated’ by anti-
Americanism and ideological orientation. This ideological influence or 
‘indoctrination’ was seen to be peddled in a few ways: the compulsory reading of 
‘ideological’ books; and, the rapid promotion of those sharing the leadership’s 
ideological views.564  
 
Other criticisms of PT’s influence were based on the unclear ends of its foreign 
policy, with objectives being described at best as misplaced messianism on the part 
of Brazil, and at worst, as a vehicle for the promotion of Lula.565 Lula’s emphasis on 
South-South diplomacy, in particular, was not popular with business sectors and 
career diplomats, who could not see the utility of close alliances with India and 
China, all the while recognising the need for partnership.566 Brazil’s recognition of 
China as a market economy in 2004, in exchange for little in return, was considered 
to be one of the Lula administration’s greatest foreign policy blunders. PT’s 
sponsorship with Castro of the Foro do São Paolo, as well as close relations with 
Cuba, have also been continuous sources of criticism. A third aspect of criticism is 
the politicisation of foreign policy, subjecting decades-old principles of Brazil’s 
international relations, such as non-intervention and its commitment to sovereignty, 
to the caprices of PT’s party-level relations. Thus, Almeida notes that while the end 
of the military dictatorship saw a return to traditional adherence to non-
interference, the arrival of the Lula administration saw the gradual adoption of a 
                                                
563 Revista Veja. 2007. “Entrevista com Roberto Abdenur: Nem na ditadura”, Vol. 1994, 
7 February, 2007. Accessed online at: http://veja.abril.com.br/070207/entrevista.shtml 
on 3 March, 2011. 
564 Ibid. 
565 Almeida, Roberto. E-mail correspondence. 2010.  
566 Revista Veja. 2007. 
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selective approach to the principle, embodied in the new phrase não indiferença (‘non-
indifference’).567 
 
The primary channels of criticism were the media568 and Congress, where divergent 
views coalesced around outspoken individuals.  
 
In summary, criticism is levelled at PT’s foreign policy at a number of levels, namely 
the institutional level and the extent of its ‘indoctrination’ of Itamaraty; the foreign 
policy formulation level, which is seen as being ‘top-down’ and exclusive, leaving 
room only for those few PT functionaries (close to Lula) with international relations 
exposure; and finally, in terms of substance, where the anti-Americanism and anti-
imperialism of PT’s foreign policy are seen as obstacles to Brazil’s interests in the 
region and beyond.  
 
6.6. Resource Mobilisation and Extraction under Lula (2003-2010) 
 
The fact that Brazil, as a rapidly rising power in South America did not respond in a 
manner predicted by the neorealist paradigm to a number of significant changes in 
its external environment is not attributable to the fact that Brazil is a different kind 
of state. As this chapter claims, it is more fruitful to see Brazil’s responses to 
changes in its external environment in terms of its own available resources and 
capabilities, and indeed, in terms of the perspectives – and perceptions – of key 
decisionmakers. The discussion in the next two sections follows a chronological 
order, and discusses events and factors affecting state institutions related to foreign 
policy formulation; ideology and nationalism, all determinants of state power.  
 
Struc tural Context  
The main global and regional structural changes to take place during and around the 
administration of Lula were the following: 
 
                                                
567 See Roberto Almeida, “Brazil and Non-Intervention”. See also Brazil’s position at the 
Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly on the responsibility to protect, 23 July, 2009. 
Accessed online at: http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/Brazil_ENG.pdf on 7 March, 
2011.  
568 The editors of O Estado de São Paulo and Veja were particularly antagonistic toward 
Lula and his foreign policy. See Paulo Roberto Almeida, “Uma nova ‘arquitetura’ 
diplomática?, 106.  
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- the 2001 attacks on the United States resulted in a significant downgrading of 
Latin American relations in US foreign policy, with the exceptions of Mexico 
and Colombia. At the same time, this event and its consequences created the 
opportunity for greater activism by intermediate states in international affairs, 
as partners in global governance.  
- the growing ideological appeal of Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela and the acquisition 
of greater military capabilities by Venezuela. This was accompanied by the 
widespread resurgence of left politics and politicians in the region: the 
simultaneous election of Gutierrez in Ecuador and Evo Morales in Bolivia in 
2006 affecting the balance of reformism and radicalism in the region.  
- the involvement of offshore actors, such as China and Iran, becoming major 
trading partners, China far more so than Iran, influencing political and 
international relations dynamics in the region. Not least was China’s significant 
contribution to Brazil’s economic growth through a burgeoning trade 
relationship. In 2009, for example, it was reported that China had surpassed the 
US to become Brazil’s largest trading partner. Total trade between Brazil and 
China reached US$3.2bn in April that year.569 
- The decline of Argentina’s economic strength and influence in the region.  
 
Arguably, each of these factors on their own, and undoubtedly all taken together, 
served to provide a motivation for Brazil to shore up its international position, by 
adopting a more assertive stance in international politics, potentially strengthening 
its military apparatus, and strengthening its partnerships with likeminded states. 
Brazil’s domestic economic situation was stabilised by Cardoso’s Plano Real. 
However, economic growth had stagnated below 2% for the duration of his tenure.  
 
The election of Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and the Workers’ Party in 2002 signalled 
for many a potentially radical change, both in Brazil’s economic and international 
policies. Indeed, Lula’s electoral campaign was predicated on the concept of 
‘Change’, marking a departure from the policies of Cardoso. Most analyses highlight 
Brazil’s foreign policy approach of the Lula years as a broad continuation of Brazil’s 
                                                
569 Malcolm Moore, “China overtakes the US as Brazil’s largest trading partner”, in The 
Telegraph, 9 May, 2009. Accessed online at: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/5296515/China-overtakes-the-US-as-
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traditional foreign policy outlook: in favour of multilateralism and conflict-averse. 
This approach misses much else that has transpired in Brazil’s foreign policy of the 
last ten years, especially the growing capacity of the state for mobilising and 
extracting resources for a more assertive foreign policy, and what this might 
portend.  
 
National Power and State Power in Lula’s First Term: 2003-2006 
Balancing domestic interests and state power in the first term 
 
The aim of this section is to examine how internationalism as a foreign policy 
posture has fared under the PT government (For a list of internationalist actions 
undertaken by the Brazilian government under Lula, consult Appendix 6). Widely-
held views hold that Lula ‘gave foreign policy to PT’, implying that Brazil’s foreign 
policy became more closely aligned with the tenets of, if not worker 
internationalism, then broader leftist internationalism. This would entail 
subscription to traditional features of leftist foreign policy, such as commitment to 
the principle of non-intervention; commitment to multilateralism; aversion to the 
use of force in settling international disputes; and, co-operation with and assistance 
for the countries of the developing world.  
 
Indeed, cultural or identity-based explanations of Brazil’s foreign policy, as 
illustrated in section 6.2 (‘Brazil: An ideological internationalist?’), emphasise the 
longstanding commitment in Brazil’s international outlook to just such policy 
guidelines. A norm of the peaceful resolution of international disputes having been 
established under the reign of the Baron do Rio Branco at the cusp of the twentieth 
century, was gradually strengthened over the decades, resulting in few cases of 
Brazil’s armed intervention in any international disputes, and strong condemnation 
of international conflicts and their resolution by the use of force outside multilateral 
machinery.  
 
The major structural changes within Brazil’s immediate region at the time of PT’s 
ascent to power created an environment for the country that appeared at the same 
time to be more permissive and more threatening. Regional dynamics were more 
permissive owing to the pre-occupation of the United States with its wars in the 
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Middle East, but they also appeared more threatening because of Brazil’s and the 
region’s economic situation, and the consequent social dislocations and their 
political repercussions. This, in turn, led to a significant militarization of US policy 
in Latin America – although with a focus “narrowly targeted at particularly troubling 
or urgent situations”570 – a potential power vacuum in the region that neorealist 
theory would predict that Brazil, as a pretender to regional hegemony, however 
muted, would seek to fill.  
 
PT entered power on a triumphant wave, with Lula securing 61.3% of the popular 
vote in a second-round run-off with PSDB candidate José Serra. Da Silva’s election, 
and the rise to power of the party of the workers, PT, was described as “a 
paradigmatic change in the social, economic and political panoramas of Brazil”.571 
Indeed, it was the first time in Brazil’s history that a party of the Left572 had been 
voted into power, after a history of reversals in Brazil; and the first time that a rank 
outsider from the traditional political elite was elected president. The noted 
Brazilian sociologist Darcy Ribeiro had noted how Brazilian history comprised a 
continuous battle between the elites and the poor, with even the 1964 coup a 
product of elite trepidation over the possible consequences of Quadros and 
Goulart’s populist policies.573 While Lula’s victory was resounding, the capacity of 
the Party to give effect to long-held foreign policy principles was limited both by 
the institutional handicaps imposed by its comparative weakness in the legislature; 
initially slow economic growth; an uncertain relationship with the military; as well as 
the party’s own weakness in the foreign policymaking domain.  
 
Lula’s first term started off in an understated fashion, when considered in the light 
of his resounding victory in the second-round run-off presidential vote. 
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572 Lula was not the first leftist President of Brazil, however. The presidency of João  
Goulart in 1961 was associated with the interests of the left. Yet, he was not voted into 
power, and his accession to the presidency after the resignation of his predecessor, 
Jânio Quadro, mobilised massive opposition from the military, and political quarters. See 
Leslie Bethell, “Chapter 2: Politics in Brazil under the Liberal Republic, 1945-1964”, in 
The Cambridge History of Latin America: Volume 9, Brazil since 1930, ed., Leslie 
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Institutionally, PT’s hand was weakened in the policy realm, in spite of it becoming 
the largest party in the Chamber of Deputies (Lower House), with 91 seats out of a 
possible 513. In the Senate (Upper House), it obtained 14 seats out of a possible 81. 
It still needed to form alliances with the centrist parties in order to attain its 
legislative goals. Furthermore, PT only won the governorships of 3 minor states: 
Piaui, Acre and Mato Grosso do Sul.  
 
The Brazilian political system, while characterised by party fragmentation and weak 
party discipline, was by Lula’s 2002 presidential victory otherwise beginning to show 
signs of consolidation and institutionalisation.574 In one of its first measures in 
government, PT established the Conselho de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social 
(CDES)(Council for Economic and Social Development) in 2003. This body would 
serve as a consultative organ of the Presidency and civil society, and at the same 
time as an institutionalised channel of negotiations of pacts between different social 
actors and the government, on the agenda of economic, political and social 
reform.575 It was initially criticised for the preponderance of PT members among its 
number. 
 
In terms of economic policy, PT’s hands were tied by undertakings the party had 
made to the Brazilian people (in Lula’s Carta ao Povo Brasileiro)576 and to the 
international financial community prior to taking power, along with agreements 
signed with the IMF by Cardoso in the closing months of his tenure.577 Brazil 
would be committed to a medium-term framework in terms of which IMF 
financing of $30bn was secured by the Cardoso government during its last days.578 
This framework committed the incoming administration to, amongst others, fiscal 
discipline, a floating exchange rate and inflation targeting. This was highly restrictive 
to any structural changes mooted by PT in its election manifesto, and placed major 
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limitations on its capacities for wealth redistribution through employment creation, 
social services and land reform. In a broader sense, the global economy was still in 
the shadow of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001, resulting in 
slowed demand for Brazilian output internationally, and diminished inward 
investment. According to UNCTAD figures, FDI into Brazil declined from $22.5bn 
in 2001 to $16.6bn in 2002, by more than a quarter.579  
 
PT’s own public legitimacy, and legitimacy in government, was based on social 
policy promises, especially poverty reduction and the improvement of social equity 
conditions,580 which were notoriously poor in Brazil. These goals were, however, 
relegated to secondary importance after fiscal stability and reducing the deficit in the 
early phase of Lula’s first term. A number of observers assumed that foreign policy 
focus on ‘social’ goals such as various campaigns against hunger and poverty, would 
somehow deflect domestic attention from the government’s economic conservatism 
in the domestic arena.581  
 
Civil-military relations, long a controversial subject in Brazil’s domestic politics, 
were productively advanced582 under Cardoso. Yet, the military’s new role in society 
was still under construction, and the armed forces were therefore not a viable 
instrument of foreign policy by this time. Indeed, a decade earlier, Brazil was rather 
cautious about engaging its military abroad, abstaining in July 1994 on Security 
Council Resolution 940 which first authorised the use of force to restore Jean-
Bertrand Aristide to power in Haiti.583  
 
In terms of Brazil’s regional context, while the new PT government immediately 
started to enjoy the support of fellow Leftist governments, such as those of Cuba 
and Venezuela, relations with its most powerful neighbour and most important 
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trading partner in the region, Argentina, were considerably strained by Brazil’s 
unilateral decision to float its currency in 1999. Nonetheless, Lula’s first trip abroad 
as President-elect in December 2002, was to Argentina, followed by Chile. This was 
succeeded by meetings with George W. Bush in the US and Vicente Fox of Mexico 
by year’s end.584 In terms of a ‘regional balance of power’, an opportunity had been 
created by US preoccupation with its ‘war on terror’ at that stage confined to 
Afghanistan, and its subsequent heightened militarization of relations in South 
America. Brazil was in no position to capitalise on this opportunity for leadership, 
however. The outgoing administration had been lukewarm toward the mooted Free 
Trade Area of the Americas, and yet it struggled to instigate progress on its own 
preferred option for regional integration, MERCOSUL. This was owing to 
Argentina’s financial weakness, and Brazil’s own foot-dragging on institutionalising 
MERCOSUL as a customs union.  This was not unusual for Brazil, however, as it 
had not shown much interest in its immediate region historically.585 The region 
became increasingly significant as the 1990s and 2000s wore on, however, as Brazil 
had made South American integration one of the cornerstones of its foreign policy, 
beginning with the Collor administration.  
 
Thus, overall, the Brazilian government under PT had some difficulty in the early 
part of Lula’s first administration in mobilising national resources for any purposes, 
let alone foreign policy. While Lula’s popular mandate was large, and his personal 
popularity by far exceeded that of PT from the start, his ability to convert this into 
resource mobilisation and extraction capability was hampered by the political, 
economic and international contexts of his arrival at the Planalto Palace.  
 
In these four years of Lula’s first administration, Brazil sought ontological security 
as a country of the developing world. By this is meant that Brazil identified with the 
developing world in a number of significant gestures. First, it voiced its strident 
opinion on the US operation in Iraq, one of the most vocal voices in this regard. 
This was tempered by a strong position on Iraq’s failure to comply with earlier UN 
resolutions. It was outspoken on the Israel-Palestine question, became an observer 
at the League of Arab States, and also started opening new embassies in Africa, in 
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São Tomé and Principe, Ethiopia and Cameroon, among others. Brazil abstained 
from voting on Cuba’s human rights record in the UN’s new Human Rights 
Commission. It asserted its leadership of the Community of Portuguese Language 
Countries (Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa, CPLP), whose members are 
mainly in the developing world. 
 
In terms of its rational choices, it sought to maximise its diplomatic exposure, 
choosing to chart an independent course in foreign policy, all the while maintaining 
a strong bilateral relationship with the United States. Brazil sought to capitalise on 
its prime position as a ‘buffer’ state in South America, between the US and 
Venezuela, and later other radical leftist governments in the region, such as that of 
Evo Morales, which came to power in 2006; and that of Rafael Correa, inaugurated 
in 2007. It was unable to avoid negative outcomes in its relations with the US, in 
retaliation for some of its positions, however. Brazil indicated, in July 2003, for 
example, that it had no intention of signing the bilateral agreement proposed by the 
US to grant immunity for American citizens in the ICC. Brazil was subsequently 
one of a number of states to lose US economic military assistance through the 
effects of US legislation designed to undermine the ICC.586 Still in 2003, Lula 
affirmed his commitment to a new compact for South America, by signing the 
‘Buenos Aires Consensus’ with Argentine President Nestor Kirchner.  
 
The US view of Brazil as a buffer was not replicated within the region, however, as 
Brazil increasingly looked like a leader without followers. This was underlined by 
Morales’ nationalisation of Bolivia’s natural gas reserves in 2006, instigated by 
Chávez in the view of some. This move had a large impact on Brazilian interests, 
where Petrobrás, the national petroleum company, was heavily exposed. It also 
revealed a major cleavage between nationalists and internationalists. This was seen 
by the Western mainstream press and Brazilian right-leaning media as the biggest 
challenge in the area of foreign policy for Brazil during the Lula administration. 
Lula’s first response, however, was tepid, asserting Bolivia’s right to sovereignty 
over its national resources. Nonetheless, he pledged to defend Petrobrás’ rights 
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under international law,587 and in a manner that promoted regional stability and 
solidarity. Analysts of the left saw in Lula’s response a grander scheme to maintain 
regional stability for the continued inward flow of global foreign investment,588 
while those of the right saw it plainly as part of a leftist conspiracy against Brazilian 
national economic interests, facilitated by the Lula government’s foreign policy. 
 
In 2004, Lula launched, along with Jacques Chirac of France and Ricardo Lagos of 
Chile, the ‘Action Against Hunger and Poverty Campaign’. Within IBSA, in 
addition, a Fund for the Alleviation of Poverty and Hunger was established in 2004, 
to finance community health projects in developing countries. The major foreign 
policy action of Lula’s first term was the decision to engage Brazilian troops in the 
UN Mission in Haiti, MINUSTAH. This represented a major mobilisation of state 
power – personnel and political capital – for a foreign policy objective. As will be 
discussed in Chapter 7, however, the goal which this action sought to realise was a 
lofty one indeed, as it represented the aspirations of the Brazilian elite since the 
birth of the Republic in 1889: international recognition as a key player in 
international affairs, through the attainment of a permanent UN Security Council 
seat. With the impending 50th anniversary of the UN and the debates over its 
reform, Brazilian decision-makers noted an opportunity for Brazil’s candidacy as 
one of the proposed new members of the Council. Indeed, on a visit to Brazil in 
2004 just ahead of Brazil’s deployment of troops in Haiti, US Secretary of State 
Colin Powell called the country a “serious candidate” for a possible seat on an 
expanded Council.589 
 
In summary, during Lula’s first term Brazil’s foreign policy outcomes were largely, 
almost squarely, in the area of internationalism, couched in rhetoric. Brazil was 
earnestly expanding its ties with a diverse group of developing countries; it 
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emphasised the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states; 
it emphasised peaceful resolution of international conflicts; as well as multilateral 
approaches over regional or unilateral approaches to pertinent international 
questions, such as trade. This reflected a domestic situation in which PT’s political 
position was precariously poised. The party was in no position in Congress to utilise 
political capital on international issues, and therefore was satisfied with strong 
internationalist gestures. On one issue, it did make an allowance, namely the 
deployment of troops as part of the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti. The timing 
of this deployment was crucial, given Brazil’s desire to be seen as a responsible and 
capable regional player. In Lula’s second term, with Brazil’s economic fortunes 
improving markedly, and Lula’s own domestic and international popularity soaring, 
Brazil was able to translate a greater proportion of national power into state power 
for foreign policy purposes.  
 
 
 
National Power and State Power in Lula’s  Second Term: 2007-2010 
Consolidating the Brazilian State and National Interests in the Second Term 
 
Lula’s second term was marked by a greater assertiveness in foreign policy that 
often contradicted the principles of internationalism espoused by the PT.  There 
was a greater sense of purpose in the country’s foreign engagements, a tempered 
move away from internationalism, in spite of what appeared to be greater rhetorical 
– and even in some cases, material – commitment to it in principle. The 
strengthening and institutionalisation of the state, and PT’s control over it, meant 
that accommodation of divergent social and political strata, while still a political 
necessity, was less obvious in the domain of foreign policy, especially foreign 
security policy. This could be seen in the form of greater assertiveness about Brazil’s 
economic interests in its dealings with neighbouring countries; the stronger 
declaration of national autonomy in the updating of national security principles and 
military materiel; 590 and, the manner of Brazil’s engagement in Haiti (to be discussed 
in Chapter 7).  
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Lula was inaugurated for his second term as President of Brazil on 1 January, 2007. 
The second term got off to a slow start, with Lula delaying the announcement of his 
cabinet until the end of March, a decision that is customarily announced within 
three to four weeks of the presidential inauguration. PT’s hegemony in Congress 
was uneven, complicating the process of assembling the Executive: while forces 
allied to Lula controlled more than 60% of Congress, there was much intra-alliance 
tension to manage among the various political parties.591   
 
During a few months spanning the end of the first term and the start of the second, 
the President’s foreign affairs adviser, Marco Aurélio Garcia, served concurrently as 
interim president of PT, as the party president Jose Genoíno was forced to resign 
under a cloud of corruption allegations. By the departure of Genoíno, along with 
the earlier resignation of José ‘Zé’ Dirceu, Lula’s Chief of Staff, Lula lost two of his 
most loyal generals in the Articulação ‘centrist’ faction of PT.592 At the same time, 
however, never in Brazil’s history has the governing party held such proximity to 
foreign policy as when Garcia held the dual roles of PT President and presidential 
foreign affairs adviser.  
 
In terms of the growth of national power, the Brazilian economy was poised to 
grow from the sound base provided by Lula’s first term, which in turn, consolidated 
on the foundation left by Cardoso’s economic stabilisation policies. According to 
the Economist Intelligence Report in early 2007, economic conditions at this stage were 
the most solid than for any other president in recent Brazilian history.593 Brazil’s 
international reserves by the end of the first year of Lula’s second term, stood at 
                                                                                                                               
nuclear capabilities for peaceful purposes; an emphasis on Brazil’s indigenous arms 
manufacturing and export capability; and, a reconsideration of the relationship between 
the military and society in light of past interruptions of democracy by the military. 
591 Economist Intelligence Unit: Brazil Country Report, 2007.  
592 Articulação has been the dominant faction, or tendençia, in PT since 1995. It is 
distinguished by its comparative moderation on economic and ideological issues, as well 
as the Party’s approach to elections and electoral alliances. The major tendencies are: 
Left Articulation, Social Democrats, Socialist Force and Workers. There are other, 
smaller regional expressions. See Carlos Graieb, “Vai ser preciso segurar”, in Veja on-
line, Edição 1774, 23 October, 2002. Accessed online at: 
http://veja.abril.com.br/231002/p_038.html on 5 October, 2010. 
593 Economist Intelligence Unit: Country Report Brazil, March 2007, p14.  
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US$180 bn, compared to US$85 bn the year before.594 To consolidate and expedite 
growth, the government launched A Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento (PAC, 
growth-acceleration programme) at the end of January.  
 
In the military sphere, the government started to turn its attention to the 
development of a defence posture for Brazil. This included Lula’s presidential 
decree of September 2007, calling for the establishment of a Ministerial Committee 
to propose a National Strategy of Defence.  The drafters of the report were the 
Minister of Defense, Nelson Jobim, and the Minister Head of the Secretariat for 
Strategic Affairs of the Presidency, the philosophy professor, Roberto Mangabeira 
Unger. They noted that, in the context of Brazil’s twenty years under military 
dictatorship, from 1964-1985, this act marked an unprecedented insertion of 
defence issues and the organisation of the military onto the national agenda.595 Until 
then, the military’s role in society was ill-defined, given its historical retention of the 
prerogative to intervene in politics should conditions necessitate it. Raising the issue 
to the level of national debate was an achievement in itself, given the customary 
reticence of the military on the discussion of any revision of its role in society.596 
Among other things, the Strategy report called for “the redefinition of the role of 
the Ministry of Defence and the listing of strategic guidelines related to each 
Military branch, specifying the relations that should prevail among them”.597 The 
document further called for a re-nationalisation of Brazilian defence supplies. 
Brazilian military expenditure increased steadily from USD17,614m in 2003, to 
reach USD28,096m by the close of Lula’s second term in 2010. This figure did 
remain constant as a percentage of GDP, however, varying between 1.5 and 1.6 
percent over the same period.598  
 
According to Michael Shifter, a vice president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a 
policy research group in Washington, speaking at the time,  
                                                
594 World Bank, Data: Brazil, accessed online at : 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FI.RES.TOTL.CD, on 1 October 2010.  
595 Ministry of Defense. 2008. National Strategy of Defense: Peace and Security for 
Brazil. 1st edition. Brasília: 6.  
596 Wendy Hunter, “The Brazilian Military after the Cold War: In Search of a Mission”, 
Studies in Comparative International Development, 28, No.4 (1994): 32.  
597 Ministry of Defense. 2008. National Strategy of Defense: Peace and Security for 
Brazil. 1st Edition. Brasília: 5.  
598 SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, accessed online at:  
http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4  on 18 April, 2011.  
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Brazil’s vision of its military’s role fits well with the country’s growing international 
seriousness and economic and institutional capacity...It is seeking to be a more 
cohesive national power, and that requires exercising full control over its vast 
territory and borders.599  
 
Echoing this opinion, Hurrell states that since 2004, Brazil “has shown a renewed 
interest in accelerating and protecting its indigenous technological development and 
reviving its nuclear energy program”.600 
 
In further indications of Brazil’s growing material power, in January 2008, Brazil 
became a net foreign creditor for the first time.601 During the Lula presidency, the 
country opened 33 new embassies, 19 new consulates and 5 new permanent 
missions to international organizations, including the International Atomic Energy 
Agency and the United Nations Human Rights Council,602 signalling firm monetary 
commitments to a more activist role in foreign affairs.  
 
Brazil faced a different regional context from that which greeted the inception of 
Lula’s first term. The election of Evo Morales in neighbouring Bolivia at roughly 
the same time as Lula’s re-election resulted in some disquiet in Western capitals 
over Latin America’s perceived ‘Left turn’.603 Brazil’s value as an interlocutor 
between the US and the Leftist governments of Chavez, Morales, and Correa of 
Ecuador, increased in this environment, giving it more latitude in foreign policy to 
challenge the United States on certain strategic issues. At the same time, Brazilian 
policymakers felt the need to make a greater effort to counterbalance the influence 
of Venezuela and Chavez’s radical anti-American stance. This need was perhaps 
                                                
599 Alexei Barrionuevo, “President of Brazil Unveils Plan to Upgrade Military in Effort to 
be Global Power”, in New York Times, 18 December, 2008. Accessed online at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/19/world/americas/19brazil.html, 4 October, 2010.  
600 Hurrell, 2010: 63.  
601 Riordan Roett, “How Reform Has Powered Brazil’s Rise”, Current History, 109, Issue 
724 (February 2010): 51. 
602 Hurrell, “Brazil and the New Global Order”, 60.  
603 See Christian Science Monitor, 2006. “Latin America’s Two Left Feet”, November 8, 
2006. Accessed online at: http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/1108/p08s02-comv.html on 4 
October 2010; Oliver Stone, 2010. South of the Border. Documentary Film: Pentagrama 
Films. For scholarly analyses, see Hector E Schamis, et al., “A ‘Left Turn’ in Latin 
America?”, Journal of Democracy Special Issue (October 2006), 17, No.4; Jorge G. 
Castañeda, “Latin America’s Left Turn”, Foreign Affairs, (May/June 2006); Special Issue 
of Third World Quarterly, 2009, Vol. 30, No.2. 
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underscored by increased military spending by Venezuela and its acquisition of 
billions of dollars’ worth of military hardware in recent years.604 
 
On balance, Brazil’s relations with its neighbours entered a new phase as the 
country sought to become more proactive in defending its economic interests. 
During 2008, relations with Ecuador became strained over that country’s unilateral 
decision to suspend debt repayments to Brazil. In addition, President Correa 
expelled Odebrecht, a major Brazilian construction firm, from the country in 
October.  Brazil’s strained relations with its neighbours were exacerbated by 
President Lugo of Paraguay’s challenging of the status of Paraguay’s debts to Brazil. 
To complicate matters, Brazil’s neighbours Venezuela, Bolivia and Chile had 
commenced upgrading their militaries.  
 
However, Brazil was not limited to its region, as in November 2009, President 
Mahmoud Ahmedinajad, in a highly controversial gesture, became the first Iranian 
president to visit Brazil. In March 2010, during a trip to Israel, Lula voiced his 
opinion on the Middle East Peace Process, appearing to offer his services as a 
facilitator.  And, to underscore the unwieldy growth of Brazilian diplomatic 
ambitions even further, Lula facilitated, along with Turkey, a deal on procedures for 
a nuclear fuel swap with Iran. This move was greeted with disdain by the United 
States.605  
 
In summary, during Lula’s second term, a palpable change occurred in Brazil’s foreign 
policy posture. While Brazil’s international activism proceeded apace, its regional 
context became thornier, rendering the discourse and practice of internationalism 
more difficult to implement. At the same time, the government seized the 
opportunity to seek to shore up Brazil’s international position by revisiting the 
country’s defence strategy and placing relations with its neighbours on a more 
calculated footing. Domestically, the Workers’ Party had improved its position 
considerably following the 2005 mensalão scandal, and was beginning to look 
forward to the candidacy of Lula’s successor in the 2010 presidential election. Lula’s 
                                                
604 Reuters, “US concerned over Venezuela-Russia arms deal”, 14 September 2009.  
605 Parisa Hafezi, “Turkey, Brazil seal deal on Iran nuclear fuel swap”, Reuters. 16 May, 
2010. Accessed online at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/05/16/us-iran-nuclear-
deal-idUSTRE64F29P20100516 on 6 September 2011.  
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personal popularity was consistently high according to polls taken in the months 
preceding the October 2010 election. Economic indicators were strong during 
Lula’s second term, meaning an increase in brute national power. Lula’s personal 
popularity and growing outspokenness on international issues lifted Brazil’s 
international profile. This, combined with the synergy between the government’s 
foreign policy goals, its outreach to the military, and popular support for Brazil’s 
international outlook, ensured a progressive conversion of this national power to 
state power. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Internationalism, comprising non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states; 
the peaceful resolution of disputes; a commitment to multilateralism; and, South-
South diplomacy, have each long enjoyed primacy in the Brazilian foreign policy 
outlook, with emphasis varying according to the political dictates of the time. 
Brazil’s foreign policy outlook adopted subtle, yet significant changes in the 
transition from Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s administration to that of Luiz Inácio 
Lula da Silva. While foreign policy became more internationalist, and invested in 
international engagements, the influence of PT should not veil the revisions in self-
perception, and in perception of the international environment, experienced by 
Brazil’s decision-making elite during Lula’s two-term tenure. Cardoso sought to 
bring Brazil back to global respectability (seen as proximity to Western powers) in 
the international sphere, to accompany and support his success in rebuilding the 
domestic economy. Lula, for his part, sought to diversify Brazil’s foreign relations, 
and adopt a decidedly ‘anti-imperialist’ outlook.  
 
The structural environment that greeted PT’s rise to power might have created an 
expectation of vigilance and heightened suspicion of Brazil’s neighbours. However, 
the opposite transpired: Lula extended a hand of friendship to Chavez, and Bolivia’s 
nationalisation of its oil reserves was similarly met with a muted response by Lula. 
While the first term of the Lula administration was thus dedicated to preserving 
Brazil’s credibility in the eyes of the international community, the second presented 
an opportunity for greater attention to be paid to questions of national defence and 
national interest. This was facilitated by the propitious economic context the 
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country enjoyed, and by the apparent success of its attempts to diversify its 
commercial contacts, thereby rendering it more of an autonomous and independent 
actor. Domestic constraints on Lula’s foreign policy included the limits imposed by 
a fractious Congress over which PT had varying amounts of influence. While these 
limits persisted into the second term, Lula’s personal popularity heightened Brazil’s 
image abroad and underlay ever more ambitious foreign policy goals, including 
forays into the Middle East peace process and the Iran nuclear power issue.  
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Chapter 7: The New Internationalists? South Africa, 
Brazil, MINUSTAH and the exile of Jean-Bertrand 
Aristide 
 
“Maybe our media and opposition will ask again how much does it cost, who is going to pay and what is in it for us. 
For us, the saving of lives, stopping wars and contributing towards peace, democracy, human rights and development 
cannot be reduced simply to rands and cents. What is in it, for us, is peace.” 
 
 South African Foreign Minister, Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, on South Africa’s participation in 
peacekeeping in Burundi.606  
 
“Quem defende novos paradigmas nas relações internacionais, não poderia omitir-se diante de uma situação 
concreta.607” 
 
  Lula da Silva, Speech at the 49th General Assembly, 21 September, 2004, in reference to Brazil’s 
participation in Haiti.  
 
 
Introduction 
South Africa and Brazil represent two prominent examples of Southern states 
embarking on internationalist foreign policies, whether for structural or unit-level 
reasons, or a combination of both. In this chapter an examination of a case of 
international crisis in which both states were involved provides a unique test case of 
each of their actions and their motivations, where it has been possible to uncover 
these. Haiti represents a ‘turning-point’ decision for each country, in the sense that 
it required the allocation of resources – military, political, and economic - to an 
international issue. A turning point decision, as noted in Chapter 1, is distinct from 
a state’s general objectives and verbal strategies; and, routine actions conducted by a 
state’s diplomatic machinery.  
 
The case of state failure in Haiti, and the measures taken by South Africa and Brazil, 
are examined to shed light on their motivations and capacities in an area in which 
neither can be said to have had pressing national interests. What is at stake in their 
respective responses to the crisis? What can neoclassical realism tell us about it? 
Haiti represents a significant opportunity for the appraisal of internationalism in the 
foreign policies of South Africa and Brazil. This is because it involves another 
‘Southern’ or developing state; assistance required the choice of sides in the conflict, 
                                                
606 Department of Foreign Affairs, 2004. Budget Speech, p13.  
607 “Whoever seeks to defend new paradigms in international relations, cannot shy away 
when faced with a concrete situation”. Author’s translation.  
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along with forms of external intervention; as well as a choice on their respective 
stances on the promotion of democracy and non-interference. 
 
While the crisis in Haiti has been referenced frequently in terms of its domestic 
dimensions, the aspects of relevance to International Relations have seldom been 
highlighted,608 and this will form part of the contribution of this chapter. It is 
important to note that the MINUSTAH mission, due to the novelty of its mandate 
(relating to multidisciplinary or ‘second-generation’ peacekeeping) and the 
circumstances under which it was approved and deployed, has been contested from 
the start, and the subject of polemical debate in the peacekeeping and international 
human rights literature.609 The focus of this chapter is the foreign policy formulation 
dimension of specifically the involvement of South Africa and Brazil,610 as two 
states seeking to portray an internationalist posture in their foreign relations.  
 
The present chapter revolves around the crisis wrought by the deposing of the 
democratically-elected government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 2004, and its 
international implications. This crisis had been at least a decade in the making. It 
ultimately saw two very different modes of Southern engagement deployed. South 
Africa displayed solidarity with Jean-Bertrand Aristide, first through the attendance 
of the bicentennial celebrations of the Haitian Revolution by President Thabo 
Mbeki, and second, by offering exile to Aristide upon his ouster in 2004. Brazil 
assumed the leadership of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti 
(MINUSTAH), relaxing longstanding terms of its engagement in UN missions in 
order to lead the mission.  
 
This case is selected for a number of reasons. It represented a turning point in the 
foreign policies of both South Africa and Brazil, under Mbeki and Lula, respectively. 
For both countries, it was a decided turn away – though not an isolated instance - 
                                                
608 For an exception, see von Einsiedel and Malone, “Peace and Democracy for Haiti?”. 
609 See Matt Halling and Blaine Bookey, “Peacekeeping in Name Alone: Accountability 
for the United Nations in Haiti”, Hastings International and Comparative Law Review, 
461 (2008): 461-486; Jennifer Peirce, “Protection for Whom? Stabilization and Coercive 
Rule in Haiti”, Paterson Review, 8 (2007); Todd Howland, “Peacekeeping and 
Conformity with Human Rights Law: How MINUSTAH Falls Short in Haiti”, International 
Peacekeeping, 13, No. 4 (2006): 462-476.  
610 Nineteen states have contributed troops to the MINUSTAH mission under the 
leadership of Brazil. Fifty-one states have contributed police personnel. See MINUSTAH 
website.  
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from their repeatedly-stated commitment to non-interference. In the South African 
case, it involved the commitment of national political and material resources for the 
reported assistance (through the attempted provision of arms and the presence of a 
South African vessel in Haitian waters months prior to Aristide’s ouster) and exile 
of the Haitian leader in South Africa, outside its core foreign policy focus areas of 
Southern Africa and Africa. In the Brazilian case, the country conducted a 
modification of its longstanding policy of engagement of Brazilian troops in 
international crises. How did domestic and systemic factors combine to lead these 
two leaders to take these positions? And, how much was new in their respective, 
and collective, approaches to Haiti? The timing of the crisis and the responses of 
these two states should be noted: debates regarding the reform of the UN Security 
Council were at a high point, ahead of the 2005 UN Millennium Summit where this 
would be a central topic of discussion.  
 
The chapter is sub-divided as follows: Following a brief background of the case, the 
approaches of South Africa and Brazil, respectively, are presented. The nature of 
their involvement, how it complies with internationalism, and the domestic and 
international implications are analysed. This is followed by an appraisal of 
‘Southern’ engagement as distinct from other, mainly ‘Northern’ engagements in 
international crises.  
 
 
7.2. Background 
Haiti has a long history of political instability. Since its independence from France 
as the first Black republic in 1804, it has never had a prolonged period of stable, 
representative government. In the twentieth century, the country was under US 
occupation between 1915 and 1934, and was subsequently led by dictators, until the 
first democratic elections were held in 1957. These elections, on whose legitimacy 
doubt was cast by widespread fraud and the presence of the Armed Forces, brought 
to power the Duvalier dynasty,611 which ruled Haiti from 1957 to 1986. ‘Doc’ 
Duvalier was succeeded by his son, ‘Baby Doc’, for almost three decades of brutal 
misrule and corruption.  
                                                
611 Ricardo Seitenfus, “Keeping the Peace and the Lessons of Haiti: Collapse or 
Rebuilding of the State?”. (2007) 
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Elections were held in 1990, ushering in two decades of further intense international 
involvement in Haiti’s affairs, much of it necessary.612 Monitored by the UN and 
the OAS, the elections brought to power the young Catholic priest and exponent of 
liberation theology, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Starting well and attaining modest 
success initially, Aristide’s rule increasingly incited opposition through its growing 
authoritarianism and personal nature. On 29 September 1991, Aristide’s 
government was overthrown by Raoul Cédras, the commander of Haiti’s armed 
forces.  
 
Exiled to Venezuela, Aristide won international backing, through the UN and the 
OAS, for his eventual return to Haiti. A pivotal source of support was the Clinton 
administration in the US. This support included a trade embargo on the Cédras 
regime in Haiti imposed by the OAS, as well as diplomatic action under the auspices 
of the UN. On 16 June 1993, the Security Council imposed mandatory sanctions on 
the country, preventing the trade of weapons, oil and petroleum products with Haiti 
by UN members. Sanctions were lifted when negotiations between Aristide and 
Cédras resulted in the Governor’s Island Agreement (GIA). The GIA provided for 
“a new civilian government, the suspension of sanctions, the deployment of UN 
peacekeepers, an amnesty, the retirement of Cédras, and the return to power of 
Aristide”.613 The agreement foundered because of the disingenuousness of Cédras, 
whose thugs prevented the landing of the UN peacekeepers who constituted the 
UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). His return thwarted, Aristide lobbied for stronger 
measures against Cédras. These included the reimposition of sanctions by the UN 
as well as a naval blockade of Haiti. Furthermore, on 31 July 1994, in terms of 
UNSC Resolution 940 (1994), the UN authorised a US-led multinational force 
(MNF) under Chapter VII. This was to be followed by a Chapter VI UN 
peacekeeping operation. By mid-September of that year, the US had gathered 19 
UN member states in the operation, amounting to a total of 2 000 troops, to join a 
20 000-strong US force within the MNF. 
 
                                                
612 Much of this background is derived from Einsiedel and Malone, “Peace and 
Democracy for Haiti?”. 
613 Einsiedel and Malone, “Peace and Democracy for Haiti?”, 155.  
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On this occasion the force was able to deploy without resistance, paving the way for 
Aristide’s return. The handover from peace restoration to peacekeeping operation 
(from MNF to UNMIH) took place in March 1995. UNMIH comprised 6 000 
troops and about 800 civilian police officers. 
 
The democratic credentials of the presidential election five years later in 2000, 
which saw Aristide returned to power were hotly disputed, with even the OAS 
registering its misgivings about the poll.614 It is upon this basis that domestic and 
international calculations of support or opposition to Aristide’s removal in 2004 
hinge. While some human rights activists have painted Aristide as the villain, some 
African and Caribbean states, and commentators on the left worldwide, tended to 
view Aristide as the legitimate leader of Haiti, in terms of the outcome of the 2000 
elections. From the latter perspective, Aristide’s removal from power in 2004 was a 
clear interruption of democratic government in Haiti, buttressed by foreign 
assistance.  
 
Nonetheless, by January 2004, Aristide was reduced to governing by decree. 
Tensions were rising in Haiti, after six months of violent protests against the 
government. Violence escalated with the decision of the Front de Résistance de 
l’Artibonite (FRA, or the Artibonite Resistance Front) based in the northern city of 
Gonaïves, to begin a military campaign against the government on 5 February 2004. 
Joining ranks with Louis-Jodel Chamblain, a prominent member of Cédras’ death 
squads, FRA’s leader Guy Philippe commanded an estimated 500 former members 
of the Haitian Army (whom Aristide had unwisely disbanded but not disarmed in 
1995), a coalition called Front pour la Libération et la Reconstruction Nationales (FLRN, or 
the National Liberation and Reconstruction Front).615  
                                                
614 The OAS declined to dispatch observers to the Haitian Presidential and Senatorial 
elections of 26 November 2000, as the poll went against the Organisation’s position that 
elections only be held under conditions of ‘national accord’. Such accord was absent, 
stemming from irregularities in the country’s two previous elections, on 21 May 2000, 
and in 1997. Opposition parties comprising the Convergence Démocratique called for an 
annulment of the 21 May elections, and refused to participate in the November 
elections, which they described as ‘illegal’. See ‘Third Report of the Mission of the 
Organization of American States to Haiti, Visit of the Assistant Secretary General to 
Haiti, February 6-10, 2001. Accessed online at: 
http://www.oas.org/xxxiiga/english/docs_en/report3_haiti.htm on 4 December, 2010.  
615 Armed Conflict Database, International Institute of Strategic Studies, accessed online 
at: 
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In less than a month, soon after the celebrations commemorating the bicentennial 
of Haiti’s independence from France in 1804, this coalition was able to overrun 
most of Haiti. At this point, according to Einsiedel and Malone, “Aristide latched 
on to a populist distraction, an attempt to extract from France compensation for the 
reparations that had been imposed on Haiti by Paris in the nineteenth century as 
indemnity for the dispossessed French colonists post-independence”.616  
 
The main international mediator at this stage of the crisis was CARICOM, along 
with the governments of the United States, Canada and France. In January 2004, 
CARICOM hosted a meeting in the Bahamas between members of the opposition 
and the heads of government of the Bahamas, Jamaica and Trinidad. The meeting 
resulted in a draft set of conditions that Aristide should meet in order to end the 
political stalemate in Haiti. These conditions were as follows: disbanding of armed 
gangs, establishment of rules governing political protest, an agreement with the 
opposition as to who should be the next prime minister, the creation of an electoral 
commission, and the setting of a date for legislative elections. The literature appears 
to be divided over the efficacy of these talks arranged by CARICOM. Some analysts 
see Aristide’s failure to implement all of the reforms agreed to at the CARICOM 
meetings under the threat of sanctions as a cause of escalating violence later in 
January 2004.617 Others, meanwhile, see these provisions as marginal, last-ditch 
efforts that the opposition placed little faith in, in any event, even, in some cases 
refusing to lend credibility to Aristide by participating.618 Even the calls of 
CARICOM and the OAS for the UN Security Council to take ‘urgent’ measures, 
including the despatch of troops, fell on deaf ears. The UNSC rejected an appeal 
from CARICOM on February 26 for the dispatch of international peacekeeping 
forces, only acceding to the request after the departure of Aristide.619  
 
                                                                                                                               
http://gate.library.lse.ac.uk:2169/armedconflict/MainPages/dsp_AnnualUpdate.asp?Conf
lictID=212&YearID=862#2004 on 2 July, 2010.  
616 Einsiedel and Malone, “Peace and Democracy for Haiti?”, 163.  
617 Armed Conflict Database: Haiti summary 2004.  
618 Einsiedel and Malone, “Peace and Democracy for Haiti?”, 165.  
619 Dionne Jackson Miller, “Aristide’s Call for Reparations From France Unlikely to Die”, 
in InterPress Service News Agency, 12 March, 2004. Accessed online at: 
http://ipsnews.net/interna.asp?idnews=22828 on 8 December, 2010.  Some observers 
saw in this reversal France’s extreme antipathy toward Aristide based on the reparations 
demand, while the latter’s significance was downplayed by others.  
 246 
Instead, France and the US were more disposed toward joining forces in exerting 
pressure on Aristide to step down. Finally, Aristide departed Haiti for exile on 29 
February 2004. The circumstances under which this occurred are the subject of 
conjecture, with Aristide claiming he was kidnapped, a charge denied by then-US 
Secretary of State, Colin Powell.620 On the same day, UNSC Resolution 1529 
authorized the immediate deployment of a Multinational Interim Force (MIF), 
comprising 3 000 troops, for 3 months. This operation would be replaced by a UN 
peacekeeping mission, the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).621 The 
transition phase was marked by an unfortunate lack of commitment shown by the 
major powers, which had spearheaded Aristide’s ouster, and uncertainty regarding 
the locus of power in Haiti.  
 
 
 
 
Given that the foreign relations of both South Africa and Brazil over the last decade 
have been played out in such ideological/rhetorical terms as is evident in Chapters 5 
and 6, it is necessary to examine the deeper issues implicit in Haiti’s complex 
international history, rather than simply the recounting of ‘facts’, and thus where the 
engagement of these two emerging powers fits. Since the first US occupation of 
Haiti between 1915 and 1934, the country has been portrayed as a key site of US 
imperialism. Indeed, writing of the 1994 invasion to restore Aristide, Cynthia Weber 
has noted,  
United Nations authorization of U.S. actions in Haiti allowed the United States to 
decorate its regional effort with flags of many nations…As the list of member 
states in this force grew to more than thirty, it appeared less and less like a 
“genuine” response by the international community to the Haiti situation and more 
and more like the artificial, dissimulated cover for U.S. regional activity that it 
was.622  
 
                                                
620 The Miami Herald. 2 March, 2004. “Aristide says he was kidnapped”. Accessed 
online at: http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/haiti/kidnap.htm on 8 December, 2010.  
621 Einsiedel and Malone, “Peace and Democracy for Haiti?”,164 and Armed Conflict 
Database.  
622 Cynthia Weber, Faking It: US Hegemony in a “Post-Phallic” Era (Minneapolis and 
London: University of Minnesota Press, 1999): 115.  
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Weber and others argued that the ‘multilateral’ operation gave poor cover to 
a purely US regional activity designed to stem the flow of refugees from Haiti into 
the US.623 
  
The second significant feature of the current UN mission in Haiti is that it is a 
foreign intervention, ostensibly to bring about order, when in the first place, it 
occurred to underwrite and facilitate governance for an illegitimate regime. This is a 
highly sensitive issue in the national and international psychologies of both South 
Africa and Brazil. MINUSTAH is an example of an evolution in UN peacekeeping 
away from “observing a ceasefire in a war between two countries and toward 
facilitating a peace accord and internal stability”.624 Essentially, the mission 
represents a clear shift in the direction of ‘peace enforcement’625 followed by ‘peace-
building’, the latter defined by former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
as “comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to 
consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among 
people”.626 MINUSTAH was authorised to include some 6 700 military personnel, 1 
622 police, 550 international civilian staff, 150 UN volunteers, and about 1 000 local 
civilian staff.627 In terms of its original mandate, MINUSTAH was established: 
 
to support the Transitional Government in ensuring a secure and stable 
environment; to assist in monitoring, restructuring, and reforming the Haitian 
National Police; to help with comprehensive and sustainable Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes; to assist with the 
restoration and maintenance of the rule of law, public safety and public order in 
Haiti; to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment 
and to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence; to support the 
constitutional and political processes; to assist in organizing, monitoring, and 
carrying out free and fair municipal, parliamentary and presidential elections; to 
support the Transitional Government as well as Haitian human rights institutions 
                                                
623 Ibid., 115.  
624 Howland, “How MINUSTAH Falls Short in Haiti”, 466.   
625 ‘Peace enforcement’ entails “the use of armed force to separate combatants and to 
create a cease-fire that does not exist”. See “Chapter III: Peace Enforcement”, 
GlobalSecurity.org. Accessed online at: 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/call_93-8_chap3.htm on 6 
September, 2011.  
626 Cited in Jan Olaf Hausotter, “The Uses of Peacekeeping: The United Nations 
Stabilization Mission in Haiti”, The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 32, Issue 1 (2008): 
147.  
627 Website of MINUSTAH, ‘MINUSTAH Background’, accessed online at: 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/background.shtml on 2 
December, 2010.  
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and groups in their efforts to promote and protect human rights; and to monitor 
and report on the human rights situation in the country.628 
 
Given this background, the manner of participation for each emerging power was 
conditioned by both structural and unit-level factors. The next two sections outline 
each set of circumstances and their resulting policies. 
 
7.3. South Africa’s strategy on Haiti: A neoclassical realist restraint?  
 
7.3.1. The Nature of South Africa’s Involvement 
The peculiarity of South Africa’s involvement in the Haiti crisis is that it is markedly 
devoid of any transparent, accessible decision-making process, moreso than any 
other decisions of state, which have usually tended anyway not to be laid bare to 
public scrutiny. This points to the personal nature of the decision – and the 
institutional freedom and legitimating capacity enjoyed by South Africa’s President 
Mbeki - to engage in the crisis. This issue was not debated in Parliament prior to 
major decisions, such as those to dispatch arms to Haiti and to grant asylum to 
Aristide and his family, being taken.  
 
For a number of reasons, South Africa’s involvement in the Haiti crisis assumed 
more restrained proportions than that of Brazil, discussed below. Already, Mbeki’s 
decision to travel to Haiti to participate in the country’s bicentennial anniversary of 
independence was injudicious. By early 2004, immediately preceding these 
celebrations, and following them, anti-Aristide protests were growing and becoming 
increasingly violent.629 Mbeki’s visit, as described by the government news agency, 
BuaNews, “was to consolidate the African Renaissance with Africans in the 
Diaspora and highlight the Haitian revolution as an important milestone in African 
history”.630 Aristide was offered asylum by South Africa after Morocco and Taiwan 
had denied it.631  
 
                                                
628 Ibid.  
629 Einsiedel and Malone, “Peace and Democracy for Haiti?”, 163.  
630 Richard Mantu, “Haiti Revolution Marks a Milestone in African History”, BuaNews, 6 
January 2004. Accessed online at: http://allafrica.com/stories/200401060335.html on 1 
December, 2010.  
631 Moyiga Nduru, “Haitian Leader’s Plight Fails to Move Opposition”, IPS, March 1, 
2004. Accessed online at: http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=22637 on 1 
December 2010.  
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Mbeki’s own interpretation of the situation was briefly offered in his weekly online 
letter, ANC Today. A few months after the revolt and deposing of Aristide, he 
wrote:  
 
The central purpose of the counter-revolution is to halt and reverse the long-
delayed democratic revolution in Haiti, guarantee the positions of the privileged 
few, and ensure the continued oppression, disempowerment and impoverishment 
of the millions of poor Haitians. In many respects, the 2004 counter-revolution in 
Haiti was not dissimilar to the counter-revolution in Chile in 1973, which resulted 
in the overthrow of the Allende government, the death of the President, and the 
installation of the Pinochet military dictatorship.632  
 
Thus was the President’s concern, and by implication, South Africa’s, framed in 
terms of a struggle in Haiti for democracy and economic, social and political 
development and equality; and, significantly, of the centrality of Aristide and his 
supporters to this struggle: 
 
From his election in 1990, President Aristide and other patriots have been engaged 
in a complex and difficult struggle to establish the stable democratic system that 
has eluded the First Black Republic since its birth 200 years ago. They have also 
sought to ensure that this new democracy should address the interests of the 
majority of the people, the black urban and rural poor.633 
 
Mbeki also conveyed his opinion on UN Resolution 1529 thus: 
 
What was and is strange and disturbing about this Resolution is that it is totally 
silent on the central issue of the unconstitutional and anti-democratic removal of 
the elected Government of Haiti. It says nothing about the notorious figures who 
achieved this objective, arms in hand, killing many people.634 
 
This gives some indication of the South African government’s stance on the 
prospect of assisting in multilateral initiatives to stabilise Haiti. While it was open to 
CARICOM’s interpretation of events, it viewed the UN Security Council’s position 
with scepticism.  
 
News reports also contended that South Africa had attempted to dispatch a 
consignment of arms to assist in the defence of the Aristide government. According 
                                                
632 Thabo Mbeki, “Haiti after the Press went home”, ANC Today, 4, No. 29, (23-29 July) 
2004. Accessed online at: http://www.anc.org.za/docs/anctoday/2004/at29.htm on 8 
December 2010.  
633 Ibid.  
634 Ibid.  
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to the leader of the Parliamentary Opposition, Tony Leon of the Democratic 
Alliance, Mbeki had authorised a South African airforce plane to carry supplies in 
support of Aristide’s government in its last days. The plane reportedly had a 
shipment of 150 R-1 rifles, 5,000 bullets, 200 smoke grenades and 200 bullet-proof 
vests.635 Parliament was indeed informed in December 2003 of the deployment of 
South African troops to “assist the Government of Haiti in celebrating two hundred 
years of its independence and victory in the struggle against slavery in the 
Americas”.636 A total of 139 personnel were deployed, along with 1 combat support 
ship, 1 harbour patrol boat, and one helicopter. It was not clarified how this 
deployment would assist in a celebration. The expected costs were R2m, at the 
expense of the Department of Foreign Affairs.637 
 
Aristide is viewed with equal amounts of sympathy and opprobrium on the two 
sides of the debate about his leadership of Haiti. In spite of his deteriorating human 
rights record, he was seen as an anti-establishment, anti-elite figure638 for his 
espousal of ‘liberation theology’ and a ‘priority option for the poor’. Indeed, his 
largest support base was among the poor and dispossessed of Haiti, mirroring that 
of the ANC in South Africa. This provided a strong ideological background for 
South Africa’s decision to participate in the Haiti crisis in the manner that it did.  
 
 
 
 
7.3.2. How does it comply with internationalism?  
 
South Africa’s engagement on the Haiti question has a mixed record as an 
intervention along the lines of southern internationalism. While the rhetoric 
employed by the African National Congress, through its President, Thabo Mbeki, 
and the government, made much of the democratic and populist credentials of 
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, there remained some question marks over the 
                                                
635 BBC News, “Haiti arms row rocks South Africa”, 15 March, 2004. Accessed online at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/3513006.stm on 7 December, 2010.   
636 Parliamentary Hansard. 2004. “Employment of the South African National Defence 
Force in Haiti in Fulfillment of the International Obligations of the Republic of South 
Africa Towards the United Nations”. 9 February, 2004, pp345-348.  
637 Ibid. 
638 Hausotter, “The Uses of Peacekeeping”,150.  
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transparency of the actions taken and the extent to which they contributed to an 
amelioration of the situation in Haiti.   
 
In spite of the request for assistance to Aristide’s government reportedly coming 
from CARICOM, the underhanded manner in which the South African government 
responded, by promising arms and ‘equipment’, would not have contributed to a 
non-violent resolution of the conflict. For this reason, the action had to be kept 
away from the glare of public and parliamentary scrutiny.  
 
Mbeki did not make any statements regarding Aristide’s calls for reparations from 
France, an issue that would lend itself patently to the Southern internationalist 
agenda. This may be attributed to his stance on the issue domestically, where he 
opposed calls for apartheid reparations by sectors of South African society, on the 
basis that they would deter the foreign direct investment on which his economic 
policy heavily depended.639His foreign minister, Dr Dlamini Zuma, however, lauded 
Aristide’s courage, declaring in the 2004 DFA Budget Vote, “President Aristide 
dared to speak for the poor of Haiti. He dared to ask for compensation to correct a 
historic injustice”.640 
 
 
7.3.3. Domestic implications 
The domestic implications of South Africa’s engagement in the Haiti crisis were 
scarcely registered in the public domain. The main voices of opposition were those 
of the opposition in parliament, who had access to privileged information about the 
country’s involvement. They called for the denial of entry to South Africa to 
Aristide.641 As neatly expounded by Mbeki in his weekly online ANC newsletter, 
‘Letter from the President’, on the occasion of Aristide’s 51st birthday, and in a 
manner only he could perfect, “As much as they did not know of President 
                                                
639 The Independent Online. 2003. “Mbeki in a bid to avert reparations litigation”, 31 
August, 2003. Accessed online at: http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/mbeki-in-bid-to-
avert-reparations-litigation-1.112302 on 7 March, 2011.  
640 Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Africa. 2004. “Address by the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, at the Budget Vote of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs”, 3 June, 2004, Cape Town. Accessed online at: 
http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2004/dzum_budget2004.pdf on 28 June, 2011.  
641 BBC News. 2004. “Aristide arrives in South Africa”, 31 May, 2004. Accessed online 
at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3762591.stm on 7 September, 2011.  
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Aristide’s birthday, our people will be ignorant of all …that is happening in 
Haiti”.642  
 
This ignorance was not helped by the lack of government transparency on the 
matter. The Minister of Foreign Affairs was famously tight-lipped about the extent 
of the expenses Aristide’s sojourn in South Africa was costing the state643 and the 
rationale for the state’s offer of asylum. The Democratic Alliance supplemented its 
enquiries in Parliament with a letter to the chairman of the National Conventional 
Arms Control Committee (NCACC), Professor Kader Asmal, asking whether a 
permit had been granted for the export of the arms and equipment to Haiti.644 A 
further complicating factor was whether personnel had been dispatched in respect 
of the equipment, in which case this would constitute a deployment of South 
African troops abroad, an action that requires Parliamentary oversight.  
 
On 13 May 2004, the ANC commended the decision of the Cabinet to accede to 
CARICOM’s request for Aristide’s asylum in South Africa. It noted that, “The 
decision was a reasonable and responsible response to a request from a regional 
multilateral body that has long been seized with the resolution of the crisis in Haiti”, 
and that “South Africa has a responsibility to assist in whatever way it can to 
achieve a peaceful and lawful resolution of Haiti’s current crisis”.645  
 
 
7.3.4. International implications: A case of neoclassical realist restraint? 
 
The primary international consequence of Aristide’s asylum in South Africa was his 
physical removal from the Caribbean, where his presence was viewed by the US and 
                                                
642 Thabo Mbeki, “State of the Nation Address”, Parliamentary Hansard, 6 February 
2004. 
643 See Chapter 5 and Parliament of South Africa. 2008. “Question No. 528: Published in 
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his enemies in Haiti as potentially incendiary.646 Immediately after being deposed in 
Haiti, Aristide was relocated to the Central African Republic (CAR). He was 
subsequently exiled, upon his own request, to Jamaica. From Jamaica, he received 
an offer of asylum from the South African government, acting on the request of 
CARICOM.  
 
The asylum of Aristide and his family in South Africa was seen as one consequence 
of President Mbeki’s commitment to the idea of an African diaspora,647 an 
important new component in African continental initiatives, one on which many 
resources are expended, and where the Caribbean is a particular focus. Just prior to 
the onset of the crisis, Mbeki extended an invitation to AU leaders to join Haiti’s 
bicentenary celebrations in January 2004. The Caribbean was seen as an important 
arena of extending the links between the African continent and Africans abroad. 
Indeed, it was the region of the world on which the AU’s focus first turned for its 
objective of strengthening relations and solidarity with the people of the African 
Diaspora. As Mbeki stated,  
The celebration of the bicentenary of the Haitian Revolution and the Decade of 
Liberation in South Africa during the same year, 2004, must serve to inspire all 
Africans to act together and decisively to end their poverty, underdevelopment, 
dehumanisation and marginalisation.648 
 
Yet, South Africa resisted the temptation to become more actively involved in the 
Haiti crisis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
646 A US government cable of 22 November 2004 later leaked by Wikileaks revealed that 
Brazil, in the guise of Marco Aurélio Garcia also felt that “Aristide must not be allowed 
back into Haitian politics under any circumstances”. See Folha.com, 2011. “Marco 
Aurélio Garcia não quer Aristide volte á política haitiana”, 14 January, 2011. Accessed 
online at: http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/859680-marco-aurelio-garcia-nao-quer-
que-aristide-volte-a-politica-haitiana-leia-em-ingles.shtml on 6 June, 2011.  
647 This view is shared by Landsberg. See Chris Landsberg, The Quiet Diplomacy of 
Liberation: International Politics and South Africa’s Transition. (Cape Town: Jacana 
Press, 2004): 178.  
648 Cited in Landsberg, The Quiet Diplomacy of Liberation, 179. 
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7.4. Brazil’s strategy on Haiti: a classical Realist expansion? 
 
7.4.1. The Nature of Brazil’s Involvement 
Brazil stepped into the breach, pledging troops for the UN Stabilization Mission in 
Haiti (MINUSTAH), after France and the US had scaled back their military 
involvement on the Caribbean island. Brazil along with other Latin American 
countries, it is noted, “came forward with significant offers of peacekeepers for the 
first time in a UN operation in the Western Hemisphere”.649  
 
According to Ambassador Gonçalo Mello Mourão, head of the Department for 
Central America and the Caribbean at the Ministry of External Relations (MRE), 
Brazil’s decision to participate in MINUSTAH was based on consultation with 
Caribbean and Latin American partners:  
 
It was a major foreign relations decision on the part of Brazil. As a major foreign 
relations decision, it was of course taken at the most high level, by the President 
himself. This is a step that was taken after consultations. The role of MRE…was to 
gather a coincidence of views as far as Latin American and Caribbean countries 
were concerned. So, our first concern in engaging in MINUSTAH was to get a 
common vision from the continent…mostly Latin America and the Caribbean 
countries. Argentina, Chile, Uruguay in the first place, and then others came. Today 
you have Peru, Paraguay, Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala. They are all part of the 
military presence of Latin America in Haiti. They represent more than half of the 
military presence there.650 
 
Moreover, the country’s legislators sanctioned Brazil’s participation, as the Brazilian 
Congress supported the decision with a majority of 266 votes in favour and 118 
against.651 Legislative Decree No.207 of 19 May 2004, approved by the President of 
Brazil’s Congress, formalised Brazil’s commitment to the Mission,652 a constitutional 
necessity. One vocal opponent to Brazil’s participation in the operation was the 
power-broker, Bahia representative, and right-wing politician, Antônio Carlos 
Magalhães. Magalhães voiced his dissent in terms of Brazilian national priorities 
                                                
649 Howland, “How MINUSTAH falls short in Haiti”, 164.  
650 Interview with the author, Brasília, July 2010.  
651 Susanne Gratius, “Brazil in the Americas: A Regional Peace Broker?”, FRIDE 
Working Paper 35, April 2007: 18, fn 51.  
652 Marinha do Brasil, 2010 ‘Entenda a participacao brasileira na Missao de 
Estabilizacao das Nacoes Unidas no Haiti (MINUSTAH)’, accessed online at: 
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lying within the country, “because the government needs to correct its internal 
situation, and then…seek to establish itself as an international authority”.653 Similar 
reservations were noted by other opposition parties, and even some of PT’s 
coalition partners such as Partido do Movimento Democratico Brasileiro (PMDB). 
Legislative support was ultimately ornamental, as one deputy noted, because prior 
to the vote in Congress, Brazilian troops were already headed for Rio de Janeiro 
from their various regional bases, destined for Haiti.654 
 
On 6 November 2004, Brazil announced that it would bolster the UN peacekeeping 
force that at the time numbered barely 2,800. Brazil’s contribution raised the overall 
size of the operation to 5,500 soldiers, and it also committed to staying in Haiti until 
the presidential elections, planned for that month. This enabled the UNSC to 
extend MINUSTAH’s mandate to June 2005.655 According to Prof Kai Michael 
Kenkel, a scholar at Rio’s PUC-Rio University, the pressures for Brazilian action 
derived from two key levels. First, in the UN Security Council, the United States 
and France had substantial interests in stabilising Haiti, but were limited in their 
own capacity for doing so. At the Brazilian national level, a shift in favour of greater 
engagement in foreign policy was already underway, with the entry to power of Lula 
in 2003.656  
 
The request or application for participation in multilateral missions usually comes 
from MRE, so it is easy for the decision to become subject to international political 
imperatives. Compare the situation in Mexico, for example, where this decision is 
                                                
653 Magalhães Neto, Antônio Carlos. 2004. Speech in the Chamber of Deputies on the 
Dispatch of Brazilian Troops to Haiti, PFL-BA. Accessed online at: 
http://www.camara.gov.br/internet/SitaqWeb/TextoHTML.asp?etapa=5&nuSessao=089.
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655 Armed Conflict Database: Haiti Summary, 2004.  
656 Interview with the author, July 2010. 
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taken by two branches of the armed forces, the Ministry of the Navy and the 
Ministry of Defence.657  
 
The military mission is not the sole aspect of Brazil’s engagement in Haiti. The 
country has also despatched police officials and civilians. In addition to this, in a 
bilateral context, Brazil has made extensive use of technical cooperation, through 
the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (Agência Brasileira de Cooperação, ABC), to 
augment its engagement in the reconstruction of Haiti. Along with India and South 
Africa, its partners in the IBSA Fund, Brazil has financed a recycling plant in Port-
au-Prince, for example.658 
 
In more general terms, it is noted that peacekeeping became part of the policy of 
civil-military reform in Brazil, but also that with reform of the political role of the 
military in Brazil, diplomats obtained an additional instrument in the service of 
foreign policy, namely the ability to deploy troops on peacekeeping missions.659 
Hence, peacekeeping commitments served a domestic purpose in Brazil, helping to 
integrate the military under civilian command – an essential component of the 
democratisation process that commenced in 1982, and it served a purpose on the 
international stage, by providing Itamaraty with additional measures for asserting 
Brazil’s credentials as an emerging power.660 Service abroad provided by the Haiti 
crisis arrived at an opportune time for the redefinition of the military’s identity in 
terms of external missions, rather than internal missions, such as pacifying and 
protecting the Amazon, for example.  
 
At the systemic level, as noted by Hirst,  
 
The types of responsibilities assumed by the South American countries in Haiti are 
closely connected to a new set of expectations imposed upon middle income 
countries (MIC) with consolidated democratic institutions and with values that are 
                                                
657 See Arturo C. Sotomayor Velásquez, “Different Paths and Divergent Policies in the 
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set by the international community. In fact, Argentina, Brazil and Chile (ABC) have 
softened their previous foreign policy anti-interventionist postures, assuming new 
responsibilities that seek to secure the regional political agenda while offering an 
innovative approach to post-conflict intervention.661  
 
In the particular case of Haiti, it has been noted that, as a sign of the international 
times, “peace building and peace promotion became an explicit component of 
[MINUSTAH’s] agenda”; and, “the onus for external intervention was premised not 
exclusively on the preservation of international peace and security, but instead on 
the responsibility of the international community to protect civilians”.662 Thus, 
Brazil’s much-vaunted approach in Haiti – which, besides, came under much 
criticism in some quarters – must be seen in the context of a paradigm shift in 
multilateral approaches to security, and not solely in the context of Brazil’s own 
pronouncements of ‘business unusual’ in Haiti.  
 
Brazil’s leading role in MINUSTAH is a significant step away from the manner in 
which it has pursued its multilateral engagement in peace operations in recent years. 
As such, it should be seen in the light of the country’s traditional stance with respect 
to peacekeeping operations. Brazil’s participation in operations under the auspices 
of the UN falls broadly into two significant periods: the first, from 1957 to 1967, 
when it engaged in six operations; and the second, from 1989 to the present, each 
corresponding with the moments of increased UN participation in maintaining 
international peace and security.663 The former period corresponded with the UN’s 
era of ‘classical’ peacekeeping operations, while the latter has been characterised by 
‘second-generation’ peacekeeping. 
 
Perhaps more instructive for the purposes of the current argument are the cases in 
which Brazil has declined to contribute troops to UN missions. In the first set of 
cases, Brazil has not had a tradition of participating in multinational forces 
authorised by the UN Security Council, especially where rules of engagement are 
not clear-cut (as opposed to forces under the auspices of the UN, created by UN 
                                                
661 Hirst, “South American Intervention in Haiti”, 102.  
662 Robert Muggah and Keith Krause, “A True Measure of Success? The Discourse and 
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resolutions).664 A primary example of this was the refusal of the Gétulio Vargas 
government in June 1951 to accede to a US request to contribute troops for the 
Korean War. Similarly, under FHC in 1996, Brazil refused a UN request to 
contribute troops to the Multinational Force in Zaïre, following an attenuation of 
the crisis there.665 By contrast, Brazil acceded to participation in a multinational 
intervention force in East Timor in 1999, in support of the United Nations 
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), on the back of a 
referendum which had unequivocally expressed the popular will, and with the 
consent of the Indonesian government. High levels of violence after the referendum 
resulted in the need for a military force to restore peace and support the work of 
UNTAET. Brazil contributed only through the despatch of its contingent of 50 
military police, which were already in the country as part of UNTAET.666 
 
Thus, Brazil’s leadership of the MINUSTAH mission is a departure on a number of 
grounds from its traditional stance on foreign deployment of Brazilian troops: 
 
• Haiti departs from the linguistic affinity of past Brazilian engagements, which 
tended to take place, if not in Portuguese-speaking countries, such as Angola, 
Mozambique and Timor Leste, then in countries of South or Central America.  
• The Brazilian government, throughout its history of participation in external 
peace missions, has sought very explicit terms of engagement when deploying 
troops abroad. These include: impartiality, the consent of the host government, 
the non-use of force (excepting in cases of self-defence), and a clear mandate 
from the United Nations Security Council. Where these conditions have not 
been met, more often than not, Brazil has declined involvement.  
• Haiti lacked a clear political settlement by the time MINUSTAH replaced the 
Multinational Interim Force. In fact, the political uncertainties of the case 
represented the ‘original sin’667 of the Mission.  
 
                                                
664 Brazil has engaged in two peacekeeping operations outside the ambit of the UN, 
however. The first occasion was the Dominican Republic in 1965-66 and the second on 
the Peru-Ecuador border from 1995 to 1999. See Fontoura, O Brasil e as Operações de 
Manutenção da Paz, 210.  
665 Fontoura, O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz, 219.  
666 Ibid., p220-221.  
667 This term is Hirst’s. Hirst, “South American Intervention in Haiti”. 
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Brazil’s leadership of MINUSTAH is more a testament to the pursuit of Brazil’s 
‘national interest’ by unreconstructed nationalist diplomats, than to the ingenuity of 
PT. PT itself was caught napping on Haiti, and admits it is a case of a development 
in Brazilian foreign policy where “the government has taken the initiative and 
[which] the Party still has not been able to track adequately”.668  
 
7.4.2. How does it comply with internationalism? 
 
An earlier chapter established internationalism as characterised by the following 
features:  
• Non-intervention in the affairs of other states 
• South-south solidarity 
• Non-violent resolution of disputes, and 
• The centrality of multilateralism. 
 
Brazil’s involvement in Haiti has been seen by its supporters as a vindication of a 
new ‘Southern’ internationalism. While leadership of MINUSTAH may be seen in 
terms of South-South solidarity, the Mission may also be seen as the organised 
victimisation of a hapless polity through the underwriting of an undemocratic 
change of government, with great power support. The Mission also represents a 
shift in Brazil’s decades-old policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of 
other states. Brazil has now adopted a policy of ‘não indiferença’/non-indifference. 
This paradigm shift, while viewed cynically by critics, as a cover for a new 
interventionism, has been described by a Brazilian diplomat as: 
 
a way of emphasizing the responsibility of the international community when faced 
with humanitarian disasters and crises, including those resulting from hunger, 
poverty and epidemics. These are humanitarian catastrophes that can be prevented 
or mitigated through political will and short, medium and long-term 
cooperation…’Non-indifference’ calls for enhanced South-South cooperation and 
innovative financing mechanisms, which complement traditional sources of 
financing for development.669 
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669 Maria Viotti, “Remarks by H.E. Ambassador Viotti, Permanent Representative of 
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However, Haiti was not merely a humanitarian engagement, it was a patently 
political one.  
 
Brazil has also sought to distance itself from any notion that it is promoting a 
‘solution’ in Haiti. Instead, Brazil is  
 
very worried about not being seen as a country that is interfering with other 
countries or with the policy of the region as far as [the Haiti question] is 
concerned…The nature of Brazil’s presence there is that we try to enforce (sic) the 
Haitian society so that they can build the country they want. We didn’t want to 
impose our culture, we didn’t want to sell our merchandise…we went there to help 
them help themselves. So that’s the spirit of [Brazil’s] presence in Haiti.670  
 
While much has been debated about the ‘novelty’ of Brazilian approaches to 
peacekeeping in Haiti, it must be borne in mind that Brazil is an expanding regional 
power with clear foreign policy statements on the kind of international order it 
favours. In recent years, it has begun to develop the capabilities to shape such an 
order, first through ‘soft’ means, such as its economic diplomacy and ‘Southern’ 
engagement in UN peacekeeping operations, but more recently, also by way of 
traditional ‘hard’ power. “In the final years of the Cardoso administration”, for 
example, “the defense budget rose by the year 2000 to some $17.8 billion, which 
was “more than the rest of South America combined””.671 In 2000 Brazil also 
acquired a replacement aircraft carrier from France – the only country in South 
America to boast this attribute.672 In 2007, it was reported that Brazil sought to 
develop a nuclear-powered submarine.673 While on the one hand, even Brazil’s 
diplomats have conceded that participation in the Mission in Haiti has been 
motivated to no small extent by the country’s UNSC aspirations; on the other, it 
“reflects Brazil’s attempts to expand its area of influence to the Caribbean, and 
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position itself as a regional power in Latin America and the Caribbean in the 
medium-term”.674  
 
The opportunity to project power in the Caribbean was expedited by the withdrawal 
from the scene of the traditional powers, the US and France. Brazil had been 
heartened by its recent engagement in East Timor, and by the prospect of 
permanent member status in the UN Security Council. Unable to justify unilateral 
engagement for a number of reasons, Brazil sought to ‘multilateralise’ its 
involvement in Haiti. Thus, it sought the cooperation and agreement of its regional 
neighbours, as well as the countries of CARICOM. CARICOM had been deeply 
engaged in facilitating a mediated solution to the crisis by attempting to coordinate 
meetings between Aristide and the opposition, hence its membership was 
predictably not initially in favour of MINUSTAH, which it saw as underwriting an 
illegal government.675 
 
7.4.3. Domestic implications 
 
How was engagement in Haiti justified by the relevant domestic actors, i.e. 
Itamaraty and PT? What have been the consequences in terms of domestic politics 
for PT and for the Brazilian government?  
 
Brazil’s intervention in Haiti, through its military leadership of MINUSTAH and 
involvement in training of police, along with technical cooperation was a polarising 
issue in the foreign policy community, and in Congress, particularly among 
opposition parties, Partido da Frente Liberal (PFL), Partido da Social Democracia 
Brasileira (PSDB) and Partido Democrático Trabalhista (PDT), along with some 
political analysts, journalists and academics.676  
 
The engagement in MINUSTAH in a leadership position was sold in terms of 
solidarity of the Brazilian people with the Haitian people, and the capacity of Brazil 
                                                
674 Gratius, “Brazil in the Americas”, 1.  
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to share its experiences of securing urban territories and bringing them under state 
control, which became a major component of MINUSTAH’s mandate.  
 
A close examination of Brazil’s recent history in peacekeeping operations and other 
similar international engagements reveals a number of domestic factors that have 
enabled a more ‘muscular’ foreign policy, albeit only with tangible results evident in 
the Haiti case. Haiti represented the consonance of interests of two major actors in 
the deployment: Itamaraty and the military.677 Indeed, this was the key to action, 
that key sectors of Brazil’s foreign policy community and the military – still a major 
player in this arena – agreed on the importance and utility of Brazil’s engagement 
and leading role in MINUSTAH. PT’s only say in the matter as a political party 
would be voiced through its representatives in Congress. Its leadership, Lula, Garcia 
and Dirceu, meanwhile, held the monopoly on what would be considered actions of 
‘solidarity’ conducted by Brazil.  
 
Meanwhile, from the broader left the argument was made that Brazil’s leadership of 
MINUSTAH was a big mistake. The engagement was attacked on various fronts: 
that it was a military engagement was an odious development for Brazil’s leftist 
intelligentsia, which had itself been victimised in the past by the country’s military; 
the fact that Brazil was underwriting an un-elected government, which had taken 
the place of an elected, if flawed, government; as well as the idea of intervening in 
the domestic affairs of a fellow Latin American state, when Lula had been elected 
on the platform of defending sovereignty and the right to self-determination.678 
While leftist sections of PT, such as Valter Pomar’s Red Hope Faction (A Esperança 
é Vermelha) did not oppose involvement overall, military engagement was criticised. 
According to Pomar, when asked by the largest-circulation daily Folha de São Paulo, 
how he saw Brazil’s presence in Haiti:  
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For reasons of principle, I consider that agreeing to participate in MINUSTAH was 
a mistake. I argue that the military presence should be replaced as soon as possible 
by cooperation that is exclusively civil, social, technical and humanitarian.679 
 
While the Left was marshalling its principled opposition to the Mission, the 
Brazilian state (comprised of its various agencies and ministries) had long been 
working out the modalities for a smoother functioning of engagement in 
peacekeeping operations. Already in 1993, an Interministerial Working Group 
(Grupo de Trabalho Interministerial, GTI), was convened in order better to coordinate 
the Brazilian government’s response to requests for troop contributions to peace 
missions. The GTI comprised representatives from Itamaraty, the Ministry of 
Justice, and the Armed Forces, along with Congressional Deputies. The group’s 
tasks were generally focused on actions and suggestions that would streamline the 
process of mobilising troops and resources, and indeed, increase their efficiency in 
the UN system by facilitating greater Brazilian involvement in the UN’s Department 
of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).680  
 
The mobilisation and extraction of resources for foreign policy – in this case, 
peacekeeping operations - was further facilitated by the integration of the three 
Chiefs of Staff in a unitary Ministry of Defence, by the Constitutional Amendment 
23 of 9 February 1999.681 This allows for greater co-ordination between the Military, 
the Navy and the Airforce. As noted by Velásquez, “the extent to which civilian 
governments can deploy troops abroad is determined by how much control they 
exercise over the military branches”.682 In the Brazilian case, as in others, legal and 
budgetary constraints represented the two major obstacles in mobilising for 
participation in peacekeeping operations.683 Politically and ideologically, however, 
Brazil’s Constitution of 1988 is more permissive than both the diplomatic traditions 
of Itamaraty, and the stance of PT. Underlining this, José Genoíno, a PT Deputy, 
introduced a Bill in 1997, proposing to strengthen the legislative oversight of the 
dispatch of troops abroad. Up to then, the Constitution had been interpreted as 
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giving near-automatic assent to the requirements of the UN Security Council, 
through the country’s ratification of the UN Charter.684  
 
 
7.4.4. International Implications: A clear case of classical Realist expansion? 
 
Brazil could not justify unilateral engagement, or mobilise and extract the required 
resources, for a unilateral operation in Haiti for reasons of domestic and 
international legitimacy, financial constraints, and its own foreign policy philosophy. 
As alluded to earlier, the Haiti mission was seen, particularly by the left, as an 
imperialist intervention in the service of US interests. This would have been, and 
indeed was in some quarters, vehemently opposed as a foreign policy priority for a 
historically independent-minded Brazil, and moreover, one governed by a workers’ 
party of the left. Internationally, Brazil could not justify acting on its own in Haiti 
because it had long been a staunch opponent of the use of force in resolving 
international crises, and of interference in the affairs of sovereign states.  
 
Nonetheless, the gap left by the US, which was “bogged down in Iraq, burnt by the 
failed coup against Chávez in 2002, … counting down to the 2004 election, [and] 
chary of another military engagement”,685 created an opportunity for Brazil at an 
important moment in its quest for permanent representation on the UN Security 
Council. It is widely understood, in sources ranging from media reports to speeches 
by Deputies in Congress, that Brazil’s primary motivation for engaging in the Haiti 
crisis has been its intention to secure a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, 
or at least to bolster its credentials as a major and dependable player in multilateral 
peace operations.  
 
Seven years after the inception of the Mission, it is not clear what Brazil has gained 
from its involvement in Haiti. For one thing, the Mission almost backfired as Brazil 
faced a raft of allegations of human rights violations through its subduing of the 
Port-au-Prince slums in July 2005. The Mission has also enjoyed mixed results, 
allowing for an election in 2006, but failing to pave the way for a deeper 
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entrenchment of democracy in Haiti, and to secure and effectively distribute 
international funds for Haiti’s reconstruction. The January 2010 earthquake, which 
claimed at least 250,000 lives from a population of 10 million, also dealt the country 
a heavy blow. The country elected a new president, Michel Martelly, by a landslide 
margin in April 2011.  
 
Brazil’s engagement can be seen as an example of a realist expansion, more 
especially, an offensive realist expansion. Brazil responded to the call for leadership 
of MINUSTAH not in response to any clear threat, but in response to expanded 
interests, and a changed perception of how to attain its ‘rightful’ place in 
international politics: from courting acceptance as a ‘respectable’ state aligned with 
Western interests, to seeking to assert the new power of an emergent Brazil in a 
‘concrete situation’.  
 
 
7.5. Southern Modes of Internationalist Engagement? 
 
As noted by Alden and le Pere, it is rare in IR scholarship that developing countries 
are accorded agency in the literature on regional or international hegemony. They 
add that,  
Local forms of nationalism…are denied and any attendant aspirations for the 
extension of power towards their respective geographic regions are seen as nothing 
more than the ‘hidden hand’ of international capital.686  
 
At the other end of the spectrum, approaches to the activism of former 
developing countries in multilateral peace missions and mediation in international 
crises focus on these events as ‘new’ departures, presented as holding great promise 
for the future of interventions and external engagement in crisis situations. The 
truth about ‘Southern’ internationalism may lie somewhere between these two 
views.  
 
The South as a collective has acted with agency, and has been hailed as a ‘norms 
leader’, helping to solidify international norms in three major areas:  
• Sovereignty and non-intervention 
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• Universalism, and  
• International decision-making.687  
 
Central to this approach to international politics has been a mode of action that has 
seen the South act as a ‘pressure group’, enabling change in international politics 
without resort to structural power.688 Now that certain Southern states are able to 
avail themselves of structural (or material) power, the dynamics of their collective 
politics have changed.  
 
More recently, within the policy and academic circles of Southern states engaged in 
activist foreign policies, a view has appeared to crystallise among some sections that 
is optimistic about Southern engagement in international crises as being somewhat 
qualitatively different from that of the North. This perception of difference has 
been based on the following factors:689 
 
• The ‘awareness’  and greater sensitivity of Southern policymakers to ‘realities 
on the ground’; 
• Partnerships with non-governmental organisations;  
• Foundations in necessity and innovation (‘demand-driven’), as opposed to 
purely geostrategic calculations, or ‘national interest’;  
• Foundations in “principles of solidarity and cultural affinity”,690 rather than 
security imperatives; and, 
• Aid based on “non-conditionality, solidarity, empathy, and sensitivity to 
multi-cultural values”.691 
 
‘Southern’ modes of engagement, their proponents argue, should be distinguished 
from older, ‘Northern’ modes of engagement. They are based on a deeper and more 
empathetic approach to the domestic economic, social and political problems of 
host countries. A similar argument was made with respect to ‘Southern aid’ from 
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the mid-1970s onward, with the assumption that aid from the developing world to 
the developing world would be more sensitive to the needs and contexts of 
destination societies. However, Southern aid was found, with few exceptions, to be 
no less odious and top-down than aid from the advanced industrialised states.692 
Likewise, ‘Southern’ forms of international engagement are often no different from 
traditional ‘Northern’ interventions. Activism by Southern states within other 
developing states should be seen in the context of the domestic and systemic, 
material and ideational, realities that frame these actions.  
 
South African engagement in Haiti has been premised on Haiti’s centrality in a 
particular mythology of African self-determination and independence, as the first 
independent Black republic. Haiti’s physical distance from South Africa also meant 
that the ANC government could give vent to its internationalist proclivities, while 
facing limited consequences domestically, both as a result of strident rhetoric 
regarding the situation, and of the covert offers of assistance to Aristide’s 
government. The government also found itself acting within the framework of an 
‘African’ response to the crisis, formed both by the like-mindedness of other 
African states on the issue, and by the importance of the African Diaspora in the 
official discourse of the African Union. This was a vital source of support for its 
actions, that they be seen as legitimate by African states.  
 
South Africa’s response therefore had a mixed resonance within South Africa. Its 
relevance was almost purely symbolic, given the undertones of anti-imperialism and 
solidarity with a fellow developing country. Domestic political considerations work 
in two ways: on the one hand, they provide or withhold legitimacy for controversial 
international engagements. On the other, meanwhile, they are themselves influenced 
by international action that may bring praise or recognition for the government of 
the day. In this case, the decision to engage in Haiti was largely insulated from 
public scrutiny, thereby averting most of the criticism it might have attracted, until 
Aristide arrived in the country.  
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A prominent official discourse on the part of the Brazilian government regarding its 
involvement in Haiti, meanwhile, is the idea of the novelty of the Brazilian 
engagement, as well as its distinctiveness from the typical interventions by 
‘Northern’ states. This novelty, according to the Ministry of External Relations, 
stems from the Brazilian component of the Mission’s foundations in solidarity with 
the Haitian people. This idea has extended to Brazil’s trilateral initiative with South 
Africa and India, situated in Carrefour Feuilles, a town in Haiti, comprising a 
flagship project of the IBSA Trust Fund.693 This novelty implies that Brazil seeks 
the good of Haiti and not exclusively its own benefit by engaging in MINUSTAH. 
It was severely undermined by continued accusations of human rights abuses 
against the Brazilian contingent.694 
 
To return to the discussion initiated in Chapter 2 on internationalism as a basis for 
the examination of South Africa’s and Brazil’s foreign policies, we are reminded 
that:  
 
large developing countries [or countries of the South] have sought to embody an 
internationalism in their foreign policies that is outward-looking, universalist, co-
existence oriented, and moderate. This means that a duty for international action is 
recognised; action is predicated on the universal values of statehood; peace and 
security represent higher values than the triumph of any particular value; and, 
change sought is moderate and gradual.695  
 
It was shown in Chapter 2 how the crisis of Western [or Northern] liberal 
internationalism during the 1990s and beyond, as well as pressing challenges to 
global governance, created conceptual and policy vacancies that allowed for the 
increased participation in international questions by non-traditional powers. This 
latter, Southern internationalism was thus characterised as being informed by two 
key elements, namely: the pre-eminence of the state, and the commitment to 
solidarity. Both factors are prominent in the history of internationalism in the 
developing world. Two additional factors are the commitment to multilateralism 
and non-violent resolution of disputes, which were also salient features of Western 
internationalism prior to the more adventurous foreign policies of Western powers 
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after the end of the Cold War. While these principles may appear unproblematic in 
theory, they involve a tension between the foreign and domestic policies of 
developing states. As noted in Chapter 2, the cosmopolitan assumptions at the root 
of Southern internationalist foreign policies are considered to be the products of 
‘modern’ outlooks on international life. Yet, developing countries are typically 
considered to be still grappling with the establishment of the first ‘modern’ principle 
of international life, sovereignty or statehood, and the strengthening of their 
jurisdiction over clearly delimited geographical territories. With high numbers of 
unemployed, gross income disparities, and numerous other socio-economic 
challenges, the justification for foreign policies that recognise international duties 
and obligations that require the allocation of state resources is potentially 
problematic. This was not the case for the first wave of middle powers from the 
West, whose vast domestic social welfare schemes, and the relations between state 
and society on which they were predicated, served as inspiration for their activist 
foreign policies.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The engagement of South Africa and Brazil, respectively, in the Haiti crisis 
stimulated a number of foreign policy debates in these countries. The sight of two 
avowedly internationalist states becoming involved in Haiti’s seemingly irresolvable 
crisis spurred questions about what intervention would look like when spearheaded 
by Southern states whose foreign policies were guided by ‘internationalism’, 
including the peaceful resolution of disputes; a commitment to multilateralism; non-
intervention; and, South-South solidarity.  
 
Proponents of involvement on both sides sought to emphasise the uniqueness of 
Southern engagements. South Africa, for its part, acted, it would appear, largely on 
the whim of President Mbeki. As Mbeki noted in his weekly newsletter, South 
Africans had little knowledge of the crisis unfolding in Haiti and South Africa’s 
engagement served to edify a policy issue (the mobilisation of the African Diaspora 
abroad) that was central to Mbeki’s plans for Africa’s renewal. The concept of 
‘African Renaissance’ and its accompanying plans had already been criticised for 
being developed out of the glare of public scrutiny and without public participation, 
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so this was an issue area that was doubly distant from the South African political 
scene, and by extrapolation, the ANC’s election prospects and the health of its 
alliance with COSATU and the SACP.  
 
The engagement in Haiti served PT’s interests, in spite of the fact that the party was 
caught unawares by the Brazilian government’s decision to deploy, and in some 
quarters was highly critical of it. It helped to cement the left-of-centre profile of 
President Lula, by the presentation of Brazil’s leadership of MINUSTAH as an act 
of solidarity with a fellow developing state. With the change in Brazil’s foreign 
policy outlook that attended the ascension of PT to power, pursuit of the 
credentials for UNSC permanent membership became more urgent under Celso 
Amorim. However, the decision to deploy was not a decision that could be 
approved by the executive alone; it required the approval of Congress. Surprisingly, 
given Brazil’s history of commitment to non-interference, and the nature of 
Aristide’s departure, this was obtained by a large majority, but was nonetheless a 
‘torturous’696 process. Brazil’s conduct at the head of the mission has come under 
extensive criticism, both domestically and abroad. This has been noted as a factor 
that limited Brazilian troops in their actions to pacify notoriously dangerous 
sections of Port-au-Prince – a factor that was ultimately overcome, with dire 
consequences in July 2005 and again in December 2006, in the Cité Soleil area of 
the capital.697  
 
Ultimately, internationalism in each case trod very different paths, in spite of South 
Africa and Brazil’s relatively equal diplomatic and political distance from the Haiti 
crisis. On the part of South Africa, decisions to engage in the Haiti issue, whether 
by the reported attempted dispatch of arms to assist Aristide, or by the granting of 
asylum, or “visitor status” to the former President and his family, were taken above 
the political fray. The only opposition to the decisions came from opposition 
parliament members and the issue barely entered the public realm of debate. In the 
Brazilian case, it had to struggle against the domestic obstacles to its 
implementation, and could not rise above domestic politics, given the media interest 
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in the engagement, and the congressional opposition to it (both from PT and its 
opposition).  
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Chapter 8: Neoclassical Realism, Internationalism, and 
the New Emerging Powers 
 
Introduction 
 
Since the turn of the twenty-first century and the epoch-making events that have 
coloured the last decade, most notably the September 11 attacks on the United 
States, and the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and most recently, Libya, observers of 
international politics have witnessed sea-changes in the relations between states, and 
in the global distribution – and understanding – of power. It would not be wrong or 
overly cautious to reserve judgement on these changes and their long-term impact. 
It would be wrong, however, to delay an attempt at analysis of how powers emerge 
in the contemporary international environment, and of how new developments in 
what was long considered the world’s periphery – Africa, Latin America, and Asia – 
are shaping multilateralism, the legitimacy of interventions, and security dynamics. 
In relation to these issues, the concept of ‘internationalism’ has migrated to a central 
place in the foreign policy debates of a number of states, large and small, since the 
end of the Cold War. While IR scholarship has focused extensively on these debates 
in the developed world, it has scarcely taken note of their progress in the developing 
world, as noted in Chapter 2. 
 
In the discussion of internationalism as it is manifest in the developing world, a 
number of dichotomies and tensions arise. The first of these is that between 
pragmatism and principle. This is by no means exclusive to the debate within the 
developing world, but in the global economic periphery, the question is complicated 
by the challenges of domestic economic development and the commitment to 
certain principles of national and international wealth redistribution. There has been 
a longstanding battle within the ideological fields of domestic politics in these 
countries for supremacy, fought between politics of the left and centre-right. 
‘Internationalism’ has been the province of the left. In the introduction to an 
anthology of South African Communist Party documents published in 1980, on the 
60th anniversary of the movement in South Africa, Dr Yusuf Dadoo stated that, 
‘socialism’ and ‘internationalism’ “have been the watchwords of the South African 
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Communists” for all of the movement’s history”.698 These categories have been 
blurred as the internationalism of new leaders in the developing world proved itself 
to be noticeably in favour of globalisation and capitalism. Domestic debates were 
mirrored in concerns that surfaced in foreign policy. These included whether 
supporters of neo-liberal economic models would prove victorious over those who 
favoured socialist mechanisms of ownership of the means of production and 
redistribution. This was reflected in the debates over relations with ‘established’ 
trading partners should be pursued at the expense of the cultivation of new relations 
in uncharted territory, such as China, Africa and the Middle East: forging a ‘new 
geography’699 of world trade, largely centring upon the ‘Global South’.  
 
Another important tension lies in the area of human rights vs. state sovereignty. The 
developing world as a whole has been markedly slower in accepting emerging 
derogations from the non-intervention norm, such as the ‘humanitarian 
intervention’ or ‘responsibility to protect’ argument, for example. While at the 
regional level, strides have been made in Africa (AU Constitutive Act) and in South 
America (Charter of OAS), at the state level, especially on the part of large and 
influential states, there is still great reticence to take bold measures on interventions, 
unless they are sanctioned by the United Nations, and with clear guidelines for 
engagement.  
 
The foreign policies of two emerging powers under the leadership of influential 
leftist movements provide pause for consideration in the current international 
order. Many have looked to South Africa and Brazil for a hint of a ‘new’ way of 
conducting foreign affairs, largely spurred on by their own pronouncements and 
history. The search for international justice has tended to begin with the emerging 
powers of the global South, aware as they are of the hardships caused by poverty 
and marginalisation owing to their own national experiences.  
 
Much of the scholarly discussion of the foreign policies of these emerging powers 
has suffered the same fate, dependent upon the foreign policy declarations of the 
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policymaking elites of these states. Steeped in internationalism, these states have 
sought to cloak their actions in a veneer of morality and justice. They represent a 
potential in international politics, as suggested by Andrew Hurrell, for a ‘middle-
range ethics’,700 defined by a reticence to impose universal moral strictures on all 
peoples. Yet, guided by basic considerations of what is just and equitable for all the 
world’s people. 
 
It should not be forgotten, however, that these are still states, with wills to power 
and wills to survive, wills grounded in legitimacy ultimately sourced from domestic 
society. In seeking to make sense of South African foreign policy and Brazilian 
foreign policy, the large majority of analysts, native or foreign, have utilised the lens 
of ‘politics unusual’ in assessing the emergence and projection of these states. This 
has served only to sequester them from the rest of foreign policy analysis, as special 
states, which have different international priorities to those held by the ‘traditional’ 
great powers. It is akin to accepting without question the doctrine of ‘China’s 
peaceful rise’ propagated by the Chinese government. While allowance may be 
made for the fact that these states may represent a new set of values in international 
politics, room should also be left for them in traditional analyses of foreign policy 
based on realist principles, incorporating systemic dynamics and power 
considerations. 
 
8.1. Discussion of Findings and Contribution of Current Work 
 
The thesis, as foreshadowed in Chapter 1, produces two broad conclusions: State 
structure, especially the nature of the relationships – legal and institutional – 
between governing parties, the executive, and the legislature, plays a significant role 
in how states respond to international threats and opportunities. Also, the trajectory 
of intermediate states is contingent upon both systemic and domestic factors.  
 
Five key themes were introduced in Chapter 1 as lying at the heart of the present 
enquiry. They are:  
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• The nature of internationalism outside the West; 
• The weaknesses of FPA with regard to the foreign policy of states in the 
Global South; 
• The role of domestic politics, especially governing parties, in shaping the 
capabilities of states to respond to systemic imperatives, such as relative 
changes in international power; 
• Alternative routes to power in the contemporary international context; and,  
• The broader question of the continuing poverty of International Relations 
theory with respect to the foreign affairs of the developing world, 
encompassing two specific areas, namely the marginalisation of the 
developing world from studies of internationalism; and, the overlooking of 
agency in the developing world.  
 
To what extent does internationalism condition the foreign policies of South Africa and Brazil? 
An unspoken question in contemporary commentaries on the changing world order 
is ‘whose side are they on’?, in reference to emerging powers such as South Africa, 
Brazil and India. While their multilateral activism is sometimes viewed as a threat, it 
has roots in the attempts to manage complex domestic challenges and competing 
foreign policy demands. The type of ‘internationalism’ that results, whether 
conflictual or cooperative, bears great significance for the future of regional and 
global order. What this analysis has aimed to steer clear of is the typical 
dichotomising of periphery-core relations in terms of West/capitalism/human 
rights/democracy v. Non-west/socialism/repression/autocracy. The choices for 
emerging powers such as South Africa and Brazil have been couched largely in these 
terms, both by their own respective domestic critics and proponents, as well as the 
international mainstream media, characterised by the Economist, for example.701 
Yet, little account is taken of domestic politics and the differential between national 
power and expendable state power. As has been shown in Chapters 5 and 6, 
decision-makers do not always have access to the required state resources for the 
implementation of foreign policy. Furthermore, ideational and identity-related 
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commitments have a substantial impact on how leaders respond to international 
crises.  
 
How can FPA better account for developments in foreign policy formulation in the developing 
world? FPA’s agenda in the developing world requires broadening. Dependency, 
state weakness, and erratic leadership are no longer the defining characteristics of 
peripheral polities. State structure, individual leadership, and most significantly, ideas, 
grand strategy and new forms of agency are key determinants of foreign policy in 
the developing world, as elsewhere. Internationalism in foreign policy has been 
shown by this study to be a significant variable determining the goals and 
instruments of state action by developing countries.  
 
How do domestic politics, especially governing parties, affect international outcomes? For both the 
ANC in South Africa and the PT in Brazil, an anti-imperial posture is an important 
feature of international identity. This derives from historical and cultural factors at 
the national level. Where governing parties have made large concessions on 
economic policy, acquiescing in liberalisation, it appears that they have reserved the 
arena of foreign policy for the rhetoric and practice of anti-imperialism. State 
structure, and the dominance of each respective party within their given political 
systems, further determines their capacity to legitimate their foreign policy stances, 
and to secure the resources for the pursuit of foreign policy projects. This, in turn, 
is a key determinant of a state’s route to power in the contemporary international 
order.  
 
South Africa and Brazil, have sought to limit the perception of threat that their 
regional dominance projects. South Africa under Mbeki selected a route to power 
predicated on recognition as an influential African voice, speaking for the African 
continent at large, but resisting the urge to throw its weight around. Lula’s Brazil 
also opted for a peaceful path to power, still reserving its rights to expand its 
interests and broaden its diplomatic instruments at a later stage, by channelling 
resources toward certain indicators of ‘hard power’, such as nuclear submarines and 
adopting a harder line on the unfairness of the nuclear proliferation regime. 
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The thesis has made a contribution to the International Relations literature on two 
emerging powers of the developing world. By seeking to theorise the foreign policy 
motivations of two large developing states, an attempt has been made to broaden 
the empirical reach of neoclassical realism, and to test its prescriptions with respect 
to politics in the periphery, thus bringing the periphery into the mainstream. Agency 
in global politics exercised by developing countries needs to be taken into account 
in analyses of contemporary international order, especially as developing countries 
and developed countries seem to adopt divergent positions on the nature and 
norms of this order.  
 
This study has contributed to a theoretical integration of the foreign policies and 
international trajectories of two emerging powers in the contemporary international 
context. Going beyond a comparison of two sets of foreign policy, the thesis has 
presented a competition of theoretical perspectives to explain the behaviour of 
intermediate states, and then settled on one perspective, neoclassical realism, to 
make a contribution to the retrieval of IR theory for the analysis of peripheral states 
and regions. Neoclassical realism has yet to be applied to the foreign policy 
strategies of any state in the Global South.   
 
Brazil, and to a much larger extent, South Africa, have been left behind by the 
mainstream literature on emerging or intermediate states, and that on 
internationalism as a foreign policy instrument. Hence, each candidate state for such 
a study is typically analysed in isolation, in terms of its own foreign policy 
objectives, strategies and obstacles. This leads to a myopic view of how such states 
develop – and frame and re-frame their foreign policies – in response to systemic 
imperatives.  
 
The research objectives stated at the outset were to account for the extent to which 
internationalism, mediated through Leftist governing parties, conditions foreign 
policy responses in South Africa and Brazil. Hence, the key variables were the 
international distribution of power at any given stage (X1), and domestic political 
structures of each state (X2), on the one hand, and the resulting form of 
internationalism on the other (Y).  
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The resulting statement that the findings of this thesis have given rise to is:  
 
the framing of foreign policy objectives in expansive terms and the allocation of resources to foreign 
policy goals in South African and Brazilian foreign policy is positively related to favourable 
perceptions of the state’s relative power position, and positively related to the extent to which 
governing parties are able to mobilise and extract material, institutional and ideational resources in 
society.  
 
In the context of Latin America’s ‘Left Turn’ or ‘Pink Revolution’, and continuing 
security crises in Africa, presenting acute foreign policy challenges for major powers 
such as the United States, it is important to understand how global, regional and 
domestic dynamics affect the eventual foreign policy behaviour of key regional 
states.  
 
Yet, the key contribution of this thesis has been its highlighting of the study of 
governing parties and how their location within the domestic political structure 
impinges upon their possibilities for influencing and directing foreign policy. While 
the literature has noted the influence of political parties and governing regimes on 
foreign policy, in terms of state structure and levels of opposition, it has not shed as 
much light on the governing party as a repository of ideational direction and 
alternative diplomacy. The governing party, complete with its ideological tendencies, 
coalition strategies, and power political sensitivities, within a neoclassical realist 
framework, is important to our understanding of unit-level factors impinging on 
state responses to external challenges and opportunities.  
 
8.1.2. Linking empirical evidence with theory 
 
The main difficulty with the evidence at hand was the degree of objectivity that it 
was possible to access at any given time from those who were closest to the making 
of political decisions. Brazilian diplomats and the South African ex-minister 
interviewed were generally promoting the official line, and this made it more 
difficult to draw inferences about state behaviour and the perceptions of statesmen 
from those closest to them.  
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Overall, with reference to both case studies, two patterns may be discerned. The 
first is that rhetoric and the allocation of resources have been relatively easier to 
deploy for issues more distant from the prime, regional, locus of each state’s 
interests. Second, the influence of the ruling party in any general, institutionalised, 
sense is limited, for different reasons in each case. This means that while the ruling 
party may exert control primarily through the structure of the political system (as in 
South Africa), or through a number of strategically-placed individuals (as in Brazil), 
its leverage is conditioned by institutionalised practices and material constraints 
occurring at the bureaucratic, national, regional, and international levels. Leaders 
have more traction in specific contexts.   
 
At the bureaucratic level, Mbeki faced few limits, owing to his institutional 
restructuring resulting in a strengthened state presidency. He faced limits at the 
national level because of resource constraints on South African foreign policy; at the 
regional level because of the legacy of liberation politics and struggle-era loyalties, as 
well as South Africa’s reticence to act as a hegemon in Southern Africa. 
Internationally, an expansive foreign policy was welcomed and expected as long as it 
conformed to Western interests.  
 
For Lula, meanwhile, the limits of the bureaucratic level were overcome by the 
positioning of like-minded individuals in key decision-making roles. While 
discontent over foreign policy simmered in some quarters of Itamaraty, at the top, 
there were few obstacles to the Lula foreign policy. Nationally, expansiveness in 
Brazil’s foreign policy was facilitated by a growing economy and by an 
accommodating and longstanding national goal of winning recognition and status 
for Brazil. The regional context proved more limiting, as Brazil struggled to win 
followers for its leadership in South America. Finally, at the international level, 
Brazil’s increasing resources provided the platform for a wider range of global 
interests, but also led the country somewhat astray from its traditional foreign policy 
postures and interests.  
 
In theoretical terms, the institutional freedom and legitimating power enjoyed by 
ruling parties ultimately affect the resource mobilisation and extraction capabilities 
of the state, meaning that activism in foreign policy is subject to these forces.  
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In South Africa, the intervening variable of state structure permitted greater 
activism in foreign policy, but this policy was deprived of the requisite material 
resources. While under Mandela there was a sense that South Africa retained the 
goodwill of the international community – a view backed up by large disbursements 
of donor funds702 to the South African state and civil society in the immediate 
aftermath of apartheid’s overturn – Mbeki, cognisant of the fact that this would not 
continue indefinitely, ushered in a more pragmatic stance. Indeed, a report 
commissioned by the Presidency in 2003 confirmed this stance thus: 
 
The danger of [South Africa] over-extending itself became more pronounced, 
particularly with president Mbeki taking the lead in 1998 (sic). For example, in light 
of the enormity of the task at hand, some analysts question whether government’s 
Africa policy … is sustainable. Playing an active continental and international role 
tended to stretch the capacity of the DFA to the limit – a difficult issue to manage, 
given the domestic requirement for civil service transformation.703  
 
Government’s response to this was a greater centralisation of foreign policymaking, 
through the implementation of the cluster system, or ‘integrated governance’, which 
had the side-effect (intended or unintended) of increasing the influence of the 
Presidency. In neoclassical realist terms, the mobilisation and extraction power of 
the state increased markedly at this time.  
 
In Brazil, meanwhile, the more diffuse nature of political power, by way of the 
federal state, in spite of the centralising figure of the President, meant that approval 
for foreign adventures had to be obtained from the National Congress, in which no 
single party holds an outright majority. PT’s legitimating power in society has always 
been contingent, owing to its leftist credentials and Lula’s three previous attempts at 
the Presidency before finally winning the 2002 election. The roles are almost 
reversed in Brazil, compared to South Africa, in the sense that PT lacks depth in 
foreign policy thinking, while Itamaraty is steeped in history and in safeguarding 
Brazil’s noteworthy and often-praised diplomatic legacy. In South Africa, 
meanwhile, the ANC and Thabo Mbeki in particular, acted as the ideological centre 
                                                
702 Julie Hearn, “Aiding Democracy? Donors and civil society in South Africa”,  Third 
World Quarterly, 21, Issue 5 (2000); Michael Bratton and Chris Landsberg, From 
promise to delivery: Official development assistance to South Africa, 1994-8. 
(Johannesburg: Centre for Policy Studies, 1999).  
703 Anthoni Van Nieuwkerk, “Report: IRPS Cluster Review” (Midrand: Institute for Global 
Dialogue: 2003): 3.  
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of South Africa’s foreign policy, while the DFA served a more instrumental 
function. 
 
At the regional level, each state faced complex challenges in which responses had to 
be carefully calibrated not to offend, and not alienate regional partners. It should 
not be overlooked, of course, that each of these countries’ activist foreign policies 
has to some extent facilitated the other’s. Because the multilateralism of coalition-
building has been such an inherent feature of the foreign policies of South Africa 
and Brazil, each has been able to turn to the other on occasion as a ‘force multiplier’ 
of its foreign policy resources. This is exemplified in the establishment first of IBSA 
in 2006 upon the initiative of Mbeki and Lula; and, latterly, with South Africa’s 
acceptance into the BRIC group of emerging economies at the end of 2010.  
 
What has made the pursuit of ‘internationalist’ foreign policies possible at all is the 
personalisation of foreign policy. This is not a reference to populism, but to the 
centralisation of foreign policymaking within the executive, and the association of 
international goals with the personal and political struggles of the policymakers. 
This is related to the histories of the governing political parties, as well as the 
personal ideological commitments of the leaders of government. This means that 
foreign policy is subject to institutional changes, in addition to social, political and 
economic imperatives. A key contribution is rendered by governing parties, who, 
because they operate in new democracies, and were for so long excluded from 
political power, retain autonomous interests and ideas, separate from ‘established’ 
sites of political power.704 This is highly significant to their behaviour in 
government, and as has been shown, in formulating foreign policy. In the cases of 
both ANC and PT, these autonomous interests and ideas have seen the parties 
continuing with parallel diplomacy even while holding the reins of state power.  
 
8.1.3. South Africa 
In attempting to answer the question to what extent does internationalism influence the 
foreign policy of South Africa, what emerges is a picture far more complex than any that 
has been yielded thus far by analysts of South African foreign policy. 
Internationalism, while very much a vestige of the ANC’s heritage and history as a 
                                                
704 I am grateful to Dr Chris Alden for pointing this out.  
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liberation movement, has assumed more nuanced tones in the foreign policy of an 
ANC in government. This was especially true in the context of the closing years of 
Mbeki’s presidency, as the ramifications of the 1999 arms deal, the controversy 
surrounding the government’s handling of HIV/AIDS and the Zimbabwe issue, all 
conspired to unsettle the ideological hegemony of the ‘African nationalist’ faction 
within the organisation.  At the same time, it appears that for reasons of political 
and economic expedience, ‘African nationalism’ is retained as the guiding 
philosophy of ANC domestic and foreign policy, with the government preferring to 
tread carefully around the domestic political crises of its neighbours, especially 
Zimbabwe and Swaziland. A more consistently solidarist and Marxist outlook on 
international affairs, as the ANC possessed in exile, and indeed as some sections of 
the ANC and its alliance partners still subscribe to, would result in greater activism 
on human rights and economic equity issues in the southern African region and 
further afield. The ANC in government, while holding the perception of a hostile, 
unipolar world, dominated by the USA and its allies, is hamstrung – and limited to 
rhetoric – by its economic-industrial context and the development blueprint it 
subscribes to. This route to development is predicated on foreign investment and 
South Africa’s outward economic orientation, and thus requires favourable relations 
with the world’s major economic players. 
 
The literature on South Africa’s activist, internationalist foreign policy curiously 
omits to examine the role played in this foreign policy posture by South Africa’s 
dominant political party and the only governing party of a free South Africa, the 
African National Congress. The ANC plays a key role in the generation of interests 
at the national level, by virtue of its dominance of South Africa’s political life, and 
by the ‘dual mandates’ of key government figures as central party figures. However, 
the ANC has not influenced South African foreign policy postures in the manner 
that would have been predicted by its liberation struggle heritage, and its early 
statements on foreign policy. The ANC in government, under Thabo Mbeki, did 
not manage to successfully chart a visionary course at the same time as retaining 
pragmatic prerogatives.  
 
The primary source of institutional and political opposition to the ANC came, not 
from the Department of Foreign Affairs, or the oversight mechanisms of the 
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legislature, nor from the parliamentary opposition, but from within the governing 
tripartite alliance. Perceptions of state power varied depending on the issue at stake. 
State power appeared less unassailable on matters closer to home, and which posed 
a threat to the unity of the ANC and the tripartite alliance, prompting foreign policy 
decision-making that shied away from conflict and the potential use of force. 
Further afield, the South African government under Mbeki, gave full vent to its 
Africanist and anti-imperialist impulses, even going as far as to agree to despatch a 
consignment of arms to Haiti, and to recognise Western Sahara, potentially 
hastening the break-up of a fellow-African state, Morocco. 
 
One of the central contentions of this thesis is that benign, or ideological as 
opposed to material perceptions of threat to the nation entertained by the African 
National Congress as South Africa’s governing party, as well as its various leaders, 
particularly Thabo Mbeki, prevented the ANC from acting in more expansive ways 
with respect to enlarging South Africa’s international engagement, and also militated 
against the country’s selection of aggressive means for the pursuit of its 
international goals. This was a function of two processes: the centralisation of key 
decision-making capacities in the office of the President; and, the mounting 
uncertainty over the legitimating power of the ANC in South African society. 
 
On the one hand, decision-making power was progressively centralised under 
Thabo Mbeki, particularly in the Presidency. On the other, the ANC’s legitimating 
power – the ability to justify significant policy decisions - came increasingly into 
question, and, indeed declined, as its economic policies fell foul of traditional allies 
and constituencies. The latter had therefore to be periodically assured that the ANC 
remained a natural ideological and political partner. Foreign policy was used for this 
purpose.  
 
Classical realism predicts that as national power increases, a state will expand its 
international engagements. South African foreign policy complied with this 
prediction, but not in the manner predicted by realist theory, as it limited aggressive 
projections of national power. Compared to Mbeki’s first term, during which he 
assembled the instruments of state power after the formative Mandela years, his 
second term was more decisive in terms of allocating resources to foreign policy. 
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South Africa expanded its engagements in both material (financial) and rhetorical 
senses. Along with the opening of some 70 new embassies, especially in Africa, and 
the establishment of an African Renaissance Fund705, among other resource 
allocations, the South African government expanded its scope of interest in 
international affairs.  This was achieved by making pronouncements on, and 
committing resources to, matters as diverse as the political crisis in Haiti, and the 
Israel-Palestine peace process, amongst others. The country was better able to 
engage in activism and adopt assertive positions on certain issues that were more 
distant from its immediate purview, such as the Palestine-Israel and Morocco-
POLISARIO questions, than those closer to home, such as Zimbabwe. Two 
reasons – one international, and one national -  may be adduced for this: First, the 
South African leadership preferred to take more decisive action on issues further 
afield because the leadership was hesitant to be cast in a negative light, as an 
‘imperialist stooge’ in the southern African region. Second, it appeared to be easier 
to build coalitions – or at least avert significant opposition - on ideological issues 
further afield, than to broach political questions, with consequences for South 
Africa – and the political dominance of the ANC - closer to home.  
 
South African foreign policymakers, while paying lip-service to internationalism as a 
guiding principle in foreign policy, were careful to chart a course in foreign policy, 
labelled ‘pragmatic’, that would limit its political costs and increase its political gains 
as far as its own electoral alliance with the labour movement and the communist 
party were concerned. One major exception here was the Zimbabwe question, 
where security (i.e. external) concerns may have exceeded political (i.e. domestic) 
concerns in importance for key decision-makers.  
 
8.1.4. Brazil 
 
While Lula’s victory in the 2002 presidential election was resounding, the capacity of 
the Party to give effect to long-held foreign policy principles was limited by the 
institutional handicaps imposed by its comparative weakness in the legislature; 
                                                
705 Act 51 of 2000 created the African Renaissance Fund, “for the purpose of enhancing 
international co-operation with and on the African Continent and to confirm the Republic 
of South Africa’s commitment to Africa”.   
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initially slow economic growth; an uncertain relationship with the military; and its 
own weaknesses in foreign policy formulation.  
 
Both the independent variable and the dependent variable underwent changes 
during the period under consideration. Establishing any kind of causal relationship 
depends on the kinds of links that may be established between these variables. On 
the one hand, the institutional makeup of foreign policymaking changed with the 
changing fortunes of PT, the attention Lula was able to pay to foreign policy, and 
the nature and level of the issues at hand. Concerning the dependent variable, 
internationalist outcomes – those favouring non-violence, non-interference, south-
south solidarity and multilateral approaches – varied depending on the issue area, its 
geographical location, and the nature of the interests at risk.  
 
To return to the questions posed earlier: What is the connection between Brazil’s 
chosen method of power projection and the influence of a new governing party, 
PT, on foreign policy? How can neoclassical realism explain Brazilian foreign policy 
under the Lula administration?  
 
While the nature of Brazil’s political system afforded PT less institutional freedom 
on a micro-level, the pervasiveness of party ideological positions appeared to have a 
trickle-down effect on Brazil’s foreign policy approach, resulting in Brazil’s 
diplomacy being seen as more anti-American, and anti-imperial than before. The 
period of government of PT has also attended a greater emphasis by Brazil’s foreign 
policymakers on the country’s projection as a strategically important power on a 
global scale. Inherent, historical anti-Americanism has replaced the revised view of 
the balance of power in the Western hemisphere that underpinned the relatively 
easy acquiescence of Cardoso in US supremacy. The latter position is now habitually 
questioned by government officials and spokespeople.  
 
PT has not had the depth of expertise in foreign relations to exploit fully the 
opportunities provided by being in power. What it has lacked in depth, however, it 
has made up for in the personal and presidential diplomacy of Lula who left office 
as Time magazine’s “Most Influential World Leader”. Evolving from its position in 
the opposition, to a party of government, PT’s foreign policy stance has become 
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more pragmatic, without losing sight of its core constituency on the left, the 
dispossessed and voiceless poor. Because of Brazil’s socio-economic challenges, 
PT’s legitimating power on foreign policy questions that required the allocation of 
financial resources was intricately linked to the party’s domestic successes and 
failures.  
 
However, PT’s internationalism is not a concession to purely its constituencies of 
the left. This is for a number of reasons: institutional, ideological and sociological. 
Institutionally, PT is such a ‘broad church’, comprising the recognition of various 
tendencias, that there is perhaps not such a monolithic ‘left’ identity of the party 
around which it coheres, and to which it feels accountable. Ideologically, 
internationalism has not formed a fulcrum of PT’s left credentials. The international 
sphere is not an arena of salient importance for the party’s performance. This is 
linked to the last point: international relations have not been an issue of particular 
electoral importance in Brazil, although this situation is slowly changing. This means 
that foreign policy decisions have a very small constituency, comprised of the 
export industries and Brazilian investors in overseas markets, along with the ‘foreign 
policy community’ of diplomats, academics, the media, and non-governmental 
organisations.   
 
Brazil has selected a ‘strategy of emergence’ that entails the employment of 
multilateralism, multipolarity, and the search for membership of key clubs and 
groupings. Also, “(b)y opting for continued market liberalism in 2003, Lula may 
have “saved Brazil for capitalism”…, but this does not mean Brazil has become an 
easy or accommodating partner”706. Ultimately, the fact that Brazil has become 
more ensconced in the global capitalist system has not led to a dilution of 
nationalism. To the contrary, it has sharpened the Brazilian foreign policymaking 
elite’s search for international autonomy.  
 
Has the ‘swing to the left’ palpably changed Brazil’s foreign policy? It would be 
excessive to argue that it has. Brazil has maintained many of the hallmarks of 
foreign policy for which it was esteemed prior to the Lula administration, and has 
undoubtedly raised its international profile since PT’s accession to power in 2003. 
                                                
706 Hurrell, “Brazil and the New Global Order”, 62-3.  
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Brazil has projected itself more, but not in the manner expected. Lula’s first term 
was a period of political uncertainty, and flux, given PT’s arrival in power after three 
prior attempts. The deployment to Haiti as part of MINUSTAH was an important 
milestone for Brazil, facilitated by both a structural power vacuum, and the 
confluence of domestic interests, political and military, in seeing Brazil press for a 
permanent seat on the UN Security Council.  
 
By the second term, however, with increased levels of resources made available by 
strong economic growth rates under Lula, the country’s interests expanded further. 
This resulted in an incremental strengthening of Brazil’s military capabilities. PT’s 
second term in power saw further economic gains, and an updating of Brazil’s 
security posture in the National Strategy of Defense of 2008. It was only with the end of 
Lula’s presidency that it was easier to perceive a falling into line of Brazil’s ‘hard 
power’ with its rhetoric. While expanded interests in foreign policy were enunciated 
at the start of the Lula administration, it is only with the changed perception of 
leading decision-makers, and the marked improvement in Brazil’s economic 
resources that a truly nationalist, and less internationalist, foreign policy can be 
pursued.  
 
 
8.2. Neoclassical realism and new powers: Metatheoretical and 
theoretical issues 
 
The basic proposition of the realist tradition in International Relations is that state 
action is motivated by the search for power. This has been modified by successive 
generations of scholars, most notably by Kenneth Waltz707, who inserted the 
international system or structure as a causal factor in state behaviour. Later realists, 
like Walt708 and Mearsheimer709, raised security and power to a position of prime 
motivator of state action. Neoclassical realism, combining the classical realist 
conception of the state, with neorealism’s holistic ontology and focus on structure, 
underlines how state actions are contained by the structure they occupy, but determined 
                                                
707 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Boston: Addison-Wesley, 1979).  
708 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).  
709 John J. Mearsheimer, “Chapter 4: Structural Realism”, in International Relations 
Theories: Discipline and Diversity, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).  
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at the unit-level, where the state holds varying degrees of agential power (or state 
power).  
 
Although it could account for the results of change (whether more or less systemic 
stability, depending on systemic polarity), accounting for change in power structures 
and distributions of power in international politics was a difficult task for 
neorealism, predicated as it is on a foundational claim of continuity, or at least, 
repetition, in international affairs. Neoclassical realism has provided answers on the 
conditions of states’ emergence as powers, as well as their potential trajectories, by 
opening the ‘black box’ of the state, and examining the factors conditioning state 
power both domestically and abroad.  
 
By showing how the similar location of South Africa and Brazil in the international 
distribution of power has constrained their broad foreign policy goals as 
intermediate states, and how domestic politics has determined their choices, this 
thesis adds to the growing body of literature within the neoclassical realist tradition. 
By combining analyses of state structure and the international distribution of power, 
it is possible to gain valuable insight into how intermediate states judge or perceive 
their relative position in international politics, and how they select among options to 
exploit their position.  
 
As noted earlier, a neoclassical realist framework does not exclude internationalism, 
to the extent that internationalism may be regarded as both a feature of domestic 
ideology, used for placating political allies domestically, and as a tool for building 
followership internationally. It may simply be regarded as another instrument of 
international policy, and a vehicle for the pursuit of self-interested goals. 
 
Much of the scholarship on peripheral states is located within area studies, and 
divorced from the mainstream of IR scholarship. This results in the simultaneous 
marginalisation and exoticisation of peripheral polities and their international 
relations. Neorealism assertively distanced itself from considering the politics of 
developing states, or indeed, any states that were not at the pinnacle of the 
international polar structure, and therefore not determining of it. As Waltz noted in 
his focus on structural concepts, he was emphasising how they “help to explain big, 
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important, and enduring patterns”710, of which second- and third-tier powers clearly 
had no part. Neoclassical realism analyses the impact of changes in relative power 
on the foreign policies of states, and is therefore particularly apposite as a 
framework for the analysis of rising powers and emerging states.  
 
Applying neoclassical realism to two formerly peripheral polities provides an 
opportunity for the theory on FPA for the developing world to be updated. As 
noted in Chapter 1, a key point of departure for the FPA literature on the 
developing world has been that of state weakness. This has precluded discussion of 
concepts such as ‘grand strategy’, strategies of emergence, and international agency, 
which are all now at the disposal of formerly peripheral states, owing to their 
expanded material capabilities. There is also much more information available about 
the circumstances influencing foreign policy decisions in the developing world – to 
some extent, because of the advent of democracy – than hitherto.  
 
South Africa and Brazil each represent a ‘tough’ test of the neoclassical realist 
theory, because each of these states occupies relatively peaceful regional 
environments, and the United States, a historical ‘offshore balancer’ in both regions, 
has been largely absent from both during the period under consideration. It might 
have been expected, therefore, that South Africa and Brazil would take advantage of 
such a scenario to expand their reach (economically, militarily and diplomatically) 
into the respective regions over which they currently tower in economic and military 
terms. However, foreign policy expansion depends on policymakers’ perceptions of 
their place in the international context, as well as how they perceive shifts in the 
relative distribution of power, regionally and globally. Expansion also depends upon 
whether, and how, decision-makers are able to mobilise and extract national power 
or resources, converting it into state power. That neither state has selected 
aggressive expansion – as might be predicted by neorealism – is explained by 
domestic factors, such as prevailing ideologies and party politics, in addition to 
systemic factors and power balances.  
 
These conclusions mean that the dominant mode of analysing middle powers, 
chiefly as expressions of the diffusion of liberal economic and political principles, 
                                                
710 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 70. 
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falls short of capturing the full gamut of motivations of the behaviour of these 
states. While the exclusive focus on multilateralism as a ‘force multiplier’ in the 
foreign policies of emerging states is a compelling liberal account of their conduct, 
the limits of the diffusion of liberal values become apparent when intermediate 
states use international organisations to prevent actions or resolutions that may be 
prejudicial to their allies or trading partners. An example of the latter is the failure of 
both South Africa and Brazil to censure Cuba in the UN’s Human Rights Council. 
 
8.3. Future directions: South Africa 
 
In utilising the relationship between resources and the ends to which they are put as 
an analytical framework, it appears that South Africa is severely constrained by its 
domestic capacity problems. It is not sufficient that the ruling party, the African 
National Congress, dominates the state. Ultimately the fruition of its foreign policy 
plans depends heavily on the material resources (national power) and their 
conversion into state power. Thus, South Africa appears to be set for a prolonged 
period of internationalism based on rhetoric, notwithstanding – or even underlined 
by - its recent inclusion with other emerging economies within the BRIC 
grouping.711  
 
The departure of a significant source of ideational power for South African foreign 
policy, former President Thabo Mbeki, will also act as a restraint on adventurism. 
By the same token, it may potentially have provided the opportunity for a 
decentralisation of foreign policy, though this development is not to be taken for 
granted. There is also the question of whom policy has been decentralised to: the 
state bureaucracy, the party elite, or faceless presidential advisers? There is an 
increasing trend toward uniformity of political conviction (or the pretense of such) 
in the current administration of President Jacob Zuma, while a clear and coherent 
foreign policy outlook is struggling to emerge. The parliamentary opposition is 
becoming increasingly meticulous in its oversight of foreign policy decisions, but 
this still does not appear to be a significant source of policy opposition for the ANC 
government. While the highly controversial and costly – not only in economic terms 
                                                
711 South Africa’s GDP at the end of 2009, a year before being invited to join BRIC, was 
$285.3bn, while Brazil’s stood at $1.57tn, Russia’s at $1.23tn, India’s at $1.31tn, and 
China’s at $4.99tn. Source: World Bank Data.  
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– arms purchase of 1999 appeared to equip South Africa for ‘primary’ missions, the 
political leadership is still hesitant to throw South Africa’s military weight around. 
This was in evidence recently with Jacob Zuma’s reticence to support a campaign of 
military intervention in Ivory Coast, and even failing to choose a side, following the 
disputed November 2010 run-off election in that country.712 Although a close 
struggle-era relationship between the ANC and Laurent Gbagbo was cited as 
another reason for this.  
 
South Africa’s transformative agenda is also held hostage to misplaced ideas of 
Southern solidarity and anti-Western imperialism. Although these notions are firmly 
derived from the ANC’s own struggle history,713 they will require some re-working, 
which has not yet properly taken place, in the foreign policy of a sovereign state 
seeking a leadership role in African continental and global politics. The agenda 
appears to be held captive by a near-paranoia about being seen to act as a hegemon 
or as a power acting in its own interests. This is a reflection of South Africa’s re-
calibrated perception of its own power in Africa after the Nigeria debacle, and the 
failure of its Zimbabwe policy. The country withheld any comment against Hosni 
Mubarak, in spite of attacks by the Egyptian state against peaceful protesters in that 
country’s January 2011 change of government, calling only for “the Government 
and people of Egypt to seek a speedy and peaceful resolution to the current 
crisis”,714 thereby hedging its bets. On Libya, South Africa displayed disastrous 
incoherence in foreign policy formulation, more a function of domestic disarray 
than any other factor. As a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, the 
country voted in favour of Resolution 1973 authorising a ‘no-fly zone’ over Libya – 
acting against all of its own foreign policy principles and past practice. In apparently 
attempting to make amends, South Africa has refused to recognise Libya’s interim 
leadership, the Transitional National Council, and to unfreeze Libyan assets for the 
Council’s use. More significantly, South Africa failed to provide leadership, of either 
                                                
712 Bloomberg, “South Africa Bully Phobia Yields No Stance on Ivory Coast Political 
Chaos”, 9 March, 2011. Accessed online at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-
08/south-africa-bully-phobia-yields-no-stance-on-ivory-coast-chaos.html on 14 March, 
2011.  
713 As shown in the current work, and additionally, in the work of Laurie Nathan, an 
expert on South Africa’s defence and foreign policies. See Nathan, “Interests, Ideas and 
Ideology, 19.  
714 Department of International Relations and Cooperation, “Media Statement on the 
situation in Egypt”, 31 January, 2011. Accessed at: 
http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/2011/media0131.html on 14 March, 2011.  
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a political or material nature, in the context of African initiatives to resolve the 
conflict. In spite of President Zuma’s personal visit to Qaddafi in May 2011, South 
Africa squandered a rare opportunity to channel the AU stance on Libya into the 
eventual UNSC position. Indeed, the text of Resolution 1973 makes scant reference 
to the AU at all. The downside of Mbeki’s personalised diplomacy – in spite of the 
broader vision it articulated for South Africa’s foreign policy – is thus its subjectivity 
to the changed political climate.  
 
As the chapter on South Africa has illustrated, the country’s foreign policy decision-
makers appear to be stuck in a quandary of both ideational and material capacity 
dimensions. This situation may be gradually changing with the presentation to 
Parliament of a White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy, “Building a Better 
World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu”, in May 2011, the fruit of a two decades-long 
process.715 The South African state under the ANC has taken more decisive action 
on issues that strengthened its political position domestically, and has refrained 
from involvement on issues that might have threatened its dominance internally. 
Thus, South Africa’s leadership should be wary of over-cautious irrelevance. It was 
recently embraced by the BRIC formation of states, but many questions – about 
South Africa’s economic power, and its relative global presence - abound regarding 
the reasoning behind this move. 
 
Moving forward from the research framework initiated in the current enquiry could 
pose questions relating to bureaucratic and sectoral struggles over foreign policy 
within the South African government. The mobilisation and extraction of resources 
for foreign policy depend both on material capabilities and ideational resources. 
Greater attention could be paid to South Africa’s structural environment, and the 
type of foreign policy behaviour it predicts. The presence of competitor-hegemons 
such as Nigeria, the potential impact of the ‘new’ Egypt, and the ever-increasing 
presence of external powers such as China, India, Brazil and Turkey, provide 
additional variables for the computation of South Africa’s external threat or 
vulnerability, all the while mediated by the perceptions of key decision-makers. As is 
the case with Brazil, South Africa’s reticent regional hegemony and Africa-first 
                                                
715 Department of International Relations and Co-operation, White Paper on South 
Africa’s Foreign Policy. 13 May, 2011. Accessed online at: 
http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=148482 on 31 August, 2011.  
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foreign policy, should not be allowed to obscure analysis of its broader, more 
expansive, foreign policy objectives.  
 
8.4. Future directions: Brazil 
 
The uppermost echelon of Brazilian foreign policy leadership under Lula was single-
minded in its objective of raising Brazil’s international profile after the comparative 
pliancy of the Cardoso years. While ideational factors, stemming from the 
confluence of the nationalistic Ministry of External Relations and the anti-
imperialist Workers Party, certainly contributed to Brazil’s new activism, financial 
stability and incremental economic growth, along with the improvement of 
domestic consumption, helped to propel Brazil’s international ambition, and to 
provide the country with the all-important resources to fulfil it.  
 
Brazil’s growth is nowhere near that of China or India, but under PT, Brazil may be 
expected to continue to consolidate and expand its involvement in international 
questions. This is particularly plausible given the increasing domestic popular 
support716 for Brazil’s heightened status in international society. Under Brazil’s new 
president, Dilma Rousseff, the relationship between the military establishment and 
the executive will become all the more important in the determination of Brazil’s 
international goals and indeed, Brazil’s international identity, which has hitherto 
been crafted remarkably – for a state that experienced military rule for 20 years - 
free of militarism. The increasing dependence of the national government on the 
military for pacifying the Amazon, and defending Brazilian sovereignty there, 
reserves for the army a special place in Brazilian security discourse once more. This 
is underlined by the recommendations of the unprecedented Brazilian National 
Strategy of Defense of 2008, which included emphasising the indigenisation of Brazil’s 
arms supply; and, re-visiting the question of compulsory military service, among 
other issues.717 
 
                                                
716 The former Foreign Minister, Celso Amorim, cites a Pew Poll indicating that some 78 
percent of Brazilians supported the manner in which Brazil’s foreign policy has been 
conducted in recent years. See Amorim, “Overview”, 239.  
717 Brazilian Ministry of Defense. 2008. National Strategy of Defense.  
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It is also plausible to expect that as Brazil selects the path of more purposeful power 
projection, in terms of military doctrines and military hardware, it will be veering 
away from the traditional principles of PT, which are still predicated on non-
violence and internationalism. The replacement of personnel at the top of the 
foreign policy decision-making structure following the 2010 elections will also bear 
significance for self-perceptions of Brazil’s international role. With the departure of 
Celso Amorim and Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, obstacles are removed to closer 
collaboration with the US on questions of mutual interest, such as Brazil’s acting as 
a counterweight to Venezuela in the region, the creation of markets for ethanol, and 
Brazil’s pursuit of a seat on the UN Security Council. Overall, a realistic expectation 
may be cultivated that Brazil’s internationalist posture in international relations may 
be giving way to a more muscular projection of power, but that perhaps the biggest 
danger it faces is, in the words of The Economist, hubris.718 
 
The institutionalisation of Brazil’s external outlook has been borne out by the fact 
that Brazil’s international posture has not suffered major changes resulting from the 
departure of Lula, Amorim and Guimarães from the key foreign policymaking 
posts. While Dilma Rousseff, Brazil’s new president, is not as visible a diplomat as 
Lula was, Brazil has held true to its time-honoured principles of international 
diplomacy. The country abstained from voting on UN Resolution 1973 that 
authorised a ‘no-fly zone’ over Libya in March 2011. This was in line with the 
position of other major emerging powers, and with Brazil’s historical opposition to 
the use of force in international disputes.719 The anti-imperialist bent remains, with 
Brazil eager to support the bids for statehood first of South Sudan, which it was the 
first country to recognise; and of Palestine, whose bid it recognised in November 
2010. Domestically, however, Rousseff’s position has also weakened, both in 
Congress, where PT depends on an unwieldy coalition, and in the Executive, where 
four Ministers had resigned by August 2011.720 While the President is expected to 
act more pragmatically in the region, and in relation to Western powers, key 
portfolios have been given to protagonists of the Lula foreign policy. While Samuel 
                                                
718 The Economist. 2009. “Brazil takes off”, 12 November, 2009. Accessed online at: 
http://www.economist.com/node/14845197 on 14 March, 2011.  
719 VOANews, “BRICS Nations Oppose Use of Force in Libya”, April 14, 2011. Accessed 
online at: http://www.voanews.com/english/news/BRICS-Nations-Oppose-Use-of-Force-
in-Libya-119833134.html.  
720 Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report, Brazil: September 2011.  
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Guimarães is Brazil’s General Representative to MERCOSUL, Celso Amorim was 
appointed Defense Minister in August 2011.  
 
In the field of academic research, there are many prospects for innovating research 
presented by Brazil’s emergence, and its connection to domestic political processes. 
Using the current research as a basis – particularly the variables of institutional 
freedom and legitimating capacity – it will be possible to interrogate the impact of 
other social actors, such as the military, on a state’s prospects for and means of 
emergence. It will also prove productive to conduct studies over a more extensive 
duration of time of variations and continuities in Brazil’s international outlook, and 
how perceptions of external threat, along with domestic constraints and capabilities 
influence changes in foreign policy outlook. There is no question that Brazil, like 
South Africa, presents a unique face of emergence to the international community. 
The principles on which it self-consciously bases its foreign policy in abstraction are 
admirable and inspire a measure of confidence for a new way of conducting 
international relations. However, researchers must go beyond Brazil’s claims of 
‘friendship’ with all nations721 and ‘incidental’ political and economic gains,722 to gain 
a better understanding of Brazil’s objectives and available means in the Western 
Hemisphere, and in Africa, to better inform the policies of all interested parties, 
both those who rely on Brazil as an international partner, and those who compete 
with it for new markets and international prestige.  
 
8.5 Concluding remarks 
 
Activism by large developing states on issues such as landmines, trade, and military 
interventions – for humanitarian or other purposes - rendered the early years of the 
twenty-first century ripe with anticipation about the new world order that was 
taking shape following the decade of drift and US unilateralism that followed the 
Gulf War of 1990-91. Emerging states from the developing world were seen as 
bearers of some measure of moral stature because they claimed to speak for the 
marginalised, impoverished and disempowered of international politics. However, 
these moral positions have needed to be re-examined in the light of growing 
                                                
721 National Defense Strategy, p6. 
722 Amorim, “Overview”, 233. 
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national capabilities and therewith, national interests. As Neorealism has proven 
barren in analyses of developments in international relations since the end of 
bipolarity, it is important that unit-level factors: states’ motivations, interests, and 
domestic capabilities, are subjected to greater scrutiny by way of understanding their 
trajectories in international affairs, and their likely responses to external threats and 
opportunities.  
 
It has been a goal of the framework presented here to underscore the contingency 
of emerging states’ responses to international challenges and advantages. The 
external environment may present opportunities for expansion – whether in terms 
of territory or interest – but what determines expansion is state power, or the 
capacity of the state to convert its national capabilities, measured in traditional ‘hard 
power’ terms, into the ability to project power abroad. This relies on numerous 
domestic factors – material and ideational - many of which the governing party of a 
state has privileged access to.  
 
Hence, the mobilisation and extraction of resources in South Africa and Brazil, as 
shown by the preceding discussion, entails managing the domestic party political 
process, which includes the management of material and ideational resources. The 
change of leadership in both countries has provided a test for the ideas presented 
here. While the highly personalised, centralised decision-making structure 
engineered by Mbeki has prejudiced South African foreign policymaking since his 
resignation, leaving it without a clear goal and centre, Lula left the well-oiled 
machinery of Itamaraty still in place when his second term expired. This points to a 
sound platform for Brazil’s projection of power, both regionally and further afield, 
depending on the future relations between the foreign policy and military 
bureaucracies, and the Presidency. In South Africa, the centrality of Mbeki to the 
foreign policymaking machinery during his tenure as president, at the expense of the 
institutional development of DFA, has left foreign policy vulnerable to sectional 
interests and incoherence following his departure. 
 
In the final analysis, in addition to the relative distribution of power, ideas, 
individuals and institutions are all crucial elements of the foreign policies and 
trajectories of emerging powers. The discussion entertained by this thesis is thus 
 299 
suggestive of implications for the ‘revisionist/status quo’ debate. However, what the 
foreign policy conduct of South Africa and Brazil has highlighted is that challenging 
the status quo of international politics is far more a political than a military, or 
economic, exercise.  As Hurrell has noted, “What counts as ‘status quo’ or 
‘revisionist’ is itself politically contested”.723 It is no longer prudent to ascribe status 
quo characteristics to the dominant states in the system. The behaviour of some 
second-tier states, which often seeks to strengthen international procedural 
machinery, has often in recent years been automatically construed as opposed to 
Western interests. Meanwhile, little discussion is entertained regarding how Western 
interests, often in pursuit of solidarist internationalist goals, such as human rights 
and democracy-promotion, exert pressure on the founding norms of international 
life, Westphalian principles of non-intervention, for example.  
 
As others have noted, while Neorealism ascribes theoretical prominence to the 
system in determining state motivations, it does not provide much guidance on 
whether states will be revisionist or status quo states.724 While, in terms of 
Neorealism, we can be certain that states are motivated by the goal of survival under 
anarchy, we cannot know which actions this motivation prompts them to take. For 
a more comprehensive understanding, it is necessary to examine state-level 
characteristics and motivations. Internationalism is a mediating influence on foreign 
policy calculations, to the extent that national leadership is able to mobilise and 
extract national resources for foreign policy. Internationalism provides important 
ideational frameworks through which decision makers view their capabilities and 
responsibilities in international life.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
723 Andrew Hurrell, “Emerging Powers, Global Order and Global Justice”, Institute for 
International Law and Justice, NYU Law School, Spring Colloquium, 2010.  
724 Sten Rynning and Jens Ringsmose, “Why are Revisionist States Revisionist? 
Reviving Classical Realism as an Approach to Understanding International Change”, 
International Politics, 45 (2008). 
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Appendix 1: Brazilian Presidents since 1930! 
 
October 1930 – November 1930:  Augusto Fragoso, Isaías de Noronha, 
and Mena Barreto  
3 November 1930 – 29 October 1945:  Getúlio Vargas (dictatorship) 
29 October 1945 – 31 January 1936:   José Linhares 
31 January 1946 – 31 January 1951:   Gaspar Dutra 
31 January 1951 – 24 August 1954:   Getúlio Vargas (civilian government) 
24 August 1954 – 9 November 1955:   Café Filho 
9 November 1955 – 11 November 1955:   Carlos Luz 
11 November 1955 – 31 January 1956:  Nereu Ramos 
31 January 1956 – 31 January 1961:   Juscelino Kubitschek 
31 January 1961 – 25 August 1961:   Jânio Quadros 
25 August 1961 -7 September 1961:   Ranieri Mazzilli 
7 September 1961 – 1 April 1964:   João Goulart 
2 April 1964 -5 April 1964:    Ranieri Mazzilli 
15 April 1964 – 15 March 1967:  Castelo Branco  
15 March 1967 – 31 August 1969:   Costa e Silva 
31 August 1969 – 30 October 1969:  Augusto Rademaker, Aurélio de 
Lira and Márcio Melo 
30 October 1969 – 15 March 1974:   Emilio Medici 
15 March 1974 – 15 March 1979:   Ernesto Geisel 
15 March 1979 – 15 March 1985:   João Figueiredo  
15 March 1985 – 15 March 1990:   José Sarney 
15 March 1990 – 29 December 1992:   Fernando Collor de Mello 
29 December 1992 – 1 January 1995:   Itamar Franco 
1 January 1995 – 1 January 2003:   Fernando Henrique Cardoso 
1 January 2003 – 1 January 2011:   Luíz Inácio Lula da Silva 
1 January 2011 – Present:    Dilma Rousseff 
 
 
 
                                                
! Periods denoted in bold print indicate the years of the military dictatorship. 
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Appendix 2: Chronology of Major South African Political 
and Economic Events725 
 
1480s:  Bartholomew Dias becomes the first European navigator to travel around 
the tip of South Africa 
 
1497: Portuguese explorer Vasco da Gama lands on the coast of Natal, to the east 
of the country 
 
1652: Jan van Riebeeck of the Dutch East India Company founds the Cape Colony 
at Table Bay 
 
1816-1826: Shaka Zulu founds the Zulu empire 
 
1835-1840: Boers leave the Cape Colony in the ‘Great Trek’ and found the Orange 
Free State and the Transvaal in the interior 
 
1867: Diamonds discovered at Kimberley 
 
1877: Britain annexes the Transvaal 
 
1879: British defeat the Zulus in Natal 
 
1880-1881: The First Anglo-Boer War 
 
1886: Discovery of gold in the Transvaal, triggering a gold rush 
 
1889-1902: The Second Anglo-Boer War 
 
1902: Treaty of Vereeniging ends the Second Anglo-Boer War. Transvaal and 
Orange Free State become self-governing colonies of the British Empire 
 
                                                
725 Author’s own compilation, based on various sources, including: BBC News, accessed 
online at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1069402.stm on 13 August, 2010. 
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1910: Formation of the Union of South Africa, uniting the former British colonies 
of the Cape and Natal, and the Boer republics of the Transvaal and Orange Free 
State 
 
1912: Native National Congress, later re-named the African National Congress, 
formed 
 
1913: Repressive Native Land Act introduced, reserving 7% of South Africa’s land 
for black ownership 
 
1914: Founding of the National Party 
 
1918: Establishment of the secretive Broederbond to advance Afrikaner interests 
 
1919: Former German colony South West Africa placed under South African 
administration by the Trusteeship Council of the League of Nations, following the 
Versailles Peace Treaty 
 
1948: National Party wins general election; commencement of policy of Apartheid 
 
1960: Sharpeville massacre in March heightens political tensions 
 
1961: Establishment of Mkhonto we Sizwe, the armed wing of the ANC 
South Africa is declared a republic and withdraws from the British Commonwealth 
 
1960s: International pressure against the South African government and its policies 
increases 
1963-1964: Rivonia Trial, in which ten ANC leaders are tried for sabotage and 
treason 
 
1964: Nelson Mandela sentenced to life imprisonment  
 
1966: Assassination of Hendrik Verwoerd, the ‘father of apartheid’ 
 
 305 
1976: Soweto uprising  
 
1983: Formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF), an umbrella anti-apartheid 
organisation 
 
1984-1989: Township revolt and a state of emergency 
 
1985: Founding of Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) 
 
1989: FW de Klerk replaces PW Botha as State President 
 
1990: ANC unbanned; release of Nelson Mandela after 27 years’ imprisonment 
Independence of Namibia 
 
1991: Start of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) 
 
1993: Agreement is reached on an interim constitution 
 
1994: First non-racial democratic elections; Nelson Mandela becomes State 
President; a government of national unity is formed and South Africa is re-admitted 
to the Commonwealth and UN. Remaining sanctions are lifted. 
 
1996: Hearings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission commence 
Adoption of the new constitution by parliament 
 
1999: ANC wins second all-race general election; Thabo Mbeki assumes the 
presidency 
 
2001: Multinational pharmaceutical companies take the South African government 
to court for contravening patent laws by importing generic AIDS drugs.  
Durban hosts UN World Conference against Racism 
 
2002: Right-wing plot against the state uncovered as a result of bomb explosions in 
Soweto and Pretoria 
 306 
 
2004: ANC wins landslide election victory, ushering in a second term of office for 
Thabo Mbeki 
 
2005: Deputy President Jacob Zuma is relieved of his post, in the midst of a 
corruption case implicating his financial adviser.  
 
2006: South Africa becomes the first African country, and the fifth worldwide, to 
allow same-sex unions.  
 
2007: ANC’s 52nd National Conference at Polokwane, Limpopo Province, elects 
Jacob Zuma party president, placing him in line to become state president following 
the next general election, pending the outcome of a corruption case 
 
2008: A wave of xenophobic violence sweeps the country resulting in a number of 
deaths and the return home of some migrants.  
 
A judge throws out the corruption case against Zuma, clearing the way for his 
election as state president 
 
Resignation of President Thabo Mbeki over allegations he interfered in the 
corruption case against Mr Zuma. Kgalema Motlanthe, ANC deputy leader, is 
chosen by parliament as president.  
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Appendix 3 : Chronology of Major Brazilian Political and 
Economic Events726 
 
1500: Portuguese explorers claim present-day Brazil for the Portuguese Crown 
 
1822: Emperor Dom Pedro I, son of the Portuguese king, declares independence 
from Portugal 
 
1888: Slavery is abolished 
 
1889: Monarchy overthrown; establishment of a federal republic, the ‘First Republic’ 
 
1930: Revolt places Getúlio Vargas at the head of a provisional  revolutionary 
government 
 
1937: Vargas leads a coup and installs himself as dictator, initiating a social welfare 
revolution under the banner of the ‘Estado Novo’ (‘New State’) 
 
1939-1945: Brazil joins the war effort on the side of the Allies in 1943, after initially 
declaring itself neutral.  
 
1945: Vargas is deposed in a military coup. Elections are held, along with the 
inauguration of a new constitution that returns power to the states. The birth of the 
‘Second Republic’ 
 
1951: Vargas is elected president 
 
1954: Vargas commits suicide, after the military gives him an ultimatum to resign or 
be overthrown. 
 
1956-61: Presidency of Juscelino Kubitschek during which Brazil achieves rapid 
economic growth, but at the expense of its economic independence, by incurring 
massive debt. The new capital, Brasilia, is built in the interior, and opened in 1960.  
                                                
726 Author’s own compilation, based on various sources, including: BBC News, accessed 
online at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1231075.stm on 12 August, 2010;  
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1960: Jânio Quadro is elected president, but resigns after seven months, plunging 
the country into crisis. He is succeeded by his left-wing vice-president João Goulart, 
whose constitutional powers are curtailed following fears by the military of his 
populist policies.  
 
1964: Military coup, supported by the CIA, deposing Goulart. The period of military 
rule is associated with repression, but comparatively milder than that experienced in 
other South American military dictatorships. It is also a period of rapid economic 
growth and industrialisation (based on import substitution) 
 
1974: Ernesto Geisel becomes president, ushering in a period of decompressão, or 
gradual liberalisation of the political system, including limited political activity and 
elections.  
 
1979: Establishment of Partido dos Trabalhadores in Sao Paulo 
 
1982: Brazil defaults on payment of its foreign debt 
 
1983: Establishment of Central Única dos Trabalhadores, affiliated to PT 
 
1985: Tancredo Neves elected first civilian president in 21 years but falls ill and dies 
shortly after his inauguration. He is succeeded by his vice-president, Jose Sarney 
 
1986: Sarney introduces the Cruzado Plan in a bid to control inflation, but when 
price freezes are lifted, inflation skyrockets.  
 
1988: Drafting of new constitution; limitation of presidential powers, and extension 
of the legislative powers. Voting age is reduced from 18 to 16.  
 
1989: In the first direct presidential elections since 1960, Fernando Collor de Mello 
is elected President. Economic woes continue and foreign debt repayments are 
suspended once more.  
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1992: Earth Summit is held in Rio de Janeiro. Collor resigns after being impeached. 
He is later cleared; succeeded by vice-president Itamar Franco. 
 
1994: Eminent sociologist and development theorist Fernando Henrique Cardoso is 
elected president following his massive popularity as Finance Minister and success 
in helping to bring inflation under control.  
 
1997: Constitution is amended to allow the president to run for re-election; a 
maximum of two consecutive terms.  
 
1998: Cardoso is re-elected; Brazil receives a rescue plan from the IMF following 
the financial crisis of East Asia. 
 
2000: Brazil’s 500th anniversary 
 
2002: Members of MST occupy President Cardoso’s family ranch 
 
2002-2003: Lula wins presidential election by a landslide, heading Brazil’s first left-
wing government for 40 years. His inauguration pledges include political and 
economic reforms, and the eradication of hunger. 
 
2004: A wave of land invasions in April tests the agrarian policy of the Lula 
government.  
 
2005: Mensalão corruption crisis rocks PT, followed by a wave of resignations 
reaching high up into the executive, including the President’s Chief-of-Staff, Jose 
Dirceu.  
 
2006: In spite of corruption scandal, Lula is re-elected.  
 
2007: Government recognises for the first time human rights abuses carried out 
under the military dictatorship. More than 500 people are believed to have been 
killed or ‘disappeared’.  
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Renan Calheiros, speaker of the Senate and a key Lula ally resigns to avoid 
impeachment following a long-running corruption scandal.  
 
2008: Environment Minister Marina Silva resigns following conflict with the 
government over its Amazon policy.  
 
Brazil turns down an invitation from Iran to join OPEC 
 
2009: Brazil pledges an offer of $10 billion to the IMF, to assist developing 
countries with credit 
Brazil and Paraguay reach a deal over the Itaipu hydroelectric plant 
The government announces that it will establish a truth commission to investigate 
abuses committed under military rule.  
 
Major blackouts in Rio and Sao Paulo 
 
2010: Lula makes controversial diplomatic forays into the Middle East and Iranian 
nuclear questions.  
 
PT wins its third consecutive presidential election, with Dilma Rousseff replacing 
Lula in office.  
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Appendix 4: Haiti Chronology of Events 
 
1 January 1804:  Independent republic of Haiti declared after 
overthrow of French rule by revolt. Haiti is the first 
independent Black republic in history.  
 
1915-1934:    US military occupation.  
 
1986:     Flight of ‘Baby Doc’ Duvalier 
 
16 December 1990:  Jean-Bertrand Aristide wins 67 per cent of the vote 
in Haiti’s first free and fair elections.  
 
September 1991:   Military coup ousts Aristide. 
 
July 1994:  UNSC authorises deployment of 20,000-strong 
multinational force, mainly comprised of US 
marines, to facilitate the return of Aristide.  
 
October 1994:   US intervention  
 
1995:  Election of René Préval, first democratic transfer of 
power from one elected leader to another in Haiti’s 
history. 
 
November 2000:   Aristide elected for second term by landslide.  
 
29 February 2004:   UNSC adopts resolution 1529 (2004), authorising 
MIF 
 
30 April 2004:  UNSC adopts resolution 1542, establishing 
MINUSTAH, to take over from MIF on 1 June 
2004.  
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31 May 2004:  Jean-Bertrand Aristide and his family arrive in South 
Africa 
 
January 2006:    Elections postponed for the fourth time.  
 
February and April 2006:  Elections bring Rene Preval to power.  
 
14 May 2006:    Préval inaugurated as 55th President of Haiti. 
 
27 August 2006:   Hurricane Ernest hits Haiti. 
 
January 2010:  Earthquake devastates Haiti, leaving nearly 200 000 
people dead. 
 
November 2010-April 2011: First- and second-round Presidential elections. 
Michel Martelly elected president by a landslide. 
 
January 2011:    ‘Baby Doc’ Duvalier returns to Haiti. 
 
March 2011: Days before the second-round election, Jean-
Bertrand Aristide returns to Haiti. 
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Appendix 5: Selected South African Internationalist 
Foreign Policy Actions 1999-2008727 
 
January Calls for ceasefire in Sierra 
Leone, supports government of 
Ahmed Tejan Kabbah. 
 
Deputy President Mbeki 
dismisses reports that South 
Africa will send troops to war-
torn Angola.  
 
On British PM Tony Blair’s 
state visit to South Africa, 
President Mandela acts as a 
mediator between Blair and 
Muammar Ghaddafi regarding 
the extradition of the PAN-AM 
bombers.  
February South Africa chairs NAM from 
1998 to 2001. 
March  
April  
May  
June 16: President Mbeki’s inauguration 
following the ANC’s victory in the 
second democratic election.  
 
25: In his speech at the opening 
of South Africa’s second 
democratically-elected 
parliament, Mbeki calls for a 
new world order and pledges 
South Africa’s commitment to 
Africa in foreign policy.  
July 10: Signing of the Lusaka 
Cease-fire Agreement for DRC, 
in which South Africa played a 
major role in negotiating and 
drafting.  
 
Mbeki reacts angrily to Britain’s 
decision to sell off vast amounts 
of its gold bullion reserves.  
1999 
August Mbeki hosts talks with Rwanda, 
Tanzania and Uganda, regarding 
the civil war in the DRC.  
 
28: Final draft of South Africa’s 
ill-fated arms purchase package 
is delivered to President Mbeki, 
for consideration by Cabinet the 
following week.  
 
The 19th SADC Summit, with 
Mbeki as Chair, takes place in 
                                                
727 Source: BBC Monitoring.  
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Maputo, Mozambique, debating 
trade and development issues, 
as well as diplomatic measures 
to end conflicts in Angola and 
DRC.  
September 9: Extraordinary Summit of the 
OAU calls for the establishment 
of an African Union (AU).  
October South African delegation, 
headed by President Thabo 
Mbeki, attends former President 
Julius Nyerere’s funeral in 
Tanzania.  
November President Mbeki is appointed 
the first Chair of the 
Commonwealth, a newly-
created position. 728 
 
December South African government 
mulls extradition of Ethiopia’s 
former military leader Haile 
Mengistu Mariam, who faces 
charges of crimes against 
humanity in Ethiopia.729 
 
January SADC Protocol on Trade 
enters into force.  
February South Africa assumes the chair 
of the Commonwealth  
March  
April  
May  
June  
July South Africa hosts the World 
Conference on HIV/AIDS 
11: Constitutive Act of the AU 
adopted during the Lomé 
Summit of the OAU.  
August 28: Arusha Peace and 
Reconciliation Agreement for 
Burundi, in which South Africa 
has played a major role, is 
signed, without two rebel 
groups.  
September South Africa establishes an 
embassy in Kigali.  
October Mbeki, in the leaked text of a 
speech, accuses the CIA, 
Western governments and 
international drug firms of 
conspiring against him over his 
AIDS-denialist position.  
2000 
November The Abuja Treaty, establishing 
the African Economic 
Community (AEC) is ratified by 
                                                
728 IRIN. 1999. “Mbeki appointed as first Commonwealth chairman”, 16 November, 1999. 
Accessed online at: http://www.irinnews.org/PrintReport.aspx?ReportID=10559 on 14 
June, 2011.  
729 BBC News. 1999. “Mengistu skips South Africa”, 8 December, 1999. Accessed online 
at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/555304.stm on 14 June, 2011.  
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the South African Parliament.  
 
Several African leaders meet in 
Mozambique for a meeting 
chaired by President Mbeki to 
revive the collapsed peace 
process in DRC. 
 
Presdient Mbeki addresses the 
opening session of the Islamic 
Summit Conference in Doha, 
Qatar.  
 
December  Donors’ conference for 
Burundi held in Paris; US$440 
million pledged.  
 
South Africa and MERCOSUL 
pledge freer trade. Mbeki 
receives Brazil’s highest civilian 
order, the Southern Cross.  
 
January President Mbeki unveils 
Millennium African Recovery 
Programme (MAP) at the 
World Economic Forum in 
Davos.  
February 27: AU Act ratified by the 
South African Parliament 
 
President Mbeki authorises a 
defence force rescue mission to 
flood-hit Mozambique. South 
Africa also provides food and 
medication.  
March 2: Establishment of the AU in 
Sirte, Libya 
 
South Africa despatches troops 
to DRC as part of the UN 
Mission.  
 
Implementation of the Review 
of the Operations of SADC 
Institutions commences.  
April South Africa concludes its 
tenure as chair of UNCTAD. 
May South Africa hosts the UN 
World Conference Against 
Racism in Durban. 
June  
July South Africa becomes a 
member of the OAU/AU 
troika for a period of three 
years.  
August  
2001 
September President Mbeki and five other 
SADC regional Heads of State 
attend a two-day summit in 
Harare, aimed at resolving 
conflict in Zimbabwe.  
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11: South Africa condemns the 
terror attacks on the US.  
October 29: The first contingent of a 
battalion of 700 South African 
troops arrives in Bujumbura, 
Burundi as part of the 
transitional government 
agreement.730 
November  
 
December  
 
January SA’s use of Mozambique’s 
Cahora Bassa dam said to be 
‘unbearable’.  
 
Parliament passes International 
Criminal Court Act, committing 
South Africa to the Rome 
Statute.  
 
President Mbeki hosts the Spier 
Presidential Peace Retreat for 
Palestinian and Israeli officials 
and peace activists. 
 
 
February  
March  
April Deputy President Jacob Zuma 
is despatched to Angola to 
discuss the country’s political 
and material needs.  
May Mozambique and South Africa 
sign transport agreements to 
ease the flows of passengers 
and goods into the two 
countries 
 
June  
July South Africa assumes chair of 
the OAU.  
 
9: AU launched in Durban, 
South Africa 
 
August Preservation of Timbuktu 
manuscripts project is launched 
with Mali.  
 
South Africa hosts the World 
Summit on Sustainable 
Development (WSSD) in 
Johannesburg.  
September  
2002 
October Parliament approves 4 bills to 
enhance the effectiveness of the 
intelligence services, in partial 
                                                
730 Source: BBC Monitoring, 29 October, 2001.  
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response to terrorist threat.   
 
November Mandela acts as mediator in 
Burundi conflict, overseeing the 
installation of a three-year 
transitional government. 
 
South Africa opens an embassy 
in Bamako, Mali.  
 
Mbeki addresses the closing 
session of the ASEAN summit, 
promoting NEPAD.  
 
December  
 
January  
February Protocol on African Court of 
Justice adopted by the 
Assembly of the African Union 
in Maputo, Mozambique.  
 
A dinner is held in honour of 
Sudanese President Omar El 
Bashir in Pretoria.  
 
South Africa hosts Nigerian 
President Obsanjo on a state 
visit. 
 
South Africa’s term as Chair of 
the Non-Aligned Movement 
ends.  
March 11: President Mbeki is the first 
foreign President to address the 
Botswana Parliament.  
 
Mbeki is involved, in his 
capacity as chairperson of the 
AU, in peace and stability 
efforts in Liberia.  
April South Africa donates 
R93,5million to the WFP to 
improve food security in 
Zimbabwe, and a further R12 
million to combat the spread of 
foot-and-mouth disease in the 
country.  
 
Final session of the Inter-
Congolese Dialogue (ICD) 
takes place at Sun City, North 
West Province in South Africa. 
Global and Inclusive 
Agreement on the Transition in 
the DRC is endorsed 
2003 
May South Africa despatches a 
rescue team to Algeria to assist 
with rescue operations 
following an earthquake which 
left more than 2,000 dead and 
8,000 injured.  
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June  
July 23: South Africa participates in 
multinational mediation in Sao 
Tome e Principe following the 
coup there. 
 
The Asian and African 
Subregional Organisations’ 
Conference is held in Bandung, 
Indonesia.  
 
President George W. Bush of 
the USA visits South Africa. 
Issues on the agenda for 
discussion with Mbeki include 
bilateral economic relations, 
NEPAD, African conflicts, 
Zimbabwe, the global war on 
terror and AIDS.  
 
President Mbeki conducts a 
state visit to Jamaica in order to 
address CARICOM on 
NEPAD.  
August  
September  
October 9: Signing of the peace 
agreement between the Burundi 
Government and the Forces for 
the Defence of Democracy, in 
which South Africa played a 
leading negotiating role.  
 
President Mbeki pays a state 
visit to India.  
November  DA criticises troop deployment 
in Burundi. Would cost R679m 
in 2003, R564m in 2004, 
R771m in 2005 and about 
R600m in 2006. No help from 
UN and other donors. 
 
During the China-Africa 
Cooperation Forum Meeting in 
Addis Ababa, China reaffirms 
its support for the objectives of 
NEPAD.  
 
President Mbeki conducts a 
state visit to Canada. Canada is 
the first country to create a 
fund to support NEPAD, the 
C$500 million Fund for Africa. 
 
Mbeki hosts Brazilian President 
Lula da Silva.  
 
Mbeki pays a state visit to 
France.  
 
December  
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January SANDF personnel and 
equipment deployed to Haiti in 
support of its centenary 
celebrations, at a cost of R2m 
(about US$300 000). 
Celebrations attended by 
President Mbeki.  
February  
March 18: Launch of Pan-African 
Parliament 
April South Africa to train South 
Sudan officials; add 800 more 
troops to peacekeeping force in 
Darfur, to join the 500 South 
Africans already there, satisfying 
UN requirement for a full SA 
battalion on the ground.  
Indian president, APJ Abdul 
Kalam, visits South Africa. 
South African government 
defends exiled Ugandan 
opposition leaders, Kizza 
Besigye, and his right to hold 
meetings in South Africa.  
 
 
May South Africa becomes a 
member of the AU’s Peace and 
Security Council. 
June A presidential Bi-National 
Commission between South 
Africa and DRC is established 
in order to serve as a legal 
framework for the management 
of post-conflict reconstruction 
and development projects in 
that country. 
July  
August South Africa supports the case 
for Madagascar’s membership 
of SADC in the aftermath of 
the disputed election results of 
2000. 
 
South Africa hosts the 
fourteenth NAM Ministerial 
conference in Durban.   
2004 
September Inauguration of Pan-African 
Parliament, South Africa. 
South Africa chairs the AU’s 
Post-Conflict Reconstruction 
Committee on Sudan. SA had 
already committed to the 
training of SPLM leadership. 
  
Mbeki addresses the UN 
General Assembly’s 59th session, 
addressing among other issues, 
the promotion of NEPAD; 
support for the Middle East 
peace process; and, expressing 
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readiness for South Africa’s 
permanent membership of the 
UN Security Council. Mbeki 
reminds the Assembly that the 
biggest threat facing the world is 
poverty and underdevelopment, 
and not terrorism.731 
October  
November South Africa participates in a 
trilateral agreement with Cuba 
and Rwanda, funded by the 
African Renaissance Fund, for 
the training of Rwandan doctors 
in Cuba.  
 
 
December  
 
January  
February South Africa supports 
ECOWAS position on restoring 
Togo to constitutionality 
following Eyadema’s death. 
 
South Africa makes a 
contribution to Guinea-Bissau 
through the UNDP trust fund.  
March 31: South Africa sends a 
National Observer Mission to 
observe Zimbabwe’s 6th 
Parliamentary elections. The 
elections are found to be 
“credible and reflective of the 
will of the people of 
Zimbabwe”.  
 
South Africa despatches police 
officials to work closely with 
the Congolese police force and 
co-operates with Britain and the 
Netherlands to assist the 
Congolese government with the 
integration of the national 
force. 
2005 
April Seven SADC states, including 
South Africa, ratify the SADC 
Mutual Defense Pact.  
South Africa funds a R25m 
contribution from the African 
Renaissance Fund to assist the 
DRC.  
 
Mbeki commences mediation 
role in Ivory Coast conflict, but 
is rejected by rebels in 
September for “economic 
expansionism” and suspected 
                                                
731 Quintal, Angela. 2004. “Poverty is the enemy, says Mbeki”, in Independent Online. September 23, 
2004. Accessed online at: http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/poverty-is-the-enemy-says-mbeki-
1.222501 on 8 June, 2011.  
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partisanship in favour of 
President Laurent Gbagbo.732 
The Pretoria Agreement is 
signed.  
 
May By 6 May, South Africa had 
deployed 294 troops in Sudan 
as part of the UN mission, 
along with 18 members of the 
South African Police Services. 
June South Africa sends a Military 
Advisory and Monitoring Team 
to Ivory Coast. 
 
South Africa participates in the 
second South Summit in Doha, 
Qatar.  
July South Africa despatches an 
electoral observer mission to 
Burundi for its elections on 4 
July, concluding that they are 
conducted in a transparent 
manner. South Africa also 
provided election materials for 
the 2005 election and 
referendum.  
 
South Africa, along with 
Indonesia, is instrumental in the 
launch of the New Asia – 
Africa Strategic Partnership 
(NAASP) in Bandung on the 
50th anniversary of the Bandung 
Conference 
August  
September South Africa opens an embassy 
in Brazzaville, Republic of 
Congo.  
October South Africa participates in the 
Conference of the Parties (CoP) 
of the Convention against 
Transnational Organised Crime 
in October 2005.  
November South Africa opens an embassy 
in Conakry, Guinea.  
 
December R13million is allocated for 
tsunami disaster relief. 
 
South Africa joins the 
Wassenaar Agreement, a 
conventional arms and dual-use 
technology control regime.  
 
2006 January South Africa receives Bolivian 
President Evo Morales on a 
state visit.  
                                                                                                                               
732 Mail and Guardian. 2005. “Côte d’Ivoire rebels reject SA mediation”, in Mail and Guardian. 1 
September, 2005. Accessed online at: http://mg.co.za/article/2005-09-01-cocircte-divoire-rebels-
reject-sa-mediation on 8 June, 2011.  
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February South Africa establishes a 
diplomatic mission in Burkina 
Faso.  
March South Africa extends 
deployment of 950 members of 
the SANDF as part of the 
ONUB to March 2007. South 
Africa’s Minister of Safety and 
Security, Charles Nqakula, is 
appointed facilitator of the 
Burundi Peace Process.  
 
South Africa also extends the 
deployment of 46 SANDF 
troops in Ivory Coast to 31 
March, 2007. 
April  
May 14: South Africa provides 680 
troops for AU force in support 
of elections in Comores.  
 
By this month, South Africa 
had contributed 1,409 troops to 
the UN Mission in the DRC.  
 
By this month, South Africa 
had sent 437 troops as part of 
the AU force in Darfur.  
June Free Trade Agreement, 
SACU/EFTA signed.  
July South Africa deploys a 108-
person election observer 
mission to monitor the general 
and presidential elections in 
DRC.  
 
The Department of Foreign 
Affairs is engaged in a capacity-
building project with DRC’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
International Co-operation.  
 
The inaugural IBSA Summit is 
held in Brasilia.  
August  
September South Africa’s cabinet approves 
the deployment of 85 SANDF 
members to assist with defence 
force capacity-building in the 
CAR.  
 
President Mbeki attends the 
signining of a cease-fire 
agreement between the 
government of Burundi and the 
Palipehutu-FNL.  
October  
 
November President Mbeki participates in 
the first-ever Africa-South 
American Summit in Abuja, 
Nigeria.  
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 December SANDF provides support to 
the CAR government in 
repelling attacks from northern 
rebels.  
 
President Mbeki meets 
President George W Bush in 
Washington. The two leaders 
discuss the status of bilateral 
political and economic 
relations; conflict resolution 
and peacekeeping in Africa; 
and, multilateral cooperation.  
 
January South Africa assumes its non-
permanent seat in the UNSC, 
following elections held in 
October 2006 in the UNGA. 
February Chinese President Hu Jintao 
visits South Africa, marking the 
inauguration of the ten-year 
China-SA diplomatic relations 
celebrations; a boost for SA-
China strategic relationship.  
 
South Africa attends the 
International Conference of 
Solidarity with the Saharawi 
People in Tifariti.  
 
South Africa opens an embassy 
in Cotonou, Benin.  
 
2007 
March  
SA assumes the Presidency of 
the UNSC for the month of 
March 2007.  
 
SA ends silence on Zimbabwe 
and urges Mugabe to ‘respect 
the rule of law’. This, after 
continued silence following the 
arrest and torture of Tsvangirai 
and others. Levy Mwanawasa of 
Zambia was the only African 
leader to speak out in stronger 
terms.  
 
In the financial year 2006-7, 
South Africa commits 
international transfers of some 
R17 million in response to 
requests for humanitarian aid 
from the Republic of Guinea 
and Djibouti, following flash 
floods in that country.   
 
South Africa participates in the 
AU Observer Mission for 
Mauritania, monitoring the 
constitutional referendum in 
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June 2006, legislative and 
municipal elections in 
December 2006, and 
presidential elections in March 
2007.  
 
Cabinet approves a request 
from the African Development 
Bank (ADB) for South Africa 
to contribute towards clearing 
Liberia’s unpaid debt to the 
bank (about US$ 3,6 million, or 
6,25% of requested amount).  
 
President Mbeki attends 
Ghana’s 50th anniversary 
independence celebrations in 
Accra.  
 
Minister Nkosazana Dlamini 
Zuma addresses the UNSC on 
the relationship between the 
UNSC and the AU’s PSC in 
conflict resolution in Africa.  
April South Africa supports the 
lifting of the AU’s suspension 
of Mauritania’s membership 
following a coup there in 
August 2005.  
 
Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz 
Pahad hosts a senior Sri Lankan 
delegation in Pretoria, with the 
purpose of sharing South 
Africa’s constitutional 
experiences. The meeting takes 
place in the framework of 
South Africa’s Road Map of 
Engagement, a contribution to 
conflict-resolution in Sri Lanka.  
 
May South Africa approves the 
extension to July 2007 of the 
deployment of 70 SANDF 
members to Mozambique. The 
purpose of the deployment is to 
provide military assistance in 
the clearance and demolition of 
unexploded ordnance devices.  
 
President Mbeki attends the 
inauguration of President 
Umaru Yar’Adua of Nigeria.  
 
President Mbeki pays the first 
visit by a South African Head 
of State since 1994 to Hanoi, 
Vietnam.  
 
South Africa hosts a delegation 
of the Movimiento al Socialismo, 
the majority party of Bolivia, as 
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part of an offer to assist 
Bolivians with institution-
building and constitution-
drafting.  
 
President George W. Bush 
authorises the President’s 
Emergency Plan for AIDS 
Relief (PEPFAR). South Africa 
is allocated R6 billion for a 4-
year period.  
June Dr Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma 
hosts an AU meeting on the 
situation in the Comoros, 
including forthcoming 
elections.  
July South Africa’s cabinet approves 
the deployment of five SANDF 
members as part of an AU 
mission in Northern Uganda 
until March 2008.  
August South Africa is represented at 
the African Diaspora Global 
Conference in Barbados. The 
conference precedes the AU 
Global Diaspora Conference in 
November 2007, and the AU 
Global Diaspora Summit of 
early 2008.  
September President Mbeki leads a South 
African delegation to the 62nd 
session of the UNGA. He 
addresses the UNGA and the 
UNSC meeting hosted by 
President Nicolas Srakozy on 
Peace and Security in Africa.  
October Second IBSA Summit takes 
place.  
November South Africa participates in the 
US-initiated Annapolis 
International Conference on 
the Israeli-Palestinian Peace 
Process.  
 
South Africa announces its 
intention to provide financial 
assistance to Palestine for 
capacity-building projects until 
2010.  
 
December Humanitarian assistance 
totalling R500 000 was 
disbursed to Haiti and Bolivia.  
 
2008 January Inaugural session of the South 
Africa-China Strategic Dialogue 
between foreign ministers of 
the two countries. The launch 
of the dialogue marks 10 years 
of SA-China relations, since 
South Africa switched from 
recognition of RoC to PRC.  
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February Kuwaiti deputy premier visits 
South Africa to advance 
bilateral ties.  
 
An agreement formalising the 
establishment of the Arab 
League Office in South Africa is 
formalised.  
 
March President Mbeki attends the 
40th Independence Day 
celebrations of Mauritius in 
Port Louis.  
 
South Africa’s Cabinet extends 
the mandate of SANDF 
members in Northern Uganda 
participating in an AU mission.  
 
South Africa despatches a relief 
consignment (worth some R4 
million) to Kenya, in response 
to an appeal for emergency 
support following the 
December 2007 election-related 
violence.  
 
AU Post-Conflict and 
Reconstruction Committee on 
Sudan, headed by Minister 
Zuma, visits Sudan.  
April President Mbeki hosts President 
Kabila of the DRC for the 5th 
Bi-National Commission. South 
Africa’s assistance to the DRC 
is broadly based on five priority 
areas: health, education, water 
and sanitation and 
infrastructure, with security 
sector reform a priority.  
 
President Mbeki pays an official 
visit to India, to participate in 
the inaugural Africa-India 
Partnership Summit.  
 
South Africa hosts the Durban 
Review Conference, the follow 
up to the World Conference 
Against Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia 
and Related Intolerance.  
 
May South Africa’s cabinet approves 
the deployment of 15 SANDF 
members to CAR.  
 
President Mbeki leads a 
government and business 
delegation to Qatar.  
 
IBSA Ministerial Meeting takes 
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place in Somerset West, South 
Africa coincides with IBSA’s 
first joint naval exercise.  
June Ethiopian President Meles 
Zenawi conducts a state visit to 
South Africa.  
 
South Africa hosts a special 
meeting with Government 
leaders of Burundi to discuss 
the consolidation of peace in 
that country.  
 
Nigerian President Umaru 
Yar’Adua conducts his first 
state visit to South Africa.  
July Egyptian President Hosni 
Mubarak pays his first state visit 
to South Africa.  
August SADC Summit held, South 
Africa assumes Chair of the 
Summit. The SADC FTA and 
Protocol on Gender and 
Development are launched.  
 
Deputy President Mlambo-
Ngcuka leads a South African 
delegation to the 17th 
International AIDS Conference.  
 
The first Turkey-Africa 
Summit, under the theme 
“Solidarity and Partnership for 
a Common Future” is held in 
Istanbul. South Africa is 
represented by Deputy 
President Mlambo-Ngcuka.  
September President Mbeki pays a visit to 
Sudan, holding talks with 
President El Bashir.  
 
Minister Dlamini Zuma 
addresses the UNGA in New 
York.  
 
24: President Mbeki’s term of office 
is terminated. 
October 3rd IBSA Summit in New Delhi.  
November  
 
December  
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Appendix 6: Selected Brazilian Internationalist Foreign 
Policy Actions, 2003-2010 
 
January The Brazilian government 
condemns terrorist attacks in 
Tel Aviv that caused 23 deaths.  
 
Brazil’s government expresses 
concern at North Korea’s 
withdrawal from the NPT.  
 
Brazil sponsors the creation of 
the OAS Secretary-General’s 
Group of Friends of Venezuela.  
 
Lula attends the World Social 
Forum in Porto Alegre.  
 
Lula attends the World 
Economic Forum in Davos.  
February USP/Itamaraty Cooperation 
Project in support of Timor 
Leste is launched.  
 
MERCOSUL ministers reaffirm 
their repudiation of terrorism 
and WMD in a joint statement.  
 
The Brazilian government 
affirms its reservations 
regarding the use of force in 
Iraq and requests a peaceful 
resolution of the issue, in 
accordance with international 
law.  
 
Brazil condemns terrorist attack 
in Colombia.  
 
Brazil requests the WTO DSM 
to establish a panel to examine 
the US’s cotton subsidies.  
2003 
March Brazil sponsors consultations to 
identify possible support 
measures for Guinea-Bissau 
during its political and 
institutional crisis.  
 
Mahathir Mohamed visits Brazil 
 
Brazil opens an embassy in Sao 
Tome e Principe, the last CPLP 
state without standing Brazilian 
diplomatic representation.  
 
The Brazilian government 
“deeply regrets” the 
commencement of military 
operations against Iraq.  
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April Brazil abstains from voting on a 
resolution on the human rights 
situation in Cuba in the UN 
Human Rights Commission.  
 
Hugo Chavez visits Brazil and 
unveils a statue of Simon 
Bolivar in Recife.  
 
Minister Amorim attends an 
OECD Ministerial Meeting in 
Paris.  
May Amorim visits 6 African 
nations: Mozambique, 
Zimbabwe, Sao Tome e 
Principe, Angola, South Africa 
and Namibia.  
 
The Framework Agreement for 
Tobacco Control is approved in 
Geneva, after talks presided 
over by Brazil.  
June Lula participates in G8 meeting 
in Evian.  
 
Brazil and South Africa sign a 
defense cooperation agreement. 
 
IBSA is established “in order to 
promote regular political 
consultation on matters of 
common interest”.733 
 
Brazil signs the Framework 
Agreement for Tobacco 
Control, the first multilateral 
mechanism of public health 
negotiated in the World Health 
Organisation (WHO). Brazil 
was instrumental in the framing 
of this agreement.  
 
Lula attends the 24th 
MERCOSUL Summit in 
Asuncion.  
 
Lula conducts a state visit to the 
USA.  
 
Brazil attains observer-status at 
the Arab League.  
 
Lula attends a Summit of the 
Andean Community, the first 
time a Brazilian president is 
invited to do so.  
 
July Brazil affirms that it has no 
intention of signing the bilateral 
                                                
733 Ministry of External Relations of Brazil. 2006. Brazilian Foreign Policy Under Lula: A 
Chronology (2003-2006). MRE: Brasília.  
 330 
agreement proposed by the 
USA to grant immunity for 
USA citizens in the ICC.  
 
Brazil contributes two transport 
planes to the Multilateral 
Interim Emergency Task Force 
in Bunia, DRC.  
 
Brazil requests the 
establishment of a WTO DSM 
panel on European sugar export 
subsidies. 
 
Brazil achieves victory in the 
WTO against US steel 
safeguards.  
 
Lula attends the Summit of 
Progressive Governance in 
London. The UK again voices 
its support for Brazil’s UNSC 
permanent seat candidacy.  
 
The Brazilian government 
condemns and “strongly 
opposes” the military coup in 
Sao Tome e Principe.  
 
Minister Amorim presides over 
the Eight Council of Ministers 
of CPLP in Coimbra, Portugal.   
August An External Relations and 
National Defense Chamber of 
the Council of Government is 
established in order to present 
guidelines and articulate 
interministerial actions abroad.  
 
Brazil and Chile, in a joint 
statement, affirm that it is 
necessary “to update and 
revitalise” the UN system.734 
 
Brazil and other developing 
nations present a proposal at 
the WTO for agricultural talks 
in the Doha Round.  
 
September Brazil establishes international 
health cooperation with Burkina 
Faso.  
 
The President of the Socialist 
International, Antonio 
Guterres, visits Brazil.  
 
Brazil is instrumental in the 
establishment of the G20 at the 
WTO Cancun Ministerial 
                                                
734 Ministry of External Relations, 2006: 37.  
 331 
Conference. The Conference 
ends in failure.  
 
Brazil expresses regret over the 
military coup on Guinea-Bissau.  
 
Lula opens the 58th General 
Assembly, and Brazil makes a 
donation to the World Fund to 
Fight Hunger and Poverty.  
 
Brazil and its partners in the 
New Agenda Coalition make a 
statement regarding 
disarmament in New York.  
October Brazil requests the WTO DSM 
to establish a panel to examine 
the customs classification of 
salted chicken cuts by the EU.  
 
Brazil ratifies the Olivos 
Protocol for the Settlement of 
Disputes in MERCOSUL.  
 
Lula signs the ‘Buenos Aires 
Consensus’ with President 
Nestor Kirchner of Argentina. 
Brazil and Argentina send a 
joint commission to La Paz to 
follow the political crisis in 
Bolivia. 
 
Brazil is elected a 9th time as a 
non-permanent member of the 
UN Security Council for a two-
year mandate (2004-2005).  
 
International Socialist Congress 
opens in Sao Paulo.  
November President Lula conducts his first 
tour of Africa, visiting five 
countries: Sao Tome e Principe, 
Angola, Mozambique, Namibia 
and South Africa.  
 
December  Lula travels to the Middle East, 
visiting five countries: Syria, 
Lebanon, the United Arab 
Emirates, Egypt and Libya. The 
last visit by a Brazilian Head of 
State occurred in 1876.  
 
Brazil hosts a G20 Ministerial 
Meeting for the coordination of 
positions for the WTO’s Doha 
Round.  
 
Lula attends the 25th 
MERCOSUL Summit.  
 
Brazil sends humanitarian 
assistance to earthquake victims 
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 in Iran.  
 
January Lula visits India; the 
Preferential Trade Agreement 
between MERCOSUR and 
India is celebrated.  
 
Lula holds meetings in Geneva 
with Presidents Chirac of 
France and Lagos of Chile, 
along with Kofi Annan, to 
discuss initiatives to fight 
hunger and poverty.  
 
 
February Lula attends the 12th Summit of 
the G15. 
 
Brazil agrees to contribute to 
efforts for the stabilisation and 
reconstruction of Haiti after the 
ouster of President Jean-
Bertrand Aristide. 
March Brazil donates medicines to 
earthquake victims in Morocco.  
 
First meeting of IBSA joint 
trilateral commission in New 
Delhi.  
 
The Brazilian government 
condemns terrorist attacks in 
Madrid.  
 
The government reaffirms its 
commitment to the “one China 
policy” and expresses disquiet 
over a Taiwanese referendum 
regarding the acquisition of 
advanced weapons.  
 
Amorim visits London to 
discuss UN reform with foreign 
secretary, Jack Straw.  
 
Brazil condemns the 
assassination of Sheik Ahmed 
Yassin, spiritual leader of 
Hamas.  
2004 
April Brazil responds frostily to 
assertions that it is concealing 
its nuclear plans.  
 
Brazil’s electoral commission 
provides support to the 
government of Guinea-Bissau 
for its parliamentary elections.  
 
Brazil abstains on a resolution 
regarding the human rights 
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situation in Cuba in the UN 
Human Rights Commission.  
 
UN Security Council adopts 
resolution 1542 establishing the 
United Nations Stabilization 
Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).  
May Diplomatic representation is 
established in Ramallah, West 
Bank.  
 
Brazil condemns IDF activities 
in the Gaza Strip.  
 
Lula visits China with a 
business delegation and in 
Shanghai, proposes a “new 
geography of world trade”.735 
 
G20 countries make their joint 
proposal on agricultural market 
access.  
 
First Brazilian contingent 
participating in MINUSTAH is 
despatched.  
June 2: Brazilian troops depart for 
Haiti, as MINUSTAH is 
officially launched.  
 
Brazil hosts 11th UNCTAD 
General Conference in Sao 
Paulo.  
July Lula attends the 26th 
MERCOSUR Summit in Puerto 
Iguazú, Argentina.  
 
Brazil announces that it will 
participate in two 
environmental projects in 
Lebanon, at the request of the 
UN.  
 
Lula conducts his second tour 
of Africa, visiting Sao Tome e 
Principe, Gabon and Cape 
Verde.  
 
Brazil supports a UNSC 
resolution that demands an 
embargo on international arms 
trade to Darfur.  
August Lula visits Haiti and Brazilian 
troops serving in the UN 
mission there.  
 
September The Brazilian government 
expresses condemnation at the 
terrorist actions conducted in 
North Ossetia, Russia.  
                                                
735 MRE, 2006: 64.  
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Brazil is successful in its cotton 
dispute with the US in the 
WTO.  
 
Meeting of world leaders in 
New York to promote the 
Action against Hunger and 
Poverty. This is a joint initiative 
of Brazil, Chile, France, and 
Spain.  
 
Germany, India, Japan and 
Brazil establish the Group of 
Four (G4) in New York with 
the objective of promoting UN 
reform and their own candidacy 
as permanent members.  
 
Brazil opens an embassy in 
Addis Ababa.  
October On a visit to Sao Paulo, US 
Secretary of State Colin Powell 
states that Brazil is a “solid 
candidate” for the UNSC.  
 
Brazil seeks to promote its own 
Ambassador Luiz Corrêa for 
the position of WTO Director-
General.  
 
Brazil condemns the terrorist 
attacks in the Sinai Peninsula, 
Egypt.  
 
Brazil is victorious in the WTO 
DSM panel on EU export 
subsidies for sugar.  
 
Brazil despatches humanitarian 
aid to the governments of 
Grenada and Jamaica.  
 
Brazil is elected for a three-year 
mandate in the UN’s ECOSOC, 
from 2005-2007.  
November  
 
December   
 
2005 January Minister Amorim visits five 
African countries: Cape Verde, 
Guinae-Bissau, Senegal, Nigeria 
and Cameroon.  
 
Brazil sends humanitarian aid to 
Guyana following heavy rains.  
 
Lula attends the World Social 
Forum in Porto Alegre, hosting 
a conference titled “Global Call 
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for Action Against Poverty”.  
 
Lula attends the World 
Economic Forum in Davos, 
signing a co-financing 
programme for Haiti with the 
World Bank.  
February Brazil opens an embassy in 
Yaoundé, Cameroon.  
 
Brazil expresses regret at North 
Korea’s suspension of the six-
party talks, as well as the 
country’s announcement that it 
possess nuclear weapons.  
 
Lula visits Venezuela and signs 
a declaration with President 
Hugo Chavez for the 
implementation of the Brazil-
Venezuela Strategic Alliance.  
 
In an effort to enlarge Brazil’s 
relations with the Arab world, 
Amorim visits Jordan, Palestine, 
Syria, Saudi Arabia, Oman, 
Qatar, Kuwait, Tunisia and 
Algeria.  
March 1: Brazil assumes the pro-
tempore presidency of the 
UNSC.  
 
Second IBSA Joint Commission 
takes place in Cape Town.  
 
Brazil opens an embassy in 
Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania.  
 
G-4 countries welcome the UN 
Secretary-General’s Report “In 
Greater Freedom: Towards 
Security, Development and 
Human Rights”.  
April Brazil receives a delegation of 
the Caribbean Community 
regarding its programme for 
combatting AIDS.  
 
Lula conducts a third visit to 
Africa, stopping in Cameroon, 
Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau 
and Senegal. On Gorée Island, 
Senegal, the President asks the 
African people’s forgiveness for 
the suffering imposed by 
slavery.  
 
UNSC mission, headed by 
Brazil’s Permanent 
Representative to the UN, visits 
Haiti.  
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Brazil opens Consulates-
General in Beirut and Lagos.  
 
Brazil abstains from voting on 
Cuba’s human rights record in 
the UN Human Rights 
Commission.  
 
Brazil hosts the 16th Continetal 
Congress of the Inter-American 
Regional Organization of 
Workers.  
 
Brazil grants diplomatic asylum 
to the former President of 
Ecuador, Lucio Gutiérrez, who 
sought shelter in the Brazilian 
Embassy in Quito during that 
country’s political crisis.  
 
US Secretary of State, 
Condoleezza Rice, visits Brazil,. 
Both countries reaffirm their 
“commitment to a common 
vision that representative 
democracy and the State of Law 
are indispensable to building 
modern societies”.  
May Brazil agrees a Protocol of 
Understanding regarding credits 
grants for Angola, amounting to 
$580 million.  
 
Honduran president, Ricardo 
Maduro, visits Brazil and 
affirms his government’s 
interest in “receiving technical 
cooperation for the production 
and use of biofuels”. 
 
Brazil hosts the first South 
American and Arab Countries 
Summit (SAAC). A Framework 
Agreement on Economic 
Cooperation between Mercosul 
and the Gulf Cooperation 
Council is signed.  
 
June 35th meeting of the General 
Assembly of the OAS in Fort 
Lauderdale, USA.  
 
Marco Aurelio Garcia arrives in 
Bolivia on an observation 
mission, in light of the political 
crisis in that country, and calls 
by the opposition for 
nationalisation of natural gas 
and oil reserves.  
 
Brazil joins a mission of 
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observers from the CPLP in the 
presidential elections of 
Guinea-Bissau.  
 
Minister Amorim participates in 
the International Conference on 
Iraq in Brussels.  
 
Brazil donates a batch of 3.7 
million vaccines against yellow 
fever to Peru.  
July Fifteen years of Foro do São 
Paulo are celebrated in São 
Paulo.  
 
Lula participates in the G8 
extended dialogue in 
Gleneagles, Scotland, joined by 
the leaders of South Africa, 
China, India and Mexico. 
 
Brazilian government expresses 
its “strongest condemnation” of 
the terrorist attacks in London.  
 
G4 foreign ministers meet in 
London, joined by the Foreign 
Minister of Ghana, and approve 
a consensus on the need to 
enlarge the UNSC.  
 
Amorim attends G20 
Ministerial Meeting regarding 
the WTO in Dalian, China. 
 
French-Brazilian declaration is 
issued regarding innovative 
financing mechanisms for 
development.  
August Brazil praises the decision of 
the Israeli government to 
persist with its disengagement 
plan in the Gaza Strip.  
 
September IBSA presidents meet in New 
York City.  
 
During the UN’s 60th 
anniversary celebrations, Lula 
participates in the High Level 
Debate on Development 
Financing, as well as special 
meetings of the UNSC and the 
UNGA regarding the 
Millennium Goals.  
 
Minister Amorim makes the 
opening statement at the 60th 
UNGA general debate.  
 
Minister Amorim visits Haiti 
for consultations with Haitian 
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and MINUSTAH authorities.  
 
Brazil hosts the first meeting of 
Heads of State of the South 
American Community of 
Nations.  
October Lula travels to Russia for 
meetings with President Putin. 
 
Brazil sends food and medicine 
to the populations of El 
Salvador and Guatemala, as well 
as Pakistan.  
November US President George W. Bush 
conducts a working visit to 
Brazil.  
 
A Brazilian Permanent Mission 
to the IAEA is established.  
 
Brazilian embassies open in 
Khartoum and Malabo.  
 
Amorim participates in talks 
about the WTO in Geneva and 
Arusha, with the African Union.  
 
December  Brazil grants 500 voting booths 
on loan to electoral authorities 
in Dominican Republic for use 
in elections there.  
 
Brazilian embassies open in 
Cotonou, Benin and Nassau, 
Bahamas.  
 
Lula participates in the 29th 
MERCOSUL summit in 
Montevideo. The political 
decision to promote the 
accession of Venezuela to the 
bloc is made.  
 
Minister Amorim leads the 
Brazilian delegation to the VI 
Ministerial Conference of the 
WTO in Hong Kong. For the 
first time, a ministerial meeting 
is held among all of the groups 
of developing nations in the 
WTO: G20, G33, ACP 
countries, the African group, 
small economies and less 
developed nations.  
 
Brazil receives an award from 
the UNDP, “Special 
Recognition for South-South 
Solidarity” for its contributions 
to Asian countries affected by 
the tsunami at the end of 2004.  
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 Brazilian embassies open in 
Lomé, Togo and Colombo, Sri 
Lanka.  
 
 
January Brazilian trade balance figures 
are issued, revealing that almost 
54% of Brazilian sales are to 
developing countries. 
 
13: President-elect of Bolivia, 
Evo Morales, visits Brazil. Lula 
attends his inauguration later in 
the month. 
 
18: Brazilian Mission to the 
CPLP is established in Lisbon.  
 
25: Brazil sends observers to 
Palestine parliamentary 
elections.  
 
31: Minister Amorim attends 
the International Conference on 
Afghanistan in London.  
February 8-12: Lula conducts a fourth 
visit to Africa, making stops in 
Algeria, Benin, Botswana and 
South Africa. In Pretoria, Lula 
attends the Summit of 
Progressive Governance.  
 
Brazil recognises the victory of 
René Préval in Haiti’s 
Presidential elections.  
 
Minister Amorim attends the 
Ministerial Conference in Paris 
on Innovative Sources of 
Financing and Development, an 
event linked to the Action 
Against Hunger and Poverty.   
March 7-10: Brazil hosts International 
Conference on Agrarian 
Reform and Development of 
the FAO.  
 
28-31: The 27th Extraordinary 
Session of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights is held 
in Brasília.  
 
Brazilian government sends 14 
tons of food to Ecuador, 
following floods in that country. 
 
Lula conducts a state visit to 
Great Britain.  
2006 
April Brazil signs a Memorandum of 
Understanding with Ghana for 
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the installation of 
EMPBRAPA’s Regional Office 
in Africa in Accra.  
May 3: Lula defends Bolivia’s 
sovereignty, following that 
country’s nationalisation of its 
hydrocarbon sector, affecting 
Petrobrás investments.  
 
Brazilian embassies open in 
Lusaka, Zambia and Conakry, 
Guinea.  
 
Brazil is elected to the UN’s 
Human Rights Council for a 
two-year period, with 165 votes 
out of 191.  
 
Technical negotiations for 
Venezuela’s membership of 
MERCOUR are completed in 
Buenos Aires. 
 
Brazil is elected to join the UN 
Peacebuilding Commission. 
 
Brazil hosts High Level Meeting 
on Haiti.  
 
 
June France and Britain re-iterate 
their support for Brazil’s 
candidacy for permanent 
membership of the UNSC.  
 
Brazil recognises the 
independence of Montenegro.  
 
Brazilian embassy opens in 
Gaborone, Botswana.  
 
30: Diplomatic mission of 
solidarity travels to Dili, Timor 
Leste. 
 
 
July Brazil condemns missile tests by 
North Korea.  
 
Brazil hosts the Second 
Conference of Intellectuals 
from Africa and the Diaspora.  
 
Brazil condemns Israel’s actions 
in South Lebanon against 
Hezbollah.  
 
Lula attends G-8 Summit in St 
Petersburg, as part of its 
broader dialogue with 
developing countries.  
 
 341 
Lula attends 30th MERCOSUR 
Summit in Argentina, the first 
attended by Venezuela as a full 
member.  
 
International Conference of 
Donors for Haiti is held in 
Port-au-Prince. 
August Two-and-a-half tons of 
medicines are delivered to 
Lebanon by way of 
humanitarian donation.  
 
Brazil offers $500,000 in aid to 
Lebanon, and a further 
$500,000 to the Palestinian 
Occupied Territories.  
 
High Level Meeting of the G20 
is held in Rio, with the aim of 
relaunching the WTO Doha 
Round of talks.  
 
Prime Minister Manmohan 
Singh visits Brazil, the first such 
visit by an Indian Chief of 
Government in 38 years. This is 
followed by the first IBSA 
Summit, held in Brasília.  
 
Brazil delivers humanitarian aid 
to victims of a volcanic 
eruption in Ecuador.  
 
Minister Amorim attends the 
NAM Summit in Cuba. 
 
Lula addresses the 61st General 
Assembly of the UN.  
 
Implementation of the 
International Central Office for 
the Purchase of Drugs to Treat 
AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis 
(UNITAID). The initiative is 
sponsored by Brazil, Chile, 
France, Norway, and the United 
Kingdom.  
September Brazil condemns nuclear test 
carried out by North Korea.  
 
The first IBSA Summit meeting 
is held in Brasilia.  
 
 
 
 
October A Multidisciplinary Brazilian 
Mission is dispatched to 
Lebanon.  
 
Debts of Bolivia, Guyana, Haiti, 
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Honduras and Nicaragua with 
the Inter-American 
Development Bank are 
cancelled due to an initiative 
supported by Brazil.  
 
November First Africa-South America 
Summit is held in Abuja, 
Nigeria. The event approves an 
action plan to enhance South-
South cooperation. 
 
December  President Rafael Correa of 
Ecuador visits Brazil on his first 
international visit as state 
president.  
 
Brazil condemns the decision to 
carry out the death sentence on 
Saddam Hussein.  
 
January Lula attends the World 
Economic Forum in Davos, 
Switzerland, offering 
concessions for the success of 
the Doha Development Round.  
February  
March US President George Bush 
attends a bilateral meeting with 
Lula in São Paulo.  
April Relations between Lula and 
Chavez are slightly strained 
over Brazil’s ethanol 
agreements with the United 
States. Lula rejects criticism that 
ethanol production, promoted 
by Brazil, would raise regional 
food prices.  
 
Lula conducts a state visit to the 
US.  
May Pope Benedict conducts a five-
day visit to Brazil, meeting with 
Lula twice. 
 
Lula authorises the Brazilian 
government to buy a generic 
version of an AIDS drug 
produced by Merck 
Phamaceuticals, bypassing its 
patent on the product. Lula 
declared the provision of the 
medication to be “in the public 
interest”.  
2007 
June MERCOSUL Summit held in 
Asunción, Paraguay.  
 
Lula conducts a three-day visit 
to India, agreeing with Indian 
officials on the goal of 
quadrupling bilateral trade by 
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2010 to $10 billion per year. 
The leaderships of both 
countries affirm their similar 
stances on global trade and the 
environment.  
July  
August  
September Lula defends Iran’s nuclear 
rights following a speech at the 
UN General Assembly.  
October Lula conducts a four-state tour 
of Africa, stopping in Burkina 
Faso, Congo, Angola and South 
Africa. He urges Africa to join 
the “biofuel revolution”.736 
November 8: Petrobrás announces a find 
of between 5 billion and 8 
billion barrels of light oil and 
gas at the Tupi oil field, 155 
miles offshore of Brazil. 
 
December  Lula offers assistance to 
Colombia in negotiating the 
release of hostages held by rebel 
militants.  
 
Lula visits Bolivia, promising 
new investments, ostensibly in a 
bid to undercut the influence of 
Hugo Chavez in the country, 
and protect Brazil’s gas supply.  
 
Bank of the South is launched 
in Buenos Aires by six Latin 
American presidents, including 
Lula.  
 
January  
February  
March  
April  
May Lula conducts a visit to Haiti, 
and pledges to seek broader 
support for reconstruction 
efforts in that country. 
June  
July  
August  
September  
2008 
October Brazilian engineering firm 
Odebrecht is expelled from 
Ecuador, along with Furnas, a 
Brazilian energy company. 
Brazil recalls its ambassador 
from Quito.  
 
                                                
736 Reuters. 2007. “Brazil urges Africa to join “biofuel revolution”. 16 October, 2007. 
Accessed online at: http://uk.reuters.com/article/2007/10/16/environment-brazil-africa-
dc-idUKL1638910920071016 on 14 June. 2011.  
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Lula requests Minister Amorim 
to mediate in the dispute 
between ZANU-PF and MDC 
over the distribution of 
government posts.737 
November Brazil tightens its defence 
policy on the border with 
Paraguay, following attacks 
against Brazilian farmers. 
Brazil’s new stand creates 
tensions with Paraguay.  
 
Brazil signs a military and 
aerospace industry co-operation 
agreement with Russia, whose 
President Medvedev is visiting 
the country.  
 
Lula attends a G20 ministerial 
meeting in Sao Paulo, Brazil. 
Leaders pledge to make 
international financial 
institutons more democratic.  
 
Lula visits Cuba 
 
December  The Brazilian government 
unveils a new defense strategy.  
 
Brazil signs a USD11 billion 
dollar deal with France to 
purchase 50 military helicopters 
and five submarines, and one 
nuclear-powered vessel.  
 
President Raul Castro of Cuba 
visits Brazil, his first trip abroad 
as Cuba’s head of state. Lula 
urges the US to lift its trade 
embargo on the country. 
 
16-17: Brazil hosts the Summit 
of Latin American and the 
Caribbean on Integration and 
Development.  
 
2009 January Brazil opens embassies in Saint 
George (Grenada), Saint Johns 
(Antigua and Barbuda), Muscat 
(Oman), Pyongyang (North 
Korea), Baku (Azerbaijan) and 
Dhaka (Bangladesh).  
 
Humanitarian assistance 
provided to Gaza, an aircraft 
carrying 6-8 tons of medicines 
and food.  
                                                                                                                               
737 Zimbabwe Independent. 2008. “Brazil joins the fray”, 20 October, 2008. Accessed 
online at: http://www.theindependent.co.zw/local/21394-brazil-joins-the-fray.html on 14 
June, 2011.  
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Assistance provided to Cuba, 
Haiti and Honduras following 
natural disasters. Food aid also 
provided to Zambia.  
February Technical and medical 
assistance despatched to Bolivia 
in its battle against dengue 
fever.  
March Hosting UK Prime Minister, 
Gordon Brown, Lula blames 
wealthy countries for the global 
financial crisis, and appeals for 
the resumption of the Doha 
trade talks.  
April  
May Donation of shelter materials to 
assist flood victims in Namibia.  
June First BRIC Summit takes place 
in Ykaterinburg, Russia, 
attended by the Heads of State 
of the BRIC countries.  
July  
August  
September Ousted Honduras President 
Manuel Zelaya takes refuge in 
the Brazilian Embassy in 
Tegucigalpa.  
 
Brazil declines membership of 
OPEC, citing Brazil’s 
reluctance to become a crude 
oil exporter, favouring instead 
the export of refined products.  
 
Lula attends the G20 Summit in 
Pittsburgh, USA.  
October Rio de Janeiro wins the bid to 
host the 2016 Summer 
Olympics. 
 
Lula attends the Second Africa-
South America Summit in 
Venezuela.   
November Iranian President Mahmoud 
Ahmedinajad conducts a state 
visit to Brazil.  
December   
 
January  
February 24: Lula conducts his last 
official trip to Cuba, his third in 
two years, and meets with 
former President Fidel Castro.  
2010 
March Brazil rebuffs US requests to 
back UN sanctions against Iran.  
 
Lula conducts a tour of the 
Middle East, including Israel 
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and the Palestinian territories.  
April  
May 18: Brazilian President Lula da 
Silva and Turkish President 
Tayyip Erdogan broker a 
nuclear fuel swap deal with 
Iran. 
 
Lula visits Russia, appealing to 
President Medvedev to defend 
reform of the UN Security 
Council.  
June Lula criticises the West for 
losing an “historic opportunity” 
to negotiate with Iran on its 
nuclear programme, following 
the imposition of new 
sanctions.  
July Brazil offers asylum to Iranian 
woman sentenced to death by 
stoning.  
 
Lula conducts his final tour of 
Africa, visiting Equatorial 
Guinea, Kenya, Tanzania, 
Zambia, and the World Cup in 
South Africa.  
 
Lula misses a G20 meeting in 
order to oversee flood relief 
efforts in Brazil’s north-east.  
August In spite of his imminent 
departure from office, Lula is 
seen to be underplaying his 
hand in reining in Chavez 
following tensions between 
Venezuela and Colombia.738 
September  
October  
November  
 
December  Lula defends Wikileaks and 
offers his solidarity with 
Wikileaks founder Julian 
Assange.739 
 
                                                
738 Bloomberg. 2010. “Lula avoids using Brazil’s Backyard Clout to confront Chavez”, 
August 5, 2010. Accessed online at: http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-08-
05/lula-avoids-using-brazil-s-backyard-clout-to-confront-chavez.html on 12 June, 2011.  
739 Bloomberg. 2010. “Lula defends Wikileaks, Offers Brazil’s “Solidarity””, 9 December, 
2010. Accessed online at: http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-12-09/lula-
defends-wikileaks-offers-brazil-s-solidarity-.html on 12 June, 2011.  
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